[tor-commits] [community/master] Update contents.lr mentioning it is an proposal and adding sources as links

[gus at torproject.org]

commit 659758b7e72664f2a6f7188fb4b861bb0abd81b9
Author: nyxnor <nyxnor at protonmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jun 25 14:23:03 2021 +0000

    Update contents.lr mentioning it is an proposal and adding sources as links
---
 content/onion-services/advanced/https/contents.lr | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/content/onion-services/advanced/https/contents.lr b/content/onion-services/advanced/https/contents.lr
index 8e68ee3..675ee83 100644
--- a/content/onion-services/advanced/https/contents.lr
+++ b/content/onion-services/advanced/https/contents.lr
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ Alternatively, websites can provide other ways to verify their onion address usi
 While there is extensive criticism regarding HTTPS and the CA trust model, the information security community has taught users to look for HTTPS when visiting a website as a synonym of secure connection and avoid HTTP connections.
 Tor Developers and UX team worked together to bring a new user experience for Tor Browser users, so when a user visits an onion site using HTTP [Tor Browser doesn't display a warning or error message](https://support.torproject.org/onionservices/onionservices-5/).
 
-3. One of the risks of using a certificate issued by a CA is that .onion names might unintentionally get leaked due to Certificate Transparency if the onion service owners use HTTPS for their .onions. If you still want to use HTTPS, you can avoid this leakage by using a self-created https cert (where you can make your own https cert chain using your onion key to sign it, and Tor Browser knows how to verify a self-created chain like that), because not only do you not need to involve a third-party in making it, you don't need to reveal to a third-party that it exists.
+3. One of the risks of using a certificate issued by a CA is that .onion names might unintentionally get [leaked](https://crt.sh/?q=.onion) due to [Certificate Transparency](https://certificate.transparency.dev/) if the onion service owners use HTTPS for their .onions. If you still want to use HTTPS, there is an [open proposal](https://github.com/alecmuffett/onion-dv-certificate-proposal/blob/master/text/draft-muffett-same-origin-onion-certificates.txt) to allow Tor Browser to verify self-created https cert (where you can make your own https cert chain using your onion key to sign it, and Tor Browser knows how to verify a self-created chain like that), because not only do you not need to involve a third-party in making it, you don't need to reveal to a third-party that it exists.
 
 4. Some websites have a complex setup and are serving HTTP and HTTPS content.
 In that case, just using onion services over HTTP could leak [secure cookies](https://github.com/alecmuffett/eotk/blob/master/docs.d/security-advisories.d/001-torbrowser.md).