[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.4.4] Merge branch 'ticket40237_043_01' into ticket40237_044_01

dgoulet at torproject.org dgoulet at torproject.org
Thu Jan 28 17:15:36 UTC 2021


commit b3652f2104c880bf626cb4e97e6088bca5a1571f
Merge: 5a822b462a 0485c7ddba
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
Date:   Tue Jan 12 10:54:31 2021 -0500

    Merge branch 'ticket40237_043_01' into ticket40237_044_01

 changes/ticket40237                          |  5 +++
 src/core/mainloop/mainloop.c                 |  3 +-
 src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c                    |  5 ++-
 src/feature/hs/hs_client.c                   |  8 +++--
 src/feature/hs/hs_common.c                   | 12 ++++++--
 src/feature/hs/hs_service.c                  |  9 ++++--
 src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c | 26 ++++++++++------
 src/feature/nodelist/nodelist.c              |  2 +-
 src/test/test_hs_cache.c                     | 19 ++++++------
 src/test/test_hs_client.c                    | 46 +++++++++++++++-------------
 src/test/test_hs_common.c                    | 36 ++++++++++++++--------
 src/test/test_hs_service.c                   | 40 ++++++++++++------------
 src/test/test_shared_random.c                | 22 ++++++++++---
 13 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)

diff --cc src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index a42879a48f,54bc572d11..c29f39c6b4
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@@ -3188,10 -3085,8 +3190,11 @@@ should_service_upload_descriptor(const 
    }
  
    /* Don't upload desc if we don't have a live consensus */
-   if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now)) {
-     msg = tor_strdup("No live consensus");
+   if (!networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(now,
+                                             usable_consensus_flavor())) {
++    msg = tor_strdup("No reasonably live consensus");
 +    log_cant_upload_desc(service, desc, msg,
 +                         LOG_DESC_UPLOAD_REASON_NO_LIVE_CONSENSUS);
      goto cannot;
    }
  
diff --cc src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c
index c2ea5afe32,b4b2f2c9d3..4e8a2942fc
--- a/src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c
@@@ -11,8 -11,8 +11,9 @@@
  #include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
  
  #include "app/config/config.h"
 -#include "feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h"
 +#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
 +#include "feature/dirauth/voting_schedule.h"
+ #include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
  #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
  #include "lib/encoding/binascii.h"
  
@@@ -55,25 -37,17 +56,27 @@@ in
  get_voting_interval(void)
  {
    int interval;
-   networkstatus_t *consensus = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time(NULL));
+   networkstatus_t *consensus =
+     networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time(NULL),
+                                                 usable_consensus_flavor());
  
    if (consensus) {
 +    /* Ideally we have a live consensus and we can just use that. */
 +    interval = (int)(consensus->fresh_until - consensus->valid_after);
 +  } else if (authdir_mode(get_options()) || ASSUME_AUTHORITY_SCHEDULING) {
 +    /* If we don't have a live consensus and we're an authority,
 +     * we should believe our own view of what the schedule ought to be. */
 +    interval = dirauth_sched_get_configured_interval();
 +  } else if ((consensus = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus())) {
 +    /* If we're a client, then maybe a latest consensus is good enough?
 +     * It's better than falling back to the non-consensus case. */
      interval = (int)(consensus->fresh_until - consensus->valid_after);
    } else {
 -    /* Same for both a testing and real network. We voluntarily ignore the
 -     * InitialVotingInterval since it complexifies things and it doesn't
 -     * affect the SR protocol. */
 -    interval = get_options()->V3AuthVotingInterval;
 +    /* We should never be reaching this point, since a client should never
 +     * call this code unless they have some kind of a consensus. All we can
 +     * do is hope that this network is using the default voting interval. */
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once();
 +    interval = DEFAULT_NETWORK_VOTING_INTERVAL;
    }
    tor_assert(interval > 0);
    return interval;
@@@ -242,28 -241,18 +247,29 @@@ sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_prot
    int voting_interval = get_voting_interval();
    time_t beginning_of_curr_round;
  
