[tor-commits] [tor/master] Split tls modules and their tests into openssl and generic.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Sep 5 00:47:14 UTC 2018
commit 1992c761308538cffea64abecc9e45cbd47b1bda
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Sun Aug 12 16:04:12 2018 -0400
Split tls modules and their tests into openssl and generic.
Also, add a stubbed-out nss version of the modules. The tests won't
pass with NSS yet since the NSS modules don't do anything.
This is a good patch to read with --color-moved.
---
src/lib/tls/include.am | 12 +
src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 2055 +-----------------------------
src/lib/tls/tortls.h | 64 +-
src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h | 65 +
src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 432 +++++++
src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c | 2032 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/lib/tls/x509.c | 479 +------
src/lib/tls/x509.h | 4 +-
src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c | 122 ++
src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c | 489 +++++++
src/test/include.am | 8 +
src/test/test.c | 3 +
src/test/test.h | 1 +
src/test/test_tortls.c | 2732 ++--------------------------------------
src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c | 2597 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
15 files changed, 5873 insertions(+), 5222 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/include.am b/src/lib/tls/include.am
index 1fd25a0b3..173104903 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/include.am
+++ b/src/lib/tls/include.am
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@ src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES = \
src/lib/tls/tortls.c \
src/lib/tls/x509.c
+if USE_NSS
+src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES += \
+ src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c \
+ src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
+else
+src_lib_libtor_tls_a_SOURCES += \
+ src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c \
+ src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
+endif
+
src_lib_libtor_tls_a_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) $(TOR_CFLAGS_CRYPTLIB)
src_lib_libtor_tls_testing_a_SOURCES = \
@@ -22,4 +32,6 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/lib/tls/ciphers.inc \
src/lib/tls/buffers_tls.h \
src/lib/tls/tortls.h \
+ src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h \
+ src/lib/tls/tortls_st.h \
src/lib/tls/x509.h
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
index 4c5dedb57..4b35177df 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
@@ -3,146 +3,13 @@
* Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
-/**
- * \file tortls.c
- * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
- * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
- **/
-
-/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
- * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
- * functions and variables.)
- */
-
-#include "orconfig.h"
-
#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
-#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
- #include <winsock2.h>
- #include <ws2tcpip.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-
-/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
- * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
-DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/tls1.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
-#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
-#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
-#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
-#include "lib/string/printf.h"
-#include "lib/net/socket.h"
#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
-
-/* Copied from or.h */
-#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
- "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
-
-/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
-#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60)
-
-#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
-
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
-/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
- * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
- * SSL3 safely at the same time.
- */
-#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
-
-/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
- * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am
- * looking at you.)
- */
-#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
-#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
-#endif
-#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
-#endif
-
-/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
- *
- * @{
- */
-/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
-#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
-/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
-#define CIPHERS_V1 1
-/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
- * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
- * supports */
-#define CIPHERS_V2 2
-/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
- * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
- * supports */
-#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
-/** @} */
-
-/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
- * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
-STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
-
-/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
-{
- if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
- tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
- SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
- }
-}
-
-/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
- * pointer. */
-STATIC tor_tls_t *
-tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
- if (result)
- tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
- return result;
-}
-
-static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
-static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
/** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs
* to touch them.
@@ -152,126 +19,37 @@ STATIC tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL;
STATIC tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL;
/**@}*/
-/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
-static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
-
-/* Module-internal error codes. */
-#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
-#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
-
-/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
- * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
-void
-tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+/**
+ * Return the appropriate TLS context.
+ */
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_get(int is_server)
{
- const char *ssl_state;
- const char *tortls_state;
-
- if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
- strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
- return;
- }
-
- ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
- switch (tls->state) {
-#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
- CASE(HANDSHAKE);
- CASE(OPEN);
- CASE(GOTCLOSE);
- CASE(SENTCLOSE);
- CASE(CLOSED);
- CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
-#undef CASE
- case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
- tortls_state = "";
- break;
- default:
- tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
- break;
- }
-
- tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+ return is_server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
}
-/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
- * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>. Log
- * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
void
-tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
- int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
{
- const char *state = NULL, *addr;
- const char *msg, *lib, *func;
-
- state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
-
- addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
-
- /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
- * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
- * priority for those cases. */
- switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
- case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
- case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
- case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
-#endif
- case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
- case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
- severity = LOG_INFO;
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
- msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
- lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
- func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
- if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
- if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
- if (!func) func = "(null)";
- if (doing) {
- tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
- doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
- msg, lib, func, state);
- } else {
- tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
- addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
- msg, lib, func, state);
- }
+ ++ctx->refcnt;
}
-/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
- * <b>domain</b>. Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
- */
+/** Free all global TLS structures. */
void
-tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+tor_tls_free_all(void)
{
- unsigned long err;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
- while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+ if (server_tls_context) {
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
+ server_tls_context = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
}
-}
-
-/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
- * code. */
-STATIC int
-tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
-{
- switch (e) {
- case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
- case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT):
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
- case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH):
- case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH):
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
- case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED):
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
- default:
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ if (client_tls_context) {
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
+ client_tls_context = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
}
}
@@ -295,331 +73,6 @@ tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
}
}
-#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
-#define CATCH_ZERO 2
-
-/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
- * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
- * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
- * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
- * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
- * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
- *
- * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
- * current action as <b>doing</b>.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
- const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
-{
- int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
- int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
- switch (err) {
- case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
- return TOR_TLS_DONE;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
- return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
- case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
- return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
- case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
- if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
- return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
- if (r == 0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
- doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
- } else {
- int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
- tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
- "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
- doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
- SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
- }
- tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
- return tor_error;
- case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
- if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
- return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
- tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
- doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
- return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
- default:
- tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
- }
-}
-
-/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_init(void)
-{
- check_no_tls_errors();
-
- if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
-#else
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-#endif
-
-#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
- OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
- long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
-
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
- if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
- /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
- If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
- don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
- just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
-
- (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
- doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
- behavior.)
- */
- EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
- const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
- const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
- const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
- m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
- m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
- EC_KEY_free(key);
-
- if (warn)
- log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
- "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
- "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
- "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
- "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
- "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
- }
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */
-
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
- tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
- }
-}
-
-/** Free all global TLS structures. */
-void
-tor_tls_free_all(void)
-{
- check_no_tls_errors();
-
- if (server_tls_context) {
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
- server_tls_context = NULL;
- tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
- }
- if (client_tls_context) {
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
- client_tls_context = NULL;
- tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
- }
-}
-
-/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
- * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
- * don't validate them until later.
- */
-STATIC int
-always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
- X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
-{
- (void) preverify_ok;
- (void) x509_ctx;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
- * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */
-static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
- * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
- * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
- * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
- */
- TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
-
-/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
- * our choice of what cipher to use. */
-static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
- /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
- TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
- TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-
- /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
- * don't hand-edit it. */
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
-#endif
- /* Required */
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
- /* Required */
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
-#endif
-#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
-#endif
- ;
-
-/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
- * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
- * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
- * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
-
-#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
-#define XCIPHER(id, name)
-/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
- * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
-static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
-#include "ciphers.inc"
- /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
- * of any cipher we say. */
- "!SSLv2"
- ;
-#undef CIPHER
-#undef XCIPHER
-
-/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
- * references. */
-static void
-tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
-{
- tor_assert(ctx);
- if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
- tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
- crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
- crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */
- tor_free(ctx);
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
- }
-}
-
-/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
- * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
- * handshake's certificate chain. If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
- * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we
- * use in client mode. (link, ID) */
-int
-tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
- const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
- const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
-{
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
- if (! ctx)
- return -1;
- if (link_cert_out)
- *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
- if (id_cert_out)
- *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**
- * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
- * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
-{
- if (! client_tls_context)
- return NULL;
- return client_tls_context->auth_key;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
- * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
-{
- X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
- EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
- int result;
-
- if (!peercert)
- return 0;
- link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
- cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert));
-
- result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
-
- X509_free(peercert);
- if (link_key)
- EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
- if (cert_key)
- EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
-
- return result;
-}
-
-/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
-static void
-tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
-{
- ++ctx->refcnt;
-}
-
/** Create new global client and server TLS contexts.
*
* If <b>server_identity</b> is NULL, this will not generate a server
@@ -686,687 +139,6 @@ tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags,
return MIN(rv1, rv2);
}
-/** Create a new global TLS context.
- *
- * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
- * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
- * the new SSL context.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
- crypto_pk_t *identity,
- unsigned int key_lifetime,
- unsigned int flags,
- int is_client)
-{
- tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
- key_lifetime,
- flags,
- is_client);
- tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
-
- if (new_ctx != NULL) {
- *ppcontext = new_ctx;
-
- /* Free the old context if one existed. */
- if (old_ctx != NULL) {
- /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
- * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
- tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
- }
- }
-
- return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
-}
-
-/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
-#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
-
-#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048
-
-/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
- * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
- * certificate.
- */
-STATIC tor_tls_context_t *
-tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
- unsigned flags, int is_client)
-{
- crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
- X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
- char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
-
- tor_tls_init();
- nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
-#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
- nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
-#else
- nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
-#endif
-
- /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
- if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new()))
- goto error;
- if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0)
- goto error;
- if (!is_client) {
- /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
- * authentication handshake. */
- if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new()))
- goto error;
- if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
- goto error;
- /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
- cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
- key_lifetime);
- /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
- idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
- IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
- /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
- authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
- key_lifetime);
- if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
- goto error;
- }
- }
-
- result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
- result->refcnt = 1;
- if (!is_client) {
- result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
- result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
- result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
- if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
- goto error;
- result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
- result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
- }
-
-#if 0
- /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results
- * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
- * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
- * with existing Tors. */
- if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
- goto error;
-#endif /* 0 */
-
- /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
-#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
- if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
- goto error;
-#else
- if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
- goto error;
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
-
- /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
- * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
-
- /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
- * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
- * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
- * with TLS sessions turned off).
- *
- * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
- * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
- * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will
- * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
- */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
- if (! is_client) {
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
- }
-#endif
-
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
-
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
- SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
-#endif
- /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
- * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
- */
- {
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
- }
-
- /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
- * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
- * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
-#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
-#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
- result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
-#endif
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-
-#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
-#endif
- if (! is_client) {
- if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
- goto error;
- X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
- cert=NULL;
- if (idcert) {
- X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
- tor_assert(s);
- X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
- X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
- idcert = NULL;
- }
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
- if (!is_client) {
- tor_assert(rsa);
- if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1)))
- goto error;
- if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
- goto error;
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- pkey = NULL;
- if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
- goto error;
- }
- {
- DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls();
- tor_assert(dh);
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh);
- DH_free(dh);
- }
- if (! is_client) {
- int nid;
- EC_KEY *ec_key;
- if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
- nid = NID_secp224r1;
- else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
- nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
- else
- nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
- /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
- ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
- SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
- EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
- }
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
- always_accept_verify_cb);
- /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
- SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
-
- if (rsa)
- crypto_pk_free(rsa);
- if (rsa_auth)
- crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
- X509_free(authcert);
- tor_free(nickname);
- tor_free(nn2);
- return result;
-
- error:
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
- tor_free(nickname);
- tor_free(nn2);
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (rsa)
- crypto_pk_free(rsa);
- if (rsa_auth)
- crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
- if (result)
- tor_tls_context_decref(result);
- if (cert)
- X509_free(cert);
- if (idcert)
- X509_free(idcert);
- if (authcert)
- X509_free(authcert);
- return NULL;
-}
-
-/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
-{
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
- ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
-
-/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
-const char *
-tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
-}
-
-/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
- * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
- * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
- * *we* don't recognize. */
-STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
- 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
- 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
- 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
- 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
- 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
- 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
- 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
- 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
- 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
- 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
- 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
- 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
- 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
- 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
- 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
- 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
- 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
- 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
- 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
- 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
- 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
- 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
- 0
-};
-/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
-static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
-
-/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
- * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
-STATIC int
-find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
-{
- const SSL_CIPHER *c;
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
- (void) m;
- {
- unsigned char cipherid[3];
- tor_assert(ssl);
- set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
- cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
- * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
- * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
- c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
- if (c)
- tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
- return c != NULL;
- }
-#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
-
-# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
- if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
- unsigned char cipherid[3];
- set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
- cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
- * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
- * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
- c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
- if (c)
- tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
- return c != NULL;
- }
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
- /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
- * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a
- * quadratic search.
- */
- int i;
- for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
- c = m->get_cipher(i);
- if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- }
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
- (void) ssl;
- (void) m;
- (void) cipher;
- return 1; /* No way to search */
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
-}
-
-/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
- * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
- * result. */
-static void
-prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- uint16_t *inp, *outp;
-#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
- const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
-#else
- const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
-#endif
-
- inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
- while (*inp) {
- if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
- *outp++ = *inp++;
- } else {
- inp++;
- }
- }
- *outp = 0;
-
- v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
-}
-
-/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
- * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
- * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
- **/
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
-{
- int i, res;
- tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
- if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
- prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
-
- tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
- if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
- return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
-
- /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
- * a cipher list. */
- if (!peer_ciphers) {
- log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
- res = CIPHERS_ERR;
- goto done;
- }
- /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
- * dealing with an updated Tor. */
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
- const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
- if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
- strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
- strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
- strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
- // return 1;
- goto v2_or_higher;
- }
- }
- res = CIPHERS_V1;
- goto done;
- v2_or_higher:
- {
- const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
- uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
- if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
- continue;
- if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
- res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
- goto dump_ciphers;
- }
- ++v2_cipher;
- }
- if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
- res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
- goto dump_ciphers;
- }
- res = CIPHERS_V2;
- }
-
- dump_ciphers:
- {
- smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
- char *s;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
- const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
- smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
- }
- s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
- log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
- (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
- tor_free(s);
- smartlist_free(elts);
- }
- done:
- if (tor_tls)
- return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
-
- return res;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
- * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
- * handshake. */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
-{
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
- ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
-#else
- SSL_SESSION *session;
- if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
- log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
- return CIPHERS_ERR;
- }
- ciphers = session->ciphers;
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
-
- return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
-}
-
-/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
- * changes state. We use this:
- * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
- * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
- * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
- */
-STATIC void
-tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
-{
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- (void) val;
-
- IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
- return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
- }
-
- tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
-
- if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
- return;
-
- OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
- if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
- return;
- tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
- if (tls) {
- /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */
- if (tls->negotiated_callback)
- tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
- if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/
- ++tls->server_handshake_count;
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
- return;
- }
-
- /* Now check the cipher list. */
- if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
- if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
- return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
- * This is a renegotiation. */
-
- /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
- * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
-
- /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
- SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
- /* Don't send a hello request. */
- SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
-
- if (tls) {
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- } else {
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
- }
-}
-
-/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
- * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
- *
- * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
- * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
- * use.
- *
- * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
- * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
- * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
- * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
- */
-STATIC int
-tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
- CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
- void *arg)
-{
- (void) secret;
- (void) secret_len;
- (void) peer_ciphers;
- (void) cipher;
- (void) arg;
-
- if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
- CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
- SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
- }
-
- SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
-
- return 0;
-}
-static void
-tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
-}
-
-/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
- * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
- */
-tor_tls_t *
-tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
-{
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context :
- client_tls_context;
- result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
-
- check_no_tls_errors();
- tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
- if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
- tor_free(result);
- goto err;
- }
-
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
- /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
- if (!isServer) {
- char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
- tor_free(fake_hostname);
- }
-#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
-
- if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
- isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
- SSL_free(result->ssl);
- tor_free(result);
- goto err;
- }
- result->socket = sock;
- bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
- if (! bio) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
- SSL_free(result->ssl);
- tor_free(result);
- goto err;
- }
- {
- int set_worked =
- SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
- if (!set_worked) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG,
- "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
- }
- }
- SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
- tor_tls_context_incref(context);
- result->context = context;
- result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
- result->isServer = isServer;
- result->wantwrite_n = 0;
- result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
- result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
- if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
- log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
- result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
- }
- if (isServer) {
- SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
- } else {
- SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
- }
-
- if (isServer)
- tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
-
- goto done;
- err:
- result = NULL;
- done:
- /* Not expected to get called. */
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
- return result;
-}
-
/** Make future log messages about <b>tls</b> display the address
* <b>address</b>.
*/
@@ -1378,64 +150,6 @@ tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
tls->address = tor_strdup(address);
}
-/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
- * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
- * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
- */
-void
-tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
- void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
- void *arg)
-{
- tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
- tls->callback_arg = arg;
- tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
- if (cb) {
- SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
- } else {
- SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
- }
-}
-
-/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
- * <b>tls</b>.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
- * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
- SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
-}
-
-/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
- * <b>tls</b>. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
- * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
- */
-void
-tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
- tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
-#else
- (void) tls;
-#endif
-}
-
-/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
-void
-tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
-#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
- long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
-#else
- (void) tls;
-#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
-}
-
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
* received it (server). */
int
@@ -1444,730 +158,3 @@ tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
tor_assert(tls);
return tls->isServer;
}
-
-/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the
- * underlying file descriptor.
