[tor-commits] [tor/main] Initial backend for an ntor-v3 implementation.
dgoulet at torproject.org
dgoulet at torproject.org
Tue Aug 31 15:10:48 UTC 2021
commit 088c0367a2da29014f1c4d5b2dd5f6a656f6cf89
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Wed Aug 25 10:40:33 2021 -0400
Initial backend for an ntor-v3 implementation.
This code is based directly on the specification, without looking at
the reference implementation or the implementation in Arti.
Nonetheless, it is now passing with the test vectors generated by
the reference implementation.
---
src/core/crypto/include.am | 2 +
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c | 760 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h | 140 ++++++++
src/test/include.am | 1 +
src/test/test.c | 1 +
src/test/test.h | 1 +
src/test/test_ntor_v3.c | 172 +++++++++
7 files changed, 1077 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/include.am b/src/core/crypto/include.am
index 28b7e22905..2d53b3cb0b 100644
--- a/src/core/crypto/include.am
+++ b/src/core/crypto/include.am
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES += \
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c \
+ src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c \
src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.c
@@ -14,5 +15,6 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h \
+ src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h \
src/core/crypto/relay_crypto.h
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..491c69cf8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,760 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file onion_ntor_v3.c
+ * @brief Implements the version 3 ntor handshake as first specified in
+ * proposal 332.
+ *
+ * The v3 ntor handshake differs from the earlier versions (ntor and hs-ntor)
+ * primarily in that it allows the client to send an authenticated encrypted
+ * message as part of its onion skin, and allows the relay to send and
+ * encrypted authenticated reply as part of its response.
+ *
+ * It also takes a "verification string" -- the handshake cannot succeed
+ * unless both parties use the same value for their verification stream.
+ **/
+
+#define ONION_NTOR_V3_PRIVATE
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h"
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Parameters used to keep the outputs of this handshake from colliding with
+ * others. These are defined in the specification. */
+#define PROTOID "ntor3-curve25519-sha3_256-1"
+#define TWEAK(A) (PROTOID ":" A)
+
+#define T_MSGKDF TWEAK("kdf_phase1")
+#define T_MSGMAC TWEAK("msg_mac")
+#define T_KEY_SEED TWEAK("key_seed")
+#define T_VERIFY TWEAK("verify")
+#define T_FINAL TWEAK("kdf_final")
+#define T_AUTH TWEAK("auth_final")
+
+/**
+ * Add @a len bytes of @a data as input to the provided @a xof.
+ *
+ * (This is provided just for abbreviation).
+ **/
+#define xof_add(xof, data, len) crypto_xof_add_bytes((xof), (data), (len))
+/**
+ * Add @a len bytes of @a data as input to the provided @a xof,
+ * prefixed with an encoding of the length.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to ENCAP(data) in the spec.
+ **/
+static void
+xof_add_encap(crypto_xof_t *xof, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint64_t len64 = tor_htonll(len);
+ xof_add(xof, (uint8_t *)(&len64), 8);
+ xof_add(xof, data, len);
+}
+/**
+ * Add an encapsulated tweak to the provided xof.
+ **/
+#define xof_add_tweak(d, s) xof_add_encap((d), (const uint8_t *)(s), strlen(s))
+
+/**
+ * Add @a len bytes of @a data to the provided @a digest.
+ *
+ * This is provided as an abbreviation, and to get the types right.
+ **/
+static void
+d_add(crypto_digest_t *digest, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (const char *)data, len);
+}
+/**
+ * Add @a len bytes of @a data to the provided @a digest, prefixed
+ * with the encoded length.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to ENCAP(data) from the spec.
+ **/
+static void
+d_add_encap(crypto_digest_t *digest, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint64_t len64 = tor_htonll(len);
+ d_add(digest, (const uint8_t *)(&len64), 8);
+ d_add(digest, data, len);
+}
+/**
+ * Add an encapsulated tweak to the provided digest.
+ **/
+#define d_add_tweak(d, s) d_add_encap((d), (const uint8_t *)(s), strlen(s))
+
+/**
+ * Helper: copy @a len bytes of @a data onto *@a ptr, and advance @a ptr
+ * forward by @a len bytes.
+ *
+ * Asserts that @a ptr will not be advanced beyond @a endptr.
+ **/
+static void
+push(uint8_t **ptr, const uint8_t *endptr, const uint8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t remaining = endptr - *ptr;
+ tor_assert(len <= remaining);
+ memcpy(*ptr, data, len);
+ *ptr += len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper: Drop storage held by @a state, after wiping it.
