[tor-commits] [tor/master] Extract or_options_t from or.h
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jul 3 15:11:30 UTC 2018
commit 13116378b1a8118e277320e377a691064e54983a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Sun Jul 1 14:58:29 2018 -0400
Extract or_options_t from or.h
I decided to have this file included from config.h, though, since it
is used nearly everywhere.
---
src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c | 2 +-
src/or/config.h | 1 +
src/or/control.h | 1 +
src/or/hs_config.c | 1 +
src/or/or.h | 1062 +--------------------------------------------
src/or/or_options_st.h | 1077 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/or/policies.h | 1 +
src/or/rendservice.h | 1 +
8 files changed, 1084 insertions(+), 1062 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c
index 1ee5f1f62..d600602a7 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "or/circuitmux_ewma.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "or/networkstatus.h"
+#include "or/or_options_st.h"
/*** EWMA parameter #defines ***/
@@ -826,4 +827,3 @@ circuitmux_ewma_free_all(void)
{
ewma_ticks_initialized = 0;
}
-
diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h
index 869499582..5fdf7862e 100644
--- a/src/or/config.h
+++ b/src/or/config.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#ifndef TOR_CONFIG_H
#define TOR_CONFIG_H
+#include "or/or_options_st.h"
#include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) || defined(DARWIN)
diff --git a/src/or/control.h b/src/or/control.h
index 53ac87107..5c5fe8a91 100644
--- a/src/or/control.h
+++ b/src/or/control.h
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ int control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal);
int init_control_cookie_authentication(int enabled);
char *get_controller_cookie_file_name(void);
+struct config_line_t;
smartlist_t *decode_hashed_passwords(struct config_line_t *passwords);
void disable_control_logging(void);
void enable_control_logging(void);
diff --git a/src/or/hs_config.c b/src/or/hs_config.c
index 603cd6e74..cb55faa9d 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_config.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_config.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "or/hs_service.h"
#include "or/rendservice.h"
#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "or/or_options_st.h"
/* Using the given list of services, stage them into our global state. Every
* service version are handled. This function can remove entries in the given
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 0886517dd..4ed774389 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -981,1067 +981,7 @@ typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t;
* to pick its own port. */
#define CFG_AUTO_PORT 0xc4005e
-/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types:
- * Exit-only, OR-only, or both */
-typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR,
- OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR,
- OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t;
-
-struct config_line_t;
-
-/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */
-typedef struct {
- uint32_t magic_;
-
- /** What should the tor process actually do? */
- enum {
- CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD,
- CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG,
- CMD_KEYGEN,
- CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION,
- } command;
- char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */
-
- struct config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines
- * for logs */
- int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */
-
- int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which
- * each log message occurs? */
- int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file
- before we start writing? */
- char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */
- char *AndroidIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for Android logging. */
-
- char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */
- char *DataDirectory_option; /**< Where to store long-term data, as
- * configured by the user. */
- char *DataDirectory; /**< Where to store long-term data, as modified. */
- int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */
-
- char *KeyDirectory_option; /**< Where to store keys, as
- * configured by the user. */
- char *KeyDirectory; /**< Where to store keys data, as modified. */
- int KeyDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the KeyDirectory g+r? */
-
- char *CacheDirectory_option; /**< Where to store cached data, as
- * configured by the user. */
- char *CacheDirectory; /**< Where to store cached data, as modified. */
- int CacheDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CacheDirectory g+r? */
-
- char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */
- char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */
- char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */
-
- routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
- * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
- * consider as exits. */
- routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
- * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
- * consider as entry points. */
- int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes
- * are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes,
- * do we just fail instead? */
- routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
- * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs
- * not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes
- * above. */
- routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
- * country codes and IP address patterns of
- * ORs not to consider as exits. */
-
- /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */
- routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
-
- int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our
- * process for all current and future memory. */
-
- struct config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */
- int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private
- * addresses, and our own published addresses?
- */
- int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local
- * interface addresses?
- * Includes OutboundBindAddresses and
- * configured ports. */
- int ReducedExitPolicy; /**<Should we use the Reduced Exit Policy? */
- struct config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */
- struct config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */
- /** Local address to bind outbound sockets */
- struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress;
- /** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */
- struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR;
- /** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */
- struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit;
- /** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines.
- * [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6
- */
- tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2];
- /** Directory server only: which versions of
- * Tor should we tell users to run? */
- struct config_line_t *RecommendedVersions;
- struct config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions;
- struct config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions;
- struct config_line_t *RecommendedPackages;
- /** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */
- int DirAllowPrivateAddresses;
- /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */
- int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses;
- char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */
- /** Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
- struct config_line_t *ORPort_lines;
- /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */
- struct config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines;
- /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
- struct config_line_t *SocksPort_lines;
- /** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */
- struct config_line_t *TransPort_lines;
- char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy
- * implementation are we using? */
- /** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */
- enum {
- TPT_DEFAULT,
- TPT_PF_DIVERT,
- TPT_IPFW,
- TPT_TPROXY,
- } TransProxyType_parsed;
- /** Ports to listen on for transparent natd connections. */
- struct config_line_t *NATDPort_lines;
- /** Ports to listen on for HTTP Tunnel connections. */
- struct config_line_t *HTTPTunnelPort_lines;
- struct config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control
- * connections. */
- /** List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on for control connections. */
- struct config_line_t *ControlSocket;
-
- int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */
- int UnixSocksGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS Unix sockets g+rw? */
- /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */
- struct config_line_t *DirPort_lines;
- /** Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */
- struct config_line_t *DNSPort_lines;
-
- /* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be
- * MaxMemInQueues. */
- uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw;
- uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated
- * for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */
- /** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */
- uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold;
-
- /** @name port booleans
- *
- * Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a
- * non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type
- * configured in one of the _lines options above.
