[tor-commits] [tor-browser] 68/72: Bug 23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion
gitolite role
git at cupani.torproject.org
Fri Jul 8 22:29:53 UTC 2022
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richard pushed a commit to branch tor-browser-91.11.0esr-11.5-1
in repository tor-browser.
commit 9265eeaa6f5df772828660db9d084a74e5ac85f8
Author: Richard Pospesel <richard at torproject.org>
AuthorDate: Fri Jun 8 13:38:40 2018 -0700
Bug 23247: Communicating security expectations for .onion
Encrypting pages hosted on Onion Services with SSL/TLS is redundant
(in terms of hiding content) as all traffic within the Tor network is
already fully encrypted. Therefore, serving HTTP pages from an Onion
Service is more or less fine.
Prior to this patch, Tor Browser would mostly treat pages delivered
via Onion Services as well as pages delivered in the ordinary fashion
over the internet in the same way. This created some inconsistencies
in behaviour and misinformation presented to the user relating to the
security of pages delivered via Onion Services:
- HTTP Onion Service pages did not have any 'lock' icon indicating
the site was secure
- HTTP Onion Service pages would be marked as unencrypted in the Page
Info screen
- Mixed-mode content restrictions did not apply to HTTP Onion Service
pages embedding Non-Onion HTTP content
This patch fixes the above issues, and also adds several new 'Onion'
icons to the mix to indicate all of the various permutations of Onion
Services hosted HTTP or HTTPS pages with HTTP or HTTPS content.
Strings for Onion Service Page Info page are pulled from Torbutton's
localization strings.
---
browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js | 39 ++++++++-----
browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js | 64 ++++++++++++++++++----
.../shared/identity-block/identity-block.inc.css | 19 +++++++
dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp | 19 +++++++
dom/base/nsContentUtils.h | 5 ++
dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp | 3 +-
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp | 4 +-
dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp | 6 +-
dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp | 16 +++++-
.../modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm | 4 ++
security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp | 12 ++++
11 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js b/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
index acbcc79fb21ea..6682ae8b096fe 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/browser-siteIdentity.js
@@ -142,6 +142,10 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
);
},
+ get _uriIsOnionHost() {
+ return this._uriHasHost ? this._uri.host.toLowerCase().endsWith(".onion") : false;
+ },
+
get _isAboutNetErrorPage() {
return (
gBrowser.selectedBrowser.documentURI &&
@@ -745,9 +749,9 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
get pointerlockFsWarningClassName() {
// Note that the fullscreen warning does not handle _isSecureInternalUI.
if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection) {
- return "verifiedDomain";
+ return this._uriIsOnionHost ? "onionVerifiedDomain" : "verifiedDomain";
}
- return "unknownIdentity";
+ return this._uriIsOnionHost ? "onionUnknownIdentity" : "unknownIdentity";
},
/**
@@ -755,6 +759,10 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
* built-in (returns false) or imported (returns true).
*/
_hasCustomRoot() {
+ if (!this._secInfo) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
let issuerCert = null;
issuerCert = this._secInfo.succeededCertChain[
this._secInfo.succeededCertChain.length - 1
@@ -797,11 +805,13 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
"identity.extension.label",
[extensionName]
);
- } else if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection) {
+ } else if (this._uriHasHost && this._isSecureConnection && this._secInfo) {
// This is a secure connection.
- this._identityBox.className = "verifiedDomain";
+ // _isSecureConnection implicitly includes onion services, which may not have an SSL certificate
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.className = uriIsOnionHost ? "onionVerifiedDomain" : "verifiedDomain";
if (this._isMixedActiveContentBlocked) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedActiveBlocked");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedActiveBlocked" : "mixedActiveBlocked");
}
if (!this._isCertUserOverridden) {
// It's a normal cert, verifier is the CA Org.
@@ -812,17 +822,17 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
}
} else if (this._isBrokenConnection) {
// This is a secure connection, but something is wrong.
- this._identityBox.className = "unknownIdentity";
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.className = uriIsOnionHost ? "onionUnknownIdentity" : "unknownIdentity";
if (this._isMixedActiveContentLoaded) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedActiveContent");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedActiveContent" : "mixedActiveContent");
} else if (this._isMixedActiveContentBlocked) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add(
- "mixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked"
- );
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked" : "mixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked");
} else if (this._isMixedPassiveContentLoaded) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("mixedDisplayContent");
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(uriIsOnionHost ? "onionMixedDisplayContent" : "mixedDisplayContent");
} else {
+ // TODO: ignore weak https cipher for onionsites?
this._identityBox.classList.add("weakCipher");
}
} else if (this._isAboutCertErrorPage) {
@@ -835,8 +845,8 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
// Network errors and blocked pages get a more neutral icon
this._identityBox.className = "unknownIdentity";
} else if (this._isPotentiallyTrustworthy) {
- // This is a local resource (and shouldn't be marked insecure).
- this._identityBox.className = "localResource";
+ // This is a local resource or an onion site (and shouldn't be marked insecure).