+ **/
+void
+ntor3_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_handshake_state_t *state)
+{
+ if (!state)
+ return;
+
+ memwipe(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
+ tor_free(state);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Perform a client-side v3 ntor handshake with a given relay.
+ *
+ * As inputs this function takes the relay's Ed25519 identity (@a relay_id),
+ * the relay's current ntor onion key (@a relay_key), a verification string
+ * (@a verification_len bytes at @a verification), and a message to send
+ * as part of the handshake (@a message_len bytes at @a message).
+ *
+ * The message will be encrypted and authenticated to the relay, but will not
+ * receive the same forward secrecy as the rest of the handshake. We should
+ * not put any super-confidential data in it.
+ *
+ * The handshake will only succeed if the relay uses the same verification
+ * string as we are using.
+ *
+ * As outputs, this function returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. On
+ * success, it sets @a onion_skin_out and @a onion_skin_len_out to a newly
+ * allocated handshake message that the client can send as part of its CREATE2
+ * or EXTEND2 cell. It also sets it sets @a handshake_state_out to a newly
+ * allocated handshake state object; the client needs to use this object to
+ * process the relay's eventual reply.
+ **/
+int
+onion_skin_ntor3_create(const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ const size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *message,
+ const size_t message_len,
+ ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
+ uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
+ size_t *onion_skin_len_out)
+{
+ curve25519_keypair_t client_keypair;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&client_keypair, 0) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ int r = onion_skin_ntor3_create_nokeygen(
+ &client_keypair,
+ relay_id,
+ relay_key,
+ verification,
+ verification_len,
+ message,
+ message_len,
+ handshake_state_out,
+ onion_skin_out,
+ onion_skin_len_out);
+ memwipe(&client_keypair, 0, sizeof(client_keypair));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Like onion_skin_ntor3_create, but do not generate a new ephemeral keypair.
+ * Instead, take the ephemeral keypair (x,X) from @a client_keypair.
+ *
+ * (Having a separate function for this lets us test the code for correct
+ * behavior.)
+ **/
+STATIC int
+onion_skin_ntor3_create_nokeygen(
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *client_keypair,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ const size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *message,
+ const size_t message_len,
+ ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
+ uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
+ size_t *onion_skin_len_out)
+{
+ *handshake_state_out = NULL;
+ *onion_skin_out = NULL;
+ *onion_skin_len_out = 0;
+
+ // Set up the handshake state object.
+ *handshake_state_out = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ntor3_handshake_state_t));
+ memcpy(&(*handshake_state_out)->client_keypair, client_keypair,
+ sizeof(*client_keypair));
+ memcpy(&(*handshake_state_out)->relay_id, relay_id, sizeof(*relay_id));
+ memcpy(&(*handshake_state_out)->relay_key, relay_key, sizeof(*relay_key));
+
+ // Perform the first DH handshake.
+ curve25519_handshake((*handshake_state_out)->bx,
+ &client_keypair->seckey, relay_key);
+ if (safe_mem_is_zero((*handshake_state_out)->bx, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN)) {
+ // Okay to return early here, since our behavior here doesn't
+ // cause a visible timing sidechannel.
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // Compute phase1_keys.
+ uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t mac_key[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_xof_t *xof = crypto_xof_new();
+ // secret_input_phase1 = Bx | ID | X | B | PROTOID | ENCAP(VER)
+ xof_add_tweak(xof, T_MSGKDF);
+ xof_add(xof, (*handshake_state_out)->bx, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, relay_id->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, client_keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, relay_key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, (const uint8_t *)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ xof_add_encap(xof, verification, verification_len);
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, enc_key, sizeof(enc_key));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+ crypto_xof_free(xof);
+ }
+
+ // Compute encrypted message.
+ uint8_t *encrypted_message = tor_memdup(message, message_len);
+ {
+ crypto_cipher_t *c =
+ crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((const char *)enc_key, 256);
+ crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(c, (char *)encrypted_message, message_len);
+ crypto_cipher_free(c);
+ }
+
+ // Compute the MAC value.
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *m = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(m, T_MSGMAC);
+ d_add_encap(m, mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+ d_add(m, relay_id->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(m, relay_key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(m, client_keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(m, encrypted_message, message_len);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(m,
+ (char *)(*handshake_state_out)->msg_mac,
+ DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(m);
+ }
+
+ // Build the onionskin.