- * For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured.
- * If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use:
- * SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set ||
- * HTTPTunnelPort_set
- * rather than SocksPort_set.
- *
- * @{
- */
- unsigned int ORPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int TransPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int DirPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1;
- unsigned int HTTPTunnelPort_set : 1;
- /**@}*/
-
- int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */
- int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */
- int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
- * for version 3 directories? */
- int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative
- * directory that's willing to recommend
- * versions? */
- int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
- * that aggregates bridge descriptors? */
-
- /** If set on a bridge relay, it will include this value on a new
- * "bridge-distribution-request" line in its bridge descriptor. */
- char *BridgeDistribution;
-
- /** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport
- * for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */
- char *BridgePassword;
- /** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http
- * authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */
- char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_;
-
- int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */
- struct config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */
-
- struct config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
- transport plugins. */
-
- struct config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
- transport plugins. */
-
- /** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */
- struct config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr;
-
- /** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */
- struct config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions;
-
- int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make
- * this explicit so we can change how we behave in the
- * future. */
-
- /** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new
- * descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */
- int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
-
- int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk?
- * Not used yet. */
- int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */
-
- int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections
- open shorter and pad them less against
- connection-level traffic analysis? */
- /** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client
- * and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still
- * pad to the server regardless of server support. */
- int ConnectionPadding;
-
- /** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are
- * "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */
- smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor;
- /** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */
- dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_;
- /** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */
- int PublishHidServDescriptors;
- int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */
- int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */
-
- int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden
- * service directories after what time? */
-
- int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */
- int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent
- * through a Tor circuit? */
-
- /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden
- * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related
- * circuits.) */
- int Tor2webMode;
-
- /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */
- routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints;
-
- /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS
- * circuits. */
- routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes;
-
- /** A routerset that should be used when picking third-hop nodes for HS
- * circuits. */
- routerset_t *HSLayer3Nodes;
-
- /** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct)
- * circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and
- * rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using
- * 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.)
- * This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by
- * this tor instance a Single Onion Service.
- * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be
- * set to 1.
- * Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or
- * rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly.
- */
- int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode;
- /* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor
- * instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables
- * non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol.
- * Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option
- * directly.
- */
- int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode;
-
- int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */
- int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */
- int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we
- * have this many. */
- int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket
- * exhaustion. */
- int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */
- int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */
- smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows
- * (strings). */
- /** IP:ports our firewall allows. */
- struct config_line_t *ReachableAddresses;
- struct config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */
- struct config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */
-
- int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */
- uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */
-
- /** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are
- * relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do
- * what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says
- * nothing). */
- int RefuseUnknownExits;
-
- /** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient
- * uptime. */
- smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts;
- /** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and
- * unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the
- * user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an
- * observer somewhere on the Internet. */
- smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts;
- /** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option
- * controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status
- * event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */
- smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts;
- /** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */
- smartlist_t *TrackHostExits;
- int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an
- * addressmap */
- struct config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */
- int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a
- * hostname ending with one of the suffixes in
- * <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a
- * virtual address. */
- /** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value
- * "." means "match everything." */
- smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes;
- int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service
- * descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */
- int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep
- * connections alive? */
- int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait
- * unattached before we fail it? */
- int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value
- * for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout
- * history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled()
- * rather than checking this value directly. */
- int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at
- * least this many seconds ago. Used until
- * adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */
- int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at
- least this long after last activity */
- int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits
- * and try a new circuit if the stream has been
- * waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use
- * our default internal timeout schedule. */
- int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */
- int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building
- * a new one? */
- int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than
- this interval ago. */
- uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing
- * to use in a second? */
- uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
- * to use in a second? */
- uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
- * tell other nodes we have? */
- uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
- * willing to use for all relayed conns? */
- uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
- * use in a second for all relayed conns? */
- uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */
- uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */
- int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */
- struct config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines
- * for rendezvous services. */
- struct config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for
- * client-side authorizations for hidden
- * services */
- char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */
-
- int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds
- * have passed. */
- int MainloopStats; /**< Log main loop statistics as part of the
- * heartbeat messages. */
-
- char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */
- tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */
- uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */
- char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
-
- char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */
- tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */
- uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */
- char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
-
- char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */
- tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
- uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
-
- char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */
- tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */
- uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */
- char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
- char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
-
- /** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities.
- * If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time,
- * use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */
- struct config_line_t *DirAuthorities;
-
- /** List of fallback directory servers */
- struct config_line_t *FallbackDir;
- /** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */
- int UseDefaultFallbackDirs;
-
- /** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them
- * along with fallbackdirs */
- double DirAuthorityFallbackRate;
-
- /** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and
- * not the default ones. */
- struct config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority;
-
- /** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */
- struct config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority;
-
- struct config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */
- struct config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR,
- normalized */
- struct config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for
- * node families */
- smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets; /**< List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */
- struct config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
- * mark as bad exits. */
- struct config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
- * reject. */
- struct config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
- * never mark as valid. */
- /** @name AuthDir...CC
- *
- * Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to
- * reject entirely.