-   /* This function is not used for voting purposes, so if we have a live
-      consensus, use its valid-after as the beginning of the current round.
-      If we have no consensus but we're an authority, use our own
-      schedule.  Otherwise, try using our view of the voting interval
-      to figure out when the current round _should_ be starting.
-   */
-   networkstatus_t *ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time());
+   /* This function is not used for voting purposes, so if we have a reasonably
+    * live consensus, use its valid-after as the beginning of the current
+    * round. If we have no consensus but we're an authority, use our own
+    * schedule. Otherwise, try using our view of the voting interval to figure
+    * out when the current round _should_ be starting. */
+   networkstatus_t *ns =
+     networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(approx_time(),
+                                                 usable_consensus_flavor());
    if (ns) {
      beginning_of_curr_round = ns->valid_after;
 +  } else if (authdir_mode(get_options()) || ASSUME_AUTHORITY_SCHEDULING) {
 +    beginning_of_curr_round = dirauth_sched_get_cur_valid_after_time();
    } else {
 -    beginning_of_curr_round = get_start_time_of_current_round();
 +    /* voting_interval comes from get_voting_interval(), so if we're in
 +     * this case as a client, we already tried to get the voting interval
 +     * from the latest_consensus and gave a bug warning if we couldn't.
 +     *
 +     * We wouldn't want to look at the latest consensus's valid_after time,
 +     * since that would be out of date. */
 +    beginning_of_curr_round = voting_sched_get_start_of_interval_after(
 +                                             approx_time() - voting_interval,
 +                                             voting_interval,
 +                                             0);
    }
  
    /* Get current SR protocol round */
diff --cc src/test/test_hs_service.c
index 80383baff8,49c8d29d27..8b94bb6cf1
--- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c
@@@ -89,13 -88,6 +90,14 @@@ mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_
    return &mock_ns;
  }
  
 +static networkstatus_t *
- mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_null(time_t now)
++mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus_null(time_t now, int flavor)
 +{
 +  (void) now;
++  (void) flavor;
 +  return NULL;
 +}
 +
  static or_state_t *dummy_state = NULL;
  
  /* Mock function to get fake or state (used for rev counters) */
@@@ -2199,490 -2170,6 +2201,490 @@@ test_export_client_circuit_id(void *arg
    tor_free(cp2);
  }
  
