[tor-commits] [community/staging] Fix onion services overview image paths

pili at torproject.org pili at torproject.org
Thu Jun 6 10:09:42 UTC 2019


commit f0baed054c6738f675bb2bff46f045405e4970d2
Author: Pili Guerra <pili at piliguerra.com>
Date:   Thu Jun 6 12:08:59 2019 +0200

    Fix onion services overview image paths
---
 content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr b/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
index f62f927..f940fa2 100644
--- a/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
+++ b/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Here is a detailed breakdown of how this happens:
 
 ### Act 1: Where the onion service sets up its introduction points
 
-![Onion Services: Step 1](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-1.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 1](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-1.png)
 
 As the first step in the protocol, Bob (the onion service) contacts a bunch of Tor relays and asks them to act as his _introduction points_, by establishing long-term circuits to them.
 These circuits are anonymized circuits, so Bob does not reveal his locations to his introduction points.
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ As part of this step, Bob gives its introduction point a special "authentication
 
 ### Act 2: Where the onion service publishes its descriptors
 
-![Onion Services: Step 2](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-2.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 2](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-2.png)
 
 Now that the introduction points are setup, we need to create a way for clients to be able to find them.
 
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ Bob uses an anonymized Tor circuit to do this upload, so that he does not reveal
 All the previous steps were just setup for the onion service so that it's reachable by clients.
 Now let's fast-forward to the point where an actual client wants to visit the service:
 
-![Onion Services: Step 3](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-3.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 3](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-3.png)
 
 In this case, Alice (the client) has the onion address of Bob and she wants to visit it, so she connects to it with her Tor Browser.
 Now the next thing that needs to happen is that Alice goes to the _distributed hash table_ from the step above, and ask for the signed descriptor of Bob.
@@ -100,14 +100,14 @@ Alice asks the relay to become her _rendezvous point_ and gives it an "one-time
 
 ### Act 5: Where the client introduces itself to the onion service
 
-![Onion Services: Step 4](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-4.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 4](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-4.png)
 
 Now, Alice goes ahead and connects to one of Bob's introduction points and introduces herself to Bob.
 Through this introduction Bob learns Alice's choice of rendezvous point and the "one-time secret".
 
 ### Act 6: Where the onion service rendezvous with the client
 
-![Onion Services: Step 5](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-5.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 5](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-5.png)
 
 In this last act, the onion service is now aware of Alice's rendezvous point.
 The onion service connects to the rendezvous point (through an anonymized circuit) and sends the "one-time secret" to it.
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages from client t
 In general, the complete connection between client and onion service consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client with the third being the rendezvous point and the other 3 were picked by the onion service.
 This provides _location hiding_ to this connection:
 
-![Onion Services: Step 6](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-6.png)
+![Onion Services: Step 6](/static/images/onion-services/overview/tor-onion-services-6.png)
 
 ## Further resources
 



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