- *
- * @{
- */
- smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs;
- smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs;
- smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs;
- /**@}*/
-
- int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits,
- * and vote for all other exits as good. */
- int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this
- * number of servers per IP address. */
- int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */
- int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */
-
- /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising
- * this amount of capacity or more. */
- uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee;
-
- /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient
- * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */
- uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee;
-
- char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when
- * does it start? */
- uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting
- * interval before hibernation? 0 for "never
- * hibernate." */
- /** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached?
- * "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax
- * "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax
- * "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax
- * "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */
- char *AccountingRule_option;
- enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule;
-
- /** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */
- struct config_line_t *HashedControlPassword;
- /** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */
- struct config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword;
-
- int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for
- * the control system? */
- char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort
- * authentication cookie. */
- char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended
- * ORPort authentication cookie. */
- int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */
- int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the
- * ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */
- int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to
- * circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller
- * to cope? (1) */
- int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively
- * make circuits in the background (0),
- * or not (1)? */
-
- /** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor
- * instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */
- char *OwningControllerProcess;
- /** FD specifier for a controller that owns this Tor instance. */
- int OwningControllerFD;
-
- int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how
- * long do we wait before exiting? */
- char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */
-
- /* Derived from SafeLogging */
- enum {
- SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE
- } SafeLogging_;
-
- int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */
- int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application
- * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */
- int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor
- * protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */
- int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly
- * log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */
- int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware
- * acceleration where available? */
- /** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */
- int TokenBucketRefillInterval;
- char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */
- char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */
-
- /** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number
- * of fixed nodes? */
- int UseEntryGuards_option;
- /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
- * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
- * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
- * UseEntryGuards_option. */
- int UseEntryGuards;
-
- int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */
-
- /** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the
- * consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter
- * decide. */
- int UseGuardFraction;
-
- int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish?
- * If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */
- int NumPrimaryGuards; /**< How many primary guards do we want? */
-
- int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */
- /** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which
- * means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */
- int FetchDirInfoEarly;
-
- /** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */
- int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly;
-
- int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via
- * tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default);
- * If 0, disabled. */
-
- char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
- * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */
- char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
- * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */
- int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit
- * addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in
- * the local domains. */
- int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure
- * hijacking. */
- int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent
- * DNS poisoning attacks. */
- char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal
- * resolver from the file here rather than from
- * /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */
- char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html
- disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show
- that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server
- will know this without any specialized knowledge. */
- int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to
- disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */
- /** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing
- * or broken. */
- int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig;
- /** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get
- * rate-limited. */
- int CountPrivateBandwidth;
- smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses; /**< A list of addresses that definitely
- * should be resolvable. Used for
- * testing our DNS server. */
- int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the
- * same network zone in the same circuit. */
- int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames
- * with weird characters. */
- /** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */
- int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames;
-
- /** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them,
- * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
- int DownloadExtraInfo;
-
- /** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients
- * requesting network statuses from us as directory. */
- int DirReqStatistics_option;
- /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
- * DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */
- int DirReqStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */
- int ExitPortStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */
- int ConnDirectionStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */
- int CellStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */
- int PaddingStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */
- int EntryStatistics;
-
- /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service
- * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */
- int HiddenServiceStatistics_option;
- /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
- * HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server,
- * else no. */
- int HiddenServiceStatistics;
-
- /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */
- int ExtraInfoStatistics;
-
- /** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
- * to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
- * Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
- int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
-
- /** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses
- * over randomly chosen exits. */
- int ClientRejectInternalAddresses;
-
- /** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid
- * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */
- int ClientUseIPv4;
- /** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid
- * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections.
- * Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value
- * directly. */
- int ClientUseIPv6;
- /** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node
- * connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients
- * prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value
- * directly. */
- int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort;
- /** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct
- * directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other
- * clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of
- * accessing this value directly. */
- int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort;
-
- /** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */
- int V3AuthVotingInterval;
- /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */
- int V3AuthVoteDelay;
- /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */
- int V3AuthDistDelay;
- /** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */
- int V3AuthNIntervalsValid;
-
- /** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key
- * migration purposes? */
- int V3AuthUseLegacyKey;
-
- /** Location of bandwidth measurement file */
- char *V3BandwidthsFile;
-
- /** Location of guardfraction file */
- char *GuardfractionFile;
-
- /** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus
- * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */
- char *ConsensusParams;
-
- /** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see
- * before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */
- int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
-
- /** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh.
- * Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval;
-
- /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes.
- * Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay;
-
- /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial
- * signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/
- int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay;
-
- /** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus
- voting. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset;
-
- /** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it
- * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only
- * altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability;
-
- /** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will
- * probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing
- * networks. */
- int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime;
-
- /** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only
- * altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only
- * altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered
- * on testing networks. */
- int TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered
- * on testing networks. */
- int TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
- * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
- * live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
- * directory mirrors.
- *
- * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
- * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
- * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
- * directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
- * usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
- * list of fallback directory mirrors.
- *
- * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
- * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
- * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
- * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
- * live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
- * from a list of fallback directory mirrors.
