[tor-commits] [tor/master] Combine DH_BYTES and DH_KEY_LEN; put them in a lib/defs header.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jul 3 15:11:29 UTC 2018
commit 7a61a92870df84c37bacd9d065e0c8df2b938d37
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Sun Jul 1 11:25:29 2018 -0400
Combine DH_BYTES and DH_KEY_LEN; put them in a lib/defs header.
---
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c | 4 +--
src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h | 4 +--
src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h | 13 +++++++
src/lib/defs/include.am | 3 +-
src/or/hs_circuit.c | 10 +++---
src/or/hs_common.h | 2 +-
src/or/onion.c | 4 +--
src/or/onion_tap.c | 18 +++++-----
src/or/onion_tap.h | 4 +--
src/or/or.h | 2 --
src/or/rendclient.c | 6 ++--
src/or/rendmid.c | 4 +--
src/or/rendservice.c | 16 ++++-----
src/or/rendservice.h | 2 +-
src/test/bench.c | 10 +++---
src/test/test.c | 3 +-
src/test/test_crypto.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
src/test/test_hs_client.c | 6 ++--
18 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c
index a2622cfc2..c37e286da 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.c
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
/** Generate g^x as necessary, and write the g^x for the key exchange
* as a <b>pubkey_len</b>-byte value into <b>pubkey</b>. Return 0 on
- * success, -1 on failure. <b>pubkey_len</b> must be \>= DH_BYTES.
+ * success, -1 on failure. <b>pubkey_len</b> must be \>= DH1024_KEY_LEN.
*/
int
crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
tor_assert(bytes >= 0);
if (pubkey_len < (size_t)bytes) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,
- "Weird! pubkey_len (%d) was smaller than DH_BYTES (%d)",
+ "Weird! pubkey_len (%d) was smaller than DH1024_KEY_LEN (%d)",
(int) pubkey_len, bytes);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h
index 7b03e128a..73a7bcb52 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h
+++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h
@@ -14,9 +14,7 @@
#define TOR_CRYPTO_DH_H
#include "orconfig.h"
-
-/** Length of our DH keys. */
-#define DH_BYTES (1024/8)
+#include "lib/defs/dh_sizes.h"
typedef struct crypto_dh_t crypto_dh_t;
diff --git a/src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h b/src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b60957281
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_DH_SIZES_H
+#define TOR_DH_SIZES_H
+
+/** Length of our legacy DH keys. */
+#define DH1024_KEY_LEN (1024/8)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/defs/include.am b/src/lib/defs/include.am
index ff48cff07..b54bac555 100644
--- a/src/lib/defs/include.am
+++ b/src/lib/defs/include.am
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-noinst_HEADERS += \
+noinst_HEADERS += \
+ src/lib/defs/dh_sizes.h \
src/lib/defs/digest_sizes.h
diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
index 9fcb30ecc..853669846 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ create_rend_cpath(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len,
/* We are a v2 legacy HS client: Create and return a crypt path for the hidden
* service on the other side of the rendezvous circuit <b>circ</b>. Initialize
* the crypt path crypto using the body of the RENDEZVOUS1 cell at
- * <b>rend_cell_body</b> (which must be at least DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN bytes).
+ * <b>rend_cell_body</b> (which must be at least DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN
+ * bytes).