 +static smartlist_t *
 +mock_node_get_link_specifier_smartlist(const node_t *node, bool direct_conn)
 +{
 +  (void) node;
 +  (void) direct_conn;
 +
 +  smartlist_t *lspecs = smartlist_new();
 +  link_specifier_t *ls_legacy = link_specifier_new();
 +  smartlist_add(lspecs, ls_legacy);
 +
 +  return lspecs;
 +}
 +
 +static node_t *fake_node = NULL;
 +
 +static const node_t *
 +mock_build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state)
 +{
 +  (void) state;
 +
 +  if (!fake_node) {
 +    curve25519_secret_key_t seckey;
 +    curve25519_secret_key_generate(&seckey, 0);
 +
 +    fake_node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(node_t));
 +    fake_node->ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
 +    fake_node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey =
 +      tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
 +    curve25519_public_key_generate(fake_node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey,
 +                                   &seckey);
 +  }
 +
 +  return fake_node;
 +}
 +
 +static void
 +mock_launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service,
 +                                     const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
 +                                     const hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data)
 +{
 +  (void) service;
 +  (void) ip;
 +  (void) data;
 +  return;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + *  Test that INTRO2 cells are handled well by onion services in the normal
 + *  case and also when onionbalance is enabled.
 + */
 +static void
 +test_intro2_handling(void *arg)
 +{
 +  (void)arg;
 +
 +  MOCK(build_state_get_exit_node, mock_build_state_get_exit_node);
 +  MOCK(relay_send_command_from_edge_, mock_relay_send_command_from_edge);
 +  MOCK(node_get_link_specifier_smartlist,
 +       mock_node_get_link_specifier_smartlist);
 +  MOCK(launch_rendezvous_point_circuit, mock_launch_rendezvous_point_circuit);
 +
 +  memset(relay_payload, 0, sizeof(relay_payload));
 +
 +  int retval;
 +  time_t now = 0101010101;
 +  update_approx_time(now);
 +
 +  /** OK this is the play:
 +   *
 +   *  In Act I, we have a standalone onion service X (without onionbalance
 +   *  enabled). We test that X can properly handle INTRO2 cells sent by a
 +   *  client Alice.
 +   *
 +   *  In Act II, we create an onionbalance setup with frontend being Z which
 +   *  includes instances X and Y. We then setup onionbalance on X and test that
 +   *  Alice who addresses Z can communicate with X through INTRO2 cells.
 +   *
 +   *  In Act III, we test that Alice can also communicate with X
 +   *  directly even tho onionbalance is enabled.
 +   *
 +   *  And finally in Act IV, we check various cases where the INTRO2 cell
 +   *  should not go through because the subcredentials don't line up
 +   *  (e.g. Alice sends INTRO2 to X using Y's subcredential).
 +   */
 +
 +  /** Let's start with some setup! Create the instances and the frontend
 +      service, create Alice, etc:  */
 +
 +  /* Create instance X */
 +  hs_service_t x_service;
 +  memset(&x_service, 0, sizeof(hs_service_t));
 +  /* Disable onionbalance */
 +  x_service.config.ob_master_pubkeys = NULL;
 +  x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie = replaycache_new(0,0);
 +
 +  /* Create subcredential for x: */
 +  ed25519_keypair_t x_identity_keypair;
 +  hs_subcredential_t x_subcred;
 +  ed25519_keypair_generate(&x_identity_keypair, 0);
 +  hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&x_identity_keypair,
 +                                              &x_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Create the x instance's intro point */
 +  hs_service_intro_point_t *x_ip = NULL;
 +  {
 +    curve25519_secret_key_t seckey;
 +    curve25519_public_key_t pkey;
 +    curve25519_secret_key_generate(&seckey, 0);
 +    curve25519_public_key_generate(&pkey, &seckey);
 +
 +    node_t intro_node;
 +    memset(&intro_node, 0, sizeof(intro_node));
 +    routerinfo_t ri;
 +    memset(&ri, 0, sizeof(routerinfo_t));
 +    ri.onion_curve25519_pkey = &pkey;
 +    intro_node.ri = &ri;
 +
 +    x_ip = service_intro_point_new(&intro_node);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Create z frontend's subcredential */
 +  ed25519_keypair_t z_identity_keypair;
 +  hs_subcredential_t z_subcred;
 +  ed25519_keypair_generate(&z_identity_keypair, 0);
 +  hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&z_identity_keypair,
 +                                              &z_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Create y instance's subcredential */
 +  ed25519_keypair_t y_identity_keypair;
 +  hs_subcredential_t y_subcred;
 +  ed25519_keypair_generate(&y_identity_keypair, 0);
 +  hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&y_identity_keypair,
 +                                              &y_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Create Alice's intro point */
 +  hs_desc_intro_point_t *alice_ip;
 +  ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp;
 +  ed25519_keypair_generate(&signing_kp, 0);
 +  alice_ip = hs_helper_build_intro_point(&signing_kp, now, "1.2.3.4", 0,
 +                                         &x_ip->auth_key_kp,
 +                                         &x_ip->enc_key_kp);
 +
 +  /* Create Alice's intro and rend circuits */
 +  origin_circuit_t *intro_circ = origin_circuit_new();
 +  intro_circ->cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
 +  intro_circ->cpath->prev = intro_circ->cpath;
 +  intro_circ->hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*intro_circ->hs_ident));
 +  origin_circuit_t rend_circ;
 +  rend_circ.hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rend_circ.hs_ident));
 +  curve25519_keypair_generate(&rend_circ.hs_ident->rendezvous_client_kp, 0);
 +  memset(rend_circ.hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie, 'r', HS_REND_COOKIE_LEN);
 +
 +  /* ************************************************************ */
 +
 +  /* Act I:
 +   *
 +   * Where Alice connects to X without onionbalance in the picture */
 +
 +  /* Create INTRODUCE1 */
 +  tt_assert(fast_mem_is_zero(relay_payload, sizeof(relay_payload)));