- *
- * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
- * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
- * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only
- * altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors when they
- * have no running bridges. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay;
-
- /** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they
- * batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has
- * passed. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest;
-
- /** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring
- * it? Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall;
-
- /** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying
- * to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or
- * error out? Only altered on testing networks. */
- int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries;
-
- /** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a
- * couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values
- * of certain configuration options. */
- int TestingTorNetwork;
-
- /** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */
- uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold;
-
- /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */
- uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold;
-
- /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit
- * regardless of exit policy. */
- routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit;
- int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict;
-
- /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard
- * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */
- routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard;
- int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict;
-
- /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir
- * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */
- routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir;
- int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict;
-
- /** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingEnableConnBwEvent;
-
- /** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */
- int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent;
-
- /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country
- * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help
- * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */
- int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry;
-
- /** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */
- char *GeoIPFile;
- char *GeoIPv6File;
-
- /** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular
- * country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in
- * ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */
- int GeoIPExcludeUnknown;
-
- /** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want
- * to make this false. */
- int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP;
-
- /* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection.
- *
- * If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection,
- * we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest.
- * Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent
- * 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as
- * much.
- *
- * If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm.
- *
- * If this value is negative, we're using the default approach
- * according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus.
- */
- double CircuitPriorityHalflife;
-
- /** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set.
- * This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that
- * the defaults have changed. */
- int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_;
-
- /** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't.
- * If -1, Tor decides. */
- int UseMicrodescriptors;
-
- /** File where we should write the ControlPort. */
- char *ControlPortWriteToFile;
- /** Should that file be group-readable? */
- int ControlPortFileGroupReadable;
-
-#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024
- /** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at
- * once. */
- int MaxClientCircuitsPending;
-
- /** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we
- * never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */
- int OptimisticData;
-
- /** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on
- * control ports. */
- int DisableNetwork;
-
- /**
- * Parameters for path-bias detection.
- * @{
- * These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
- * experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
- * misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
- * fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built.
- *
- * The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to
- * build through a guard before we make these checks. The
- * PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options
- * control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we
- * won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits
- * succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that
- * guard.
- *
- * When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a
- * guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so
- * that new observations don't get swamped by old ones.
- *
- * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
- * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
- * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
- * .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
- */
- int PathBiasCircThreshold;
- double PathBiasNoticeRate;
- double PathBiasWarnRate;
- double PathBiasExtremeRate;
- int PathBiasDropGuards;
- int PathBiasScaleThreshold;
- /** @} */
-
- /**
- * Parameters for path-bias use detection
- * @{
- * Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
- * of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm.
- *
- * Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
- * building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
- * only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not
- * counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
- * successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
- * well-formed responses to RELAY cells.
- *
- * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
- * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
- * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
- * .60, and 100, respectively.
- */
- int PathBiasUseThreshold;
- double PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
- double PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
- int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
- /** @} */
-
- int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */
-
- /** Fraction: */
- double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits;
-
- /** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we
- * should guess a suitable value. */
- int SSLKeyLifetime;
-
- /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */
- int GuardLifetime;
-
- /** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use
- * the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy
- * is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user."
- *
- * XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
- int ExitRelay;
-
- /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */
- int SigningKeyLifetime;
- /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
- int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
- /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */
- int TestingAuthKeyLifetime;
-
- /** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
- int TestingSigningKeySlop;
- /** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
- int TestingLinkKeySlop;
- /** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
- int TestingAuthKeySlop;
-
- /** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master
- * ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */
- int OfflineMasterKey;
-
- enum {
- FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0,
- FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON,
- FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF
- } keygen_force_passphrase;
- int use_keygen_passphrase_fd;
- int keygen_passphrase_fd;
- int change_key_passphrase;
- char *master_key_fname;
-
- /** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */
- int KeepBindCapabilities;
-
- /** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the
- * lifetime of this Tor process.
- */
- uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog;
-
- /** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only
- * relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't
- * participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the
- * vote indicating participation. */
- int AuthDirSharedRandomness;
-
- /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */
- int DisableOOSCheck;
-
- /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
- * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
- int ExtendByEd25519ID;
-
- /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
- * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
- /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
- int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
-
- /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */
- int IncludeUsed;
-
- /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old
- * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0,
- * use the default. */
- int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs;
-
- /** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program.
- */
- int NoExec;
-
- /** Have the KIST scheduler run every X milliseconds. If less than zero, do
- * not use the KIST scheduler but use the old vanilla scheduler instead. If
- * zero, do what the consensus says and fall back to using KIST as if this is
- * set to "10 msec" if the consensus doesn't say anything. */
- int KISTSchedRunInterval;
-
- /** A multiplier for the KIST per-socket limit calculation. */
- double KISTSockBufSizeFactor;
-
- /** The list of scheduler type string ordered by priority that is first one
- * has to be tried first. Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla */
- smartlist_t *Schedulers;
- /* An ordered list of scheduler_types mapped from Schedulers. */
- smartlist_t *SchedulerTypes_;
-
- /** List of files that were opened by %include in torrc and torrc-defaults */
- smartlist_t *FilesOpenedByIncludes;
-
- /** If true, Tor shouldn't install any posix signal handlers, since it is
- * running embedded inside another process.
