[tor-commits] [tor/master] or_connection_t: replace real_addr with canonical_orport.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Jul 17 15:44:45 UTC 2020
commit 7b3bd45cfe400deb2420afa0018c642402cc4f94
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Thu Jul 16 14:36:54 2020 -0400
or_connection_t: replace real_addr with canonical_orport.
Instead of replacing connection_t.{addr,port} with a canonical
orport, and tracking the truth in real_addr, we now leave
connection_t.addr alone, and put the canonical address in
canonical_orport.
Closes #40042
Closes #33898
---
changes/ticket33898 | 7 +++++
src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 32 +++++++-------------
src/core/or/channeltls.c | 30 +++++++++++--------
src/core/or/connection_or.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++-------------------------
src/core/or/dos.c | 12 ++++----
src/core/or/or_connection_st.h | 17 ++++++-----
src/test/test_channel.c | 4 +--
src/test/test_channeltls.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_connection.c | 18 +++++++-----
src/test/test_dos.c | 30 +++++++++++--------
10 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/ticket33898 b/changes/ticket33898
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c8d9d0009
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket33898
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+ o Minor features (relay address tracking):
+ - We store relay addresses for OR connections in a more logical way.
+ Previously we would sometimes overwrite the actual address of a
+ connection with a "canonical address", and then store the "real
+ address" elsewhere to remember it. We now track the "canonical address"
+ elsewhere for the cases where we need it, and leave the connection's
+ address alone. Closes ticket 33898.
diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
index 90fd35b527..b3c5e6f51c 100644
--- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
+++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c
@@ -434,14 +434,6 @@ connection_describe_peer_internal(const connection_t *conn,
} else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
/* For OR connections, we have a lot to do. */
const or_connection_t *or_conn = CONST_TO_OR_CONN(conn);
- /* we report 'real_addr' as the address we're talking with, if it's set.
- *
- * TODO: Eventually we should have 'addr' always mean the address on the
- * internet, and have a separate 'canonical_addr' field.
- */
- if (!tor_addr_is_null(&or_conn->real_addr)) {
- addr = &or_conn->real_addr;
- }
/* We report the IDs we're talking to... */
if (fast_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
// This could be a client, so scrub it. No identity to report.
@@ -453,13 +445,17 @@ connection_describe_peer_internal(const connection_t *conn,
tor_snprintf(extra_buf, sizeof(extra_buf),
" ID=%s", id_buf);
}
- if (! tor_addr_eq(addr, &conn->addr) && !scrub) {
+ if (! scrub && (! tor_addr_eq(addr, &or_conn->canonical_orport.addr) ||
+ conn->port != or_conn->canonical_orport.port)) {
/* We report canonical address, if it's different */
char canonical_addr_buf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
- if (tor_addr_to_str(canonical_addr_buf, &conn->addr,
+ if (tor_addr_to_str(canonical_addr_buf, &or_conn->canonical_orport.addr,
sizeof(canonical_addr_buf), 1)) {
- strlcat(extra_buf, " canonical_addr=", sizeof(extra_buf));
- strlcat(extra_buf, canonical_addr_buf, sizeof(extra_buf));
+ tor_snprintf(extra_buf+strlen(extra_buf),
+ sizeof(extra_buf)-strlen(extra_buf),
+ " canonical_addr=%s:%"PRIu16,
+ canonical_addr_buf,
+ or_conn->canonical_orport.port);
}
}
} else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT) {
@@ -570,6 +566,7 @@ or_connection_new(int type, int socket_family)
tor_assert(type == CONN_TYPE_OR || type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
connection_init(now, TO_CONN(or_conn), type, socket_family);
+ tor_addr_make_unspec(&or_conn->canonical_orport.addr);
connection_or_set_canonical(or_conn, 0);
if (type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR)
@@ -2252,16 +2249,7 @@ connection_connect_log_client_use_ip_version(const connection_t *conn)
? fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_orport(options)
: fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport(options));
tor_addr_t real_addr;
- tor_addr_make_null(&real_addr, AF_UNSPEC);
-
- /* OR conns keep the original address in real_addr, as addr gets overwritten
- * with the descriptor address */
- if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
- const or_connection_t *or_conn = CONST_TO_OR_CONN(conn);
- tor_addr_copy(&real_addr, &or_conn->real_addr);
- } else if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) {
- tor_addr_copy(&real_addr, &conn->addr);
- }
+ tor_addr_copy(&real_addr, &conn->addr);
/* Check if we broke a mandatory address family restriction */
if ((must_ipv4 && tor_addr_family(&real_addr) == AF_INET6)
diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
index 90049a7e5c..7ec977be3c 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
@@ -548,14 +548,8 @@ channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(const channel_t *chan,
return 0;
}
- if (! tor_addr_is_null(&tlschan->conn->real_addr)) {
- /* They want the real address, and real_addr is set. */
- tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &(tlschan->conn->real_addr));
- } else {
- /* We'll have to give them the nominal address, which hopefully has
- * not been overwritten yet. */
- tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr);
- }
+ /* They want the real address, so give it to them. */
+ tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr);
return 1;
}
@@ -692,6 +686,16 @@ channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan,
return 0;
}
+ const tor_addr_port_t *orport = &tlschan->conn->canonical_orport;
+ // If the canonical address is set, then we'll allow matches based on that.