+ this._identityBox.className = this._uriIsOnionHost ? "onionUnknownIdentity" : "localResource";
} else {
// This is an insecure connection.
let warnOnInsecure =
@@ -860,7 +870,8 @@ var gIdentityHandler = {
}
if (this._isCertUserOverridden) {
- this._identityBox.classList.add("certUserOverridden");
+ const uriIsOnionHost = this._uriIsOnionHost;
+ this._identityBox.classList.add(uriIsOnionHost ? "onionCertUserOverridden" : "certUserOverridden");
// Cert is trusted because of a security exception, verifier is a special string.
tooltip = gNavigatorBundle.getString(
"identity.identified.verified_by_you"
diff --git a/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js b/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
index 1222c8b0ec35d..8d10c8df814c4 100644
--- a/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
+++ b/browser/base/content/pageinfo/security.js
@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ ChromeUtils.defineModuleGetter(
"PluralForm",
"resource://gre/modules/PluralForm.jsm"
);
+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyGetter(
+ this,
+ "gTorButtonBundle",
+ function() {
+ return Services.strings.createBundle("chrome://torbutton/locale/torbutton.properties");
+ }
+);
var security = {
async init(uri, windowInfo) {
@@ -60,6 +67,11 @@ var security = {
(Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT |
Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT);
var isEV = ui.state & Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_IDENTITY_EV_TOPLEVEL;
+ var isOnion = false;
+ const hostName = this.windowInfo.hostName;
+ if (hostName && hostName.endsWith(".onion")) {
+ isOnion = true;
+ }
let retval = {
cAName: "",
@@ -69,6 +81,7 @@ var security = {
isBroken,
isMixed,
isEV,
+ isOnion,
cert: null,
certificateTransparency: null,
};
@@ -107,6 +120,7 @@ var security = {
isBroken,
isMixed,
isEV,
+ isOnion,
cert,
certChain: certChainArray,
certificateTransparency: undefined,
@@ -348,22 +362,50 @@ async function securityOnLoad(uri, windowInfo) {
}
msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None2");
} else if (info.encryptionStrength > 0) {
- hdr = pkiBundle.getFormattedString(
- "pageInfo_EncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
- [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
- );
+ if (!info.isOnion) {
+ hdr = pkiBundle.getFormattedString(
+ "pageInfo_EncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
+ [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
+ );
+ } else {
+ try {
+ hdr = gTorButtonBundle.formatStringFromName(
+ "pageInfo_OnionEncryptionWithBitsAndProtocol",
+ [info.encryptionAlgorithm, info.encryptionStrength + "", info.version]
+ );
+ } catch(err) {
+ hdr = "Connection Encrypted (Onion Service, "
+ + info.encryptionAlgorithm
+ + ", "
+ + info.encryptionStrength
+ + " bit keys, "
+ + info.version
+ + ")";
+ }
+ }
msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted1");
msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted2");
} else {
- hdr = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_NoEncryption");
- if (windowInfo.hostName != null) {
- msg1 = pkiBundle.getFormattedString("pageInfo_Privacy_None1", [
- windowInfo.hostName,
- ]);
+ if (!info.isOnion) {
+ hdr = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_NoEncryption");
+ if (windowInfo.hostName != null) {
+ msg1 = pkiBundle.getFormattedString("pageInfo_Privacy_None1", [
+ windowInfo.hostName,
+ ]);
+ } else {
+ msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None4");
+ }
+ msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None2");
} else {
- msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None4");
+ try {
+ hdr = gTorButtonBundle.GetStringFromName("pageInfo_OnionEncryption");
+ } catch (err) {
+ hdr = "Connection Encrypted (Onion Service)";
+ }
+
+ msg1 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted1");
+ msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_Encrypted2");
}
- msg2 = pkiBundle.getString("pageInfo_Privacy_None2");
}
setText("security-technical-shortform", hdr);
setText("security-technical-longform1", msg1);
diff --git a/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.inc.css b/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.inc.css
index a01e7d705cd72..68ed0beed6842 100644
--- a/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.inc.css
+++ b/browser/themes/shared/identity-block/identity-block.inc.css
@@ -203,6 +203,25 @@
list-style-image: url(chrome://global/skin/icons/security-broken.svg);
}
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionUnknownIdentity #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionVerifiedDomain #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedActiveBlocked #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedDisplayContent #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedDisplayContentLoadedActiveBlocked #identity-icon,
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionCertUserOverridden #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion-warning.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
+#identity-box[pageproxystate="valid"].onionMixedActiveContent #identity-icon {
+ list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/onion-slash.svg);
+ visibility: visible;
+}
+
#permissions-granted-icon {
list-style-image: url(chrome://browser/skin/permissions.svg);
}
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
index fac49bab17f23..6dd69d1d81a8a 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.cpp
@@ -9325,6 +9325,25 @@ bool nsContentUtils::ComputeIsSecureContext(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
return principal->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy();
}
+/* static */ bool nsContentUtils::DocumentHasOnionURI(Document* aDocument) {
+ if (!aDocument) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsIURI* uri = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+ if (!uri) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ nsAutoCString host;
+ if (NS_SUCCEEDED(uri->GetHost(host))) {
+ bool hasOnionURI = StringEndsWith(host, ".onion"_ns);
+ return hasOnionURI;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/* static */
void nsContentUtils::TryToUpgradeElement(Element* aElement) {
NodeInfo* nodeInfo = aElement->NodeInfo();
diff --git a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
index baa75be5b5702..bb5c84886af9a 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
+++ b/dom/base/nsContentUtils.h
@@ -2999,6 +2999,11 @@ class nsContentUtils {
*/
static bool HttpsStateIsModern(Document* aDocument);
+ /**
+ * Returns true of the document's URI is a .onion
+ */
+ static bool DocumentHasOnionURI(Document* aDocument);
+
/**
* Returns true if the channel is for top-level window and is over secure
* context.