*/
static crypt_path_t *
create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
crypt_path_t *hop = NULL;
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
- /* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
+ /* first DH1024_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
* handshake...*/
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
tor_assert(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
- (char*)rend_cell_body, DH_KEY_LEN,
+ (char*)rend_cell_body, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
goto err;
@@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
goto err;
/* Check whether the digest is right... */
- if (tor_memneq(keys, rend_cell_body+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ if (tor_memneq(keys, rend_cell_body+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Incorrect digest of key material.");
goto err;
}
@@ -1244,4 +1245,3 @@ hs_circ_cleanup(circuit_t *circ)
hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(circ);
}
}
-
diff --git a/src/or/hs_common.h b/src/or/hs_common.h
index 6d60d7799..11806365e 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_common.h
+++ b/src/or/hs_common.h
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@
* bigger than the 84 bytes needed for version 3 so we need to pad up to that
* length so it is indistinguishable between versions. */
#define HS_LEGACY_RENDEZVOUS_CELL_SIZE \
- (REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN + DIGEST_LEN)
+ (REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN + DIGEST_LEN)
/* Type of authentication key used by an introduction point. */
typedef enum {
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c
index 776aacbf7..2b30870e5 100644
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
(char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
return -1;
r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
- memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
break;
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN)
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
msg_out) < 0)
return -1;
- memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
return 0;
case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.c b/src/or/onion_tap.c
index cf5963b19..0f9f638fa 100644
--- a/src/or/onion_tap.c
+++ b/src/or/onion_tap.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key,
crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
char *onion_skin_out) /* TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN bytes */
{
- char challenge[DH_KEY_LEN];
+ char challenge[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
crypto_dh_t *dh = NULL;
int dhbytes, pkbytes;
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *dest_router_key,
/* set meeting point, meeting cookie, etc here. Leave zero for now. */
if (crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(dest_router_key, onion_skin_out,
TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
- challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
+ challenge, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1)<0)
goto err;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Couldn't decrypt onionskin: client may be using old onion key");
goto err;
- } else if (len != DH_KEY_LEN) {
+ } else if (len != DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected onionskin length after decryption: %ld",
(long)len);
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
goto err;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
- if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH_KEY_LEN)) {
+ if (crypto_dh_get_public(dh, handshake_reply_out, DH1024_KEY_LEN)) {
/* LCOV_EXCL_START
* This can only fail if the length of the key we just allocated is too
* big. That should be impossible. */
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
- DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material,
key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(
}
/* send back H(K|0) as proof that we learned K. */
- memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH_KEY_LEN, key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(handshake_reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
/* use the rest of the key material for our shared keys, digests, etc */
memcpy(key_out, key_material+DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len);
@@ -212,12 +212,12 @@ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
ssize_t len;
char *key_material=NULL;
size_t key_material_len;
- tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH_KEY_LEN);
+ tor_assert(crypto_dh_get_bytes(handshake_state) == DH1024_KEY_LEN);
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
- handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ handshake_reply, DH1024_KEY_LEN, key_material,
key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
if (msg_out)
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(crypto_dh_t *handshake_state,
goto err;
}
- if (tor_memneq(key_material, handshake_reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ if (tor_memneq(key_material, handshake_reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* H(K) does *not* match. Something fishy. */
if (msg_out)
*msg_out = "Digest DOES NOT MATCH on onion handshake. Bug or attack.";
diff --git a/src/or/onion_tap.h b/src/or/onion_tap.h
index fdc2ce912..5b1eacce7 100644
--- a/src/or/onion_tap.h
+++ b/src/or/onion_tap.h
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN (PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD+\
CIPHER_KEY_LEN+\
- DH_KEY_LEN)
-#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN)
+#define TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN (DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN)
int onion_skin_TAP_create(crypto_pk_t *router_key,
crypto_dh_t **handshake_state_out,
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 63349cffb..3d3972fb8 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -1542,8 +1542,6 @@ typedef struct crypt_path_reference_t crypt_path_reference_t;
#define CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN (20*2+16*2)
-#define DH_KEY_LEN DH_BYTES
-
typedef struct cpath_build_state_t cpath_build_state_t;
/** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 1da695706..b71457456 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
}
if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
- DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't extract g^x.");
status = -2;
goto perm_err;
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
r = crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN,
sizeof(payload)-DIGEST_LEN,
tmp,
- (int)(dh_offset+DH_KEY_LEN),
+ (int)(dh_offset+DH1024_KEY_LEN),
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Internal error: hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ int
rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
- if (request_len != DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
+ if (request_len != DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"Incorrect length (%d) on RENDEZVOUS2 cell.",
(int)request_len);
goto err;
diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c
index 56b65079a..38c1c52e4 100644
--- a/src/or/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/or/rendmid.c
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ rend_mid_introduce_legacy(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
* to revise this protocol anyway.
