[tor-commits] [tor/master] hs-v3: Disallow single hop client to post/get a descriptor

asn at torproject.org asn at torproject.org
Mon Aug 19 15:06:16 UTC 2019


commit ef2123c7c7bbf0cb6ec2a5528bae082d51ea8962
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
Date:   Wed Jun 19 12:02:41 2019 -0400

    hs-v3: Disallow single hop client to post/get a descriptor
    
    Closes #24964
    
    Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
---
 changes/ticket24964               |  4 +++
 src/feature/dircache/dircache.c   | 13 ++++----
 src/feature/dircommon/directory.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/feature/dircommon/directory.h |  1 +
 src/test/test_hs_cache.c          | 23 +++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/ticket24964 b/changes/ticket24964
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..171c86eb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket24964
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+  o Minor feature (onion service v3):
+    - Do not allow single hop client to fetch or post an HS descriptor from an
+      HSDir. Closes ticket 24964;
+
diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c b/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c
index 1b36f716f..7c6af3582 100644
--- a/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c
+++ b/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c
@@ -1390,8 +1390,9 @@ handle_get_hs_descriptor_v3(dir_connection_t *conn,
   const char *pubkey_str = NULL;
   const char *url = args->url;
 
-  /* Reject unencrypted dir connections */
-  if (!connection_dir_is_encrypted(conn)) {
+  /* Reject non anonymous dir connections (which also tests if encrypted). We
+   * do not allow single hop clients to query an HSDir. */
+  if (!connection_dir_is_anonymous(conn)) {
     write_short_http_response(conn, 404, "Not found");
     goto done;
   }
@@ -1632,10 +1633,10 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
     goto done;
   }
 
-  /* Handle HS descriptor publish request. */
-  /* XXX: This should be disabled with a consensus param until we want to
-   * the prop224 be deployed and thus use. */
-  if (connection_dir_is_encrypted(conn) && !strcmpstart(url, "/tor/hs/")) {
+  /* Handle HS descriptor publish request. We force an anonymous connection
+   * (which also tests for encrypted). We do not allow single-hop client to
+   * post a descriptor onto an HSDir. */
+  if (connection_dir_is_anonymous(conn) && !strcmpstart(url, "/tor/hs/")) {
     const char *msg = "HS descriptor stored successfully.";
 
     /* We most probably have a publish request for an HS descriptor. */
diff --git a/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c b/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c
index 9e6f72e9a..b3db0aa10 100644
--- a/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c
+++ b/src/feature/dircommon/directory.c
@@ -7,6 +7,10 @@
 
 #include "app/config/config.h"
 #include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
+#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
 #include "feature/dircache/dircache.h"
 #include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
 #include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
@@ -15,6 +19,10 @@
 #include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
 #include "lib/compress/compress.h"
 
+#include "core/or/circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
 #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
 
@@ -167,6 +175,67 @@ connection_dir_is_encrypted(const dir_connection_t *conn)
   return TO_CONN(conn)->linked;
 }
 
+/** Return true iff the given directory connection <b>dir_conn</b> is
+ * anonymous, that is, it is on a circuit via a public relay and not directly
+ * from a client or bridge.
+ *
+ * For client circuits via relays: true for 2-hop+ paths.
+ * For client circuits via bridges: true for 3-hop+ paths.
+ *
+ * This first test if the connection is encrypted since it is a strong
+ * requirement for anonymity. */
+bool
+connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *dir_conn)
+{
+  const connection_t *conn, *linked_conn;
+  const edge_connection_t *edge_conn;
+  const circuit_t *circ;
+
+  tor_assert(dir_conn);
+
+  if (!connection_dir_is_encrypted(dir_conn)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Buckle up, we'll do a deep dive into the connection in order to get the
+   * final connection channel of that connection in order to figure out if
+   * this is a client or relay link.
+   *
+   * We go: dir_conn -> linked_conn -> edge_conn -> on_circuit -> p_chan.
+   */
+
+  conn = TO_CONN(dir_conn);
+  linked_conn = conn->linked_conn;
+
+  /* The dir connection should be connected to an edge connection. It can not
+   * be closed or marked for close. */
+  if (linked_conn == NULL || linked_conn->magic != EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC ||
+      conn->linked_conn_is_closed || conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
+    log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not linked to edge");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  edge_conn = TO_EDGE_CONN((connection_t *) linked_conn);
+  circ = edge_conn->on_circuit;
+
+  /* Can't be a circuit we initiated and without a circuit, no channel. */
+  if (circ == NULL || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
+    log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: not on OR circuit");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  /* Get the previous channel to learn if it is a client or relay link. */
+  if (BUG(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan == NULL)) {
+    log_info(LD_DIR, "Rejected HSDir request: no p_chan");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  /* Will be true if the channel is an unauthenticated peer which is only true
+   * for clients and bridges. */
+  return !channel_is_client(CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan);
+}
+
 /** Parse an HTTP request line at the start of a headers string.  On failure,
  * return -1.  On success, set *<b>command_out</b> to a copy of the HTTP
  * command ("get", "post", etc), set *<b>url_out</b> to a copy of the URL, and
diff --git a/src/feature/dircommon/directory.h b/src/feature/dircommon/directory.h
index ba3f8c1b0..4fc743ad3 100644
--- a/src/feature/dircommon/directory.h
+++ b/src/feature/dircommon/directory.h
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ int parse_http_command(const char *headers,
 char *http_get_header(const char *headers, const char *which);
 
 int connection_dir_is_encrypted(const dir_connection_t *conn);
+bool connection_dir_is_anonymous(const dir_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_dir_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_dir_process_inbuf(dir_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_dir_finished_flushing(dir_connection_t *conn);
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
index d71f8b6b1..86ac7e7fb 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #define DIRCACHE_PRIVATE
 #define DIRCLIENT_PRIVATE
 #define HS_CACHE_PRIVATE
+#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
 
 #include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
 #include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h"
@@ -20,7 +21,12 @@
 #include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
 #include "core/proto/proto_http.h"
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/channel.h"
 
+#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
 #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
 
@@ -232,6 +238,8 @@ helper_fetch_desc_from_hsdir(const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_key)
 
   /* The dir conn we are going to simulate */
   dir_connection_t *conn = NULL;
+  edge_connection_t *edge_conn = NULL;
+  or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
 
   /* First extract the blinded public key that we are going to use in our
      query, and then build the actual query string. */
@@ -245,8 +253,16 @@ helper_fetch_desc_from_hsdir(const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_key)
   /* Simulate an HTTP GET request to the HSDir */
   conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET);
   tt_assert(conn);
+  TO_CONN(conn)->linked = 1; /* Signal that it is encrypted. */
   tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&conn->base_.addr, 0x7f000001);
-  TO_CONN(conn)->linked = 1;/* Pretend the conn is encrypted :) */
+
+  /* Pretend this conn is anonymous. */
+  edge_conn = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
+  TO_CONN(conn)->linked_conn = TO_CONN(edge_conn);
+  or_circ = or_circuit_new(0, NULL);
+  or_circ->p_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_t));
+  edge_conn->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ);
+
   retval = directory_handle_command_get(conn, hsdir_query_str,
                                         NULL, 0);
   tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
@@ -263,8 +279,11 @@ helper_fetch_desc_from_hsdir(const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_key)
 
  done:
   tor_free(hsdir_query_str);
-  if (conn)
+  if (conn) {
+    tor_free(or_circ->p_chan);
+    connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(conn)->linked_conn);
     connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(conn));
+  }
 
   return received_desc;
 }





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