[tor-commits] [tor-browser-build/maint-9.5] No need for the 0.4.3.6 patch file anymore
gk at torproject.org
gk at torproject.org
Sun Aug 23 19:55:25 UTC 2020
commit bad091590e3d4db6995ccfe5efa03756e5e7234f
Author: Georg Koppen <gk at torproject.org>
Date: Sun Aug 23 19:54:50 2020 +0000
No need for the 0.4.3.6 patch file anymore
Thanks cypherpunk.
---
...ve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch | 212 ---------------------
1 file changed, 212 deletions(-)
diff --git a/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch b/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1432039..0000000
--- a/projects/tor/0001-hs-v3-Improve-accessor-semantic-of-client-cached-obj.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-From 1810771799dd0b434ac2b5926297d64e383582e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
-Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 10:58:51 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] hs-v3: Improve accessor semantic of client cached object
-
-Add an inline helper function that indicates if the cached object contains a
-decrypted descriptor or not.
-
-The descriptor object is NULL if tor is unable to decrypt it (lacking client
-authorization) and some actions need to be done only when we have a decrypted
-object.
-
-This improves code semantic.
-
-Fixes #33458
-
-Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
----
- src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- src/test/test_hs_client.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 2 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-index 9cf408ca3e..44cd2505fd 100644
---- a/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_cache.c
-@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@
- static int cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(time_t now,
- const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *cached_desc);
-
-+/** Helper function: Return true iff the cache entry has a decrypted
-+ * descriptor.
-+ *
-+ * A NULL desc object in the entry means that we were not able to decrypt the
-+ * descriptor because we are likely lacking client authorization. It is still
-+ * a valid entry but some operations can't be done without the decrypted
-+ * descriptor thus this function MUST be used to safe guard access to the
-+ * decrypted desc object. */
-+static inline bool
-+entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry)
-+{
-+ tor_assert(entry);
-+ return (entry->desc != NULL);
-+}
-+
- /********************** Directory HS cache ******************/
-
- /** Directory descriptor cache. Map indexed by blinded key. */
-@@ -341,8 +356,23 @@ static digest256map_t *hs_cache_client_intro_state;
- static size_t
- cache_get_client_entry_size(const hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *entry)
- {
-- return sizeof(*entry) +
-- strlen(entry->encoded_desc) + hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc);
-+ size_t size = 0;
-+
-+ if (entry == NULL) {
-+ goto end;
-+ }
-+ size += sizeof(*entry);
-+
-+ if (entry->encoded_desc) {
-+ size += strlen(entry->encoded_desc);
-+ }
-+
-+ if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) {
-+ size += hs_desc_obj_size(entry->desc);
-+ }
-+
-+ end:
-+ return size;
- }
-
- /** Remove a given descriptor from our cache. */
-@@ -659,14 +689,20 @@ cache_store_as_client(hs_cache_client_descriptor_t *client_desc)
- * client authorization. */
- cache_entry = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(client_desc->key.pubkey);
- if (cache_entry != NULL) {
-- /* Signalling an undecrypted descriptor. We'll always replace the one we
-- * have with the new one just fetched. */
-- if (cache_entry->desc == NULL) {
-+ /* If the current or the new cache entry don't have a decrypted descriptor
-+ * (missing client authorization), we always replace the current one with
-+ * the new one. Reason is that we can't inspect the revision counter
-+ * within the plaintext data so we blindly replace. */
-+ if (!entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cache_entry) ||
-+ !entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(client_desc)) {
- remove_v3_desc_as_client(cache_entry);
- cache_client_desc_free(cache_entry);
- goto store;
- }
-
-+ /* From this point on, we know that the decrypted descriptor is in the
-+ * current entry and new object thus safe to access. */
-+
- /* If we have an entry in our cache that has a revision counter greater
- * than the one we just fetched, discard the one we fetched. */
- if (cache_entry->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter >
-@@ -740,11 +776,15 @@ cache_clean_v3_as_client(time_t now)
- MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
- entry_size = cache_get_client_entry_size(entry);
- bytes_removed += entry_size;
-+
- /* We just removed an old descriptor. We need to close all intro circuits
-- * so we don't have leftovers that can be selected while lacking a