+ if (! tor_addr_is_unspec(&orport->addr)) {
+ if (extend_info_has_orport(extend_info, &orport->addr, orport->port)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // We also want to match if the true address and port are listed in the
+ // extend info.
return extend_info_has_orport(extend_info,
&TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr,
TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->port);
@@ -722,8 +726,8 @@ channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan,
return 0;
}
- /* real_addr is the address this connection came from.
- * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
+ /* addr is the address this connection came from.
+ * canonical_orport is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
* to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to
* allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would
* enable someone who steals a relay's keys to covertly impersonate/MITM it
@@ -734,7 +738,7 @@ channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan,
* An adversary who has stolen a relay's keys could also post a fake relay
* descriptor, but that attack is easier to detect.
*/
- return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target);
+ return tor_addr_eq(&TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr, target);
}
/**
@@ -1883,7 +1887,7 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
* might be doing something funny, but nobody else is doing a MITM
* on the relay's TCP.
*/
- if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &(chan->conn->real_addr))) {
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &TO_CONN(chan->conn)->addr)) {
connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1);
break;
}
@@ -1921,7 +1925,7 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
* we were unable to resolve it previously. The endpoint address is passed
* in order to make sure to never consider an address that is the same as
* our endpoint. */
- relay_address_new_suggestion(&my_apparent_addr, &chan->conn->real_addr,
+ relay_address_new_suggestion(&my_apparent_addr, &TO_CONN(chan->conn)->addr,
identity_digest);
if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_or.c b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
index 91dcbe695b..0795521be0 100644
--- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@ -893,7 +893,9 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
conn->base_.port = port;
tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
- tor_addr_copy(&conn->real_addr, addr);
+ if (! conn->base_.address) {
+ conn->base_.address = tor_strdup(fmt_addr(addr));
+ }
connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
}
@@ -905,9 +907,10 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
static void
connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
{
+ (void) started_here;
+
const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
- const tor_addr_t *addr = &conn->real_addr;
if (conn->chan)
ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
@@ -936,34 +939,17 @@ connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
} else {
node_ap = &node_ipv6_ap;
}
- if (!started_here) {
- /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
- * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
- * its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
- /* XXXX arma: this is stupid, and it's the reason we need real_addr
- * to track is_canonical properly. What requires it? */
- /* XXXX <arma> i believe the reason we did this, originally, is because
- * we wanted to log what OR a connection was to, and if we logged the
- * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we
- * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2.
- */
- /* See #33898 for a ticket that resolves this technical debt. */
- tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap->addr);
- conn->base_.port = node_ap->port;
- }
+ /* Remember the canonical addr/port so our log messages will make
+ sense. */
+ tor_addr_port_copy(&conn->canonical_orport, node_ap);
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
- tor_free(conn->base_.address);
- conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap->addr);
} else {
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-
- tor_free(conn->base_.address);
- conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(addr);
}
/*
@@ -1144,8 +1130,8 @@ connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
(int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
- } else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
- &best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
+ } else if (tor_addr_eq(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
+ &TO_CONN(best)->addr)) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"Marking %s unsuitable for new circuits: "
"(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). We have a better "
@@ -1275,7 +1261,7 @@ static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
- or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &or_conn->real_addr,
+ or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
return ocf;
}
@@ -1653,8 +1639,8 @@ connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving))
log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
return -1;
}
- tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls, // XXX client and relay?
- escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address));
+ tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls,
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
@@ -1801,18 +1787,15 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
- const char *safe_address =
- started_here ? conn->base_.address :
- safe_str_client(conn->base_.address);
const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
int has_cert = 0;
check_no_tls_errors();
has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
if (started_here && !has_cert) {
- log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
+ log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s, but it didn't "
"send a cert! Closing.",
- safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
return -1;
} else if (!has_cert) {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
@@ -1824,9 +1807,9 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
if (started_here && v<0) {
- log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
+ log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s: It"
" has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
- safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
return -1;
} else if (v<0) {
log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
@@ -1834,7 +1817,8 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
} else {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
"The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
- "with %s:%d", conn_type, safe_address, conn->base_.port);
+ "with %s", conn_type,
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
}
check_no_tls_errors();
}
@@ -2027,9 +2011,14 @@ connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
/* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
* just discovered it to be canonical. */
connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, conn->handshake_state->started_here);
+ if (conn->tls)
+ tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls,
+ connection_describe_peer(TO_CONN(conn)));
}
if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
+ // We don't want to use canonical_orport here -- we want the address
+ // that we really used.
dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
(const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
}
@@ -2507,11 +2496,9 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn))
netinfo_cell_set_timestamp(netinfo_cell, (uint32_t)now);
/* Their address. */
- const tor_addr_t *remote_tor_addr =
- !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr) ? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr;
- /* We use &conn->real_addr below, unless it hasn't yet been set. If it
- * hasn't yet been set, we know that base_.addr hasn't been tampered with
- * yet either. */
+ const tor_addr_t *remote_tor_addr = &TO_CONN(conn)->addr;
+ /* We can safely use TO_CONN(conn)->addr here, since we no longer replace
+ * it with a canonical address. */
netinfo_addr_t *their_addr = netinfo_addr_from_tor_addr(remote_tor_addr);
netinfo_cell_set_other_addr(netinfo_cell, their_addr);
diff --git a/src/core/or/dos.c b/src/core/or/dos.c
index 5f99280030..41bf303ffe 100644
--- a/src/core/or/dos.c
+++ b/src/core/or/dos.c
@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ dos_geoip_entry_about_to_free(const clientmap_entry_t *geoip_ent)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_connection_array(), connection_t *, conn) {
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
- if (!tor_addr_compare(&geoip_ent->addr, &or_conn->real_addr,
+ if (!tor_addr_compare(&geoip_ent->addr, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
CMP_EXACT)) {
or_conn->tracked_for_dos_mitigation = 0;
}
@@ -696,12 +696,12 @@ dos_new_client_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn, const char *transport_name)
* reason to do so is because network reentry is possible where a client
* connection comes from an Exit node. Even when we'll fix reentry, this is
* a robust defense to keep in place. */
- if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&or_conn->real_addr)) {
+ if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr)) {
goto end;
}
/* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */
- entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn->real_addr, transport_name,
+ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr, transport_name,
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
if (BUG(entry == NULL)) {
/* Should never happen because we note down the address in the geoip
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ dos_new_client_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn, const char *transport_name)
entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count++;
or_conn->tracked_for_dos_mitigation = 1;
log_debug(LD_DOS, "Client address %s has now %u concurrent connections.",
- fmt_addr(&or_conn->real_addr),
+ fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr),
entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count);
end:
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ dos_close_client_conn(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
}
/* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */
- entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn->real_addr, NULL,
+ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr, NULL,
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
if (entry == NULL) {
/* This can happen because we can close a connection before the channel
@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ dos_close_client_conn(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count--;
log_debug(LD_DOS, "Client address %s has lost a connection. Concurrent "
"connections are now at %u",
- fmt_addr(&or_conn->real_addr),
+ fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr),
entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count);
end:
diff --git a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h
index 2507f90803..8e012a6b85 100644
--- a/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h
+++ b/src/core/or/or_connection_st.h
@@ -50,17 +50,18 @@ struct or_connection_t {
channel_tls_t *chan;
/**
- * The actual address (as modified by any proxies) that this connection
- * came from or went to. (See connection_t.addr for caveats.)