 +  retval = hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, &rend_circ,
 +                                   alice_ip, &x_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Check that the payload was written successfully */
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(relay_payload, sizeof(relay_payload)));
 +  tt_int_op(relay_payload_len, OP_NE, 0);
 +
 +  /* Handle the cell */
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                    intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                    &x_subcred,
 +                                    (uint8_t*)relay_payload,relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +
 +  /* ************************************************************ */
 +
 +  /* Act II:
 +   *
 +   * We now create an onionbalance setup with Z being the frontend and X and Y
 +   * being the backend instances. Make sure that Alice can talk with the
 +   * backend instance X even tho she thinks she is talking to the frontend Z.
 +   */
 +
 +  /* Now configure the X instance to do onionbalance with Z as the frontend */
 +  x_service.config.ob_master_pubkeys = smartlist_new();
 +  smartlist_add(x_service.config.ob_master_pubkeys,
 +                &z_identity_keypair.pubkey);
 +
 +  /* Create descriptors for x and load next descriptor with the x's
 +   * subcredential so that it can accept connections for itself. */
 +  x_service.desc_current = service_descriptor_new();
 +  memset(x_service.desc_current->desc->subcredential.subcred, 'C',SUBCRED_LEN);
 +  x_service.desc_next = service_descriptor_new();
 +  memcpy(&x_service.desc_next->desc->subcredential, &x_subcred, SUBCRED_LEN);
 +
 +  /* Refresh OB keys */
 +  hs_ob_refresh_keys(&x_service);
 +
 +  /* Create INTRODUCE1 from Alice to X through Z */
 +  memset(relay_payload, 0, sizeof(relay_payload));
 +  retval = hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, &rend_circ,
 +                                   alice_ip, &z_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Check that the payload was written successfully */
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(relay_payload, sizeof(relay_payload)));
 +  tt_int_op(relay_payload_len, OP_NE, 0);
 +
 +  /* Deliver INTRODUCE1 to X even tho it carries Z's subcredential */
 +  replaycache_free(x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
 +  x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &z_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +
 +  replaycache_free(x_ip->replay_cache);
 +  x_ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +
 +  replaycache_free(x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
 +  x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +
 +  /* ************************************************************ */
 +
 +  /* Act III:
 +   *
 +   * Now send a direct INTRODUCE cell from Alice to X using X's subcredential
 +   * and check that it succeeds even with onionbalance enabled.
 +   */
 +
 +  /* Refresh OB keys (just to check for memleaks) */
 +  hs_ob_refresh_keys(&x_service);
 +
 +  /* Create INTRODUCE1 from Alice to X using X's subcred. */
 +  memset(relay_payload, 0, sizeof(relay_payload));
 +  retval = hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, &rend_circ,
 +                                   alice_ip, &x_subcred);
 +
 +  /* Check that the payload was written successfully */
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(relay_payload, sizeof(relay_payload)));
 +  tt_int_op(relay_payload_len, OP_NE, 0);
 +
 +  /* Send INTRODUCE1 to X with X's subcredential (should succeed) */
 +  replaycache_free(x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
 +  x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &x_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +
 +  /* ************************************************************ */
 +
 +  /* Act IV:
 +   *
 +   * Test cases where the INTRO2 cell should not be able to decode.
 +   */
 +
 +  /* Try sending the exact same INTRODUCE2 cell again and see that the intro
 +   * point replay cache triggers: */
 +  setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &x_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
 +  expect_log_msg_containing("with the same ENCRYPTED section");
 +  teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +
 +  /* Now cleanup the intro point replay cache but not the service replay cache
 +     and see that this one triggers this time. */
 +  replaycache_free(x_ip->replay_cache);
 +  x_ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +  setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &x_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
 +  expect_log_msg_containing("with same REND_COOKIE");
 +  teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +
 +  /* Now just to make sure cleanup both replay caches and make sure that the
 +     cell gets through */
 +  replaycache_free(x_ip->replay_cache);
 +  x_ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +  replaycache_free(x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
 +  x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie = replaycache_new(0, 0);
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &x_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +
 +  /* As a final thing, create an INTRODUCE1 cell from Alice to X using Y's
 +   * subcred (should fail since Y is just another instance and not the frontend
 +   * service!) */
 +  memset(relay_payload, 0, sizeof(relay_payload));
 +  retval = hs_circ_send_introduce1(intro_circ, &rend_circ,
 +                                   alice_ip, &y_subcred);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
 +
 +  /* Check that the payload was written successfully */
 +  tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(relay_payload, sizeof(relay_payload)));
 +  tt_int_op(relay_payload_len, OP_NE, 0);
 +
 +  retval = hs_circ_handle_introduce2(&x_service,
 +                                   intro_circ, x_ip,
 +                                   &y_subcred,
 +                                   (uint8_t*)relay_payload, relay_payload_len);
 +  tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, -1);
 +
 + done:
 +  /* Start cleaning up X */