- */
- int DisableSignalHandlers;
-
- /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */
- int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled;
- /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any
- * defense is used. */
- int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections;
- /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */
- int DoSCircuitCreationRate;
- /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is
- * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */
- int DoSCircuitCreationBurst;
- /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used
- * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */
- int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType;
- /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious
- * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address
- * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */
- int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod;
-
- /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */
- int DoSConnectionEnabled;
- /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */
- int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount;
- /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be
- * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */
- int DoSConnectionDefenseType;
-
- /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */
- int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous;
-} or_options_t;
+typedef struct or_options_t or_options_t;
#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level())
diff --git a/src/or/or_options_st.h b/src/or/or_options_st.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0c0c5d32b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/or_options_st.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1077 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_OR_OPTIONS_ST_H
+#define TOR_OR_OPTIONS_ST_H
+
+#include "lib/cc/torint.h"
+#include "lib/net/address.h"
+
+struct smartlist_t;
+struct config_line_t;
+
+/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types:
+ * Exit-only, OR-only, or both */
+typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR,
+ OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR,
+ OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t;
+
+/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */
+struct or_options_t {
+ uint32_t magic_;
+
+ /** What should the tor process actually do? */
+ enum {
+ CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD,
+ CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG,
+ CMD_KEYGEN,
+ CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION,
+ } command;
+ char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */
+
+ struct config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines
+ * for logs */
+ int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */
+
+ int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which
+ * each log message occurs? */
+ int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file
+ before we start writing? */
+ char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */
+ char *AndroidIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for Android logging. */
+
+ char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */
+ char *DataDirectory_option; /**< Where to store long-term data, as
+ * configured by the user. */
+ char *DataDirectory; /**< Where to store long-term data, as modified. */
+ int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */
+
+ char *KeyDirectory_option; /**< Where to store keys, as
+ * configured by the user. */
+ char *KeyDirectory; /**< Where to store keys data, as modified. */
+ int KeyDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the KeyDirectory g+r? */
+
+ char *CacheDirectory_option; /**< Where to store cached data, as
+ * configured by the user. */
+ char *CacheDirectory; /**< Where to store cached data, as modified. */
+ int CacheDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CacheDirectory g+r? */
+
+ char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */
+ char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */
+ char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */
+
+ routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
+ * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
+ * consider as exits. */
+ routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
+ * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
+ * consider as entry points. */
+ int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes
+ * are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes,
+ * do we just fail instead? */
+ routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
+ * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs
+ * not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes
+ * above. */
+ routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
+ * country codes and IP address patterns of
+ * ORs not to consider as exits. */
+
+ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */
+ routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
+
+ int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our
+ * process for all current and future memory. */
+
+ struct config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */
+ int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private
+ * addresses, and our own published addresses?
+ */
+ int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local
+ * interface addresses?
+ * Includes OutboundBindAddresses and
+ * configured ports. */
+ int ReducedExitPolicy; /**<Should we use the Reduced Exit Policy? */
+ struct config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */
+ struct config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */
+ /** Local address to bind outbound sockets */
+ struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress;
+ /** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */
+ struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR;
+ /** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */
+ struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit;
+ /** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines.
+ * [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6
+ */
+ tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2];
+ /** Directory server only: which versions of
+ * Tor should we tell users to run? */
+ struct config_line_t *RecommendedVersions;
+ struct config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions;
+ struct config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions;
+ struct config_line_t *RecommendedPackages;
+ /** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */
+ int DirAllowPrivateAddresses;
+ /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */
+ int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses;
+ char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */
+ /** Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *ORPort_lines;
+ /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines;
+ /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *SocksPort_lines;
+ /** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *TransPort_lines;
+ char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy
+ * implementation are we using? */
+ /** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */
+ enum {
+ TPT_DEFAULT,
+ TPT_PF_DIVERT,
+ TPT_IPFW,
+ TPT_TPROXY,
+ } TransProxyType_parsed;
+ /** Ports to listen on for transparent natd connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *NATDPort_lines;
+ /** Ports to listen on for HTTP Tunnel connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *HTTPTunnelPort_lines;
+ struct config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control
+ * connections. */
+ /** List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on for control connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *ControlSocket;
+
+ int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */
+ int UnixSocksGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS Unix sockets g+rw? */
+ /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */
+ struct config_line_t *DirPort_lines;
+ /** Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */
+ struct config_line_t *DNSPort_lines;
+
+ /* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be
+ * MaxMemInQueues. */
+ uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw;
+ uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated
+ * for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */
+ /** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */
+ uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold;
+
+ /** @name port booleans
+ *
+ * Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a
+ * non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type
+ * configured in one of the _lines options above.
+ * For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured.
+ * If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use:
+ * SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set ||
+ * HTTPTunnelPort_set
+ * rather than SocksPort_set.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+ unsigned int ORPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int TransPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int DirPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1;
+ unsigned int HTTPTunnelPort_set : 1;
+ /**@}*/
+
+ int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */
+ int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */
+ int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
+ * for version 3 directories? */
+ int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative
+ * directory that's willing to recommend
+ * versions? */
+ int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
+ * that aggregates bridge descriptors? */
+
+ /** If set on a bridge relay, it will include this value on a new
+ * "bridge-distribution-request" line in its bridge descriptor. */
+ char *BridgeDistribution;
+
+ /** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport
+ * for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */
+ char *BridgePassword;
+ /** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http
+ * authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */
+ char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_;
+
+ int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */
+ struct config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */
+
+ struct config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
+ transport plugins. */
+
+ struct config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
+ transport plugins. */
+
+ /** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */
+ struct config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr;
+
+ /** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */
+ struct config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions;
+
+ int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make
+ * this explicit so we can change how we behave in the
+ * future. */
+
+ /** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new
+ * descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */
+ int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
+
+ int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk?