+ * The "canonical" address and port for this relay's ORPort, if this is
+ * a known relay.
*
- * TECHNICAL DEBT:
+ * An ORPort is "canonical" in this sense only if it is the same ORPort
+ * that is listed for this identity in the consensus we have.
*
- * This field shouldn't really exist. We need it because our code
- * overwrites conenction_t.addr with the "canonical address" of the OR we
- * are talking to, taken from the descriptor of the authenticated OR.
- * That's a bad choice.
+ * This field may be set on outbound connections for _any_ relay, and on
+ * inbound connections after authentication. If we don't know the relay's
+ * identity, or if we don't have the relay's identity in our consensus, we
+ * leave this address as UNSPEC.
**/
- tor_addr_t real_addr;
+ tor_addr_port_t canonical_orport;
/** Should this connection be used for extending circuits to the server
* matching the <b>identity_digest</b> field? Set to true if we're pretty
diff --git a/src/test/test_channel.c b/src/test/test_channel.c
index 14d8a4eae7..c7d4343ede 100644
--- a/src/test/test_channel.c
+++ b/src/test/test_channel.c
@@ -1554,11 +1554,11 @@ test_channel_listener(void *arg)
#define TEST_SETUP_MATCHES_ADDR(orcon, addr, src, rv) STMT_BEGIN \
rv = tor_inet_pton(addr.family, src, &addr.addr); \
tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, 1); \
- orcon->real_addr = addr; \
+ orcon->base_.addr = addr; \
STMT_END;
#define TEST_MATCHES_ADDR(chan, addr4, addr6, rv, exp) STMT_BEGIN \
- rv = channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, addr4, addr6); \
+ rv = channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, addr4, addr6); \
tt_int_op(rv, OP_EQ, exp); \
STMT_END;
diff --git a/src/test/test_channeltls.c b/src/test/test_channeltls.c
index f682c57acf..0227779e8b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_channeltls.c
+++ b/src/test/test_channeltls.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ tlschan_connection_or_connect_mock(const tor_addr_t *addr,
result->base_.port = port;
memcpy(result->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
result->chan = tlschan;
- memcpy(&(result->real_addr), addr, sizeof(tor_addr_t));
+ memcpy(&result->base_.addr, addr, sizeof(tor_addr_t));
result->tls = (tor_tls_t *)((void *)(&fake_tortls));
done:
diff --git a/src/test/test_connection.c b/src/test/test_connection.c
index e9be04656b..954aeb82e3 100644
--- a/src/test/test_connection.c
+++ b/src/test/test_connection.c
@@ -911,7 +911,8 @@ test_failed_orconn_tracker(void *arg)
/* Prepare the OR connection that will be used in this test */
or_connection_t or_conn;
- tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr, "18.0.0.1"));
+ tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.canonical_orport.addr,
+ "18.0.0.1"));
tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.base_.addr, "18.0.0.1"));
or_conn.base_.port = 1;
memset(or_conn.identity_digest, 'c', sizeof(or_conn.identity_digest));
@@ -1048,17 +1049,20 @@ test_conn_describe(void *arg)
tt_str_op(connection_describe(conn), OP_EQ,
"OR connection (open) with [ffff:3333:1111::2]:8080 "
"ID=0000000700000000000000000000000000000000");
- // Add a 'real address' that is the same as the one we have.
- tor_addr_parse(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->real_addr, "[ffff:3333:1111::2]");
+ // Add a 'canonical address' that is the same as the one we have.