- */
-void
-tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- if (!tls)
- return;
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- {
- size_t r,w;
- tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */
- }
-#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
- SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
-#endif
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- tls->ssl = NULL;
- tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
- if (tls->context)
- tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
- tor_free(tls->address);
- tls->magic = 0x99999999;
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
- * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
- * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
- * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
-{
- int r, err;
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
- tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
- r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
- if (r > 0) {
- if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
- /* Renegotiation happened! */
- log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
- if (tls->negotiated_callback)
- tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
- tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
- }
- return r;
- }
- err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
- if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
- log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
- return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
- } else {
- tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
- log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
- return err;
- }
-}
-
-/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS
- * overhead. */
-STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
-/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
- * track TLS overhead. */
-STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
-
-/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
- * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
- * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
- * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
-{
- int r, err;
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
- tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
- if (n == 0)
- return 0;
- if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
- /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
- tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
- log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
- (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
- n = tls->wantwrite_n;
- tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
- }
- r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
- err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
- if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
- total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
- return r;
- }
- if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
- tls->wantwrite_n = n;
- }
- return err;
-}
-
-/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
- * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
- * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- int r;
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
-
- check_no_tls_errors();
-
- OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
-
- if (tls->isServer) {
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
- SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
- } else {
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
- SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
- }
-
- OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
-
- if (oldstate != newstate)
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
- tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
- /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
- * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
- tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
- r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
- if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
- tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
- "handshaking");
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
- }
- if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
- return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- }
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
- * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
- * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
- * handshake as appropriate.
- *
- * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
- * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
- check_no_tls_errors();
- if (tls->isServer) {
- SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
- SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
- SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
- if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
- /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
- * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
- * was buggy. Fixing that. */
- if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
- " get set. Fixing that.");
- }
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
- " for renegotiation.");
- } else {
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
- }
- } else {
- /* Client-side */
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
- if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
- r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
- }
- }
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
- * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
- * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- int r, err;
- char buf[128];
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
- check_no_tls_errors();
-
- while (1) {
- if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
- /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
- * we read until the other side has closed too.
- */
- do {
- r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
- } while (r>0);
- err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
- LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
- if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
- /* fall through... */
- } else {
- return err;
- }
- }
-
- r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
- if (r == 1) {
- /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
- return TOR_TLS_DONE;
- }
- err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
- LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
- if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) {
- /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
- return TOR_TLS_DONE;
- } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
- /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
- * isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't
- * happened before, then go back to the start of the function
- * and try to read.
- */
- if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
- tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
- log_warn(LD_NET,
- "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
- return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
- }
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
- /* fall through ... */
- } else {
- return err;
- }
- } /* end loop */
-}
-
-/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- X509 *cert;
- cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
- tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
- if (!cert)
- return 0;
- X509_free(cert);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
- * isn't one. */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
-{
- X509 *cert;
- cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
- tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
- if (!cert)
- return NULL;
- return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
-}
-
-/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
- * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
-{
- X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
- tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
- "getting own-connection certificate");
- if (!cert)
- return NULL;
- /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
- * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
- X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
- if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
- return NULL;
- return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
-}
-
-/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
- * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
- * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
- * <b>severity</b>.
- *
- * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
- * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
-MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
-try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
- X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
-{
- X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
- STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
- int num_in_chain, i;
- *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
- if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
- return;
- *cert_out = cert;
- if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
- return;
- num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
- /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
- * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
- * cert and the id_cert.
- */
- if (num_in_chain < 1) {
- log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
- num_in_chain);
- return;
- }
- for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
- id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
- if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
- break;
- }
- *id_cert_out = id_cert;
-}
-
-/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
- * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
- * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
- * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key)
-{
- X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
- RSA *rsa;
- int r = -1;
-
- check_no_tls_errors();
- *identity_key = NULL;
-
- try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
- if (!cert)
- goto done;
- if (!id_cert) {
- log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
- goto done;
- }
- tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
-
- if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
- X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
- log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
- tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
- goto done;
- }
-
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
- if (!rsa)
- goto done;
- *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
-
- r = 0;
-
- done:
- if (cert)
- X509_free(cert);
- if (id_pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
-
- /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
- * acts unexpectedly. */
- tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
-
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is expired
- * give or take <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
- * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
- *
- * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
- time_t now,
- int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
-{
- X509 *cert;
- int r = -1;
-
- if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
- goto done;
-
- if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now,
- past_tolerance,
- future_tolerance) < 0)
- goto done;
-
- r = 0;
- done:
- if (cert)
- X509_free(cert);
- /* Not expected to get invoked */
- tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
-
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
- */
-int
-tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- tor_assert(tls);
- return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
-}
-
-/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
- * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
-size_t
-tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- return tls->wantwrite_n;
-}
-
-/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
- * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
- * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
-void
-tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
-{
- BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
- unsigned long r, w;
- r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
- /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
- * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
- * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
- * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
- * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
- * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
- * that would be tempting fate. */
- wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
- /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not
- * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
- * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
- */
- if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
- (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
- wbio = tmpbio;
-#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
- if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
- wbio = tmpbio;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
- w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
-
- /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
- * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
- * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
- * this function.
- */
- *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
- *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
- if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
- "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
- r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
- }
- total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
- tls->last_read_count = r;
- tls->last_write_count = w;
-}
-
-/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
- * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
-MOCK_IMPL(double,
-tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
-{
- if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
- return 1.0;
-
- return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
- ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
-}
-
-/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
- * errors, log an error message. */
-void
-check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
-{
- if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
- return;
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
- tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
- * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
-int
-tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
-}
-
-/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
- * <b>tls</b>. */
-int
-tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- return tls->server_handshake_count;
-}
-
-/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
- * request it was waiting for. */
-int
-tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
-{
- return tls->got_renegotiate;
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tor_assert(s->s3);
- memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
-static size_t
-SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- if (len == 0)
- return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
- tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- tor_assert(s->s3);
- memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
-STATIC size_t
-SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
-{
- tor_assert(s);
- if (len == 0)
- return s->master_key_length;
- tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
- tor_assert(out);
- memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
- return len;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
-
-/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
- * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
- * connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
-{
-#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
- uint8_t buf[128];
- size_t len;
- tor_assert(tls);
-
- SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
- SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
-
- tor_assert(ssl);
- tor_assert(session);
-
- const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
- const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
- const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
-
- tor_assert(server_random_len);
- tor_assert(client_random_len);
- tor_assert(master_key_len);
-
- len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
- tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
-
- {
- size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
- tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
- }
-
- {
- size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
- buf+client_random_len,
- server_random_len);
- tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
- }
-
- uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
- {
- size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
- tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
- }
-
- uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
- memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
-
- /*
- The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
- client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
- */
- crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
- (char*)master_key,
- master_key_len,
- (char*)buf, len);
- memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
- memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
- tor_free(master_key);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
- * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
- * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
- * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
- * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
- const uint8_t *context,
- size_t context_len,
- const char *label))
-{
- tor_assert(tls);
- tor_assert(tls->ssl);
-
- int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
- secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
- label, strlen(label),
- context, context_len, 1);
- return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
-}
-
-/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
- * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
- * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
- * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
- * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
- *
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
-int
-tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
- size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
- size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
-{
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
- (void)tls;
- (void)rbuf_capacity;
- (void)rbuf_bytes;
- (void)wbuf_capacity;
- (void)wbuf_bytes;
-
- return -1;
-#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
- if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
- *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
- else
- *rbuf_capacity = 0;
- if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
- *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
- else
- *wbuf_capacity = 0;
- *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
- *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
- return 0;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-}
-
-/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
- * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
- */
-int
-evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
-{
- EC_KEY *ec_key;
- int nid;
- int ret;
-
- if (!ecgroup)
- nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
- else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
- nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
- else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
- nid = NID_secp224r1;
- else
- return 0;
-
- ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- ret = (ec_key != NULL);
- EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
-
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
index f46e73267..306d321cd 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.h
@@ -50,74 +50,13 @@ struct tor_x509_cert_t;
#define TOR_TLS_IS_ERROR(rv) ((rv) < TOR_TLS_CLOSE)
-#ifdef TORTLS_PRIVATE
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
-struct ssl_st;
-struct ssl_ctx_st;
-struct ssl_session_st;
-#endif
-
/** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS
* connections.
*/
typedef struct tor_tls_context_t tor_tls_context_t;
-STATIC int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e);
-STATIC int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
- const char *doing, int severity, int domain);
-STATIC tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
-STATIC void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void);
-MOCK_DECL(STATIC void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,
- (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, struct x509_st **cert_out,
- struct x509_st **id_cert_out));
-#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-STATIC int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
-STATIC int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers);
-#endif
-STATIC int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
-STATIC size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s,
- uint8_t *out,
- size_t len);
-#endif
-STATIC void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
- int type, int val);
-STATIC void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
- int type, int val);
-#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
-STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret,
- int *secret_len,
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
- CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
- void *arg);
-STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m,
- uint16_t cipher);
-#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */
-STATIC tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
- unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client);
-STATIC int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
- crypto_pk_t *identity,
- unsigned int key_lifetime,
- unsigned int flags,
- int is_client);
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
-extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context;
-extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context;
-extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[];
-extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls;
-extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls;
-
-#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
-
-#endif /* defined(TORTLS_PRIVATE) */
-
const char *tor_tls_err_to_string(int err);
void tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz);
-
void tor_tls_free_all(void);
#define TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER (1u<<0)
@@ -131,6 +70,9 @@ int tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags,
crypto_pk_t *client_identity,
crypto_pk_t *server_identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime);
+void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_get(int is_server);
tor_tls_t *tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server);
void tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address);
void tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f6afb348c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TORTLS_INTERNAL_H
+#define TORTLS_INTERNAL_H
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
+struct ssl_st;
+struct ssl_ctx_st;
+struct ssl_session_st;
+#endif
+
+int tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e);
+int tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+ const char *doing, int severity, int domain);
+tor_tls_t *tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+void tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void);
+MOCK_DECL(void, try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,
+ (int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out));
+#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+int always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx);
+int tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers);
+#endif
+int tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl);
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(struct ssl_session_st *s,
+ uint8_t *out,
+ size_t len);
+#endif
+void tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ int type, int val);
+void tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ int type, int val);
+#ifdef TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+STATIC int tor_tls_session_secret_cb(struct ssl_st *ssl, void *secret,
+ int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+ void *arg);
+STATIC int find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m,
+ uint16_t cipher);
+#endif /* defined(TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE) */
+tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client);
+int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+ crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ int is_client);
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+extern int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
+extern tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context;
+extern tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context;
+extern uint16_t v2_cipher_list[];
+extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls;
+extern uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls;
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+#endif /* defined(TORTLS_INTERNAL_H) */
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..078196ac5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,432 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls_nss.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS and SSL X.509 functions from NSS.
+ **/
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
+ #include <winsock2.h>
+ #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+
+int
+tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
+{
+ (void)e;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+ const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)r;
+ (void)extra;
+ (void)doing;
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)domain;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+{
+ (void) ssl;
+ // XXXX
+ // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+ return NULL;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+ // XXXX openssl only.
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(cert_out);
+ tor_assert(id_cert_out);
+ (void)severity;
+ // XXXX
+}
+int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const struct ssl_st *ssl)
+{
+ (void) ssl;
+ // XXXX
+ // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ int type, int val)
+{
+ (void) ssl;
+ (void)type;
+ (void)val;
+ // XXXX
+ // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const struct ssl_st *ssl,
+ int type, int val)
+{
+ (void)ssl;
+ (void)type;
+ (void)val;
+ // XXXX
+ // XXXX refers to ssl_st.
+}
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime, unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+ tor_assert(identity);
+ tor_assert(key_lifetime);
+ (void)flags;
+ (void)is_client;
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+ crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ int is_client)
+{
+ tor_assert(ppcontext);
+ tor_assert(identity);
+ tor_assert(key_lifetime);
+ (void)flags;
+ (void)is_client;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)buf;
+ (void)sz;
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+ // XXXX
+}
+void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain,
+ const char *doing)
+{
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)domain;
+ (void)doing;
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(int sock, int is_server)
+{
+ (void)sock;
+ (void)is_server;
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ (void)cb;
+ (void)arg;
+ // XXXX;
+}
+
+void
+tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ (void)tls;
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ (void)tls;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(identity);
+ (void)severity;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity,
+ tor_tls_t *tls, time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance,
+ int future_tolerance)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)now;
+ (void)past_tolerance;
+ (void)future_tolerance;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read, (tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(cp);
+ (void)len;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(cp);
+ (void)n;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+}
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return 0;
+}
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(n_read);
+ tor_assert(n_written);
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+ size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(rbuf_capacity);
+ tor_assert(rbuf_bytes);
+ tor_assert(wbuf_capacity);
+ tor_assert(wbuf_bytes);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio, (void))
+{
+ // XXXX
+ return 0.0;
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
+ const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ // XXXX
+ return 0;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(secrets_out);
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+ const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len,
+ const char *label))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(secrets_out);
+ tor_assert(context);
+ tor_assert(label);
+ (void)context_len;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+ (void)fname;
+ (void)line;
+ // XXXX
+}
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+ int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ (void)err;
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)domain;
+ (void)doing;
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
+ const struct tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+ const struct tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+ tor_assert(link_cert_out);
+ tor_assert(id_cert_out);
+ (void)server;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
+{
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+ (void)ecgroup;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..333b86481
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2032 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
+ * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
+ * functions and variables.)
+ */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
+ #include <winsock2.h>
+ #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
+#include "lib/string/printf.h"
+#include "lib/net/socket.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+
+/* Copied from or.h */
+#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+
+/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
+#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60)
+
+#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
+/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
+ * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
+ * SSL3 safely at the same time.
+ */
+#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
+
+/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
+ * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am
+ * looking at you.)
+ */
+#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
+#endif
+
+/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
+#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
+#define CIPHERS_V1 1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_V2 2
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
+/** @} */
+
+/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
+ * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
+STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
+
+/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
+void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+ if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
+ tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
+ SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
+ * pointer. */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+ if (result)
+ tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
+static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
+
+/* Module-internal error codes. */
+#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
+#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
+
+/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
+ * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ const char *ssl_state;
+ const char *tortls_state;
+
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
+ strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
+ switch (tls->state) {
+#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
+ CASE(HANDSHAKE);
+ CASE(OPEN);
+ CASE(GOTCLOSE);
+ CASE(SENTCLOSE);
+ CASE(CLOSED);
+ CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
+#undef CASE
+ case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
+ tortls_state = "";
+ break;
+ default:
+ tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+}
+
+/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
+ * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>. Log
+ * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+ int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ const char *state = NULL, *addr;
+ const char *msg, *lib, *func;
+
+ state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
+
+ addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
+
+ /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
+ * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
+ * priority for those cases. */
+ switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
+ case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
+#endif
+ case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
+ case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
+ severity = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
+ lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
+ func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
+ if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
+ if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
+ if (!func) func = "(null)";
+ if (doing) {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
+ * <b>domain</b>. Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
+ */
+void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
+ * code. */
+int
+tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
+{
+ switch (e) {
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH):
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
+ default:
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+}
+
+#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
+#define CATCH_ZERO 2
+
+/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
+ * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
+ * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
+ * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
+ * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
+ * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
+ *
+ * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
+ * current action as <b>doing</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+ const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+ int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
+ int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ switch (err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
+ return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
+ if (r == 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
+ } else {
+ int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
+ "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
+ doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return tor_error;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
+ return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ default:
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
+#else
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+
+#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
+ long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
+
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
+ if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
+ /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
+ If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
+ don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
+ just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
+
+ (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
+ doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
+ behavior.)
+ */
+ EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
+ const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
+ const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+
+ if (warn)
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
+ "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
+ "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
+ "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
+ "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
+ "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
+ }
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
+ * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
+ * don't validate them until later.
+ */
+int
+always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+ (void) preverify_ok;
+ (void) x509_ctx;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
+ * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */
+static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
+ * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
+ * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
+ * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
+ */
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
+ * our choice of what cipher to use. */
+static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+ /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+
+ /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
+ * don't hand-edit it. */
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+#endif
+ ;
+
+/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
+ * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
+ * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
+ * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
+
+#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
+#define XCIPHER(id, name)
+/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
+ * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
+static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#include "ciphers.inc"
+ /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
+ * of any cipher we say. */
+ "!SSLv2"
+ ;
+#undef CIPHER
+#undef XCIPHER
+
+/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
+ * references. */
+void
+tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ tor_assert(ctx);
+ if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
+ crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
+ crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */
+ tor_free(ctx);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+ }
+}
+
+/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
+ * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
+ * handshake's certificate chain. If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
+ * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we
+ * use in client mode. (link, ID) */
+int
+tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = tor_tls_context_get(server);
+ if (! ctx)
+ return -1;
+ if (link_cert_out)
+ *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
+ if (id_cert_out)
+ *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
+ * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
+{
+ tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(0);
+ if (! context)
+ return NULL;
+ return context->auth_key;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
+ * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
+ X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
+ int result;
+
+ if (!peercert)
+ return 0;
+ link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
+ cert_key = X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)tor_x509_cert_get_impl(cert));
+
+ result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
+
+ X509_free(peercert);
+ if (link_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
+ if (cert_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Create a new global TLS context.