diff --git a/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp b/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
index aab4a37e78a8f..e981573e9822b 100644
--- a/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
+++ b/dom/base/nsGlobalWindowOuter.cpp
@@ -1880,7 +1880,8 @@ bool nsGlobalWindowOuter::ComputeIsSecureContext(Document* aDocument,
return false;
}
- if (nsContentUtils::HttpsStateIsModern(aDocument)) {
+ if (nsContentUtils::HttpsStateIsModern(aDocument) ||
+ nsContentUtils::DocumentHasOnionURI(aDocument)) {
return true;
}
diff --git a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
index 8a3b49edd4d70..9975136e8e18a 100644
--- a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
+++ b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalActor.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include "mozilla/net/CookieJarSettings.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalChild.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h"
#include "nsNetUtil.h"
@@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ WindowGlobalInit WindowGlobalActor::WindowInitializer(
// Init Mixed Content Fields
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(doc->GetDocumentURI());
- fields.mIsSecure = innerDocURI && innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https");
+ fields.mIsSecure = innerDocURI && (innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI));
nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo;
if (nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = doc->GetChannel()) {
diff --git a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
index 84c060c415341..73ac6a0cf96d2 100644
--- a/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
+++ b/dom/ipc/WindowGlobalChild.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,8 @@
# include "GeckoProfiler.h"
#endif
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+
using namespace mozilla::ipc;
using namespace mozilla::dom::ipc;
@@ -234,7 +236,9 @@ void WindowGlobalChild::OnNewDocument(Document* aDocument) {
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI =
NS_GetInnermostURI(aDocument->GetDocumentURI());
if (innerDocURI) {
- txn.SetIsSecure(innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https"));
+ txn.SetIsSecure(
+ innerDocURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI));
}
MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(mDocumentPrincipal->GetIsLocalIpAddress() ==
diff --git a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
index 01c7877e020d3..dab3f19bad409 100644
--- a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
+++ b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
@@ -634,8 +634,8 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
return NS_OK;
}
- // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content
- // restrictions do not apply.
+ // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS or .onion page then mixed
+ // content restrictions do not apply.
nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerRequestingLocation =
NS_GetInnermostURI(requestingLocation);
if (!innerRequestingLocation) {
@@ -650,6 +650,17 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
bool parentIsHttps = innerRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("https");
if (!parentIsHttps) {
+ bool parentIsOnion = IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerRequestingLocation);
+ if (!parentIsOnion) {
+ *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+ return NS_OK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
+ // .onion URLs are encrypted and authenticated. Don't treat them as mixed
+ // content if potentially trustworthy (i.e. whitelisted).
+ if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
(" -> decision: Request will be allowed because the requesting "
@@ -676,7 +687,6 @@ nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
return NS_OK;
}
- bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(innerContentLocation)) {
*aDecision = ACCEPT;
return NS_OK;
diff --git a/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm b/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
index 17069dbe657f7..c1346b1858cf1 100644
--- a/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
+++ b/mobile/android/modules/geckoview/GeckoViewProgress.jsm
@@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ var IdentityHandler = {
result.host = uri.host;
}
+ if (!aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
const cert = aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo.serverCert;
result.certificate = aBrowser.securityUI.secInfo.serverCert.getBase64DERString();
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
index b4de1a331ffcf..f1ce395828547 100644
--- a/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsSecureBrowserUI.cpp
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
#include "nsContentUtils.h"
#include "nsIChannel.h"
#include "nsDocShell.h"
@@ -85,6 +86,17 @@ void nsSecureBrowserUI::RecomputeSecurityFlags() {
}
}
}
+
+ // any protocol routed over tor is secure
+ if (!(mState & nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE)) {
+ nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerDocURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(win->GetDocumentURI());
+ if (innerDocURI &&
+ nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(innerDocURI)) {
+ MOZ_LOG(gSecureBrowserUILog, LogLevel::Debug, (" is onion"));
+ mState = (mState & ~nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_INSECURE) |
+ nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
+ }
+ }
}
// Add upgraded-state flags when request has been
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