+ *onion_skin_len_out = (ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN*2 +
+ DIGEST256_LEN + message_len);
+ *onion_skin_out = tor_malloc(*onion_skin_len_out);
+ {
+ uint8_t *ptr = *onion_skin_out, *end = ptr + *onion_skin_len_out;
+
+ push(&ptr, end, relay_id->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ push(&ptr, end, relay_key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ push(&ptr, end, client_keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ push(&ptr, end, encrypted_message, message_len);
+ push(&ptr, end, (*handshake_state_out)->msg_mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ tor_assert(ptr == end);
+ }
+
+ memwipe(&enc_key, 0, sizeof(enc_key));
+ memwipe(&mac_key, 0, sizeof(mac_key));
+ memwipe(encrypted_message, 0, message_len);
+ tor_free(encrypted_message);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Complete a client-side v3 ntor handshake.
+ *
+ * Takes a @a handshake_state returned earlier by `onion_skin_ntor3_create()`,
+ * and the relay's reply to that handshake (@a reply_len bytes at @a
+ * handshake_reply). Also takes a verification string (@a verification_len
+ * bytes at @a verification).
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. On success, generates @a key_len
+ * bytes of key material into the provided @a keys_out buffer, and sets @a
+ * message_out to the message that the relay sent in reply to our message (and
+ * sets @a message_out_len to that message's length).
+ **/
+int
+onion_ntor3_client_handshake(const ntor3_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
+ const uint8_t *handshake_reply,
+ size_t reply_len,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len,
+ uint8_t **message_out,
+ size_t *message_len_out)
+{
+ *message_out = NULL;
+ *message_len_out = 0;
+
+ int problems = 0;
+
+ // Parse the relay's message.
+ curve25519_public_key_t relay_Y;
+ uint8_t relay_auth[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ size_t encrypted_msg_len;
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_msg;
+ {
+ if (reply_len < CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN) {
+ // Okay to return early here, since the message is completely
+ // ill-formed, so we can't leak anything.
+ ++problems;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ encrypted_msg_len = reply_len - (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(&relay_Y.public_key, handshake_reply, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ handshake_reply += CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
+ memcpy(&relay_auth, handshake_reply, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ handshake_reply += DIGEST256_LEN;
+ encrypted_msg = handshake_reply;
+ }
+
+ // Finish the second diffie hellman handshake.
+ uint8_t yx[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
+ curve25519_handshake(yx, &handshake_state->client_keypair.seckey, &relay_Y);
+ problems |= safe_mem_is_zero(yx, sizeof(yx));
+
+ // Compute two tweaked hashes of secret_input.
+ uint8_t key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN], verify[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *ks = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ crypto_digest_t *v = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(ks, T_KEY_SEED);
+ d_add_tweak(v, T_VERIFY);
+#define ADD2(s,len) STMT_BEGIN { \
+ d_add(ks, (s),(len)); d_add(v, (s), (len)); \
+ } STMT_END
+#define ADD2_ENCAP(s,len) STMT_BEGIN { \
+ d_add_encap(ks, (s),(len)); d_add_encap(v, (s), (len)); \
+ } STMT_END
+
+ ADD2(yx, sizeof(yx));
+ ADD2(handshake_state->bx, sizeof(handshake_state->bx));
+ ADD2(handshake_state->relay_id.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(handshake_state->relay_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(handshake_state->client_keypair.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(relay_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2((const uint8_t *)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ ADD2_ENCAP(verification, verification_len);
+
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(ks, (char*) key_seed, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(v, (char*) verify, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(ks);
+ crypto_digest_free(v);
+ }
+
+ // compute expected auth value.
+ uint8_t auth_computed[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(d, T_AUTH);
+ d_add(d, verify, sizeof(verify));
+ d_add(d, handshake_state->relay_id.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, handshake_state->relay_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, relay_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, handshake_state->client_keypair.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, handshake_state->msg_mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ d_add_encap(d, encrypted_msg, encrypted_msg_len);
+ d_add(d, (const uint8_t*)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ d_add(d, (const uint8_t*)"Server", strlen("Server"));
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char *)auth_computed, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(d);
+ }
+
+ // Check authentication value.
+ problems |= tor_memneq(auth_computed, relay_auth, DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ // Compute keystream, decrypt message, and return.
+ *message_out = tor_malloc(encrypted_msg_len);
+ *message_len_out = encrypted_msg_len;
+ uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_xof_t *xof = crypto_xof_new();
+ xof_add_tweak(xof, T_FINAL);
+ xof_add(xof, key_seed, sizeof(key_seed));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, enc_key, sizeof(enc_key));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, (uint8_t *)keys_out, keys_out_len);
+ crypto_xof_free(xof);
+
+ crypto_cipher_t *c =
+ crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((const char *)enc_key, 256);
+ crypto_cipher_decrypt(c, (char *)*message_out,
+ (const char *)encrypted_msg, encrypted_msg_len);
+ crypto_cipher_free(c);
+ }
+
+ done:
+ memwipe(&relay_Y, 0, sizeof(relay_Y));
+ memwipe(&relay_auth, 0, sizeof(relay_auth));
+ memwipe(&yx, 0, sizeof(yx));
+ memwipe(key_seed, 0, sizeof(key_seed));
+ memwipe(verify, 0, sizeof(verify));
+ memwipe(enc_key, 0, sizeof(enc_key));
+ if (problems) {
+ if (*message_out) {
+ memwipe(*message_out, 0, *message_len_out);
+ tor_free(*message_out); // Sets it to NULL.