+ *
+ * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
+ * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
+ * the new SSL context.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+ crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ int is_client)
+{
+ tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
+ key_lifetime,
+ flags,
+ is_client);
+ tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
+
+ if (new_ctx != NULL) {
+ *ppcontext = new_ctx;
+
+ /* Free the old context if one existed. */
+ if (old_ctx != NULL) {
+ /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
+ * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
+ tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
+#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
+
+#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048
+
+/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
+ * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
+ * certificate.
+ */
+tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
+ char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
+
+ tor_tls_init();
+ nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
+ nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#else
+ nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
+#endif
+
+ /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
+ if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0)
+ goto error;
+ if (!is_client) {
+ /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
+ * authentication handshake. */
+ if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
+ goto error;
+ /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
+ cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
+ key_lifetime);
+ /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
+ idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
+ IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
+ /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
+ authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
+ key_lifetime);
+ if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
+ result->refcnt = 1;
+ if (!is_client) {
+ result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
+ result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
+ result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
+ if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
+ goto error;
+ result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
+ result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results
+ * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
+ * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
+ * with existing Tors. */
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
+ goto error;
+#else
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+
+ /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
+ * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+
+ /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
+ * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
+ * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
+ * with TLS sessions turned off).
+ *
+ * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
+ * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
+ * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will
+ * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
+ */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ if (! is_client) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
+#endif
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
+ */
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+ }
+
+ /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
+ * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
+ * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
+ result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+ if (! is_client) {
+ if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
+ goto error;
+ X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
+ cert=NULL;
+ if (idcert) {
+ X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
+ tor_assert(s);
+ X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
+ X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
+ idcert = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ if (!is_client) {
+ tor_assert(rsa);
+ if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,1)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
+ goto error;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ {
+ DH *dh = crypto_dh_new_openssl_tls();
+ tor_assert(dh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+ if (! is_client) {
+ int nid;
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+ always_accept_verify_cb);
+ /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+ if (rsa)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+ if (rsa_auth)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+ X509_free(authcert);
+ tor_free(nickname);
+ tor_free(nn2);
+ return result;
+
+ error:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
+ tor_free(nickname);
+ tor_free(nn2);
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (rsa)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+ if (rsa_auth)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+ if (result)
+ tor_tls_context_decref(result);
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ if (idcert)
+ X509_free(idcert);
+ if (authcert)
+ X509_free(authcert);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
+void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
+ ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
+ * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
+ * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
+ * *we* don't recognize. */
+STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
+ 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
+ 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0
+};
+/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
+static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
+
+/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
+ * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
+int
+find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+ (void) m;
+ {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
+
+# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
+ if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
+ /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
+ * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a
+ * quadratic search.
+ */
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
+ c = m->get_cipher(i);
+ if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
+ (void) ssl;
+ (void) m;
+ (void) cipher;
+ return 1; /* No way to search */
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
+}
+
+/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
+ * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
+ * result. */
+static void
+prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ uint16_t *inp, *outp;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
+#else
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
+#endif
+
+ inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
+ while (*inp) {
+ if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
+ *outp++ = *inp++;
+ } else {
+ inp++;
+ }
+ }
+ *outp = 0;
+
+ v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
+ * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
+ * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
+ **/
+int
+tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
+{
+ int i, res;
+ tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
+ prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
+
+ tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
+
+ /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
+ * a cipher list. */
+ if (!peer_ciphers) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
+ res = CIPHERS_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
+ * dealing with an updated Tor. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
+ // return 1;
+ goto v2_or_higher;
+ }
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V1;
+ goto done;
+ v2_or_higher:
+ {
+ const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
+ if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
+ continue;
+ if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ ++v2_cipher;
+ }
+ if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V2;
+ }
+
+ dump_ciphers:
+ {
+ smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
+ char *s;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
+ }
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
+ (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
+ tor_free(s);
+ smartlist_free(elts);
+ }
+ done:
+ if (tor_tls)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
+ * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
+ * handshake. */
+int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+ ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
+#else
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
+ return CIPHERS_ERR;
+ }
+ ciphers = session->ciphers;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+
+ return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
+ * changes state. We use this:
+ * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
+ * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
+ * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ (void) val;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
+ return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+ }
+
+ tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
+
+ if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
+ return;
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
+ if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
+ return;
+ tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tls) {
+ /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/
+ ++tls->server_handshake_count;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Now check the cipher list. */
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
+ if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
+ return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
+ * This is a renegotiation. */
+
+ /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
+ * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
+
+ /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
+ SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ /* Don't send a hello request. */
+ SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+ if (tls) {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
+ * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
+ *
+ * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
+ * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
+ * use.
+ *
+ * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
+ * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
+ * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
+ * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ (void) secret;
+ (void) secret_len;
+ (void) peer_ciphers;
+ (void) cipher;
+ (void) arg;
+
+ if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
+ CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
+ SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+static void
+tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
+ * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
+ */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tor_tls_context_t *context = tor_tls_context_get(isServer);
+ result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
+ if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
+ if (!isServer) {
+ char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
+ tor_free(fake_hostname);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
+
+ if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
+ isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ result->socket = sock;
+ bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (! bio) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ {
+ int set_worked =
+ SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
+ if (!set_worked) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
+ tor_tls_context_incref(context);
+ result->context = context;
+ result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ result->isServer = isServer;
+ result->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
+ result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
+ if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
+ log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
+ result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
+ }
+ if (isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+
+ if (isServer)
+ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ result = NULL;
+ done:
+ /* Not expected to get called. */
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
+ * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
+ * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
+ tls->callback_arg = arg;
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ if (cb) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
+ SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
+ * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
+ tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
+ long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
+}
+
+/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the
+ * underlying file descriptor.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ if (!tls)
+ return;
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ {
+ size_t r,w;
+ tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tls->ssl = NULL;
+ tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
+ if (tls->context)
+ tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+ tls->magic = 0x99999999;
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
+ * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
+ r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
+ if (r > 0) {
+ if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
+ /* Renegotiation happened! */
+ log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ }
+ return r;
+ }
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS
+ * overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
+/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
+ * track TLS overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
+ * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
+ /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
+ tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
+ (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
+ n = tls->wantwrite_n;
+ tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ }
+ r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
+ tls->wantwrite_n = n;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
+ }
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (oldstate != newstate)
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
+ tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
+ * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+ r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
+ if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "handshaking");
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
+ * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
+ * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
+ * handshake as appropriate.
+ *
+ * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
+ * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
+ SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
+ SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
+ /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
+ * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
+ * was buggy. Fixing that. */
+ if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
+ " get set. Fixing that.");
+ }
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
+ " for renegotiation.");
+ } else {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Client-side */
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
+ if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
+ r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r, err;
+ char buf[128];
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ while (1) {
+ if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+ /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
+ * we read until the other side has closed too.
+ */
+ do {
+ r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
+ } while (r>0);
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
+ LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+ /* fall through... */
+ } else {
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
+ if (r == 1) {
+ /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ }
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
+ LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) {
+ /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+ /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
+ * isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't
+ * happened before, then go back to the start of the function
+ * and try to read.
+ */
+ if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
+ tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+ log_warn(LD_NET,
+ "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+ /* fall through ... */
+ } else {
+ return err;
+ }
+ } /* end loop */
+}
+
+/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return 0;
+ X509_free(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
+ * isn't one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
+ * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "getting own-connection certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
+ * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
+ X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
+ if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
+}
+
+/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
+ * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
+ * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
+ * <b>severity</b>.
+ *
+ * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
+ * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
+MOCK_IMPL(void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ int num_in_chain, i;
+ *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
+ if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
+ * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
+ * cert and the id_cert.
+ */
+ if (num_in_chain < 1) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
+ num_in_chain);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
+ id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ *id_cert_out = id_cert;
+}
+
+/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
+ * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
+ * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
+ * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int r = -1;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ *identity_key = NULL;
+
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ if (!cert)
+ goto done;
+ if (!id_cert) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
+
+ if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
+ X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
+ if (!rsa)
+ goto done;
+ *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+
+ r = 0;
+
+ done:
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ if (id_pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
+
+ /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
+ * acts unexpectedly. */
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is expired
+ * give or take <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
+ *
+ * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ int r = -1;
+
+ if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+ goto done;
+
+ if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now,
+ past_tolerance,
+ future_tolerance) < 0)
+ goto done;
+
+ r = 0;
+ done:
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ /* Not expected to get invoked */
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
+ * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->wantwrite_n;
+}
+
+/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
+ * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
+ * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+ BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
+ unsigned long r, w;
+ r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
+ /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
+ * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
+ * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
+ * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
+ * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
+ * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
+ * that would be tempting fate. */
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
+ /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not
+ * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
+ * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
+ */
+ if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
+ (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
+ if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
+ w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
+
+ /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
+ * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
+ * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
+ * this function.
+ */
+ *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
+ *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
+ if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
+ "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
+ r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
+ }
+ total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
+ tls->last_read_count = r;
+ tls->last_write_count = w;
+}
+
+/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
+ * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
+{
+ if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
+ return 1.0;
+
+ return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
+ ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
+}
+
+/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
+ * errors, log an error message. */
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
+ tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
+ * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
+ * <b>tls</b>. */
+int
+tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->server_handshake_count;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
+ * request it was waiting for. */
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->got_renegotiate;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+size_t
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ tor_assert(s);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return s->master_key_length;
+ tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
+ tor_assert(out);
+ memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
+
+/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
+ * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
+ * connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
+ uint8_t buf[128];
+ size_t len;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+
+ SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
+ SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ tor_assert(session);
+
+ const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
+
+ tor_assert(server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(master_key_len);
+
+ len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
+ tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
+ }
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
+ buf+client_random_len,
+ server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
+ tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
+ memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
+
+ /*
+ The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
+ client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
+ */
+ crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
+ (char*)master_key,
+ master_key_len,
+ (char*)buf, len);
+ memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
+ tor_free(master_key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
+ * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
+ * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
+ * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
+ * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+ const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len,
+ const char *label))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+
+ int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
+ secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ label, strlen(label),
+ context, context_len, 1);
+ return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
+ * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
+ * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
+ * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+ size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)rbuf_capacity;
+ (void)rbuf_bytes;
+ (void)wbuf_capacity;
+ (void)wbuf_bytes;
+
+ return -1;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
+ *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
+ else
+ *rbuf_capacity = 0;
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
+ *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
+ else
+ *wbuf_capacity = 0;
+ *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
+ *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
+ return 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+}
+
+/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
+ * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
+ */
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ int nid;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!ecgroup)
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ ret = (ec_key != NULL);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.c b/src/lib/tls/x509.c
index 8bed6f5a1..dbf1dd927 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/x509.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.c
@@ -4,86 +4,15 @@
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
- * \file x509.c
+ * \file x509_openssl.c
* \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
- * X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ * X.509 functions.
**/
#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
-
-/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
- * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
-DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/bio.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-
-ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include "lib/log/log.h"
#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
-#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
-#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
-#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
- X509_get0_notBefore(cert)
-#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
- X509_get0_notAfter(cert)
-#ifndef X509_get_notBefore
-#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
- X509_getm_notBefore(cert)
-#endif
-#ifndef X509_get_notAfter
-#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
- X509_getm_notAfter(cert)
-#endif
-#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
- ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert))
-#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
- ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
-#endif
-
-/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
-static X509_NAME *
-tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
-{
- int nid;
- X509_NAME *name;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */
- if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
- return NULL;
- if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
- if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
- (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
- goto error;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
- return name;
-
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/
- error:
- X509_NAME_free(name);
- return NULL;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
/** Choose the start and end times for a certificate */
void
@@ -121,221 +50,6 @@ tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(time_t now,
*end_time_out = end_time;
}
-/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
- * signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>. The commonName of the
- * certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
- * <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b>
- * seconds, starting from some time in the past.
- *
- * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(X509 *,
-tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
- crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
- const char *cname,
- const char *cname_sign,
- unsigned int cert_lifetime))
-{
- /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial
- * numbers, so let's do that too. */
-#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8
-
- time_t start_time, end_time;
- BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL;
- unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE];
- EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
- X509 *x509 = NULL;
- X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
-
- tor_tls_init();
-
- time_t now = time(NULL);
-
- tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime,
- &start_time, &end_time);
-
- tor_assert(rsa);
- tor_assert(cname);
- tor_assert(rsa_sign);
- tor_assert(cname_sign);
- if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1)))
- goto error;
- if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0)))
- goto error;
- if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
- goto error;
- if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
- goto error;
-
- { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
- crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
- if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
- goto error;
- if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
- goto error;
- }
-
- if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
- goto error;
- if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
- goto error;
- if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
- goto error;
- if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
- goto error;
-
- if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
- goto error;
- if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
- goto error;
- if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
- goto error;
-
- if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256()))
- goto error;
-
- goto done;
- error:
- if (x509) {
- X509_free(x509);
- x509 = NULL;
- }
- done:
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
- if (sign_pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- if (serial_number)
- BN_clear_free(serial_number);
- if (name)
- X509_NAME_free(name);
- if (name_issuer)
- X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
- return x509;
-
-#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE
-}
-
-/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
-void
-tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
- if (! cert)
- return;
- if (cert->cert)
- X509_free(cert->cert);
- tor_free(cert->encoded);
- memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert));
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */
- tor_free(cert);
- /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
-}
-
-/**
- * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
- *
- * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
- */
-MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
-tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
-{
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey;
- RSA *rsa;
- int length;
- unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-
- if (!x509_cert)
- return NULL;
-
- length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
- cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
- memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
-
- cert->cert = x509_cert;
-
- crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests,
- (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
-
- if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
- (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
- crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
- if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) {
- crypto_pk_free(pk);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- goto err;
- }
-
- cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
- crypto_pk_free(pk);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- }
-
- return cert;
- err:
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */
- tor_free(cert);
- log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate.");
- X509_free(x509_cert);
- return NULL;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
-}
-
-/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
-tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
- tor_assert(cert);
- X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
- return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
-}
-
-/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
- * from a <b>certificate</b>. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
- * success and NULL on failure. */
-tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
-{
- X509 *x509;
- const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
- tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
- tor_assert(certificate);
- check_no_tls_errors();
-
- if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
- goto err;
-
- x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
-
- if (!x509)
- goto err; /* Couldn't decode */
- if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
- X509_free(x509);
- goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
- }
- newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
- if (!newcert) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
- fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
- /* Cert wasn't in DER */
- tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
- goto err;
- }
- return newcert;
- err:
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate");
- return NULL;
-}
-
/** Set *<b>encoded_out</b> and *<b>size_out</b> to <b>cert</b>'s encoded DER
* representation and length, respectively. */
void
@@ -375,190 +89,3 @@ tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
return &cert->cert_digests;
}
-/**
- * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate
- * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
-{
- crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
- RSA *rsa;
- if (!pkey)
- return NULL;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
- if (!rsa) {
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return NULL;
- }
- result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return result;
-}
-
-/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
- * signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>. If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
- * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
- * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
- * we couldn't check it. */
-int
-tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
- const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
- const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
- time_t now,
- int check_rsa_1024)
-{
- check_no_tls_errors();
- EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
- int r, key_ok = 0;
-
- if (!signing_cert || !cert)
- goto bad;
-
- EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
- if (!signing_key)
- goto bad;
- r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
- EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
- if (r <= 0)
- goto bad;
-
- /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the
- * lifetime. */
- if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now,
- 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
- goto bad;
-
- cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
- if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
- RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024)
-#else
- if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
-#endif
- key_ok = 1;
- if (rsa)
- RSA_free(rsa);
- } else if (cert_key) {
- int min_bits = 1024;
-#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
- if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- min_bits = 128;
-#endif
- if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
- key_ok = 1;
- }
- EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
- if (!key_ok)
- goto bad;
-
- /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
-
- return 1;
- bad:
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
-static void
-log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,
- time_t now)
-{
- BIO *bio = NULL;
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
- char mytime[33];
- struct tm tm;
- size_t n;
-
- if (problem)
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
- "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
- "is wrong.",
- problem);
-
- if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
- }
- if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
- s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
-
- (void)BIO_reset(bio);
- if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) {
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
- goto end;
- }
- BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
- s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
-
- n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
- if (n > 0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
- "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
- s1,s2,mytime);
- } else {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
- "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. "
- "Couldn't get your time.)",
- s1, s2);
- }
-
- end:
- /* Not expected to get invoked */
- tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
- if (bio)
- BIO_free(bio);
- tor_free(s1);
- tor_free(s2);
-}
-
-/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take
- * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
- * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. (Relative to the current time
- * <b>now</b>.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message
- * and return -1. */
-int
-tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
- time_t now,
- int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
-{
- time_t t;
-
- t = now + future_tolerance;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) {
- log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now);
- return -1;
- }
- t = now - past_tolerance;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) {
- log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now);
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
-/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>,
- but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with
- <b>signing_key</b>. */
-STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *
-tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
- time_t new_expiration_time,
- crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
-{
- X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert);
- X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time);
- EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1);
- tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256()));
- EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
- return tor_x509_cert_new(newc);
-}
-#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509.h b/src/lib/tls/x509.h
index e3dfcf393..f75d15d7e 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/x509.h
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509.h
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
/* Opaque structure to hold an X509 certificate. */
typedef struct tor_x509_cert_t tor_x509_cert_t;
-#ifdef ENABLE_OPENSSL
+#ifdef ENABLE_NSS
+typedef struct CERTCertificateStr tor_x509_cert_impl_t;
+#elif defined(ENABLE_OPENSSL)
typedef struct x509_st tor_x509_cert_impl_t;
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e856c9518
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_nss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file x509_nss.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * X.509 functions from NSS.