-- * descriptor. We leave the rendezvous circuits opened because they could
-- * be in use. */
-- hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc);
-+ * if the descriptor is decrypted so we don't have leftovers that can be
-+ * selected while lacking a descriptor. Circuits are selected by intro
-+ * authentication key thus we need the descriptor. We leave the rendezvous
-+ * circuits opened because they could be in use. */
-+ if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(entry)) {
-+ hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(entry->desc);
-+ }
- /* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */
- cache_client_desc_free(entry);
- /* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
-@@ -793,7 +833,7 @@ hs_cache_lookup_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
- tor_assert(key);
-
- cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(key->pubkey);
-- if (cached_desc && cached_desc->desc) {
-+ if (cached_desc && entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
- return cached_desc->desc;
- }
-
-@@ -866,7 +906,7 @@ hs_cache_remove_as_client(const ed25519_public_key_t *key)
- /* If we have a decrypted/decoded descriptor, attempt to close its
- * introduction circuit(s). We shouldn't have circuit(s) without a
- * descriptor else it will lead to a failure. */
-- if (cached_desc->desc) {
-+ if (entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
- hs_client_close_intro_circuits_from_desc(cached_desc->desc);
- }
- /* Remove and free. */
-@@ -995,7 +1035,7 @@ hs_cache_client_new_auth_parse(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
- }
-
- cached_desc = lookup_v3_desc_as_client(service_pk->pubkey);
-- if (cached_desc == NULL || cached_desc->desc != NULL) {
-+ if (cached_desc == NULL || entry_has_decrypted_descriptor(cached_desc)) {
- /* No entry for that service or the descriptor is already decoded. */
- goto end;
- }
-diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-index 5f7fe9c404..bff71d2645 100644
---- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-+++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
-@@ -965,6 +965,7 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg)
- (void) arg;
-
- hs_init();
-+ rend_cache_init();
-
- /* This is needed because of the client cache expiration timestamp is based
- * on having a consensus. See cached_client_descriptor_has_expired(). */
-@@ -989,6 +990,51 @@ test_close_intro_circuits_new_desc(void *arg)
- circ->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
- ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
-
-+ /* Build a descriptor _without_ client authorization and thus not
-+ * decryptable. Make sure the close circuit code path is not triggered. */
-+ {
-+ char *desc_encoded = NULL;
-+ uint8_t descriptor_cookie[HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN];
-+ curve25519_keypair_t client_kp;
-+ hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
-+
-+ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, curve25519_keypair_generate(&client_kp, 0));
-+ crypto_rand((char *) descriptor_cookie, sizeof(descriptor_cookie));
-+
-+ desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_client_auth(descriptor_cookie,
-+ &client_kp.pubkey,
-+ &service_kp);
-+ tt_assert(desc);
-+ ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, descriptor_cookie,
-+ &desc_encoded);
-+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-+ /* Associate descriptor intro key with the dummy circuit. */
-+ const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip =
-+ smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0);
-+ tt_assert(ip);
-+ ocirc->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_kp.pubkey);
-+ ed25519_pubkey_copy(ô->hs_ident->intro_auth_pk,
-+ &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key);
-+ hs_descriptor_free(desc);
-+ tt_assert(desc_encoded);
-+ /* Put it in the cache. Should not be decrypted since the client
-+ * authorization creds were not added to the global map. */
-+ ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_encoded, &service_kp.pubkey);
-+ tor_free(desc_encoded);
-+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_DESC_DECODE_NEED_CLIENT_AUTH);
-+
-+ /* Clean cache with a future timestamp. It will trigger the clean up and
-+ * attempt to close the circuit but only if the descriptor is decryptable.
-+ * Cache object should be removed and circuit untouched. */
-+ hs_cache_clean_as_client(mock_ns.valid_after + (60 * 60 * 24));
-+ tt_assert(!hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey));
-+
-+ /* Make sure the circuit still there. */
-+ tt_assert(circuit_get_next_intro_circ(NULL, true));
-+ /* Get rid of the ident, it will be replaced in the next tests. */
-+ hs_ident_circuit_free(ocirc->hs_ident);
-+ }
-+
- /* Build the first descriptor and cache it. */
- {
- char *encoded;
---
-2.20.1
-
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