+ }
+ *message_len_out = 0;
+ crypto_rand((char*)keys_out, keys_out_len); // In case bad code uses it.
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Wipe a server handshake state, and release the storage it holds.
+ **/
+void
+ntor3_server_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state)
+{
+ if (state == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ memwipe(state, 0, sizeof(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t));
+ tor_free(state);
+}
+
+/**
+ * As a relay, start handling a client's v3 ntor handshake.
+ *
+ * This function performs the _first half_ of the handshake, up to the point
+ * where the client's message is decoded. After calling it, the relay should
+ * decide how and whether to reply to the client's message, compose its reply,
+ * and call `onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2`.
+ *
+ * It takes as input a map of the relay's known onion keys in @a private_keys,
+ * along with a fake @a junk_key to use if there is a complete mismatch. It
+ * takes the relay's ed25519 identity in @a my_id, along with the client's
+ * handshake message (@a client_handshake_len bytes in @a client_handshake),
+ * and a verification string (@a verification_len bytes in @a verification).
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, and -1 on failure. On success, sets @a
+ * client_message_out to a newly allocated string holding the plaintext of the
+ * message that the client sent as part of its handshake, and @a
+ * client_message_out_len to its length. Also sets @a state_out to a newly
+ * allocated state object holding the intermediate computation for this
+ * handshake.
+ **/
+int
+onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part1(
+ const di_digest256_map_t *private_keys,
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *junk_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *my_id,
+ const uint8_t *client_handshake,
+ size_t client_handshake_len,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ uint8_t **client_message_out,
+ size_t *client_message_len_out,
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_t **state_out)
+{
+ *client_message_out = NULL;
+ *client_message_len_out = 0;
+ *state_out = NULL;
+
+ int problems = 0;
+
+ // Initialize state.
+ (*state_out) = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t));
+ memcpy(&(*state_out)->my_id, my_id, sizeof(*my_id));
+
+ const uint8_t *wanted_id; // [ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN]
+ const uint8_t *wanted_key; // [CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN]
+ const uint8_t *encrypted_message;
+ size_t encrypted_message_len;
+ // Unpack the client handshake.
+ {
+ const uint8_t *ptr = client_handshake;
+ const uint8_t *end = ptr + client_handshake_len;
+
+ if (client_handshake_len <
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 2 + DIGEST256_LEN) {
+ // Okay to end early; the client knows this is unparseable already.
+ ++problems;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ wanted_id = ptr;
+ ptr += ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
+ wanted_key = ptr;
+ ptr += CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
+ memcpy((*state_out)->client_key.public_key, ptr, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ptr += CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
+ size_t remaining = (end-ptr);
+ if (BUG(remaining < DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+ // Okay to end early; this is a bug.
+ ++problems;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ encrypted_message = ptr;
+ encrypted_message_len = remaining - DIGEST256_LEN;
+ ptr += encrypted_message_len;
+ remaining = (end-ptr);
+ tor_assert(remaining == DIGEST256_LEN);
+ memcpy((*state_out)->msg_mac, ptr, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ }
+
+ // Check the identity.
+ problems |= tor_memneq(my_id->pubkey, wanted_id, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+ // Find the correct keypair.
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair =
+ dimap_search(private_keys, wanted_key, (void *)junk_key);
+ tor_assert(keypair);
+ memcpy(&(*state_out)->my_key, &keypair->pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+
+ // Do the first diffie hellman handshake.
+ curve25519_handshake((*state_out)->xb,
+ &keypair->seckey, &(*state_out)->client_key);
+ problems |= safe_mem_is_zero((*state_out)->xb, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
+
+ // Derive the encryption and mac keys
+ uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN], mac_key[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_xof_t *xof = crypto_xof_new();
+ xof_add_tweak(xof, T_MSGKDF);
+ xof_add(xof, (*state_out)->xb, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, wanted_id, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, (*state_out)->client_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ xof_add(xof, (const uint8_t *)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ xof_add_encap(xof, verification, verification_len);
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, enc_key, sizeof(enc_key));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+ crypto_xof_free(xof);
+ }
+
+ // Check the MAC.