+ **/
+
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *,
+tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+ const char *cname,
+ const char *cname_sign,
+ unsigned int cert_lifetime))
+{
+ tor_assert(rsa);
+ tor_assert(rsa_sign);
+ tor_assert(cname);
+ tor_assert(cname_sign);
+ (void) cert_lifetime;
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_x509_cert_new,(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert))
+{
+ tor_assert(x509_cert);
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ (void)cert;
+ // XXXX
+}
+
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate,
+ size_t certificate_len)
+{
+ tor_assert(certificate);
+ (void) certificate_len;
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ // XXXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int check_rsa_1024)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ tor_assert(signing_cert);
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)now;
+ (void)check_rsa_1024;
+ // XXXXX
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity,
+ const tor_x509_cert_impl_t *cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance,
+ int future_tolerance)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ (void)severity;
+ (void)now;
+ (void)past_tolerance;
+ (void)future_tolerance;
+ // XXXX
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
+ time_t new_expiration_time,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
+{
+ tor_assert(inp);
+ tor_assert(signing_key);
+ (void)new_expiration_time;
+
+ // XXXX
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c003d4704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tls/x509_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,489 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file x509_openssl.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+ X509_get0_notBefore(cert)
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+ X509_get0_notAfter(cert)
+#ifndef X509_get_notBefore
+#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
+ X509_getm_notBefore(cert)
+#endif
+#ifndef X509_get_notAfter
+#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
+ X509_getm_notAfter(cert)
+#endif
+#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+ ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert))
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+ ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
+#endif
+
+/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
+static X509_NAME *
+tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
+{
+ int nid;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */
+ if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
+ return NULL;
+ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
+ if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+ (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+ return name;
+
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/
+ error:
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return NULL;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
+ * signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>. The commonName of the
+ * certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
+ * <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b>
+ * seconds, starting from some time in the past.
+ *
+ * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(X509 *,
+tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+ const char *cname,
+ const char *cname_sign,
+ unsigned int cert_lifetime))
+{
+ /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial
+ * numbers, so let's do that too. */
+#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8
+
+ time_t start_time, end_time;
+ BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL;
+ unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE];
+ EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
+
+ tor_tls_init();
+
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ tor_tls_pick_certificate_lifetime(now, cert_lifetime,
+ &start_time, &end_time);
+
+ tor_assert(rsa);
+ tor_assert(cname);
+ tor_assert(rsa_sign);
+ tor_assert(cname_sign);
+ if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(rsa,0)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
+ goto error;
+
+ { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
+ crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
+ if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
+ goto error;
+ if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
+ goto error;
+ if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256()))
+ goto error;
+
+ goto done;
+ error:
+ if (x509) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ done:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
+ if (sign_pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (serial_number)
+ BN_clear_free(serial_number);
+ if (name)
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ if (name_issuer)
+ X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
+ return x509;
+
+#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE
+}
+
+/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
+void
+tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (! cert)
+ return;
+ if (cert->cert)
+ X509_free(cert->cert);
+ tor_free(cert->encoded);
+ memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert));
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */
+ tor_free(cert);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
+ *
+ * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
+{
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int length;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (!x509_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
+ cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
+ memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ cert->cert = x509_cert;
+
+ crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests,
+ (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+
+ if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
+ (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+ if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) {
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ return cert;
+ err:
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */
+ tor_free(cert);
+ log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate.");
+ X509_free(x509_cert);
+ return NULL;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
+}
+
+/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
+ * from a <b>certificate</b>. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
+ * success and NULL on failure. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
+ tor_assert(certificate);
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
+ goto err;
+
+ x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
+
+ if (!x509)
+ goto err; /* Couldn't decode */
+ if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
+ }
+ newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
+ if (!newcert) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
+ fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
+ /* Cert wasn't in DER */
+ tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return newcert;
+ err:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate
+ * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+ RSA *rsa;
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ if (!rsa) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ result = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(rsa);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
+ * signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>. If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
+ * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
+ * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
+ * we couldn't check it. */
+int
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int check_rsa_1024)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
+ int r, key_ok = 0;
+
+ if (!signing_cert || !cert)
+ goto bad;
+
+ EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
+ if (!signing_key)
+ goto bad;
+ r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
+ if (r <= 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the
+ * lifetime. */
+ if (tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now,
+ 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+ if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024)
+#else
+ if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
+#endif
+ key_ok = 1;
+ if (rsa)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ } else if (cert_key) {
+ int min_bits = 1024;
+#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ min_bits = 128;
+#endif
+ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
+ key_ok = 1;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+ if (!key_ok)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
+
+ return 1;
+ bad:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
+static void
+log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
+ char mytime[33];
+ struct tm tm;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if (problem)
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
+ "is wrong.",
+ problem);
+
+ if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
+ }
+ if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+ s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+ (void)BIO_reset(bio);
+ if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+ s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+ n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
+ if (n > 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
+ s1,s2,mytime);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. "
+ "Couldn't get your time.)",
+ s1, s2);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ /* Not expected to get invoked */
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
+ if (bio)
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ tor_free(s1);
+ tor_free(s2);
+}
+
+/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take
+ * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. (Relative to the current time
+ * <b>now</b>.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message
+ * and return -1. */
+int
+tor_x509_check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+ time_t t;
+
+ t = now + future_tolerance;
+ if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) {
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ t = now - past_tolerance;
+ if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) {
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>,
+ but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with
+ <b>signing_key</b>. */
+STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
+ time_t new_expiration_time,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
+{
+ X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert);
+ X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time);
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1);
+ tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256()));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(newc);
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am
index 68372adc7..c2e08aa3d 100644
--- a/src/test/include.am
+++ b/src/test/include.am
@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES += \
src/test/testing_common.c \
src/test/testing_rsakeys.c \
src/ext/tinytest.c
+
+if USE_NSS
+# ...
+else
+src_test_test_SOURCES += \
+ src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
+endif
+
endif
src_test_test_slow_SOURCES =
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 94eae5a4f..3b63f1c07 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -919,6 +919,9 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = {
{ "status/" , status_tests },
{ "storagedir/", storagedir_tests },
{ "tortls/", tortls_tests },
+#ifndef ENABLE_NSS
+ { "tortls/openssl/", tortls_openssl_tests },
+#endif
{ "util/", util_tests },
{ "util/format/", util_format_tests },
{ "util/logging/", logging_tests },
diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h
index b3a73271e..94aa9443d 100644
--- a/src/test/test.h
+++ b/src/test/test.h
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t socks_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t status_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t thread_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t tortls_tests[];
+extern struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t util_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t util_format_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t util_process_tests[];
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls.c b/src/test/test_tortls.c
index ec197ba99..d20bc5fa6 100644
--- a/src/test/test_tortls.c
+++ b/src/test/test_tortls.c
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
-#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
#define LOG_PRIVATE
#include "orconfig.h"
@@ -11,64 +10,24 @@
#include <winsock2.h>
#endif
#include <math.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h"
-/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
- * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
-DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-#include <openssl/ssl.h>
-#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-
-ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
-
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "lib/log/log.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
-#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
#include "test/test.h"
#include "test/log_test_helpers.h"
-#define NS_MODULE tortls
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_STATE
-#define OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-#endif
-#if defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
-#define SSL_STATE_STR "before SSL initialization"
-#else
-#define SSL_STATE_STR "before/accept initialization"
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static SSL_METHOD *
-give_me_a_test_method(void)
-{
- SSL_METHOD *method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- memcpy(method, TLSv1_method(), sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- return method;
-}
-
-static int
-fake_num_ciphers(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+#include "tinytest.h"
static void
test_tortls_errno_to_tls_error(void *data)
@@ -121,66 +80,6 @@ mock_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
}
static void
-test_tortls_tor_tls_new(void *data)
-{
- (void) data;
- MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
- crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL;
- SSL_METHOD *method = NULL;
-
- key1 = pk_generate(2);
- key2 = pk_generate(3);
-
- tor_tls_t *tls = NULL;
- tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
- key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0);
- tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
- tt_want(tls);
- tor_tls_free(tls); tls = NULL;
-
- SSL_CTX_free(client_tls_context->ctx);
- client_tls_context->ctx = NULL;
- tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
- tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
- method = give_me_a_test_method();
- SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
- method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
- client_tls_context->ctx = ctx;
- tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
- tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL);
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
- done:
- UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
- crypto_pk_free(key1);
- crypto_pk_free(key2);
- tor_tls_free(tls);
- tor_free(method);
- tor_tls_free_all();
-}
-
-#define NS_MODULE tortls
-NS_DECL(void, logv, (int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain,
- const char *funcname, const char *suffix,
- const char *format, va_list ap));
-
-static void
-NS(logv)(int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain,
- const char *funcname, const char *suffix, const char *format,
- va_list ap)
-{
- (void) severity;
- (void) domain;
- (void) funcname;
- (void) suffix;
- (void) format;
- (void) ap; // XXXX look at this.
- CALLED(logv)++;
-}
-
-static void
test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data)
{
(void) data;
@@ -193,11 +92,10 @@ test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data)
tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0);
tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
- NS_MOCK(logv);
- tt_int_op(CALLED(logv), OP_EQ, 0);
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0,
- (const char *)"test", 0, 0);
- tt_int_op(CALLED(logv), OP_EQ, 1);
+ (const char *)"in unit test", LOG_WARN, LD_GENERAL);
+ expect_single_log_msg_containing("unexpected close while in unit test");
done:
UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
@@ -208,2638 +106,172 @@ test_tortls_tor_tls_get_error(void *data)
}
static void
-library_init(void)
-{
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
-#else
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-#endif
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_get_state_description(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_x509_cert_get_id_digests(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- char *buf;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
-
- library_init();
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
-
- buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000);
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tor_tls_get_state_description(NULL, buf, 20);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)");
-
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- tls->ssl = NULL;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 20);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)");
-
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in HANDSHAKE");
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in OPEN");
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in GOTCLOSE");
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in SENTCLOSE");
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in CLOSED");
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in RENEGOTIATE");
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+ common_digests_t *d;
+ const common_digests_t *res;
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(common_digests_t));
+ d->d[0][0] = 42;
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR);
+ res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert);
+ tt_assert(!res);
- tls->state = 7;
- tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
- tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in unknown TLS state");
+ cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
+ cert->pkey_digests = *d;
+ res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert);
+ tt_int_op(res->d[0][0], OP_EQ, 42);
done:
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(buf);
- tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(cert);
+ tor_free(d);
}
static void
-test_tortls_get_by_ssl(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_get_my_certs(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- tor_tls_t *res;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL *ssl;
-
- library_init();
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
-
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
-
- res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
- tt_assert(!res);
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx;
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert_out = NULL;
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert_out = NULL;
- SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
+ ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
- res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
- tt_assert(res == tls);
+ client_tls_context = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
- done:
- SSL_free(ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
+ server_tls_context = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, NULL, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-static void
-test_tortls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int first;
+ client_tls_context = ctx;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+ client_tls_context = ctx;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- first = tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
- tt_int_op(first, OP_EQ, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+ server_tls_context = ctx;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
done:
- (void)0;
+ (void)1;
}
static void
-test_tortls_log_one_error(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_get_forced_write_size(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
+ long ret;
tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL *ssl = NULL;
- library_init();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
-
- tor_tls_log_one_error(NULL, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "something");
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: "
- "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error: (null) "
- "(in (null):(null):---)\n");
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello");
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: "
- "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
- tor_free(tls->address);
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello");
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "blarg");
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while blarg with "
- "127.hello: (null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, 3), LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: "
- "BN lib (in unknown library:(null):---)\n");
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL),
- LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: (null)"
- " (in (null):(null):" SSL_STATE_STR ")\n");
+ tls->wantwrite_n = 43;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 43);
done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- SSL_free(ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- if (tls && tls->ssl)
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- if (tls)
- tor_free(tls->address);
tor_free(tls);
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
static void
-test_tortls_get_error(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_used_v1_handshake(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
int ret;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
-
- library_init();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error: unexpected close while"
- " something (before/accept initialization)\n");
+ // These tests assume both V2 handshake server and client are enabled
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 2, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- expect_no_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 1, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -11);
- expect_no_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ERR_clear_error();
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null)"
- " (in bignum routines:(null):before/accept initialization)\n");
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ;
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD);
- expect_no_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE;
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE);
- expect_no_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->rwstate = 0;
- tls->ssl->shutdown = SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- tls->ssl->s3->warn_alert =SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE);
- expect_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 2, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -10);
- expect_no_log_entry();
-
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null) (in system library:"
- "connect:before/accept initialization)\n");
done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
tor_free(tls);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
static void
-test_tortls_always_accept_verify_cb(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_get_num_server_handshakes(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
- ret = always_accept_verify_cb(0, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- done:
- (void)0;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_x509_cert_free(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
-
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
-
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- cert->cert = X509_new();
- cert->encoded = tor_malloc_zero(1);
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_x509_cert_get_id_digests(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
- common_digests_t *d;
- const common_digests_t *res;
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(common_digests_t));
- d->d[0][0] = 42;
-
- res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert);
- tt_assert(!res);
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
- cert->pkey_digests = *d;
- res = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(cert);
- tt_int_op(res->d[0][0], OP_EQ, 42);
+ tls->server_handshake_count = 3;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
done:
- tor_free(cert);
- tor_free(d);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static int
-fixed_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
-{
- (void) a; (void) b;
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Use only for the matching fake_x509_free() call
- */
-static X509 *
-fake_x509_malloc(void)
-{
- return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
-}
-
-static void
-fake_x509_free(X509 *cert)
-{
- if (cert) {
- if (cert->cert_info) {
- if (cert->cert_info->key) {
- if (cert->cert_info->key->pkey) {
- tor_free(cert->cert_info->key->pkey);
- }
- tor_free(cert->cert_info->key);
- }
- tor_free(cert->cert_info);
- }
- tor_free(cert);
- }
+ tor_free(tls);
}
static void
-test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_server_got_renegotiate(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
- int res;
+ int ret;
tor_tls_t *tls;
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
- X509 *one = NULL, *two = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *meth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(999, 0, NULL, NULL);
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(meth, NULL, NULL, fixed_pub_cmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- one = fake_x509_malloc();
- one->references = 1;
- two = fake_x509_malloc();
- two->references = 1;
-
- res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
- tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- tls->ssl->session->peer = one;
- res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
- tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- cert->cert = two;
- res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
- tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- one->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
- one->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
- one->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
- one->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
- one->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth;
- one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
-
- two->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