*/
if (request_len < (DIGEST_LEN+(MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+REND_COOKIE_LEN+
- DH_KEY_LEN+CIPHER_KEY_LEN+PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD)) {
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN+CIPHER_KEY_LEN+
+ PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING_OVERHEAD)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Impossibly short INTRODUCE1 cell on circuit %u; "
"responding with nack.",
(unsigned)circ->p_circ_id);
@@ -367,4 +368,3 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), reason);
return -1;
}
-
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index b2023c72c..f55b9b776 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -2005,7 +2005,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
* part 1. */
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
service->accepted_intro_dh_parts,
- parsed_req->dh, DH_KEY_LEN,
+ parsed_req->dh, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
&elapsed);
if (replay) {
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
}
if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh,
(char *)(parsed_req->dh),
- DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
@@ -2336,7 +2336,7 @@ rend_service_begin_parse_intro(const uint8_t *request,
/* min key length plus digest length plus nickname length */
if (request_len <
(DIGEST_LEN + REND_COOKIE_LEN + (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1) +
- DH_KEY_LEN + 42)) {
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN + 42)) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"got a truncated INTRODUCE%d cell",
@@ -2872,14 +2872,14 @@ rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(
*/
ver_invariant_len = intro->plaintext_len - ver_specific_len;
- if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
+ if (ver_invariant_len < REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was truncated (%ld bytes)",
(int)(intro->type),
(long)(intro->plaintext_len));
status = -5;
goto err;
- } else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH_KEY_LEN) {
+ } else if (ver_invariant_len > REND_COOKIE_LEN + DH1024_KEY_LEN) {
tor_asprintf(&err_msg,
"decrypted plaintext of INTRODUCE%d cell was too long (%ld bytes)",
(int)(intro->type),
@@ -2892,7 +2892,7 @@ rend_service_parse_intro_plaintext(
REND_COOKIE_LEN);
memcpy(intro->dh,
intro->plaintext + ver_specific_len + REND_COOKIE_LEN,
- DH_KEY_LEN);
+ DH1024_KEY_LEN);
}
/* Flag it as being fully parsed */
@@ -3449,12 +3449,12 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
/* All we need to do is send a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell... */
memcpy(buf, rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
if (crypto_dh_get_public(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
- buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
+ buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH1024_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't get DH public key.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
- memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
+ memcpy(buf+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH1024_KEY_LEN, hop->rend_circ_nonce,
DIGEST_LEN);
/* Send the cell */
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index b2644d8b4..a9b3689d2 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct rend_intro_cell_s {
/* Rendezvous cookie */
uint8_t rc[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
/* Diffie-Hellman data */
- uint8_t dh[DH_KEY_LEN];
+ uint8_t dh[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
};
#ifdef RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE
diff --git a/src/test/bench.c b/src/test/bench.c
index 6653f4942..f46eeef7f 100644
--- a/src/test/bench.c
+++ b/src/test/bench.c
@@ -551,8 +551,8 @@ bench_dh(void)
reset_perftime();
start = perftime();
for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) {
- char dh_pubkey_a[DH_BYTES], dh_pubkey_b[DH_BYTES];
- char secret_a[DH_BYTES], secret_b[DH_BYTES];
+ char dh_pubkey_a[DH1024_KEY_LEN], dh_pubkey_b[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
+ char secret_a[DH1024_KEY_LEN], secret_b[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
ssize_t slen_a, slen_b;
crypto_dh_t *dh_a = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS);
crypto_dh_t *dh_b = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS);
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name)
reset_perftime();
start = perftime();
for (i = 0; i < iters; ++i) {
- char secret_a[DH_BYTES], secret_b[DH_BYTES];
+ char secret_a[DH1024_KEY_LEN], secret_b[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
ssize_t slen_a, slen_b;
EC_KEY *dh_a = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
EC_KEY *dh_b = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
@@ -597,10 +597,10 @@ bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name)
EC_KEY_generate_key(dh_a);
EC_KEY_generate_key(dh_b);
- slen_a = ECDH_compute_key(secret_a, DH_BYTES,
+ slen_a = ECDH_compute_key(secret_a, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(dh_b), dh_a,
NULL);
- slen_b = ECDH_compute_key(secret_b, DH_BYTES,
+ slen_b = ECDH_compute_key(secret_b, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(dh_a), dh_b,
NULL);
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index e3121293c..d36c47a07 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg)
memset(junk_buf, 0, sizeof(junk_buf));
crypto_pk_obsolete_public_hybrid_encrypt(pk,
junk_buf2, TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
- junk_buf, DH_KEY_LEN, PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1);
+ junk_buf, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 1);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ,
onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(junk_buf2, pk, NULL,
s_buf, s_keys, 40));
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index e8a2efe59..a85d036e3 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -23,38 +23,39 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
crypto_dh_t *dh1 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT);
crypto_dh_t *dh1_dup = NULL;
crypto_dh_t *dh2 = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT);
- char p1[DH_BYTES];
- char p2[DH_BYTES];
