[tor-commits] [Git][tpo/applications/tor-browser][tor-browser-102.8.0esr-12.5-1] 2 commits: fixup! Firefox preference overrides.

[Richard Pospesel (@richard)]

Richard Pospesel pushed to branch tor-browser-102.8.0esr-12.5-1 at The Tor Project / Applications / Tor Browser


Commits:
90df17da by Richard Pospesel at 2023-02-15T13:37:32+00:00
fixup! Firefox preference overrides.

bug 41627: Enable network.http.referer.hideOnionSource in base-browser

- - - - -
a697a2c0 by Richard Pospesel at 2023-02-15T13:38:06+00:00
fixup! Bug 40562: Added Tor Browser preferences to 000-tor-browser.js

bug 41627: Enable network.http.referer.hideOnionSource in base-browser

- - - - -


2 changed files:

- browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
- browser/app/profile/001-base-profile.js


Changes:

=====================================
browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js
=====================================
@@ -38,9 +38,6 @@ pref("dom.securecontext.allowlist_onions", true);
 // Disable HTTPS-Only mode for .onion domains (tor-browser#19850)
 pref("dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion", false);
 
-// tor-browser#22320: Hide referer when comming from a .onion address
-pref("network.http.referer.hideOnionSource", true);
-
 // Bug 40423/41137: Disable http/3
 // We should re-enable it as soon as Tor gets UDP support
 pref("network.http.http3.enabled", false);


=====================================
browser/app/profile/001-base-profile.js
=====================================
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ pref("browser.pagethumbnails.capturing_disabled", true);
 pref("dom.security.https_only_mode", true);
 pref("dom.security.https_only_mode_pbm", true);
 
+// tor-browser#22320: Hide referer when comming from a .onion address
+// We enable this here (rather than in Tor Browser) in case users of other
+// base-browser derived browsers configure it to use a system Tor daemon
+// to visit onion services.
+pref("network.http.referer.hideOnionSource", true);
+
 // Require Safe Negotiation ( https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/issues/27719 )
 // Blocks connections to servers that don't support RFC 5746 [2] as they're potentially vulnerable to a
 // MiTM attack [3]. A server without RFC 5746 can be safe from the attack if it disables renegotiations



View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/compare/33b90e5e1ea36001dc33f97c91bfaba99ca982b1...a697a2c0dfb46591f6d497ae7178be3a55d55fc7

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View it on GitLab: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser/-/compare/33b90e5e1ea36001dc33f97c91bfaba99ca982b1...a697a2c0dfb46591f6d497ae7178be3a55d55fc7
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