- two->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
- two->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
- two->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
- two->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth;
- two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2;
-
- res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
- tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
- one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
- two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
- res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
- tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ ret = tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
done:
- EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(meth);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(cert);
- fake_x509_free(one);
- fake_x509_free(two);
}
static void
-test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored)
+test_tortls_evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(void *ignored)
{
(void)ignored;
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
- crypto_pk_t *res = NULL;
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- X509 *key = NULL;
- key = fake_x509_malloc();
- key->references = 1;
-
- res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert);
- tt_assert(!res);
-
- cert->cert = key;
- key->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
- key->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
- key->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
- key->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
- key->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2;
- res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert);
- tt_assert(!res);
-
- done:
- fake_x509_free(key);
- tor_free(cert);
- crypto_pk_free(res);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+ int ret;
-static void
-test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- crypto_pk_t *ret;
- crypto_pk_t *expected;
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx;
- RSA *k = RSA_new();
+ ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
- expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k);
- ctx->auth_key = expected;
+ ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("foobar");
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- client_tls_context = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
- tt_assert(!ret);
+ ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P256");
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- client_tls_context = ctx;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
- tt_assert(ret == expected);
+ ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P224");
+ // tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); This varies between machines
+ tt_assert(ret == 0 || ret == 1);
done:
- tor_free(expected);
- tor_free(ctx);
+ (void)0;
}
-static void
-test_tortls_get_my_certs(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_context_t *ctx;
- const tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert_out = NULL;
- const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert_out = NULL;
-
- ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
-
- client_tls_context = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- server_tls_context = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, NULL, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- client_tls_context = ctx;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, NULL, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- client_tls_context = ctx;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- server_tls_context = ctx;
- ret = tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_cert_out, &id_cert_out);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- done:
- (void)1;
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
-static SSL_CIPHER *
-get_cipher_by_name(const char *name)
-{
- int i;
- const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
- int num = method->num_ciphers();
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
- const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
- if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) {
- return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
- }
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- const char *ret;
- tor_tls_t *ctx;
- ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- ctx->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
-
- ret = tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(ctx);
- tt_str_op(ret, OP_EQ, "(NONE)");
-
- done:
- tor_free(ctx->ssl);
- tor_free(ctx);
-}
-
-static SSL_CIPHER *
-get_cipher_by_id(uint16_t id)
-{
- int i;
- const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
- int num = method->num_ciphers();
- for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
- if (id == (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff)) {
- return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
- }
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_classify_client_ciphers(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int i;
- int ret;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL *ssl;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
- SSL_CIPHER *tmp_cipher;
-
- library_init();
-
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- tls->ssl = ssl;
-
- ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
-
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 42;
-
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
-
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
-
- SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA),
- *two = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA),
- *three = get_cipher_by_name(SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA),
- *four = NULL;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, three);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, four);
-
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
-
- one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
- tt_assert(one);
- one->id = 0x00ff;
- two = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256");
- tt_assert(two);
- two->id = 0x0000;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two);
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
-
- one->id = 0xC00A;
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
- for (i=0; v2_cipher_list[i]; i++) {
- tmp_cipher = get_cipher_by_id(v2_cipher_list[i]);
- tt_assert(tmp_cipher);
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, tmp_cipher);
- }
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 2);
- tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 2);
-
- done:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
- tt_skip();
- done:
- (void)1;
-#else
- int ret;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL *ssl;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
-
- library_init();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
-
- ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- ssl->session = sess;
- ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
- SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
- tt_assert(one);
- one->id = 0x00ff;
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
- sess->ciphers = ciphers;
- ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- done:
- SSL_free(ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = NULL;
-static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = NULL;
-
-static void
-fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
- X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)
-{
- (void) severity;
- (void) tls;
- *cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result;
- *id_cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static const char* notCompletelyValidCertString =
- "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
- "MIICVjCCAb8CAg37MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIGbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwG\n"
- "A1UECBMFVG9reW8xEDAOBgNVBAcTB0NodW8ta3UxETAPBgNVBAoTCEZyYW5rNERE\n"
- "MRgwFgYDVQQLEw9XZWJDZXJ0IFN1cHBvcnQxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ZyYW5rNEREIFdl\n"
- "YiBDQTEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUc3VwcG9ydEBmcmFuazRkZC5jb20wHhcNMTIw\n"
- "ODIyMDUyNzIzWhcNMTcwODIxMDUyNzIzWjBKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwGA1UE\n"
- "CAwFVG9reW8xETAPBgNVBAoMCEZyYW5rNEREMRgwFgYDVQQDDA93d3cuZXhhbXBs\n"
- "ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMYBBrx5PlP0WNI/ZdzD\n"
- "+6Pktmurn+F2kQYbtc7XQh8/LTBvCo+P6iZoLEmUA9e7EXLRxgU1CVqeAi7QcAn9\n"
- "MwBlc8ksFJHB0rtf9pmf8Oza9E0Bynlq/4/Kb1x+d+AyhL7oK9tQwB24uHOueHi1\n"
- "C/iVv8CSWKiYe6hzN1txYe8rAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAASPdjigJ\n"
- "kXCqKWpnZ/Oc75EUcMi6HztaW8abUMlYXPIgkV2F7YanHOB7K4f7OOLjiz8DTPFf\n"
- "jC9UeuErhaA/zzWi8ewMTFZW/WshOrm3fNvcMrMLKtH534JKvcdMg6qIdjTFINIr\n"
- "evnAhf0cwULaebn+lMs8Pdl7y37+sfluVok=\n"
- "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static const char* validCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
- "MIIDpTCCAY0CAg3+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMREwDwYD\n"
- "VQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIGA1UECgwLVG9yIFRl\n"
- "c3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkwNjEzMzk1OVoXDTQz\n"
- "MDEyMjEzMzk1OVowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0NoaWNhZ28xFDAS\n"
- "BgNVBAoMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZ0ZXN0aW5nLnRvcnByb2plY3Qu\n"
- "b3JnMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDoT6uyVVhWyOF3wkHjjYbd\n"
- "nKaykyRv4JVtKQdZ4OpEErmX1zw4MmyzpQNV6iR4bQnWiyLfzyVJMZDIC/WILBfX\n"
- "w2Pza/yuLgUvDc3twMuhOACzOQVO8PrEF/aVv2+hbCCy2udXvKhnYn+CCXl3ozc8\n"
- "XcKYvujTXDyvGWY3xwAjlQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQCUvnhzQWuQ\n"
- "MrN+pERkE+zcTI/9dGS90rUMMLgu8VDNqTa0TUQh8uO0EQ6uDvI8Js6e8tgwS0BR\n"
- "UBahqb7ZHv+rejGCBr5OudqD+x4STiiuPNJVs86JTLN8SpM9CHjIBH5WCCN2KOy3\n"
- "mevNoRcRRyYJzSFULCunIK6FGulszigMYGscrO4oiTkZiHPh9KvWT40IMiHfL+Lw\n"
- "EtEWiLex6064LcA2YQ1AMuSZyCexks63lcfaFmQbkYOKqXa1oLkIRuDsOaSVjTfe\n"
- "vec+X6jvf12cFTKS5WIeqkKF2Irt+dJoiHEGTe5RscUMN/f+gqHPzfFz5dR23sxo\n"
- "g+HC6MZHlFkLAOx3wW6epPS8A/m1mw3zMPoTnb2U2YYt8T0dJMMlUn/7Y1sEAa+a\n"
- "dSTMaeUf6VnJ//11m454EZl1to9Z7oJOgqmFffSrdD4BGIWe8f7hhW6L1Enmqe/J\n"
- "BKL3wbzZh80O1W0bndAwhnEEhlzneFY84cbBo9pmVxpODHkUcStpr5Z7pBDrcL21\n"
- "Ss/aB/1YrsVXhdvJdOGxl3Mnl9dUY57CympLGlT8f0pPS6GAKOelECOhFMHmJd8L\n"
- "dj3XQSmKtYHevZ6IvuMXSlB/fJvSjSlkCuLo5+kJoaqPuRu+i/S1qxeRy3CBwmnE\n"
- "LdSNdcX4N79GQJ996PA8+mUCQG7YRtK+WA==\n"
- "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-static const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
- "MIIFjzCCA3egAwIBAgIJAKd5WgyfPMYRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMF4xCzAJBgNV\n"
- "BAYTAlVTMREwDwYDVQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIG\n"
- "A1UECgwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkw\n"
- "NjEzMzc0MVoXDTQzMDEyMjEzMzc0MVowXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgM\n"
- "CElsbGlub2lzMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdDaGljYWdvMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtUb3IgVGVzdGlu\n"
- "ZzEUMBIGA1UEAwwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n"
- "ggIKAoICAQCpLMUEiLW5leUgBZoEJms2V7lZRhIAjnJBhVMHD0e3UubNknmaQoxf\n"
- "ARz3rvqOaRd0JlV+qM9qE0DjiYcCVP1cAfqAo9d83uS1vwY3YMVJzADlaIiHfyVW\n"
- "uEgBy0vvkeUBqaua24dYlcwsemOiXYLu41yM1wkcGHW1AhBNHppY6cznb8TyLgNM\n"
- "2x3SGUdzc5XMyAFx51faKGBA3wjs+Hg1PLY7d30nmCgEOBavpm5I1disM/0k+Mcy\n"
- "YmAKEo/iHJX/rQzO4b9znP69juLlR8PDBUJEVIG/CYb6+uw8MjjUyiWXYoqfVmN2\n"
- "hm/lH8b6rXw1a2Aa3VTeD0DxaWeacMYHY/i01fd5n7hCoDTRNdSw5KJ0L3Z0SKTu\n"
- "0lzffKzDaIfyZGlpW5qdouACkWYzsaitQOePVE01PIdO30vUfzNTFDfy42ccx3Di\n"
- "59UCu+IXB+eMtrBfsok0Qc63vtF1linJgjHW1z/8ujk8F7/qkOfODhk4l7wngc2A\n"
- "EmwWFIFoGaiTEZHB9qteXr4unbXZ0AHpM02uGGwZEGohjFyebEb73M+J57WKKAFb\n"
- "PqbLcGUksL1SHNBNAJcVLttX55sO4nbidOS/kA3m+F1R04MBTyQF9qA6YDDHqdI3\n"
- "h/3pw0Z4fxVouTYT4/NfRnX4JTP4u+7Mpcoof28VME0qWqD1LnRhFQIDAQABo1Aw\n"
- "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUMoAgIXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUMoAg\n"
- "IXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n"
- "AgEAUJxacjXR9sT+Xs6ISFiUsyd0T6WVKMnV46xrYJHirGfx+krWHrjxMY+ZtxYD\n"
- "DBDGlo11Qc4v6QrclNf5QUBfIiGQsP9Cm6hHcQ+Tpg9HHCgSqG1YNPwCPReCR4br\n"
- "BLvLfrfkcBL2IWM0PdQdCze+59DBfipsULD2mEn9fjYRXQEwb2QWtQ9qRc20Yb/x\n"
- "Q4b/+CvUodLkaq7B8MHz0BV8HHcBoph6DYaRmO/N+hPauIuSp6XyaGYcEefGKVKj\n"
- "G2+fcsdyXsoijNdL8vNKwm4j2gVwCBnw16J00yfFoV46YcbfqEdJB2je0XSvwXqt\n"
- "14AOTngxso2h9k9HLtrfpO1ZG/B5AcCMs1lzbZ2fp5DPHtjvvmvA2RJqgo3yjw4W\n"
- "4DHAuTglYFlC3mDHNfNtcGP20JvepcQNzNP2UzwcpOc94hfKikOFw+gf9Vf1qd0y\n"
- "h/Sk6OZHn2+JVUPiWHIQV98Vtoh4RmUZDJD+b55ia3fQGTGzt4z1XFzQYSva5sfs\n"
- "wocS/papthqWldQU7x+3wofNd5CNU1x6WKXG/yw30IT/4F8ADJD6GeygNT8QJYvt\n"
- "u/8lAkbOy6B9xGmSvr0Kk1oq9P2NshA6kalxp1Oz/DTNDdL4AeBXV3JmM6WWCjGn\n"
- "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n"
- "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-static X509 *
-read_cert_from(const char *str)
-{
- BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
- BIO_write(bio, str, (int) strlen(str));
- X509 *res = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- BIO_free(bio);
- return res;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_verify(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- crypto_pk_t *k = NULL;
- X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *invalidCert = NULL,
- *validCert = NULL, *caCert = NULL;
-
- cert1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
- cert1->references = 10;
-
- cert2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
- cert2->references = 10;
-
- validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- caCert = read_cert_from(caCertString);
- invalidCert = read_cert_from(notCompletelyValidCertString);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- MOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls);
-
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = cert1;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = cert2;
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
-
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = validCert;
- fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = caCert;
-
- ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_assert(k);
-
- done:
- UNMOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls);
- tor_free(cert1);
- tor_free(cert2);
- tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(k);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_check_lifetime(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- X509 *validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- time_t now = time(NULL);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- tls->ssl->session->peer = validCert;
- ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore);
- validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now-10);
- ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter);
- validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now+60);
-
- ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, -1000);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), -1000, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- X509_free(validCert);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static int fixed_ssl_pending_result = 0;
-
-static int
-fixed_ssl_pending(const SSL *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- return fixed_ssl_pending_result;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_get_pending_bytes(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_METHOD *method;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
- method->ssl_pending = fixed_ssl_pending;
- tls->ssl->method = method;
-
- fixed_ssl_pending_result = 42;
- ret = tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
-
- done:
- tor_free(method);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_get_forced_write_size(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- long ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tls->wantwrite_n = 43;
- ret = tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 43);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_get_write_overhead_ratio(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- double ret;
-
- total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
- ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
- tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 1.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
-
- total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10;
- total_bytes_written_over_tls = 1;
- ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
- tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 10.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
-
- total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10;
- total_bytes_written_over_tls = 2;
- ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
- tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 5.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
-
- done:
- (void)0;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_used_v1_handshake(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- // These tests assume both V2 handshake server and client are enabled
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- ret = tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_get_num_server_handshakes(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tls->server_handshake_count = 3;
- ret = tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_server_got_renegotiate(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
- ret = tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- size_t ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- uint8_t *out;
- out = tor_malloc_zero(1);
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1;
-
-#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
- tls->ssl->session->master_key[0] = 43;
- ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 1);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 43);
-
- done:
-#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(out);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_get_tlssecrets(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- uint8_t *secret_out = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN);
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1;
- tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
-
- ret = tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tls, secret_out);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- done:
- tor_free(secret_out);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_get_buffer_sizes(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- size_t rbuf_c=-1, rbuf_b=-1, wbuf_c=-1, wbuf_b=-1;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
-
- tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
- tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len = 1;
- tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
- tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left = 42;
-
- tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
- tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len = 2;
- tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.offset = 0;
- tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left = 43;
-
- ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-#else
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(rbuf_b, OP_EQ, 42);
- tt_int_op(wbuf_b, OP_EQ, 43);
-
- tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1);
- tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1);
- ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 1);
- tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 2);
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
-
- ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(NULL);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("foobar");
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P256");
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- ret = evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls("P224");
- // tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); This varies between machines
- tt_assert(ret == 0 || ret == 1);
-
- done:
- (void)0;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-typedef struct cert_pkey_st_local
-{
- X509 *x509;
- EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
- const EVP_MD *digest;
-} CERT_PKEY_local;
-
-typedef struct sess_cert_st_local
-{
- STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
- int peer_cert_type;
- CERT_PKEY_local *peer_key;
- CERT_PKEY_local peer_pkeys[8];
- int references;
-} SESS_CERT_local;
-
-static void
-test_tortls_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL, *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL;
- SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL;
-
- c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- c2 = read_cert_from(caCertString);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local));
- tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess;
-
- try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
- tt_assert(!cert);
- tt_assert(!id_cert);
-
- tls->ssl->session->peer = c1;
- try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
- tt_assert(cert == c1);
- tt_assert(!id_cert);
- X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
-
- sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
- try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
- tt_assert(cert == c1);
- tt_assert(!id_cert);
- X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
-
- sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1);
- sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c2);
-
- try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
- tt_assert(cert == c1);
- tt_assert(id_cert);
- X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
-
- done:
- sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain);
- tor_free(sess);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- X509_free(c1);
- X509_free(c2);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_get_peer_cert(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_x509_cert_t *ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
-
- cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
- ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- tls->ssl->session->peer = cert;
- ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls);
- tt_assert(ret);
- tt_assert(ret->cert == cert);
-
- done:
- tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- X509_free(cert);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_peer_has_cert(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- X509 *cert = NULL;
-
- cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
- ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- tls->ssl->session->peer = cert;
- ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls);
- tt_assert(ret);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- X509_free(cert);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_is_server(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- int ret;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->isServer = 1;
- ret = tor_tls_is_server(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_session_secret_cb(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
- SSL_CIPHER *one;
-
- library_init();
-
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
-
- SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
-
- tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb);
-
- one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
- one->id = 0x00ff;
- ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
-
- tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
- tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, ciphers, NULL, NULL);
- tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb);
-
- done:
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-/* TODO: It seems block_renegotiation and unblock_renegotiation and
- * using different blags. This might not be correct */
-static void
-test_tortls_block_renegotiation(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
-#ifndef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
-#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0
-#endif
-
- tls->ssl->s3->flags = SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
-
- tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
- tt_assert(!(tls->ssl->s3->flags &
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
-#endif
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_unblock_renegotiation(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
-
- tt_uint_op(SSL_get_options(tls->ssl) &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, OP_EQ,
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
- tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tls);
- /* No assertion here - this test will fail if tor_assert is turned on
- * and things are bad. */
-
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static void
-test_tortls_set_logged_address(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
-
- tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar");
-
- tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar");
-
- tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar 2");
- tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar 2");
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->address);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-example_cb(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg)
-{
- (void)t;
- (void)arg;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_set_renegotiate_callback(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- const char *arg = "hello";
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
-
- tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, example_cb, (void*)arg);
- tt_assert(tls->negotiated_callback == example_cb);
- tt_assert(tls->callback_arg == arg);
- tt_assert(!tls->got_renegotiate);
-
- /* Assumes V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER */
- tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_server_info_callback);
-
- tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, (void*)arg);
- tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
-
- done:
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher1 = NULL;
-static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher2 = NULL;
-static const SSL_CIPHER *
-fake_get_cipher(unsigned ncipher)
-{
-
- switch (ncipher) {
- case 1:
- return fixed_cipher1;
- case 2:
- return fixed_cipher2;
- default:
- return NULL;
- }
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_find_cipher_by_id(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- SSL *ssl;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- const SSL_METHOD *m = TLSv1_method();
- SSL_METHOD *empty_method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
-
- fixed_cipher1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER));
- fixed_cipher2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER));
- fixed_cipher2->id = 0xC00A;
-
- library_init();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(m);
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
-