+ uint8_t computed_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(d, T_MSGMAC);
+ d_add_encap(d, mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+ d_add(d, my_id->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, keypair->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, (*state_out)->client_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, encrypted_message, encrypted_message_len);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char *)computed_mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(d);
+ }
+
+ problems |= tor_memneq((*state_out)->msg_mac, computed_mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ // Decrypt the message.
+ *client_message_out = tor_malloc(encrypted_message_len);
+ *client_message_len_out = encrypted_message_len;
+ {
+ crypto_cipher_t *c =
+ crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((const char *)enc_key, 256);
+ crypto_cipher_decrypt(c, (char *)*client_message_out,
+ (const char *)encrypted_message,
+ encrypted_message_len);
+ crypto_cipher_free(c);
+ }
+
+ done:
+ memwipe(enc_key, 0, sizeof(enc_key));
+ memwipe(mac_key, 0, sizeof(mac_key));
+ memwipe(computed_mac, 0, sizeof(computed_mac));
+ if (problems) {
+ if (*client_message_out) {
+ memwipe(*client_message_out, 0, *client_message_len_out);
+ tor_free(*client_message_out); // Sets it to NULL.
+ }
+ *client_message_len_out = 0;
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(*state_out);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Finish the relay side of an ntor v3 handshake.
+ *
+ * The relay calls this function after it has decided to respond to the
+ * client's original encrypted message. This function receives the relay's
+ * message in @a server_message and its length in @a server_message_len, and
+ * completes the handshake.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. On success, stores the newly
+ * allocated handshake for the relay to send in @a handshake_out, and its
+ * length in @a handshake_len_out. Stores @a keys_out_len bytes of generated
+ * keys in the provided buffer at @a keys_out.
+ **/
+int
+onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2(
+ const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *server_message,
+ size_t server_message_len,
+ uint8_t **handshake_out,
+ size_t *handshake_len_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len)
+{
+ curve25519_keypair_t relay_keypair;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&relay_keypair, 0) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ int r = onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2_nokeygen(
+ &relay_keypair,
+ state,
+ verification,
+ verification_len,
+ server_message,
+ server_message_len,
+ handshake_out,
+ handshake_len_out,
+ keys_out,
+ keys_out_len);
+ memwipe(&relay_keypair, 0, sizeof(relay_keypair));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Like `onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2`, but do not generate
+ * an ephemeral (y,Y) keypair.
+ *
+ * Instead, this function takes that keypair as @a relay_keypair_y.
+ *
+ * (Having a separate function for this lets us test the code for correct
+ * behavior.)
+ **/
+STATIC int
+onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2_nokeygen(
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *relay_keypair_y,
+ const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *server_message,
+ size_t server_message_len,
+ uint8_t **handshake_out,
+ size_t *handshake_len_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len)
+{
+ *handshake_out = NULL;
+ *handshake_len_out = 0;
+
+ int problems = 0;
+
+ // Second diffie-hellman handshake.
+ uint8_t xy[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
+ curve25519_handshake(xy, &relay_keypair_y->seckey, &state->client_key);
+ problems |= safe_mem_is_zero(xy, sizeof(xy));
+
+ // Compute two tweaked hashes of secret_input.
+ uint8_t key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN], verify[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *ks = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ crypto_digest_t *v = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(ks, T_KEY_SEED);
+ d_add_tweak(v, T_VERIFY);
+ ADD2(xy, sizeof(xy));
+ ADD2(state->xb, sizeof(state->xb));
+ ADD2(state->my_id.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(state->my_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(state->client_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2(relay_keypair_y->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ ADD2((const uint8_t *)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ ADD2_ENCAP(verification, verification_len);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(ks, (char*) key_seed, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(v, (char*) verify, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(ks);
+ crypto_digest_free(v);
+ }
+
+ // Compute enc_key and keystream.
+ uint8_t enc_key[CIPHER256_KEY_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_xof_t *xof = crypto_xof_new();
+ xof_add_tweak(xof, T_FINAL);
+ xof_add(xof, key_seed, sizeof(key_seed));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, enc_key, sizeof(enc_key));
+ crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keys_out, keys_out_len);
+ crypto_xof_free(xof);
+ }
+
+ // Encrypt message.
+ uint8_t *encrypted_message = tor_memdup(server_message, server_message_len);
+ {
+ crypto_cipher_t *c =
+ crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((const char *)enc_key, 256);
+ crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(
+ c, (char *)encrypted_message, server_message_len);
+ crypto_cipher_free(c);
+ }
+
+ // Compute AUTH digest.