 +  replaycache_free(x_service.state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
 +  smartlist_free(x_service.config.ob_master_pubkeys);
 +  tor_free(x_service.state.ob_subcreds);
 +  service_descriptor_free(x_service.desc_current);
 +  service_descriptor_free(x_service.desc_next);
 +  service_intro_point_free(x_ip);
 +
 +  /* Clean up Alice */
 +  hs_desc_intro_point_free(alice_ip);
 +  tor_free(rend_circ.hs_ident);
 +
 +  if (fake_node) {
 +    tor_free(fake_node->ri->onion_curve25519_pkey);
 +    tor_free(fake_node->ri);
 +    tor_free(fake_node);
 +  }
 +
 +  UNMOCK(build_state_get_exit_node);
 +  UNMOCK(relay_send_command_from_edge_);
 +  UNMOCK(node_get_link_specifier_smartlist);
 +  UNMOCK(launch_rendezvous_point_circuit);
 +}
 +
 +static void
 +test_cannot_upload_descriptors(void *arg)
 +{
 +  int ret;
 +  time_t now;
 +  hs_service_t *service;
 +
 +  (void) arg;
 +
 +  hs_init();
 +  MOCK(get_or_state,
 +       get_or_state_replacement);
-   MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
-        mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
++  MOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus,
++       mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus);
 +
 +  dummy_state = or_state_new();
 +
 +  ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC",
 +                           &mock_ns.valid_after);
 +  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC",
 +                           &mock_ns.fresh_until);
 +  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  dirauth_sched_recalculate_timing(get_options(), mock_ns.valid_after);
 +
 +  update_approx_time(mock_ns.valid_after + 1);
 +  now = mock_ns.valid_after + 1;
 +
 +  /* Create a service with no descriptor. It's added to the global map. */
 +  service = hs_service_new(get_options());
 +  tt_assert(service);
 +  service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
 +  ed25519_secret_key_generate(&service->keys.identity_sk, 0);
 +  ed25519_public_key_generate(&service->keys.identity_pk,
 +                              &service->keys.identity_sk);
 +  /* Register service to global map. */
 +  ret = register_service(get_hs_service_map(), service);
 +  tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
 +  /* But first, build our descriptor. */
 +  build_all_descriptors(now);
 +
 +  /* 1. Testing missing intro points reason. */
 +  {
 +    digest256map_t *cur = service->desc_current->intro_points.map;
 +    digest256map_t *tmp = digest256map_new();
 +    service->desc_current->intro_points.map = tmp;
 +    service->desc_current->missing_intro_points = 1;
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    digest256map_free(tmp, tor_free_);
 +    service->desc_current->intro_points.map = cur;
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
 +      "Missing intro points");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +    /* Reset. */
 +    service->desc_current->missing_intro_points = 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 2. Testing non established intro points. */
 +  {
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
 +      "Intro circuits aren't yet all established (0/3).");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We need to pass the established circuit tests and thus from now on, we
 +   * MOCK this to return 3 intro points. */
 +  MOCK(count_desc_circuit_established, mock_count_desc_circuit_established);
 +  num_intro_points = 3;
 +
 +  /* 3. Testing non established intro points. */
 +  {
 +    service->desc_current->next_upload_time = now + 1000;
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
 +      "Next upload time is");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +    /* Reset. */
 +    service->desc_current->next_upload_time = 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 4. Testing missing live consensus. */
 +  {
-     MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
-          mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_null);
++    MOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus,
++         mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus_null);
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
-       "No live consensus");
++      "No reasonably live consensus");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +    /* Reset. */
-     MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
-          mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
++    MOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus,
++         mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 5. Test missing minimum directory information. */
 +  {
 +    MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
 +         mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false);
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
 +      "Not enough directory information");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +
 +    /* Running it again shouldn't trigger anything due to rate limitation. */
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_no_log_entry();
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +    UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Increase time and redo test (5) in order to test the rate limiting. */
 +  update_approx_time(mock_ns.valid_after + 61);
 +  {
 +    MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info,
 +         mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false);
 +    setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
 +    run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
 +    expect_log_msg_containing(
 +      "Service [scrubbed] can't upload its current descriptor: "
 +      "Not enough directory information");
 +    teardown_capture_of_logs();
 +    UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info);
 +  }
 +
 + done:
 +  hs_free_all();
 +  UNMOCK(count_desc_circuit_established);
-   UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
++  UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus);
 +  UNMOCK(get_or_state);
 +}
 +
  struct testcase_t hs_service_tests[] = {
    { "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup, TT_FORK,
      NULL, NULL },





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