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, NULL, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xFFFF);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xFFFF);
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-#else
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-#endif
-
- empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher;
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- empty_method->get_cipher = m->get_cipher;
- empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers;
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher;
- empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers;
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- empty_method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
- ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
-#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-#else
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-#endif
-
- done:
- tor_free(empty_method);
- SSL_free(ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(fixed_cipher1);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_debug_state_callback(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- SSL *ssl;
- char *buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000);
- int n;
-
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
-
- ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
-
- tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, 32, 45);
-
- n = tor_snprintf(buf, 1000, "SSL %p is now in state unknown"
- " state [type=32,val=45].\n", ssl);
- /* tor's snprintf returns -1 on error */
- tt_int_op(n, OP_NE, -1);
- expect_log_msg(buf);
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- tor_free(buf);
- tor_free(ssl);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_server_info_callback(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL *ssl;
-
- library_init();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
- ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
-
- tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
- tls->ssl = ssl;
-
- setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
- SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A);
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n");
-
- SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B);
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n");
-
- SSL_set_state(ssl, 99);
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- expect_no_log_entry();
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
-
- SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
- SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B);
- tls->negotiated_callback = 0;
- tls->server_handshake_count = 120;
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 121);
-
- tls->server_handshake_count = 127;
- tls->negotiated_callback = (void *)1;
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 127);
- tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new();
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
- tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- SSL_free(ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static int fixed_ssl_read_result_index;
-static int fixed_ssl_read_result[5];
-static int fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
-
-static int
-fixed_ssl_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
-{
- (void)s;
- (void)buf;
- (void)len;
- return fixed_ssl_read_result[fixed_ssl_read_result_index++];
-}
-
-static int
-fixed_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- (void)s;
- return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
-}
-
-#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
-static int fixed_ssl_state_to_set;
-static tor_tls_t *fixed_tls;
-
-static int
-setting_version_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
- return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
-}
-
-static int
-setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
-{
- fixed_tls->state = fixed_ssl_state_to_set;
- s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
- return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
-}
-#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
-
-static int
-dummy_handshake_func(SSL *s)
-{
- (void)s;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_shutdown(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->ssl->method = method;
- method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read;
- method->ssl_shutdown = fixed_ssl_shutdown;
-
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = -1;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
-#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
- tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
-
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
- fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE);
- tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
-
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
- fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->version = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE);
- tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
-
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
- fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->version = 0;
- method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_ssl_shutdown;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
-
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
- fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
- fixed_tls = tls;
- fixed_ssl_state_to_set = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->version = 0;
- method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
-
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[3] = -1;
- fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
- fixed_tls = tls;
- fixed_ssl_state_to_set = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->version = 0;
- method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown;
- ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
-#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- tor_free(method);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
-}
-
-static int negotiated_callback_called;
-
-static void
-negotiated_callback_setter(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg)
-{
- (void)t;
- (void)arg;
- negotiated_callback_called++;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_read(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- char buf[100];
- SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
-
- ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- /* These tests assume that V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER is set */
- tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
- tls->ssl->method = method;
- method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read;
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 42;
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
- ERR_clear_error();
- ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
- tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
- tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
- negotiated_callback_called = 0;
- tls->negotiated_callback = negotiated_callback_setter;
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- ERR_clear_error();
- ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(negotiated_callback_called, OP_EQ, 1);
-
-#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
- fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
- fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 0;
- tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION;
- ERR_clear_error();
- ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE);
- tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
-#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
- // TODO: fill up
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(method);
-}
-
-static int fixed_ssl_write_result;
-
-static int
-fixed_ssl_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
-{
- (void)s;
- (void)buf;
- (void)len;
- return fixed_ssl_write_result;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_write(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
- char buf[100];
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
-
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- tls->ssl->method = method;
- tls->wantwrite_n = 1;
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(tls->wantwrite_n, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- method->ssl_write = fixed_ssl_write;
- tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
- fixed_ssl_write_result = 1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- fixed_ssl_write_result = -1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
- SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ;
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD);
-
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
- SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE;
- ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE);
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- BIO_free(tls->ssl->rbio);
- tor_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(method);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static int fixed_ssl_accept_result;
-static int fixed_ssl_connect_result;
-
-static int
-setting_error_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl)
-{
- (void)ssl;
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- return fixed_ssl_accept_result;
-}
-
-static int
-setting_error_ssl_connect(SSL *ssl)
-{
- (void)ssl;
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
- return fixed_ssl_connect_result;
-}
-
-static int
-fixed_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl)
-{
- (void) ssl;
- return fixed_ssl_accept_result;
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_handshake(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
- setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
-
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
-
- ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- tls->isServer = 1;
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
- ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- tls->ssl->method = method;
- method->ssl_accept = fixed_ssl_accept;
- fixed_ssl_accept_result = 2;
- ERR_clear_error();
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
- ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
-
- method->ssl_accept = setting_error_ssl_accept;
- fixed_ssl_accept_result = 1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
- ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
- expect_log_entry();
- /* This fails on jessie. Investigate why! */
-#if 0
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in bignum routines:"
- "(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in system library:"
- "connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
-#endif /* 0 */
- expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
-
- tls->isServer = 0;
- method->ssl_connect = setting_error_ssl_connect;
- fixed_ssl_connect_result = 1;
- ERR_clear_error();
- mock_clean_saved_logs();
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
- ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
- expect_log_entry();
-#if 0
- /* See above */
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: "
- "(null) (in bignum routines:(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
- expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: "
- "(null) (in system library:connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
-#endif /* 0 */
- expect_log_severity(LOG_WARN);
-
- done:
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(tls);
- tor_free(method);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static void
-test_tortls_finish_handshake(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_t *tls;
- SSL_CTX *ctx;
- SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
-
- X509 *c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL;
-
- ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
-
- tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
- tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
- tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
-
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tls->isServer = 1;
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
- setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
- expect_single_log_msg_containing("For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't "
- "get set.");
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
-
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
- tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new();
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tls->isServer = 0;
-
- sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local));
- tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess;
- sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
- sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1);
- tls->ssl->session->peer = c1;
- tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
- ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
-
- done:
- if (sess)
- sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain);
- if (tls->ssl && tls->ssl->session) {
- tor_free(tls->ssl->session->sess_cert);
- }
- SSL_free(tls->ssl);
- tor_free(tls);
- SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
- tor_free(method);
- teardown_capture_of_logs();
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static int fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index;
-static crypto_pk_t *fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[5];
-
-static crypto_pk_t *
-fixed_crypto_pk_new(void)
-{
- return fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index++];
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index;
-static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[5];
-static int fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index;
-static X509 *fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[5];
-static int fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index;
-static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[5];
-
-static int
-fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits)
-{
- (void)env;
- (void)bits;
- return fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index++];
-}
-
-static X509 *
-fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
- crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
- const char *cname,
- const char *cname_sign,
- unsigned int cert_lifetime)
-{
- (void)rsa;
- (void)rsa_sign;
- (void)cname;
- (void)cname_sign;
- (void)cert_lifetime;
- return fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index++];
-}
-
-static tor_x509_cert_t *
-fixed_tor_x509_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
-{
- (void) x509_cert;
- return fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++];
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_tls_context_t *ret;
- crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2, *pk3, *pk4, *pk5, *pk6, *pk7, *pk8, *pk9, *pk10,
- *pk11, *pk12, *pk13, *pk14, *pk15, *pk16, *pk17, *pk18;
-
- pk1 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk2 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk3 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk4 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk5 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk6 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk7 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk8 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk9 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk10 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk11 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk12 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk13 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk14 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk15 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk16 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk17 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk18 = crypto_pk_new();
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL;
- MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new);
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- /* note: we already override this in testing_common.c, so we
- * run this unit test in a subprocess. */
- MOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits,
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits);
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk1;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = -1;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk2;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk3;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk4;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = -1;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- MOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate, fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk5;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk6;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = NULL;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk7;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk8;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = NULL;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk9;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk10;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- MOCK(tor_x509_cert_new, fixed_tor_x509_cert_new);
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk11;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk12;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = NULL;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk13;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk14;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk15;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk16;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk17;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk18;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
- fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- done:
- UNMOCK(tor_x509_cert_new);
- UNMOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate);
- UNMOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits);
- UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new);
-}
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-static int fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
-static EVP_PKEY *fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[5];
-
-static EVP_PKEY *
-fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(crypto_pk_t *env, int private)
-{
- (void) env;
- (void) private;
- return fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index++];
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- X509 *ret;
- crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2;
-
- pk1 = crypto_pk_new();
- pk2 = crypto_pk_new();
-
- MOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_);
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new();
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new();
- fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = EVP_PKEY_new();
- ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- done:
- UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_);
- crypto_pk_free(pk1);
- crypto_pk_free(pk2);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_cert_new(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- tor_x509_cert_t *ret;
- X509 *cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
-
- ret = tor_x509_cert_new(NULL);
- tt_assert(!ret);
-
- ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
- tt_assert(ret);
- tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
- ret = NULL;
-
-#if 0
- cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- /* XXX this doesn't do what you think: it alters a copy of the pubkey. */
- X509_get_pubkey(cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
- ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
- tt_assert(ret);
-#endif /* 0 */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
- cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
- X509_CINF_free(cert->cert_info);
- cert->cert_info = NULL;
- ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
- tt_assert(ret);
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
- done:
- tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL, *scert = NULL;
-
- scert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
- tor_free(scert);
- tor_free(cert);
-
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- ASN1_TIME_free(cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter);
- cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter =
- ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL)-1000000);
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- X509_PUBKEY_free(cert->cert->cert_info->key);
- cert->cert->cert_info->key = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
-#if 0
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
- BN_one(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert))->n);
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
- X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
- X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
-
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
- cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
- scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
- /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
- X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
- X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->ameth = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
-#endif /* 0 */
-
- done:
- tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
- tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
-}
-
-static void
-test_tortls_context_init_one(void *ignored)
-{
- (void)ignored;
- int ret;
- tor_tls_context_t *old = NULL;
-
- MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new);
-
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
- fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL;
- ret = tor_tls_context_init_one(&old, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
-
- done:
- UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new);
-}
-
-#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
+#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
{ #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL }
-#ifdef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
-#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
- { #name, NULL, TT_SKIP, NULL, NULL }
-#else
-#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags)
-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
-
struct testcase_t tortls_tests[] = {
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(errno_to_tls_error, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(err_to_string, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_new, TT_FORK),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_get_error, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_state_description, TT_FORK),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_by_ssl, TT_FORK),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, TT_FORK),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(log_one_error, TT_FORK),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_get_id_digests, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_certs, TT_FORK),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(classify_client_ciphers, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(client_is_using_v2_ciphers, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(verify, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(check_lifetime, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_pending_bytes, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_forced_write_size, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_write_overhead_ratio, TT_FORK),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(used_v1_handshake, TT_FORK),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_num_server_handshakes, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(server_got_renegotiate, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(SSL_SESSION_get_master_key, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_tlssecrets, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_buffer_sizes, 0),
LOCAL_TEST_CASE(evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_peer_cert, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(peer_has_cert, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(shutdown, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(finish_handshake, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(handshake, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(write, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(read, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(server_info_callback, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(assert_renegotiation_unblocked, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(block_renegotiation, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(unblock_renegotiation, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(set_renegotiate_callback, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(set_logged_address, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(find_cipher_by_id, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(session_secret_cb, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(debug_state_callback, 0),
- INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(context_new, TT_FORK /* redundant */),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(create_certificate, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_new, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_is_valid, 0),
- LOCAL_TEST_CASE(context_init_one, 0),
END_OF_TESTCASES
};
diff --git a/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a9336a6f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/test_tortls_openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2597 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2010-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+#define TOR_X509_PRIVATE
+#define LOG_PRIVATE
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#endif
+#include <math.h>
+
+#include "lib/cc/compat_compiler.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/compat_openssl.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_st.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls_internal.h"
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+
+#include "test/test.h"
+#include "test/log_test_helpers.h"
+#define NS_MODULE tortls
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_STATE
+#define OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#define SSL_STATE_STR "before SSL initialization"
+#else
+#define SSL_STATE_STR "before/accept initialization"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static SSL_METHOD *
+give_me_a_test_method(void)
+{
+ SSL_METHOD *method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+ memcpy(method, TLSv1_method(), sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+ return method;
+}
+
+static int
+fake_num_ciphers(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static int
+mock_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ (void) tls;
+ (void) cert; // XXXX look at this.