+ uint8_t auth[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ {
+ crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ d_add_tweak(d, T_AUTH);
+ d_add(d, verify, sizeof(verify));
+ d_add(d, state->my_id.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, state->my_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, relay_keypair_y->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, state->client_key.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ d_add(d, state->msg_mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ d_add_encap(d, encrypted_message, server_message_len);
+ d_add(d, (const uint8_t*)PROTOID, strlen(PROTOID));
+ d_add(d, (const uint8_t*)"Server", strlen("Server"));
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char *)auth, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ crypto_digest_free(d);
+ }
+
+ // Compose the reply.
+ *handshake_len_out = CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN +
+ server_message_len;
+ *handshake_out = tor_malloc(*handshake_len_out);
+ uint8_t *ptr = *handshake_out, *end = ptr + *handshake_len_out;
+ push(&ptr, end, relay_keypair_y->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ push(&ptr, end, auth, sizeof(auth));
+ push(&ptr, end, encrypted_message, server_message_len);
+ tor_assert(ptr == end);
+
+ // Clean up and return.
+ memwipe(xy, 0, sizeof(xy));
+ memwipe(key_seed, 0, sizeof(key_seed));
+ memwipe(verify, 0, sizeof(verify));
+ memwipe(enc_key, 0, sizeof(enc_key));
+ memwipe(encrypted_message, 0, server_message_len);
+ tor_free(encrypted_message);
+
+ if (problems) {
+ memwipe(*handshake_out, 0, *handshake_len_out);
+ tor_free(*handshake_out); // Sets it to NULL.
+ *handshake_len_out = 0;
+ crypto_rand((char*)keys_out, keys_out_len); // In case bad code uses it.
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4449eb237d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * @file onion_ntor_v3.h
+ * @brief Header for core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H
+#define TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H
+
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h"
+
+/**
+ * Client-side state held while an ntor v3 handshake is in progress.
+ **/
+typedef struct ntor3_handshake_state_t ntor3_handshake_state_t;
+
+/**
+ * Server-side state held while the relay is handling a client's
+ * encapsulated message, before replying to the v3 handshake.
+ **/
+typedef struct ntor3_server_handshake_state_t ntor3_server_handshake_state_t;
+
+void ntor3_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_handshake_state_t *st);
+#define ntor3_handshake_state_free(ptr) \
+ FREE_AND_NULL(ntor3_handshake_state_t, ntor3_handshake_state_free_, (ptr))
+void ntor3_server_handshake_state_free_(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *st);
+#define ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(ptr) \
+ FREE_AND_NULL(ntor3_server_handshake_state_t, \
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_free_, (ptr))
+
+int onion_skin_ntor3_create(const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ const size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *message,
+ const size_t message_len,
+ ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
+ uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
+ size_t *onion_skin_len_out);
+
+int onion_ntor3_client_handshake(
+ const ntor3_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
+ const uint8_t *handshake_reply,
+ size_t reply_len,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len,
+ uint8_t **message_out,
+ size_t *message_len_out);
+
+struct di_digest256_map_t;
+int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part1(
+ const struct di_digest256_map_t *private_keys,
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *junk_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *my_id,
+ const uint8_t *client_handshake,
+ size_t client_handshake_len,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ uint8_t **client_message_out,
+ size_t *client_message_len_out,
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_t **state_out);
+
+int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2(
+ const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *server_message,
+ size_t server_message_len,
+ uint8_t **handshake_out,
+ size_t *handshake_len_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len);
+
+#ifdef ONION_NTOR_V3_PRIVATE
+struct ntor3_handshake_state_t {
+ /** Ephemeral (x,X) keypair. */
+ curve25519_keypair_t client_keypair;
+ /** Relay's ed25519 identity key (ID) */
+ ed25519_public_key_t relay_id;
+ /** Relay's public key (B) */
+ curve25519_public_key_t relay_key;
+ /** Shared secret (Bx). */
+ uint8_t bx[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
+ /** MAC of the client's encrypted message data (MAC) */
+ uint8_t msg_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
+};
+
+struct ntor3_server_handshake_state_t {
+ /** Relay's ed25519 identity key (ID) */
+ ed25519_public_key_t my_id;
+ /** Relay's public key (B) */
+ curve25519_public_key_t my_key;