+ * Not used yet. */
+ int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */
+
+ int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections
+ open shorter and pad them less against
+ connection-level traffic analysis? */
+ /** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client
+ * and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still
+ * pad to the server regardless of server support. */
+ int ConnectionPadding;
+
+ /** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are
+ * "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */
+ struct smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor;
+ /** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */
+ dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_;
+ /** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */
+ int PublishHidServDescriptors;
+ int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */
+ int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */
+
+ int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden
+ * service directories after what time? */
+
+ int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */
+ int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent
+ * through a Tor circuit? */
+
+ /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden
+ * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related
+ * circuits.) */
+ int Tor2webMode;
+
+ /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */
+ routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints;
+
+ /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS
+ * circuits. */
+ routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes;
+
+ /** A routerset that should be used when picking third-hop nodes for HS
+ * circuits. */
+ routerset_t *HSLayer3Nodes;
+
+ /** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct)
+ * circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and
+ * rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using
+ * 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.)
+ * This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by
+ * this tor instance a Single Onion Service.
+ * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be
+ * set to 1.
+ * Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or
+ * rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly.
+ */
+ int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode;
+ /* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor
+ * instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables
+ * non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol.
+ * Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option
+ * directly.
+ */
+ int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode;
+
+ int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */
+ int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */
+ int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we
+ * have this many. */
+ int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket
+ * exhaustion. */
+ int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */
+ int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */
+ struct smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows
+ * (strings). */
+ /** IP:ports our firewall allows. */
+ struct config_line_t *ReachableAddresses;
+ struct config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */
+ struct config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */
+
+ int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */
+ uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */
+
+ /** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are
+ * relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do
+ * what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says
+ * nothing). */
+ int RefuseUnknownExits;
+
+ /** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient
+ * uptime. */
+ struct smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts;
+ /** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and
+ * unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the
+ * user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an
+ * observer somewhere on the Internet. */
+ struct smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts;
+ /** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option
+ * controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status
+ * event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */
+ struct smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts;
+ /** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */
+ struct smartlist_t *TrackHostExits;
+ int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an
+ * addressmap */
+ struct config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */
+ int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a
+ * hostname ending with one of the suffixes in
+ * <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a
+ * virtual address. */
+ /** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value
+ * "." means "match everything." */
+ struct smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes;
+ int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service
+ * descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */
+ int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep
+ * connections alive? */
+ int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait
+ * unattached before we fail it? */
+ int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value
+ * for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout
+ * history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled()
+ * rather than checking this value directly. */
+ int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at
+ * least this many seconds ago. Used until
+ * adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */
+ int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at
+ least this long after last activity */
+ int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits
+ * and try a new circuit if the stream has been
+ * waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use
+ * our default internal timeout schedule. */
+ int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */
+ int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building
+ * a new one? */
+ int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than
+ this interval ago. */
+ uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing
+ * to use in a second? */
+ uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
+ * to use in a second? */
+ uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
+ * tell other nodes we have? */
+ uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
+ * willing to use for all relayed conns? */
+ uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
+ * use in a second for all relayed conns? */
+ uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */
+ uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */
+ int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */
+ struct config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines
+ * for rendezvous services. */
+ struct config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for
+ * client-side authorizations for hidden
+ * services */
+ char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */
+
+ int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds
+ * have passed. */
+ int MainloopStats; /**< Log main loop statistics as part of the
+ * heartbeat messages. */
+
+ char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */
+ tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */
+ uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */
+ char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
+
+ char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */
+ tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */
+ uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */
+ char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
+
+ char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */
+ tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
+ uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
+
+ char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */
+ tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */
+ uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */
+ char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
+ char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
+
+ /** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities.
+ * If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time,
+ * use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */
+ struct config_line_t *DirAuthorities;
+
+ /** List of fallback directory servers */
+ struct config_line_t *FallbackDir;
+ /** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */
+ int UseDefaultFallbackDirs;
+
+ /** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them
+ * along with fallbackdirs */
+ double DirAuthorityFallbackRate;
+
+ /** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and
+ * not the default ones. */
+ struct config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority;
+
+ /** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */
+ struct config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority;
+
+ struct config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */
+ struct config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR,
+ normalized */
+ struct config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for
+ * node families */
+ /** List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */
+ struct smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets;
+ struct config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
+ * mark as bad exits. */
+ struct config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
+ * reject. */
+ struct config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
+ * never mark as valid. */
+ /** @name AuthDir...CC
+ *
+ * Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to
+ * reject entirely.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+ struct smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs;
+ struct smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs;
+ struct smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs;
+ /**@}*/
+
+ int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits,
+ * and vote for all other exits as good. */
+ int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this
+ * number of servers per IP address. */
+ int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */
+ int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */
+
+ /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising
+ * this amount of capacity or more. */
+ uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee;
+
+ /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient
+ * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */
+ uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee;
+
+ char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when
+ * does it start? */
+ uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting
+ * interval before hibernation? 0 for "never
+ * hibernate." */
+ /** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached?
+ * "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax
+ * "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax
+ * "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax
+ * "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */
+ char *AccountingRule_option;
+ enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule;
+
+ /** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */
+ struct config_line_t *HashedControlPassword;
+ /** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */
+ struct config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword;
+
+ int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for
+ * the control system? */
+ char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort
+ * authentication cookie. */
+ char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended
+ * ORPort authentication cookie. */
+ int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */
+ int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the
+ * ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */
+ int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to
+ * circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller
+ * to cope? (1) */
+ int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively
+ * make circuits in the background (0),
+ * or not (1)? */
+
+ /** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor
+ * instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */
+ char *OwningControllerProcess;
+ /** FD specifier for a controller that owns this Tor instance. */
+ int OwningControllerFD;
+
+ int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how
+ * long do we wait before exiting? */
+ char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */
+
+ /* Derived from SafeLogging */
+ enum {
+ SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE
+ } SafeLogging_;
+
+ int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */
+ int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application
+ * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */
+ int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor
+ * protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */
+ int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly
+ * log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */
+ int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware
+ * acceleration where available? */
+ /** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */
+ int TokenBucketRefillInterval;
+ char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */
+ char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */
+
+ /** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number
+ * of fixed nodes? */
+ int UseEntryGuards_option;
+ /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
+ * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
+ * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
+ * UseEntryGuards_option. */
+ int UseEntryGuards;
+
+ int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */
+
+ /** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the
+ * consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter
+ * decide. */
+ int UseGuardFraction;
+
+ int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish?