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_tor_tls_new(void *data)
+{
+ (void) data;
+ MOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key, mock_tls_cert_matches_key);
+ crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL, *key2 = NULL;
+ SSL_METHOD *method = NULL;
+
+ key1 = pk_generate(2);
+ key2 = pk_generate(3);
+
+ tor_tls_t *tls = NULL;
+ tt_int_op(tor_tls_context_init(TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER,
+ key1, key2, 86400), OP_EQ, 0);
+ tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
+ tt_want(tls);
+ tor_tls_free(tls); tls = NULL;
+
+ SSL_CTX_free(client_tls_context->ctx);
+ client_tls_context->ctx = NULL;
+ tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+ method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+ method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
+ client_tls_context->ctx = ctx;
+ tls = tor_tls_new(-1, 0);
+ tt_ptr_op(tls, OP_EQ, NULL);
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(tor_tls_cert_matches_key);
+ crypto_pk_free(key1);
+ crypto_pk_free(key2);
+ tor_tls_free(tls);
+ tor_free(method);
+ tor_tls_free_all();
+}
+
+#define NS_MODULE tortls
+
+static void
+library_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
+#else
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_get_state_description(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ char *buf;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+
+ library_init();
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+
+ buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000);
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(NULL, buf, 20);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)");
+
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tls->ssl = NULL;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 20);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, "(No SSL object)");
+
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in HANDSHAKE");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in OPEN");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in GOTCLOSE");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in SENTCLOSE");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in CLOSED");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in RENEGOTIATE");
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR);
+
+ tls->state = 7;
+ tor_tls_get_state_description(tls, buf, 200);
+ tt_str_op(buf, OP_EQ, SSL_STATE_STR " in unknown TLS state");
+
+ done:
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(buf);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_get_by_ssl(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ tor_tls_t *res;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ library_init();
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ tt_assert(!res);
+
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
+
+ res = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ tt_assert(res == tls);
+
+ done:
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int first;
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ first = tor_tls_object_ex_data_index;
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+ tt_int_op(first, OP_EQ, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+
+ done:
+ (void)0;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_log_one_error(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl = NULL;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(NULL, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "something");
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: "
+ "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error: (null) "
+ "(in (null):(null):---)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello");
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: "
+ "(null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tls->address = tor_strdup("127.hello");
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, "blarg");
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while blarg with "
+ "127.hello: (null) (in (null):(null):---)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, 3), LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: "
+ "BN lib (in unknown library:(null):---)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, ERR_PACK(1, 2, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL),
+ LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, 0, LOG_WARN, 0, NULL);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error with 127.hello: (null)"
+ " (in (null):(null):" SSL_STATE_STR ")\n");
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (tls && tls->ssl)
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ if (tls)
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_get_error(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
+
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error: unexpected close while"
+ " something (before/accept initialization)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 2, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 1, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -11);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null)"
+ " (in bignum routines:(null):before/accept initialization)\n");
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->rwstate = 0;
+ tls->ssl->shutdown = SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
+ tls->ssl->s3->warn_alert =SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE);
+ expect_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, 0, 2, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -10);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ ret = tor_tls_get_error(tls, -1, 0, "something", LOG_WARN, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while something: (null) (in system library:"
+ "connect:before/accept initialization)\n");
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static void
+test_tortls_always_accept_verify_cb(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = always_accept_verify_cb(0, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ done:
+ (void)0;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_x509_cert_free(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ cert->cert = X509_new();
+ cert->encoded = tor_malloc_zero(1);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static int
+fixed_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b)
+{
+ (void) a; (void) b;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use only for the matching fake_x509_free() call
+ */
+static X509 *
+fake_x509_malloc(void)
+{
+ return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
+}
+
+static void
+fake_x509_free(X509 *cert)
+{
+ if (cert) {
+ if (cert->cert_info) {
+ if (cert->cert_info->key) {
+ if (cert->cert_info->key->pkey) {
+ tor_free(cert->cert_info->key->pkey);
+ }
+ tor_free(cert->cert_info->key);
+ }
+ tor_free(cert->cert_info);
+ }
+ tor_free(cert);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_cert_matches_key(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int res;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+ X509 *one = NULL, *two = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *meth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_new(999, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_public(meth, NULL, NULL, fixed_pub_cmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ one = fake_x509_malloc();
+ one->references = 1;
+ two = fake_x509_malloc();
+ two->references = 1;
+
+ res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
+ tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = one;
+ res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
+ tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ cert->cert = two;
+ res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
+ tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ one->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
+ one->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
+ one->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
+ one->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
+ one->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth;
+ one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
+
+ two->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
+ two->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
+ two->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
+ two->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
+ two->cert_info->key->pkey->ameth = meth;
+ two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2;
+
+ res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
+ tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ one->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
+ two->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 1;
+ res = tor_tls_cert_matches_key(tls, cert);
+ tt_int_op(res, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ done:
+ EVP_PKEY_asn1_free(meth);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(cert);
+ fake_x509_free(one);
+ fake_x509_free(two);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_cert_get_key(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ crypto_pk_t *res = NULL;
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ X509 *key = NULL;
+ key = fake_x509_malloc();
+ key->references = 1;
+
+ res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert);
+ tt_assert(!res);
+
+ cert->cert = key;
+ key->cert_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_CINF));
+ key->cert_info->key = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509_PUBKEY));
+ key->cert_info->key->pkey = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(EVP_PKEY));
+ key->cert_info->key->pkey->references = 1;
+ key->cert_info->key->pkey->type = 2;
+ res = tor_tls_cert_get_key(cert);
+ tt_assert(!res);
+
+ done:
+ fake_x509_free(key);
+ tor_free(cert);
+ crypto_pk_free(res);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static void
+test_tortls_get_my_client_auth_key(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ crypto_pk_t *ret;
+ crypto_pk_t *expected;
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx;
+ RSA *k = RSA_new();
+
+ ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
+ expected = crypto_new_pk_from_openssl_rsa_(k);
+ ctx->auth_key = expected;
+
+ client_tls_context = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ client_tls_context = ctx;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
+ tt_assert(ret == expected);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(expected);
+ tor_free(ctx);
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+static SSL_CIPHER *
+get_cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ int i;
+ const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
+ int num = method->num_ciphers();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ if (!strcmp(ciphername, name)) {
+ return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_get_ciphersuite_name(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ const char *ret;
+ tor_tls_t *ctx;
+ ctx = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ ctx->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+
+ ret = tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(ctx);
+ tt_str_op(ret, OP_EQ, "(NONE)");
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(ctx->ssl);
+ tor_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static SSL_CIPHER *
+get_cipher_by_id(uint16_t id)
+{
+ int i;
+ const SSL_METHOD *method = SSLv23_method();
+ int num = method->num_ciphers();
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = method->get_cipher(i);
+ if (id == (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff)) {
+ return (SSL_CIPHER *)cipher;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_classify_client_ciphers(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int i;
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+ SSL_CIPHER *tmp_cipher;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ tls->ssl = ssl;
+
+ ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 42;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
+
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, SSL_get_ciphers(ssl));
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
+
+ SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA),
+ *two = get_cipher_by_name(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA),
+ *three = get_cipher_by_name(SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA),
+ *four = NULL;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, three);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, four);
+
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
+
+ one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
+ tt_assert(one);
+ one->id = 0x00ff;
+ two = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256");
+ tt_assert(two);
+ two->id = 0x0000;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, two);
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
+
+ one->id = 0xC00A;
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 3);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(ciphers);
+ for (i=0; v2_cipher_list[i]; i++) {
+ tmp_cipher = get_cipher_by_id(v2_cipher_list[i]);
+ tt_assert(tmp_cipher);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, tmp_cipher);
+ }
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 2);
+ tt_int_op(tls->client_cipher_list_type, OP_EQ, 2);
+
+ done:
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static void
+test_tortls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+ tt_skip();
+ done:
+ (void)1;
+#else
+ int ret;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
+
+ ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ ssl->session = sess;
+ ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ SSL_CIPHER *one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
+ tt_assert(one);
+ one->id = 0x00ff;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
+ sess->ciphers = ciphers;
+ ret = tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+ done:
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = NULL;
+static X509 *fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = NULL;
+
+static void
+fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **cert_out,
+ tor_x509_cert_impl_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+ (void) severity;
+ (void) tls;
+ *cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result;
+ *id_cert_out = fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static const char* notCompletelyValidCertString =
+ "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIICVjCCAb8CAg37MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMIGbMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwG\n"
+ "A1UECBMFVG9reW8xEDAOBgNVBAcTB0NodW8ta3UxETAPBgNVBAoTCEZyYW5rNERE\n"
+ "MRgwFgYDVQQLEw9XZWJDZXJ0IFN1cHBvcnQxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ZyYW5rNEREIFdl\n"
+ "YiBDQTEjMCEGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYUc3VwcG9ydEBmcmFuazRkZC5jb20wHhcNMTIw\n"
+ "ODIyMDUyNzIzWhcNMTcwODIxMDUyNzIzWjBKMQswCQYDVQQGEwJKUDEOMAwGA1UE\n"
+ "CAwFVG9reW8xETAPBgNVBAoMCEZyYW5rNEREMRgwFgYDVQQDDA93d3cuZXhhbXBs\n"
+ "ZS5jb20wgZ8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMYBBrx5PlP0WNI/ZdzD\n"
+ "+6Pktmurn+F2kQYbtc7XQh8/LTBvCo+P6iZoLEmUA9e7EXLRxgU1CVqeAi7QcAn9\n"
+ "MwBlc8ksFJHB0rtf9pmf8Oza9E0Bynlq/4/Kb1x+d+AyhL7oK9tQwB24uHOueHi1\n"
+ "C/iVv8CSWKiYe6hzN1txYe8rAgMBAAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAASPdjigJ\n"
+ "kXCqKWpnZ/Oc75EUcMi6HztaW8abUMlYXPIgkV2F7YanHOB7K4f7OOLjiz8DTPFf\n"
+ "jC9UeuErhaA/zzWi8ewMTFZW/WshOrm3fNvcMrMLKtH534JKvcdMg6qIdjTFINIr\n"
+ "evnAhf0cwULaebn+lMs8Pdl7y37+sfluVok=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static const char* validCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIDpTCCAY0CAg3+MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMF4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMREwDwYD\n"
+ "VQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIGA1UECgwLVG9yIFRl\n"
+ "c3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkwNjEzMzk1OVoXDTQz\n"
+ "MDEyMjEzMzk1OVowVjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxEDAOBgNVBAcMB0NoaWNhZ28xFDAS\n"
+ "BgNVBAoMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMR8wHQYDVQQDDBZ0ZXN0aW5nLnRvcnByb2plY3Qu\n"
+ "b3JnMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDoT6uyVVhWyOF3wkHjjYbd\n"
+ "nKaykyRv4JVtKQdZ4OpEErmX1zw4MmyzpQNV6iR4bQnWiyLfzyVJMZDIC/WILBfX\n"
+ "w2Pza/yuLgUvDc3twMuhOACzOQVO8PrEF/aVv2+hbCCy2udXvKhnYn+CCXl3ozc8\n"
+ "XcKYvujTXDyvGWY3xwAjlQIDAQABMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQCUvnhzQWuQ\n"
+ "MrN+pERkE+zcTI/9dGS90rUMMLgu8VDNqTa0TUQh8uO0EQ6uDvI8Js6e8tgwS0BR\n"
+ "UBahqb7ZHv+rejGCBr5OudqD+x4STiiuPNJVs86JTLN8SpM9CHjIBH5WCCN2KOy3\n"
+ "mevNoRcRRyYJzSFULCunIK6FGulszigMYGscrO4oiTkZiHPh9KvWT40IMiHfL+Lw\n"
+ "EtEWiLex6064LcA2YQ1AMuSZyCexks63lcfaFmQbkYOKqXa1oLkIRuDsOaSVjTfe\n"
+ "vec+X6jvf12cFTKS5WIeqkKF2Irt+dJoiHEGTe5RscUMN/f+gqHPzfFz5dR23sxo\n"
+ "g+HC6MZHlFkLAOx3wW6epPS8A/m1mw3zMPoTnb2U2YYt8T0dJMMlUn/7Y1sEAa+a\n"
+ "dSTMaeUf6VnJ//11m454EZl1to9Z7oJOgqmFffSrdD4BGIWe8f7hhW6L1Enmqe/J\n"
+ "BKL3wbzZh80O1W0bndAwhnEEhlzneFY84cbBo9pmVxpODHkUcStpr5Z7pBDrcL21\n"
+ "Ss/aB/1YrsVXhdvJdOGxl3Mnl9dUY57CympLGlT8f0pPS6GAKOelECOhFMHmJd8L\n"
+ "dj3XQSmKtYHevZ6IvuMXSlB/fJvSjSlkCuLo5+kJoaqPuRu+i/S1qxeRy3CBwmnE\n"
+ "LdSNdcX4N79GQJ996PA8+mUCQG7YRtK+WA==\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static const char* caCertString = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+ "MIIFjzCCA3egAwIBAgIJAKd5WgyfPMYRMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMF4xCzAJBgNV\n"
+ "BAYTAlVTMREwDwYDVQQIDAhJbGxpbm9pczEQMA4GA1UEBwwHQ2hpY2FnbzEUMBIG\n"
+ "A1UECgwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcxFDASBgNVBAMMC1RvciBUZXN0aW5nMB4XDTE1MDkw\n"
+ "NjEzMzc0MVoXDTQzMDEyMjEzMzc0MVowXjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMxETAPBgNVBAgM\n"
+ "CElsbGlub2lzMRAwDgYDVQQHDAdDaGljYWdvMRQwEgYDVQQKDAtUb3IgVGVzdGlu\n"
+ "ZzEUMBIGA1UEAwwLVG9yIFRlc3RpbmcwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw\n"
+ "ggIKAoICAQCpLMUEiLW5leUgBZoEJms2V7lZRhIAjnJBhVMHD0e3UubNknmaQoxf\n"
+ "ARz3rvqOaRd0JlV+qM9qE0DjiYcCVP1cAfqAo9d83uS1vwY3YMVJzADlaIiHfyVW\n"
+ "uEgBy0vvkeUBqaua24dYlcwsemOiXYLu41yM1wkcGHW1AhBNHppY6cznb8TyLgNM\n"
+ "2x3SGUdzc5XMyAFx51faKGBA3wjs+Hg1PLY7d30nmCgEOBavpm5I1disM/0k+Mcy\n"
+ "YmAKEo/iHJX/rQzO4b9znP69juLlR8PDBUJEVIG/CYb6+uw8MjjUyiWXYoqfVmN2\n"
+ "hm/lH8b6rXw1a2Aa3VTeD0DxaWeacMYHY/i01fd5n7hCoDTRNdSw5KJ0L3Z0SKTu\n"
+ "0lzffKzDaIfyZGlpW5qdouACkWYzsaitQOePVE01PIdO30vUfzNTFDfy42ccx3Di\n"
+ "59UCu+IXB+eMtrBfsok0Qc63vtF1linJgjHW1z/8ujk8F7/qkOfODhk4l7wngc2A\n"
+ "EmwWFIFoGaiTEZHB9qteXr4unbXZ0AHpM02uGGwZEGohjFyebEb73M+J57WKKAFb\n"
+ "PqbLcGUksL1SHNBNAJcVLttX55sO4nbidOS/kA3m+F1R04MBTyQF9qA6YDDHqdI3\n"
+ "h/3pw0Z4fxVouTYT4/NfRnX4JTP4u+7Mpcoof28VME0qWqD1LnRhFQIDAQABo1Aw\n"
+ "TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUMoAgIXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUMoAg\n"
+ "IXH7pZ3QMRwTjT+DM9Yo/v0wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\n"
+ "AgEAUJxacjXR9sT+Xs6ISFiUsyd0T6WVKMnV46xrYJHirGfx+krWHrjxMY+ZtxYD\n"
+ "DBDGlo11Qc4v6QrclNf5QUBfIiGQsP9Cm6hHcQ+Tpg9HHCgSqG1YNPwCPReCR4br\n"
+ "BLvLfrfkcBL2IWM0PdQdCze+59DBfipsULD2mEn9fjYRXQEwb2QWtQ9qRc20Yb/x\n"
+ "Q4b/+CvUodLkaq7B8MHz0BV8HHcBoph6DYaRmO/N+hPauIuSp6XyaGYcEefGKVKj\n"
+ "G2+fcsdyXsoijNdL8vNKwm4j2gVwCBnw16J00yfFoV46YcbfqEdJB2je0XSvwXqt\n"
+ "14AOTngxso2h9k9HLtrfpO1ZG/B5AcCMs1lzbZ2fp5DPHtjvvmvA2RJqgo3yjw4W\n"
+ "4DHAuTglYFlC3mDHNfNtcGP20JvepcQNzNP2UzwcpOc94hfKikOFw+gf9Vf1qd0y\n"
+ "h/Sk6OZHn2+JVUPiWHIQV98Vtoh4RmUZDJD+b55ia3fQGTGzt4z1XFzQYSva5sfs\n"
+ "wocS/papthqWldQU7x+3wofNd5CNU1x6WKXG/yw30IT/4F8ADJD6GeygNT8QJYvt\n"
+ "u/8lAkbOy6B9xGmSvr0Kk1oq9P2NshA6kalxp1Oz/DTNDdL4AeBXV3JmM6WWCjGn\n"
+ "Yy1RT69d0rwYc5u/vnqODz1IjvT90smsrkBumGt791FAFeg=\n"
+ "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static X509 *
+read_cert_from(const char *str)
+{
+ BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BIO_write(bio, str, (int) strlen(str));
+ X509 *res = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return res;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_verify(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ crypto_pk_t *k = NULL;
+ X509 *cert1 = NULL, *cert2 = NULL, *invalidCert = NULL,
+ *validCert = NULL, *caCert = NULL;
+
+ cert1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
+ cert1->references = 10;
+
+ cert2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(X509));
+ cert2->references = 10;
+
+ validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ caCert = read_cert_from(caCertString);
+ invalidCert = read_cert_from(notCompletelyValidCertString);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ MOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls);
+
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = cert1;
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = cert2;
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = invalidCert;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_cert_out_result = validCert;
+ fixed_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls_id_cert_out_result = caCert;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_verify(LOG_WARN, tls, &k);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_assert(k);
+
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls);
+ tor_free(cert1);
+ tor_free(cert2);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(k);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_check_lifetime(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ X509 *validCert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = validCert;
+ ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore);
+ validCert->cert_info->validity->notBefore = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now-10);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter);
+ validCert->cert_info->validity->notAfter = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, now+60);
+
+ ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), 0, -1000);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ ret = tor_tls_check_lifetime(LOG_WARN, tls, time(NULL), -1000, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ X509_free(validCert);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static int fixed_ssl_pending_result = 0;
+
+static int
+fixed_ssl_pending(const SSL *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ return fixed_ssl_pending_result;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_get_pending_bytes(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+ method->ssl_pending = fixed_ssl_pending;
+ tls->ssl->method = method;
+
+ fixed_ssl_pending_result = 42;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(method);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ size_t ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ uint8_t *out;
+ out = tor_malloc_zero(1);
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+ tls->ssl->session->master_key[0] = 43;
+ ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ ret = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(tls->ssl->session, out, 1);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(out[0], OP_EQ, 43);
+
+ done:
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(out);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_get_tlssecrets(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t *secret_out = tor_malloc_zero(DIGEST256_LEN);
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ tls->ssl->session->master_key_length = 1;
+ tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
+
+ ret = tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tls, secret_out);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(secret_out);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_get_buffer_sizes(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ size_t rbuf_c=-1, rbuf_b=-1, wbuf_c=-1, wbuf_b=-1;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
+
+ tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = NULL;
+ tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len = 1;
+ tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.offset = 0;
+ tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left = 42;
+
+ tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = NULL;
+ tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len = 2;
+ tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.offset = 0;
+ tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left = 43;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+#else
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(rbuf_b, OP_EQ, 42);
+ tt_int_op(wbuf_b, OP_EQ, 43);
+
+ tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1);
+ tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf = tor_malloc_zero(1);
+ ret = tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tls, &rbuf_c, &rbuf_b, &wbuf_c, &wbuf_b);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(rbuf_c, OP_EQ, 1);
+ tt_int_op(wbuf_c, OP_EQ, 2);
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+typedef struct cert_pkey_st_local
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ EVP_PKEY *privatekey;
+ const EVP_MD *digest;
+} CERT_PKEY_local;
+
+typedef struct sess_cert_st_local
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain;
+ int peer_cert_type;
+ CERT_PKEY_local *peer_key;
+ CERT_PKEY_local peer_pkeys[8];
+ int references;
+} SESS_CERT_local;
+
+static void
+test_tortls_try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL, *c1 = NULL, *c2 = NULL;
+ SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL;
+
+ c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ c2 = read_cert_from(caCertString);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+ sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local));
+ tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess;
+
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ tt_assert(!cert);
+ tt_assert(!id_cert);
+
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = c1;
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ tt_assert(cert == c1);
+ tt_assert(!id_cert);
+ X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
+
+ sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ tt_assert(cert == c1);
+ tt_assert(!id_cert);
+ X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
+
+ sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1);
+ sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c2);
+
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(LOG_WARN, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ tt_assert(cert == c1);
+ tt_assert(id_cert);
+ X509_free(cert); /* decrease refcnt */
+
+ done:
+ sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain);
+ tor_free(sess);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ X509_free(c1);
+ X509_free(c2);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_get_peer_cert(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+
+ cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = cert;
+ ret = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tls);
+ tt_assert(ret);
+ tt_assert(ret->cert == cert);
+
+ done:
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ X509_free(cert);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_peer_has_cert(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ X509 *cert = NULL;
+
+ cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->session = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
+
+ ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = cert;
+ ret = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tls);
+ tt_assert(ret);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ X509_free(cert);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static void
+test_tortls_get_write_overhead_ratio(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ double ret;
+
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
+ ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
+ tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 1.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
+
+ total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10;
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls = 1;
+ ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
+ tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 10.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
+
+ total_bytes_written_by_tls = 10;
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls = 2;
+ ret = tls_get_write_overhead_ratio();
+ tt_double_op(fabs(ret - 5.0), OP_LT, 1E-12);
+
+ done:
+ (void)0;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_is_server(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ int ret;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->isServer = 1;
+ ret = tor_tls_is_server(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_session_secret_cb(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
+ SSL_CIPHER *one;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+
+ tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
+
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
+
+ tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb);
+
+ one = get_cipher_by_name("ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384");
+ one->id = 0x00ff;
+ ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphers, one);