+ /** Client's public ephemeral key (X). */
+ curve25519_public_key_t client_key;
+
+ /** Shared secret (Xb) */
+ uint8_t xb[CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN];
+ /** MAC of the client's encrypted message data */
+ uint8_t msg_mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
+};
+
+STATIC int onion_skin_ntor3_create_nokeygen(
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *client_keypair,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *relay_id,
+ const curve25519_public_key_t *relay_key,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ const size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *message,
+ const size_t message_len,
+ ntor3_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
+ uint8_t **onion_skin_out,
+ size_t *onion_skin_len_out);
+
+STATIC int onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2_nokeygen(
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *relay_keypair_y,
+ const ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *state,
+ const uint8_t *verification,
+ size_t verification_len,
+ const uint8_t *server_message,
+ size_t server_message_len,
+ uint8_t **handshake_out,
+ size_t *handshake_len_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out,
+ size_t keys_out_len);
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(TOR_CORE_CRYPTO_ONION_NTOR_V3_H) */
diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am
index b5e121d1ad..0dc1630044 100644
--- a/src/test/include.am
+++ b/src/test/include.am
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES += \
src/test/test_namemap.c \
src/test/test_netinfo.c \
src/test/test_nodelist.c \
+ src/test/test_ntor_v3.c \
src/test/test_oom.c \
src/test/test_oos.c \
src/test/test_options.c \
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 9543a24376..0aa1353ec2 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -707,6 +707,7 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = {
{ "netinfo/", netinfo_tests },
{ "nodelist/", nodelist_tests },
{ "oom/", oom_tests },
+ { "onion-handshake/ntor-v3/", ntor_v3_tests },
{ "oos/", oos_tests },
{ "options/", options_tests },
{ "options/act/", options_act_tests },
diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h
index 700aa70a4b..0a22043acc 100644
--- a/src/test/test.h
+++ b/src/test/test.h
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t microdesc_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t namemap_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t netinfo_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t nodelist_tests[];
+extern struct testcase_t ntor_v3_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t oom_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t oos_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t options_tests[];
diff --git a/src/test/test_ntor_v3.c b/src/test/test_ntor_v3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..096ac6668f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/test_ntor_v3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2021, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+#define ONION_NTOR_V3_PRIVATE
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "test/test.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor_v3.h"
+
+#define unhex(arry, s) \
+ { tt_int_op(sizeof(arry), OP_EQ, \
+ base16_decode((char*)arry, sizeof(arry), s, strlen(s))); \
+ }
+
+static void
+test_ntor3_testvecs(void *arg)
+{
+ (void)arg;
+ char *mem_op_hex_tmp = NULL; // temp val to make test_memeq_hex work.
+
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_t *relay_state = NULL;
+ uint8_t *onion_skin = NULL;
+ size_t onion_skin_len;
+ ntor3_handshake_state_t *client_state = NULL;
+ uint8_t *cm = NULL, *sm = NULL;
+ size_t cm_len, sm_len;
+ di_digest256_map_t *private_keys = NULL;
+ uint8_t *server_handshake = NULL;
+ size_t server_handshake_len;
+
+ // Test vectors from python implementation, confirmed with rust
+ // implementation.
+ curve25519_keypair_t relay_keypair_b;
+ curve25519_keypair_t client_keypair_x;
+ curve25519_keypair_t relay_keypair_y;
+ ed25519_public_key_t relay_id;
+
+ unhex(relay_keypair_b.seckey.secret_key,
+ "4051daa5921cfa2a1c27b08451324919538e79e788a81b38cbed097a5dff454a");
+ unhex(relay_keypair_b.pubkey.public_key,
+ "f8307a2bc1870b00b828bb74dbb8fd88e632a6375ab3bcd1ae706aaa8b6cdd1d");
+ unhex(relay_id.pubkey,
+ "9fad2af287ef942632833d21f946c6260c33fae6172b60006e86e4a6911753a2");
+ unhex(client_keypair_x.seckey.secret_key,
+ "b825a3719147bcbe5fb1d0b0fcb9c09e51948048e2e3283d2ab7b45b5ef38b49");
+ unhex(client_keypair_x.pubkey.public_key,
+ "252fe9ae91264c91d4ecb8501f79d0387e34ad8ca0f7c995184f7d11d5da4f46");
+ unhex(relay_keypair_y.seckey.secret_key,
+ "4865a5b7689dafd978f529291c7171bc159be076b92186405d13220b80e2a053");
+ unhex(relay_keypair_y.pubkey.public_key,
+ "4bf4814326fdab45ad5184f5518bd7fae25dc59374062698201a50a22954246d");
+
+ uint8_t client_message[11];
+ uint8_t verification[5];
+ unhex(client_message, "68656c6c6f20776f726c64");
+ unhex(verification, "78797a7a79");
+
+ // ========= Client handshake 1.