- char s1[DH_BYTES];
- char s2[DH_BYTES];
+ char p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
+ char p2[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
+ char s1[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
+ char s2[DH1024_KEY_LEN];
ssize_t s1len, s2len;
(void)arg;
- tt_int_op(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh1),OP_EQ, DH_BYTES);
- tt_int_op(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh2),OP_EQ, DH_BYTES);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh1),OP_EQ, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ tt_int_op(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh2),OP_EQ, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
- memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES);
- memset(p2, 0, DH_BYTES);
- tt_mem_op(p1,OP_EQ, p2, DH_BYTES);
+ memset(p1, 0, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ memset(p2, 0, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ tt_mem_op(p1,OP_EQ, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, 6)); /* too short */
- tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES));
- tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH_BYTES);
- tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh2, p2, DH_BYTES));
- tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH_BYTES);
+ tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN));
+ tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh2, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN));
+ tt_mem_op(p1,OP_NE, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
- memset(s1, 0, DH_BYTES);
- memset(s2, 0xFF, DH_BYTES);
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
- s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, p1, DH_BYTES, s2, 50);
+ memset(s1, 0, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ memset(s2, 0xFF, DH1024_KEY_LEN);
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN, s1, 50);
+ s2len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN, s2, 50);
tt_assert(s1len > 0);
tt_int_op(s1len,OP_EQ, s2len);
tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len);
/* test dh_dup; make sure it works the same. */
dh1_dup = crypto_dh_dup(dh1);
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1_dup, p2, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_mem_op(s1,OP_EQ, s2, s1len);
{
@@ -67,12 +68,14 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, "\x00", 1, s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- memset(p1, 0, DH_BYTES); /* 0 with padding. */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ memset(p1, 0, DH1024_KEY_LEN); /* 0 with padding. */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 1; /* 1 with padding*/
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN-1] = 1; /* 1 with padding*/
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
/* 2 is okay, though weird. */
@@ -89,15 +92,18 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
/* p-1, p, and so on are not okay. */
base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P, strlen(P));
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFE; /* p-1 */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN-1] = 0xFE; /* p-1 */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xFD; /* p-2 works fine */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN-1] = 0xFD; /* p-2 works fine */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(50, OP_EQ, s1len);
const char P_plus_one[] =
@@ -109,31 +115,35 @@ test_crypto_dh(void *arg)
base16_decode(p1, sizeof(p1), P_plus_one, strlen(P_plus_one));
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0x01; /* p+2 */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN-1] = 0x01; /* p+2 */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- p1[DH_BYTES-1] = 0xff; /* p+256 */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ p1[DH1024_KEY_LEN-1] = 0xff; /* p+256 */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
- memset(p1, 0xff, DH_BYTES), /* 2^1024-1 */
- s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH_BYTES, s1, 50);
+ memset(p1, 0xff, DH1024_KEY_LEN), /* 2^1024-1 */
+ s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
+ s1, 50);
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, s1len);
}
{
/* provoke an error in the openssl DH_compute_key function; make sure we
* survive. */
- tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH_BYTES));
+ tt_assert(! crypto_dh_get_public(dh1, p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN));
crypto_dh_free(dh2);
dh2= crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT); /* no private key set */
s1len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_WARN, dh2,
- p1, DH_BYTES,
+ p1, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
s1, 50);
tt_int_op(s1len, OP_EQ, -1);
}
@@ -3063,4 +3073,3 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = {
{ "failure_modes", test_crypto_failure_modes, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};
-
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_client.c b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
index 58002d629..3a4d35431 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_client.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_client.c
@@ -197,17 +197,17 @@ test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy(void *arg)
/* Make a good RENDEZVOUS1 cell body because it needs to pass key exchange
* digest verification... */
- uint8_t rend_cell_body[DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN] = {2};
+ uint8_t rend_cell_body[DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN] = {2};
{
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypto_dh_t *dh_state =
or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state;
/* compute and overwrite digest of cell body with the right value */
retval = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh_state,
- (char*)rend_cell_body, DH_KEY_LEN,
+ (char*)rend_cell_body, DH1024_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
tt_int_op(retval, OP_GT, 0);
- memcpy(rend_cell_body+DH_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(rend_cell_body+DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/* Setup the circuit */
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