+
+ tls->client_cipher_list_type = 0;
+ tor_tls_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, NULL, NULL, ciphers, NULL, NULL);
+ tt_assert(!tls->ssl->tls_session_secret_cb);
+
+ done:
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+/* TODO: It seems block_renegotiation and unblock_renegotiation and
+ * using different blags. This might not be correct */
+static void
+test_tortls_block_renegotiation(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->s3 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL3_STATE));
+#ifndef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0
+#endif
+
+ tls->ssl->s3->flags = SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+
+ tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ tt_assert(!(tls->ssl->s3->flags &
+ SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
+#endif
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->s3);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_unblock_renegotiation(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+
+ tt_uint_op(SSL_get_options(tls->ssl) &
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION, OP_EQ,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+ tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tls);
+ /* No assertion here - this test will fail if tor_assert is turned on
+ * and things are bad. */
+
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static void
+test_tortls_set_logged_address(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+
+ tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar");
+
+ tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar");
+
+ tor_tls_set_logged_address(tls, "foo bar 2");
+ tt_str_op(tls->address, OP_EQ, "foo bar 2");
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+example_cb(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg)
+{
+ (void)t;
+ (void)arg;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_set_renegotiate_callback(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ const char *arg = "hello";
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+
+ tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, example_cb, (void*)arg);
+ tt_assert(tls->negotiated_callback == example_cb);
+ tt_assert(tls->callback_arg == arg);
+ tt_assert(!tls->got_renegotiate);
+
+ /* Assumes V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER */
+ tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+
+ tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, (void*)arg);
+ tt_assert(tls->ssl->info_callback == tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher1 = NULL;
+static SSL_CIPHER *fixed_cipher2 = NULL;
+static const SSL_CIPHER *
+fake_get_cipher(unsigned ncipher)
+{
+
+ switch (ncipher) {
+ case 1:
+ return fixed_cipher1;
+ case 2:
+ return fixed_cipher2;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_find_cipher_by_id(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = TLSv1_method();
+ SSL_METHOD *empty_method = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_METHOD));
+
+ fixed_cipher1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER));
+ fixed_cipher2 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER));
+ fixed_cipher2->id = 0xC00A;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(m);
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, NULL, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, 0xFFFF);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xFFFF);
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+#else
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+#endif
+
+ empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher;
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ empty_method->get_cipher = m->get_cipher;
+ empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers;
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ empty_method->get_cipher = fake_get_cipher;
+ empty_method->num_ciphers = m->num_ciphers;
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ empty_method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
+ ret = find_cipher_by_id(ssl, empty_method, 0xC00A);
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+#else
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+#endif
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(empty_method);
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(fixed_cipher1);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_debug_state_callback(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ char *buf = tor_malloc_zero(1000);
+ int n;
+
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_DEBUG);
+
+ ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+
+ tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, 32, 45);
+
+ n = tor_snprintf(buf, 1000, "SSL %p is now in state unknown"
+ " state [type=32,val=45].\n", ssl);
+ /* tor's snprintf returns -1 on error */
+ tt_int_op(n, OP_NE, -1);
+ expect_log_msg(buf);
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tor_free(buf);
+ tor_free(ssl);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_server_info_callback(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+
+ library_init();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+ ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+ tls->ssl = ssl;
+
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+ SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A);
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n");
+
+ SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B);
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ expect_single_log_msg("Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!\n");
+
+ SSL_set_state(ssl, 99);
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ expect_no_log_entry();
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+
+ SSL_set_ex_data(tls->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, tls);
+ SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B);
+ tls->negotiated_callback = 0;
+ tls->server_handshake_count = 120;
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 121);
+
+ tls->server_handshake_count = 127;
+ tls->negotiated_callback = (void *)1;
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->server_handshake_count, OP_EQ, 127);
+ tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ tor_tls_server_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ SSL_free(ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static int fixed_ssl_read_result_index;
+static int fixed_ssl_read_result[5];
+static int fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
+
+static int
+fixed_ssl_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int len)
+{
+ (void)s;
+ (void)buf;
+ (void)len;
+ return fixed_ssl_read_result[fixed_ssl_read_result_index++];
+}
+
+static int
+fixed_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ (void)s;
+ return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
+}
+
+#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+static int fixed_ssl_state_to_set;
+static tor_tls_t *fixed_tls;
+
+static int
+setting_version_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
+}
+
+static int
+setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown(SSL *s)
+{
+ fixed_tls->state = fixed_ssl_state_to_set;
+ s->version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ return fixed_ssl_shutdown_result;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
+
+static int
+dummy_handshake_func(SSL *s)
+{
+ (void)s;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_shutdown(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->ssl->method = method;
+ method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read;
+ method->ssl_shutdown = fixed_ssl_shutdown;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = -1;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+ tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
+
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE);
+ tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
+
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->version = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_DONE);
+ tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
+
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->version = 0;
+ method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_ssl_shutdown;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
+ fixed_tls = tls;
+ fixed_ssl_state_to_set = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->version = 0;
+ method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 10;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[1] = 42;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[2] = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[3] = -1;
+ fixed_ssl_shutdown_result = 0;
+ fixed_tls = tls;
+ fixed_ssl_state_to_set = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->version = 0;
+ method->ssl_shutdown = setting_version_and_state_ssl_shutdown;
+ ret = tor_tls_shutdown(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tor_free(method);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+static int negotiated_callback_called;
+
+static void
+negotiated_callback_setter(tor_tls_t *t, void *arg)
+{
+ (void)t;
+ (void)arg;
+ negotiated_callback_called++;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_read(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ char buf[100];
+ SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ /* These tests assume that V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER is set */
+ tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
+ tls->ssl->method = method;
+ method->ssl_read = fixed_ssl_read;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 42;
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 42);
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(tls->got_renegotiate, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ negotiated_callback_called = 0;
+ tls->negotiated_callback = negotiated_callback_setter;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(negotiated_callback_called, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+ fixed_ssl_read_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_ssl_read_result[0] = 0;
+ tls->ssl->version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = tor_tls_read(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_CLOSE);
+ tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED);
+#endif /* !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) */
+ // TODO: fill up
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(method);
+}
+
+static int fixed_ssl_write_result;
+
+static int
+fixed_ssl_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int len)
+{
+ (void)s;
+ (void)buf;
+ (void)len;
+ return fixed_ssl_write_result;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_write(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ char buf[100];
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL));
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ tls->ssl->method = method;
+ tls->wantwrite_n = 1;
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wantwrite_n, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ method->ssl_write = fixed_ssl_write;
+ tls->ssl->handshake_func = dummy_handshake_func;
+ fixed_ssl_write_result = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ fixed_ssl_write_result = -1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
+ SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_READ;
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD);
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->ssl->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ SSL_set_bio(tls->ssl, BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()), NULL);
+ SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)->flags = BIO_FLAGS_WRITE;
+ ret = tor_tls_write(tls, buf, 10);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE);
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ BIO_free(tls->ssl->rbio);
+ tor_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(method);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static int fixed_ssl_accept_result;
+static int fixed_ssl_connect_result;
+
+static int
+setting_error_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ (void)ssl;
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ return fixed_ssl_accept_result;
+}
+
+static int
+setting_error_ssl_connect(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ (void)ssl;
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_BN, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SYS, 2, -1, "somewhere.c", 99);
+ return fixed_ssl_connect_result;
+}
+
+static int
+fixed_ssl_accept(SSL *ssl)
+{
+ (void) ssl;
+ return fixed_ssl_accept_result;
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_handshake(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ setup_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ tls->isServer = 1;
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ tls->ssl->method = method;
+ method->ssl_accept = fixed_ssl_accept;
+ fixed_ssl_accept_result = 2;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(tls->state, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+
+ method->ssl_accept = setting_error_ssl_accept;
+ fixed_ssl_accept_result = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+ expect_log_entry();
+ /* This fails on jessie. Investigate why! */
+#if 0
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in bignum routines:"
+ "(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: (null) (in system library:"
+ "connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
+#endif /* 0 */
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_INFO);
+
+ tls->isServer = 0;
+ method->ssl_connect = setting_error_ssl_connect;
+ fixed_ssl_connect_result = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ mock_clean_saved_logs();
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ ret = tor_tls_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC);
+ expect_log_entry();
+#if 0
+ /* See above */
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: "
+ "(null) (in bignum routines:(null):SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
+ expect_log_msg("TLS error while handshaking: "
+ "(null) (in system library:connect:SSLv3 write client hello B)\n");
+#endif /* 0 */
+ expect_log_severity(LOG_WARN);
+
+ done:
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ tor_free(method);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static void
+test_tortls_finish_handshake(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL_METHOD *method = give_me_a_test_method();
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+
+ X509 *c1 = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ SESS_CERT_local *sess = NULL;
+
+ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+
+ tls = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tls->ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tls->isServer = 1;
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
+ expect_single_log_msg_containing("For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't "
+ "get set.");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ tls->ssl->session = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tls->isServer = 0;
+
+ sess = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SESS_CERT_local));
+ tls->ssl->session->sess_cert = (void *)sess;
+ sess->cert_chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ sk_X509_push(sess->cert_chain, c1);
+ tls->ssl->session->peer = c1;
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tt_int_op(tls->wasV2Handshake, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ method->num_ciphers = fake_num_ciphers;
+ ret = tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -9);
+
+ done:
+ if (sess)
+ sk_X509_free(sess->cert_chain);
+ if (tls->ssl && tls->ssl->session) {
+ tor_free(tls->ssl->session->sess_cert);
+ }
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tor_free(tls);
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
+ tor_free(method);
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static int fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index;
+static crypto_pk_t *fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[5];
+
+static crypto_pk_t *
+fixed_crypto_pk_new(void)
+{
+ return fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index++];
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index;
+static int fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[5];
+static int fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index;
+static X509 *fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[5];
+static int fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index;
+static tor_x509_cert_t *fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[5];
+
+static int
+fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_t *env, int bits)
+{
+ (void)env;
+ (void)bits;
+ return fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index++];
+}
+
+static X509 *
+fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+ const char *cname,
+ const char *cname_sign,
+ unsigned int cert_lifetime)
+{
+ (void)rsa;
+ (void)rsa_sign;
+ (void)cname;
+ (void)cname_sign;
+ (void)cert_lifetime;
+ return fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index++];
+}
+
+static tor_x509_cert_t *
+fixed_tor_x509_cert_new(tor_x509_cert_impl_t *x509_cert)
+{
+ (void) x509_cert;
+ return fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index++];
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_context_new(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_tls_context_t *ret;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2, *pk3, *pk4, *pk5, *pk6, *pk7, *pk8, *pk9, *pk10,
+ *pk11, *pk12, *pk13, *pk14, *pk15, *pk16, *pk17, *pk18;
+
+ pk1 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk2 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk3 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk4 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk5 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk6 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk7 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk8 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk9 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk10 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk11 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk12 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk13 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk14 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk15 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk16 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk17 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk18 = crypto_pk_new();
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL;
+ MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new);
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ /* note: we already override this in testing_common.c, so we
+ * run this unit test in a subprocess. */
+ MOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits,
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits);
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk1;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = -1;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk2;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk3;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk4;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[0] = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = -1;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ MOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate, fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk5;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk6;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result[1] = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = NULL;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk7;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk8;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = NULL;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk9;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk10;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ MOCK(tor_x509_cert_new, fixed_tor_x509_cert_new);
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk11;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk12;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = NULL;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk13;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk14;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = NULL;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk15;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk16;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = pk17;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[1] = pk18;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[2] = NULL;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[0] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[1] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_tls_create_certificate_result[2] = X509_new();
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ fixed_tor_x509_cert_new_result[2] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ ret = tor_tls_context_new(NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(tor_x509_cert_new);
+ UNMOCK(tor_tls_create_certificate);
+ UNMOCK(crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits);
+ UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+static int fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
+static EVP_PKEY *fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[5];
+
+static EVP_PKEY *
+fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(crypto_pk_t *env, int private)
+{
+ (void) env;
+ (void) private;
+ return fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index++];
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_create_certificate(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ X509 *ret;
+ crypto_pk_t *pk1, *pk2;
+
+ pk1 = crypto_pk_new();
+ pk2 = crypto_pk_new();
+
+ MOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_, fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_);
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[0] = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ fixed_crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_result[1] = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ ret = tor_tls_create_certificate(pk1, pk2, "hello", "hello2", 1);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(crypto_pk_get_openssl_evp_pkey_);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk1);
+ crypto_pk_free(pk2);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_cert_new(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *ret;
+ X509 *cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+
+ ret = tor_x509_cert_new(NULL);
+ tt_assert(!ret);
+
+ ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+ tt_assert(ret);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
+ ret = NULL;
+
+#if 0
+ cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ /* XXX this doesn't do what you think: it alters a copy of the pubkey. */
+ X509_get_pubkey(cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
+ ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+ tt_assert(ret);
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+ cert = read_cert_from(validCertString);
+ X509_CINF_free(cert->cert_info);
+ cert->cert_info = NULL;
+ ret = tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+ tt_assert(ret);
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+ done:
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_cert_is_valid(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL, *scert = NULL;
+
+ scert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+ tor_free(scert);
+ tor_free(cert);
+
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ ASN1_TIME_free(cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter);
+ cert->cert->cert_info->validity->notAfter =
+ ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, time(NULL)-1000000);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ X509_PUBKEY_free(cert->cert->cert_info->key);
+ cert->cert->cert_info->key = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+#if 0
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
+ BN_one(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert))->n);
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
+ X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 1);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
+ X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1);
+
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+ cert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(validCertString));
+ scert = tor_x509_cert_new(read_cert_from(caCertString));
+ /* This doesn't actually change the key in the cert. XXXXXX */
+ X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->type = EVP_PKEY_EC;
+ X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert)->ameth = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_WARN, cert, scert, time(NULL), 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ done:
+ tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(scert);
+}
+
+static void
+test_tortls_context_init_one(void *ignored)
+{
+ (void)ignored;
+ int ret;
+ tor_tls_context_t *old = NULL;
+
+ MOCK(crypto_pk_new, fixed_crypto_pk_new);
+
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result_index = 0;
+ fixed_crypto_pk_new_result[0] = NULL;
+ ret = tor_tls_context_init_one(&old, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
+ tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
+
+ done:
+ UNMOCK(crypto_pk_new);
+}
+
+#define LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
+ { #name, test_tortls_##name, (flags|TT_FORK), NULL, NULL }
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_OPAQUE
+#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) \
+ { #name, NULL, TT_SKIP, NULL, NULL }
+#else
+#define INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(name, flags) LOCAL_TEST_CASE(name, flags)
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_OPAQUE) */
+
+struct testcase_t tortls_openssl_tests[] = {
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(tor_tls_new, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_state_description, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_by_ssl, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(log_one_error, TT_FORK),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_error, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(always_accept_verify_cb, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(x509_cert_free, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_matches_key, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(cert_get_key, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_my_client_auth_key, TT_FORK),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_ciphersuite_name, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(classify_client_ciphers, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(client_is_using_v2_ciphers, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(verify, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(check_lifetime, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_pending_bytes, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(SSL_SESSION_get_master_key, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_tlssecrets, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_buffer_sizes, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(try_to_extract_certs_from_tls, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(get_peer_cert, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(peer_has_cert, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(shutdown, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(finish_handshake, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(handshake, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(write, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(read, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(server_info_callback, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(get_write_overhead_ratio, TT_FORK),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(is_server, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(assert_renegotiation_unblocked, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(block_renegotiation, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(unblock_renegotiation, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(set_renegotiate_callback, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(set_logged_address, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(find_cipher_by_id, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(session_secret_cb, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(debug_state_callback, 0),
+ INTRUSIVE_TEST_CASE(context_new, TT_FORK /* redundant */),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(create_certificate, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_new, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(cert_is_valid, 0),
+ LOCAL_TEST_CASE(context_init_one, 0),
+ END_OF_TESTCASES
+};
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