+ * If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */
+ int NumPrimaryGuards; /**< How many primary guards do we want? */
+
+ int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */
+ /** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which
+ * means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */
+ int FetchDirInfoEarly;
+
+ /** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */
+ int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly;
+
+ int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via
+ * tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default);
+ * If 0, disabled. */
+
+ char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
+ * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */
+ char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
+ * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */
+ int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit
+ * addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in
+ * the local domains. */
+ int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure
+ * hijacking. */
+ int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent
+ * DNS poisoning attacks. */
+ char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal
+ * resolver from the file here rather than from
+ * /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */
+ char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html
+ disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show
+ that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server
+ will know this without any specialized knowledge. */
+ int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to
+ disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */
+ /** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing
+ * or broken. */
+ int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig;
+ /** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get
+ * rate-limited. */
+ int CountPrivateBandwidth;
+ /** A list of addresses that definitely should be resolvable. Used for
+ * testing our DNS server. */
+ struct smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses;
+ int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the
+ * same network zone in the same circuit. */
+ int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames
+ * with weird characters. */
+ /** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */
+ int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames;
+
+ /** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them,
+ * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
+ int DownloadExtraInfo;
+
+ /** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients
+ * requesting network statuses from us as directory. */
+ int DirReqStatistics_option;
+ /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
+ * DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */
+ int DirReqStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */
+ int ExitPortStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */
+ int ConnDirectionStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */
+ int CellStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */
+ int PaddingStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */
+ int EntryStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service
+ * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */
+ int HiddenServiceStatistics_option;
+ /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
+ * HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server,
+ * else no. */
+ int HiddenServiceStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */
+ int ExtraInfoStatistics;
+
+ /** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
+ * to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
+ * Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
+ int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
+
+ /** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses
+ * over randomly chosen exits. */
+ int ClientRejectInternalAddresses;
+
+ /** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid
+ * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */
+ int ClientUseIPv4;
+ /** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid
+ * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections.
+ * Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value
+ * directly. */
+ int ClientUseIPv6;
+ /** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node
+ * connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients
+ * prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value
+ * directly. */
+ int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort;
+ /** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct
+ * directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other
+ * clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of
+ * accessing this value directly. */
+ int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort;
+
+ /** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */
+ int V3AuthVotingInterval;
+ /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */
+ int V3AuthVoteDelay;
+ /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */
+ int V3AuthDistDelay;
+ /** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */
+ int V3AuthNIntervalsValid;
+
+ /** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key
+ * migration purposes? */
+ int V3AuthUseLegacyKey;
+
+ /** Location of bandwidth measurement file */
+ char *V3BandwidthsFile;
+
+ /** Location of guardfraction file */
+ char *GuardfractionFile;
+
+ /** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus
+ * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */
+ char *ConsensusParams;
+
+ /** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see
+ * before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */
+ int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
+
+ /** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh.
+ * Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval;
+
+ /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes.
+ * Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay;
+
+ /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial
+ * signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/
+ int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay;
+
+ /** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus
+ voting. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset;
+
+ /** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it
+ * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only
+ * altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability;
+
+ /** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will
+ * probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing
+ * networks. */
+ int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime;
+
+ /** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only
+ * altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only
+ * altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered
+ * on testing networks. */
+ int TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered
+ * on testing networks. */
+ int TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
+ * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
+ * live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
+ * directory mirrors.
+ *
+ * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
+ * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
+ * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
+ * directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
+ * usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
+ * list of fallback directory mirrors.
+ *
+ * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
+ * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
+ * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
+ * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
+ * live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
+ * from a list of fallback directory mirrors.
+ *
+ * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
+ * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
+ * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only
+ * altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors when they
+ * have no running bridges. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay;
+
+ /** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they
+ * batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has
+ * passed. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest;
+
+ /** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring
+ * it? Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall;
+
+ /** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying
+ * to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or
+ * error out? Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries;
+
+ /** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a
+ * couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values
+ * of certain configuration options. */
+ int TestingTorNetwork;
+
+ /** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */
+ uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold;
+
+ /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */
+ uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold;
+
+ /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit
+ * regardless of exit policy. */
+ routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit;
+ int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict;
+
+ /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard
+ * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */
+ routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard;
+ int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict;
+
+ /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir
+ * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */
+ routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir;
+ int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict;
+
+ /** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingEnableConnBwEvent;
+
+ /** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */
+ int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent;
+
+ /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country
+ * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help
+ * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */
+ int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry;
+
+ /** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */
+ char *GeoIPFile;
+ char *GeoIPv6File;
+
+ /** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular
+ * country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in
+ * ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */
+ int GeoIPExcludeUnknown;
+
+ /** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want
+ * to make this false. */
+ int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP;
+
+ /* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection.
+ *
+ * If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection,
+ * we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest.
+ * Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent
+ * 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as
+ * much.
+ *
+ * If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm.
+ *
+ * If this value is negative, we're using the default approach
+ * according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus.
+ */
+ double CircuitPriorityHalflife;
+
+ /** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set.
+ * This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that
+ * the defaults have changed. */
+ int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_;
+
+ /** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't.
+ * If -1, Tor decides. */
+ int UseMicrodescriptors;
+
+ /** File where we should write the ControlPort. */
+ char *ControlPortWriteToFile;
+ /** Should that file be group-readable? */
+ int ControlPortFileGroupReadable;
+
+#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024
+ /** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at
+ * once. */
+ int MaxClientCircuitsPending;
+
+ /** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we
+ * never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */
+ int OptimisticData;
+
+ /** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on
+ * control ports. */
+ int DisableNetwork;
+
+ /**
+ * Parameters for path-bias detection.
+ * @{
+ * These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
+ * experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
+ * misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
+ * fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built.
+ *
+ * The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to
+ * build through a guard before we make these checks. The
+ * PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options
+ * control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we
+ * won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits
+ * succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that
+ * guard.
+ *
+ * When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a
+ * guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so
+ * that new observations don't get swamped by old ones.
+ *
+ * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
+ * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
+ * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
+ * .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
+ */
+ int PathBiasCircThreshold;
+ double PathBiasNoticeRate;
+ double PathBiasWarnRate;
+ double PathBiasExtremeRate;
+ int PathBiasDropGuards;
+ int PathBiasScaleThreshold;
+ /** @} */
+
+ /**
+ * Parameters for path-bias use detection
+ * @{
+ * Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
+ * of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm.
+ *
+ * Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
+ * building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
+ * only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not
+ * counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
+ * successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
+ * well-formed responses to RELAY cells.
+ *
+ * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
+ * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
+ * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
+ * .60, and 100, respectively.
+ */
+ int PathBiasUseThreshold;
+ double PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
+ double PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
+ int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
+ /** @} */
+
+ int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */
+
+ /** Fraction: */
+ double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits;
+
+ /** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we
+ * should guess a suitable value. */
+ int SSLKeyLifetime;
+
+ /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */
+ int GuardLifetime;
+
+ /** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use
+ * the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy
+ * is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user."
+ *
+ * XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
+ int ExitRelay;
+
+ /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */
+ int SigningKeyLifetime;
+ /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
+ int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
+ /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */
+ int TestingAuthKeyLifetime;
+
+ /** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+ int TestingSigningKeySlop;
+ /** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+ int TestingLinkKeySlop;
+ /** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
+ int TestingAuthKeySlop;
+
+ /** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master
+ * ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */
+ int OfflineMasterKey;
+
+ enum {
+ FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0,
+ FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON,
+ FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF
+ } keygen_force_passphrase;
+ int use_keygen_passphrase_fd;
+ int keygen_passphrase_fd;
+ int change_key_passphrase;
+ char *master_key_fname;
+
+ /** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */
+ int KeepBindCapabilities;
+
+ /** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the
+ * lifetime of this Tor process.
+ */
+ uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only
+ * relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't
+ * participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the
+ * vote indicating participation. */
+ int AuthDirSharedRandomness;
+
+ /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */
+ int DisableOOSCheck;
+
+ /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
+ * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
+ int ExtendByEd25519ID;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
+ * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
+ /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
+ int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */
+ int IncludeUsed;
+
+ /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old
+ * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0,
+ * use the default. */
+ int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program.
+ */
+ int NoExec;
+
+ /** Have the KIST scheduler run every X milliseconds. If less than zero, do
+ * not use the KIST scheduler but use the old vanilla scheduler instead. If
+ * zero, do what the consensus says and fall back to using KIST as if this is
+ * set to "10 msec" if the consensus doesn't say anything. */
+ int KISTSchedRunInterval;
+
+ /** A multiplier for the KIST per-socket limit calculation. */
+ double KISTSockBufSizeFactor;
+
+ /** The list of scheduler type string ordered by priority that is first one
+ * has to be tried first. Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla */
+ struct smartlist_t *Schedulers;
+ /* An ordered list of scheduler_types mapped from Schedulers. */
+ struct smartlist_t *SchedulerTypes_;
+
+ /** List of files that were opened by %include in torrc and torrc-defaults */
+ struct smartlist_t *FilesOpenedByIncludes;
+
+ /** If true, Tor shouldn't install any posix signal handlers, since it is
+ * running embedded inside another process.
+ */
+ int DisableSignalHandlers;
+
+ /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled;
+ /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any
+ * defense is used. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections;
+ /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationRate;
+ /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is
+ * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationBurst;
+ /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used
+ * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType;
+ /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious
+ * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address
+ * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod;
+
+ /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */
+ int DoSConnectionEnabled;
+ /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */
+ int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount;
+ /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be
+ * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */
+ int DoSConnectionDefenseType;
+
+ /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */
+ int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous;
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/or/policies.h b/src/or/policies.h
index ff0b54499..7da3ba031 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.h
+++ b/src/or/policies.h
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ int policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(
uint32_t local_address,
const tor_addr_t *ipv6_local_address,
smartlist_t **result);
+struct config_line_t;
int policies_parse_exit_policy(struct config_line_t *cfg, smartlist_t **dest,
exit_policy_parser_cfg_t options,
const smartlist_t *configured_addresses);
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index b11a2a7da..35962df7f 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "or/hs_service.h"
typedef struct rend_intro_cell_t rend_intro_cell_t;
+struct config_line_t;
/* This can be used for both INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE2 */
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