+ tor_addr_parse(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->canonical_orport.addr,
+ "[ffff:3333:1111::2]");
+ TO_OR_CONN(conn)->canonical_orport.port = 8080;
tt_str_op(connection_describe(conn), OP_EQ,
"OR connection (open) with [ffff:3333:1111::2]:8080 "
"ID=0000000700000000000000000000000000000000");
- // Add a different 'real address'
- tor_addr_parse(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->real_addr, "[ffff:3333:1111::8]");
+ // Add a different 'canonical address'
+ tor_addr_parse(&TO_OR_CONN(conn)->canonical_orport.addr,
+ "[ffff:3333:1111::8]");
tt_str_op(connection_describe(conn), OP_EQ,
- "OR connection (open) with [ffff:3333:1111::8]:8080 "
+ "OR connection (open) with [ffff:3333:1111::2]:8080 "
"ID=0000000700000000000000000000000000000000 "
- "canonical_addr=[ffff:3333:1111::2]");
+ "canonical_addr=[ffff:3333:1111::8]:8080");
// Clear identity_digest so that free_minimal won't complain.
memset(TO_OR_CONN(conn)->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
diff --git a/src/test/test_dos.c b/src/test/test_dos.c
index 7378efd426..850bbef59b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dos.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dos.c
@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ test_dos_conn_creation(void *arg)
/* Initialize test data */
or_connection_t or_conn;
time_t now = 1281533250; /* 2010-08-11 13:27:30 UTC */
- tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr,
+ tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
"18.0.0.1"));
- tor_addr_t *addr = &or_conn.real_addr;
+ tor_addr_t *addr = &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr;
/* Get DoS subsystem limits */
dos_init();
@@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ test_dos_circuit_creation(void *arg)
/* Initialize test data */
or_connection_t or_conn;
time_t now = 1281533250; /* 2010-08-11 13:27:30 UTC */
- tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr,
+ tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
"18.0.0.1"));
- tor_addr_t *addr = &or_conn.real_addr;
+ tor_addr_t *addr = &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr;
/* Get DoS subsystem limits */
dos_init();
@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ test_dos_bucket_refill(void *arg)
channel_init(chan);
chan->is_client = 1;
or_connection_t or_conn;
- tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr,
+ tt_int_op(AF_INET,OP_EQ, tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
"18.0.0.1"));
- tor_addr_t *addr = &or_conn.real_addr;
+ tor_addr_t *addr = &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr;
/* Initialize DoS subsystem and get relevant limits */
dos_init();
@@ -443,10 +443,10 @@ test_known_relay(void *arg)
/* Setup an OR conn so we can pass it to the DoS subsystem. */
or_connection_t or_conn;
- tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr, "42.42.42.42");
+ tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, "42.42.42.42");
rs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rs));
- tor_addr_copy(&rs->ipv4_addr, &or_conn.real_addr);
+ tor_addr_copy(&rs->ipv4_addr, &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr);
crypto_rand(rs->identity_digest, sizeof(rs->identity_digest));
smartlist_add(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list, rs);
@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@ test_known_relay(void *arg)
/* We have now a node in our list so we'll make sure we don't count it as a
* client connection. */
- geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &or_conn.real_addr, NULL, 0);
+ geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
+ NULL, 0);
/* Suppose we have 5 connections in rapid succession, the counter should
* always be 0 because we should ignore this. */
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
@@ -465,18 +466,21 @@ test_known_relay(void *arg)
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
- entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn.real_addr, NULL, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
+ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, NULL,
+ GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
tt_assert(entry);
/* We should have a count of 0. */
tt_uint_op(entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count, OP_EQ, 0);
/* To make sure that his is working properly, make a unknown client
* connection and see if we do get it. */
- tor_addr_parse(&or_conn.real_addr, "42.42.42.43");
- geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &or_conn.real_addr, NULL, 0);
+ tor_addr_parse(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, "42.42.42.43");
+ geoip_note_client_seen(GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT, &TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr,
+ NULL, 0);
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
dos_new_client_conn(&or_conn, NULL);
- entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn.real_addr, NULL, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
+ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&TO_CONN(&or_conn)->addr, NULL,
+ GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
tt_assert(entry);
/* We should have a count of 2. */
tt_uint_op(entry->dos_stats.concurrent_count, OP_EQ, 2);
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