[tor-commits] [torspec/master] fix three small typos in the specs

arma at torproject.org arma at torproject.org
Sun Aug 9 04:31:51 UTC 2020


commit a9065681989ec3497914979c1999edebda37b9f4
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date:   Sun Aug 9 00:31:19 2020 -0400

    fix three small typos in the specs
---
 proposals/214-longer-circids.txt        | 2 +-
 proposals/295-relay-crypto-with-adl.txt | 2 +-
 rend-spec-v3.txt                        | 2 +-
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/proposals/214-longer-circids.txt b/proposals/214-longer-circids.txt
index 9494984..b5bd88a 100644
--- a/proposals/214-longer-circids.txt
+++ b/proposals/214-longer-circids.txt
@@ -89,6 +89,6 @@ Implemented-In: 0.2.4.11-alpha
    * How hard is this to implement?
 
      I wasn't sure, so I coded it up.  I've got a probably-buggy
-     implementation in branch "wide_cird_ids" in my public repository.
+     implementation in branch "wide_circ_ids" in my public repository.
      Be afraid!  More testing is needed!
 
diff --git a/proposals/295-relay-crypto-with-adl.txt b/proposals/295-relay-crypto-with-adl.txt
index a1752df..7f8fc42 100644
--- a/proposals/295-relay-crypto-with-adl.txt
+++ b/proposals/295-relay-crypto-with-adl.txt
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ Status: Open
    guarantees as SHA256, it is worth discussing why security is not
    lost from computing the running digest differently.
 
-   The running digets is used to ensure that if the same payload is
+   The running digest is used to ensure that if the same payload is
    encrypted twice, then the resulting ciphertext does not remain
    the same. Therefore, all that is needed is that the digest should
    repeat with low probability. GHASH is a universal hash function,
diff --git a/rend-spec-v3.txt b/rend-spec-v3.txt
index b067731..8059017 100644
--- a/rend-spec-v3.txt
+++ b/rend-spec-v3.txt
@@ -1934,7 +1934,7 @@ Table of contents:
    extended ntor handshake, as described in tor-spec.txt section 5.1.4,
    with the modified PROTOID as given above. To be explicit, the hidden
    service host generates a keypair of y,Y = KEYGEN(), and uses its
-   introduction point encryption key 'b' to computes:
+   introduction point encryption key 'b' to compute:
 
       intro_secret_hs_input = EXP(X,b) | AUTH_KEY | X | B | PROTOID
       info = m_hsexpand | subcredential



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