+
+ onion_skin_ntor3_create_nokeygen(
+ &client_keypair_x,
+ &relay_id,
+ &relay_keypair_b.pubkey,
+ verification,
+ sizeof(verification),
+ client_message,
+ sizeof(client_message),
+ &client_state,
+ &onion_skin,
+ &onion_skin_len);
+
+ const char expect_client_handshake[] = "9fad2af287ef942632833d21f946c6260c"
+ "33fae6172b60006e86e4a6911753a2f8307a2bc1870b00b828bb74dbb8fd88e632a6375"
+ "ab3bcd1ae706aaa8b6cdd1d252fe9ae91264c91d4ecb8501f79d0387e34ad8ca0f7c995"
+ "184f7d11d5da4f463bebd9151fd3b47c180abc9e044d53565f04d82bbb3bebed3d06cea"
+ "65db8be9c72b68cd461942088502f67";
+
+ tt_int_op(onion_skin_len, OP_EQ, strlen(expect_client_handshake)/2);
+ test_memeq_hex(onion_skin, expect_client_handshake);
+
+ // ========= Relay handshake.
+
+ dimap_add_entry(&private_keys,
+ relay_keypair_b.pubkey.public_key,
+ &relay_keypair_b);
+
+ int r = onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part1(
+ private_keys,
+ &client_keypair_x,
+ &relay_id,
+ onion_skin,
+ onion_skin_len,
+ verification,
+ sizeof(verification),
+ &cm,
+ &cm_len,
+ &relay_state);
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(cm_len, OP_EQ, sizeof(client_message));
+ tt_mem_op(cm, OP_EQ, client_message, cm_len);
+
+ uint8_t server_message[10];
+ unhex(server_message, "486f6c61204d756e646f");
+
+ uint8_t server_keys[256];
+ onion_skin_ntor3_server_handshake_part2_nokeygen(
+ &relay_keypair_y,
+ relay_state,
+ verification,
+ sizeof(verification),
+ server_message,
+ sizeof(server_message),
+ &server_handshake,
+ &server_handshake_len,
+ server_keys,
+ sizeof(server_keys));
+
+ const char expect_server_handshake[] = "4bf4814326fdab45ad5184f5518bd7fae25"
+ "dc59374062698201a50a22954246d2fc5f8773ca824542bc6cf6f57c7c29bbf4e5476461"
+ "ab130c5b18ab0a91276651202c3e1e87c0d32054c";
+ tt_int_op(server_handshake_len, OP_EQ, strlen(expect_server_handshake)/2);
+ test_memeq_hex(server_handshake, expect_server_handshake);
+
+ uint8_t expect_keys[256];
+ unhex(expect_keys, "9c19b631fd94ed86a817e01f6c80b0743a43f5faebd39cfaa8b00f"
+ "a8bcc65c3bfeaa403d91acbd68a821bf6ee8504602b094a254392a07737d5662768"
+ "c7a9fb1b2814bb34780eaee6e867c773e28c212ead563e98a1cd5d5b4576f5ee61c"
+ "59bde025ff2851bb19b721421694f263818e3531e43a9e4e3e2c661e2ad547d8984"
+ "caa28ebecd3e4525452299be26b9185a20a90ce1eac20a91f2832d731b54502b097"
+ "49b5a2a2949292f8cfcbeffb790c7790ed935a9d251e7e336148ea83b063a5618fc"
+ "ff674a44581585fd22077ca0e52c59a24347a38d1a1ceebddbf238541f226b8f88d"
+ "0fb9c07a1bcd2ea764bbbb5dacdaf5312a14c0b9e4f06309b0333b4a");
+ tt_mem_op(server_keys, OP_EQ, expect_keys, 256);
+
+ // ===== Client handshake 2
+
+ uint8_t client_keys[256];
+ r = onion_ntor3_client_handshake(
+ client_state,
+ server_handshake,
+ server_handshake_len,
+ verification,
+ sizeof(verification),
+ client_keys,
+ sizeof(client_keys),
+ &sm,
+ &sm_len);
+
+ tt_int_op(r, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(sm_len, OP_EQ, sizeof(server_message));
+ tt_mem_op(sm, OP_EQ, server_message, sizeof(server_message));
+ tt_mem_op(client_keys, OP_EQ, server_keys, 256);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(onion_skin);
+ tor_free(server_handshake);
+ tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp);
+ ntor3_handshake_state_free(client_state);
+ ntor3_server_handshake_state_free(relay_state);
+ tor_free(cm);
+ tor_free(sm);
+ dimap_free(private_keys, NULL);
+}
+
+struct testcase_t ntor_v3_tests[] = {
+ { "testvecs", test_ntor3_testvecs, 0, NULL, NULL, },
+ END_OF_TESTCASES,
+};
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