[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix spelling mistakes corresponding to ticket #23650
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Feb 7 15:46:47 UTC 2018
commit ca6682f3f86dbcf2b5346ae69d45293e8a59322b
Author: Deepesh Pathak <deepshpathak at gmail.com>
Date: Wed Jan 24 14:25:15 2018 +0530
Fix spelling mistakes corresponding to ticket #23650
---
.gitlab-ci.yml | 2 +-
ChangeLog | 24 ++++++++++++------------
ReleaseNotes | 16 ++++++++--------
configure.ac | 2 +-
contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh | 2 +-
doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md | 2 +-
doc/HACKING/Tracing.md | 2 +-
doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md | 2 +-
doc/tor.1.txt | 4 ++--
scripts/maint/redox.py | 2 +-
scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py | 6 +++---
src/common/address.c | 2 +-
src/common/compat.c | 2 +-
src/common/compat_openssl.h | 2 +-
src/common/compat_time.c | 2 +-
src/common/crypto.c | 4 ++--
src/common/crypto_ed25519.c | 10 +++++-----
src/common/crypto_rsa.c | 2 +-
src/common/timers.c | 2 +-
src/common/tortls.c | 2 +-
src/common/util.c | 6 +++---
src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c | 2 +-
src/or/bridges.c | 2 +-
src/or/channel.c | 8 ++++----
src/or/circpathbias.c | 4 ++--
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +-
src/or/circuitlist.c | 4 ++--
src/or/circuitstats.c | 16 ++++++++--------
src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +-
src/or/config.c | 2 +-
src/or/connection.c | 4 ++--
src/or/control.c | 6 +++---
src/or/directory.c | 10 +++++-----
src/or/dirserv.c | 4 ++--
src/or/dirserv.h | 2 +-
src/or/dirvote.c | 2 +-
src/or/dns.c | 2 +-
src/or/hs_cache.c | 4 ++--
src/or/hs_client.c | 2 +-
src/or/hs_config.c | 2 +-
src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 6 +++---
src/or/hs_intropoint.c | 2 +-
src/or/hs_service.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
src/or/main.c | 2 +-
src/or/onion_fast.c | 2 +-
src/or/or.h | 6 +++---
src/or/policies.c | 2 +-
src/or/reasons.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendcache.c | 4 ++--
src/or/rendcache.h | 2 +-
src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendservice.c | 6 +++---
src/or/rendservice.h | 2 +-
src/or/rephist.c | 2 +-
src/or/routerlist.c | 4 ++--
src/or/shared_random.c | 2 +-
src/or/shared_random_state.c | 6 +++---
src/or/status.c | 2 +-
src/or/transports.c | 2 +-
src/test/test.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_cell_formats.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_channelpadding.c | 8 ++++----
src/test/test_config.c | 4 ++--
src/test/test_connection.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_dir.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_hs.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 4 ++--
src/test/test_hs_service.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_options.c | 10 +++++-----
src/test/test_shared_random.c | 4 ++--
src/test/test_util.c | 10 +++++-----
src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel | 2 +-
74 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 156 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.gitlab-ci.yml b/.gitlab-ci.yml
index ba981d5f1..d2d0d55dd 100644
--- a/.gitlab-ci.yml
+++ b/.gitlab-ci.yml
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ update:
- ssh-add <(echo "$DEPLOY_KEY")
# For Docker builds disable host key checking. Be aware that by adding that
- # you are suspectible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
+ # you are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
# WARNING: Use this only with the Docker executor, if you use it with shell
# you will overwrite your user's SSH config.
- mkdir -p ~/.ssh
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 96629e37f..fa1a9e573 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -8267,7 +8267,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.5-rc - 2015-03-18
o Major bugfixes (pluggable transports):
- Initialize the extended OR Port authentication cookie before
launching pluggable transports. This prevents a race condition
- that occured when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
+ that occurred when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
authentication cookie before it has been (re)generated. Fixes bug
15240; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
@@ -9010,7 +9010,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.2-alpha - 2014-12-31
some bugs where we would look at (but fortunately, not reveal)
uninitialized memory on the stack. Fixes bug 14013; bugfix on all
versions of Tor.
- - Clear all memory targetted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
+ - Clear all memory targeted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
just the part that's used. This makes it harder for data leak bugs
to occur in the event of other programming failures. Resolves
ticket 14041.
@@ -10153,7 +10153,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.5-alpha - 2014-06-18
directory authority options, remove the documentation for a
V2-directory fetching option that no longer exists. Resolves
ticket 11634.
- - Correct the documenation so that it lists the correct directory
+ - Correct the documentation so that it lists the correct directory
for the stats files. (They are in a subdirectory called "stats",
not "status".)
- In the manpage, move more authority-only options into the
@@ -11438,7 +11438,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.1-alpha - 2013-10-02
from Arlo Breault.
- Remove instances of strcpy() from the unit tests. They weren't
hurting anything, since they were only in the unit tests, but it's
- embarassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
+ embarrassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
tools don't like it. Fixes bug 8790; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha and
0.2.3.8-alpha. Patch from Arlo Breault.
@@ -11539,7 +11539,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.16-rc - 2013-08-10
0.2.4.15-rc. Found by stem integration tests.
o Minor bugfixes:
- - Fix an invalid memory read that occured when a pluggable
+ - Fix an invalid memory read that occurred when a pluggable
transport proxy failed its configuration protocol.
Fixes bug 9288; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha.
- When evaluating whether to use a connection that we haven't
@@ -14330,7 +14330,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.11-alpha - 2012-01-22
CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes the
remaining part of bug 1297; bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha.
- Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having
- had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point
+ had its introduction cell acknowledged by the introduction-point
relay. Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a
client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have
marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in
@@ -15637,7 +15637,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.3-alpha - 2011-09-01
raised by bug 3898.
- The "--quiet" and "--hush" options now apply not only to Tor's
behavior before logs are configured, but also to Tor's behavior in
- the absense of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
+ the absence of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
0.2.0.10-alpha.
o Minor bugfixes (also part of 0.2.2.31-rc):
@@ -18138,7 +18138,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.8-alpha - 2010-01-26
please upgrade.
o Major bugfixes:
- - Fix a memory corruption bug on bridges that occured during the
+ - Fix a memory corruption bug on bridges that occurred during the
inclusion of stats data in extra-info descriptors. Also fix the
interface for geoip_get_bridge_stats* to prevent similar bugs in
the future. Diagnosis by Tas, patch by Karsten and Sebastian.
@@ -18552,7 +18552,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.2-alpha - 2009-09-21
to EDGE and find out if the build-time data in the .tor/state gets
reset without loss of Tor usability. You should also see a notice
log message telling you that Tor has reset its timeout.
- - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitary integer values as
+ - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitrary integer values as
part of the consensus process. This is designed to help set
network-wide parameters. Implements proposal 167.
- Tor now reads the "circwindow" parameter out of the consensus,
@@ -21580,7 +21580,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.9-alpha - 2007-10-24
- Distinguish between detached signatures for the wrong period, and
detached signatures for a divergent vote.
- Fix a small memory leak when computing a consensus.
- - When there's no concensus, we were forming a vote every 30
+ - When there's no consensus, we were forming a vote every 30
minutes, but writing the "valid-after" line in our vote based
on our configured V3AuthVotingInterval: so unless the intervals
matched up, we immediately rejected our own vote because it didn't
@@ -24967,7 +24967,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.9-rc - 2005-06-09
KeepalivePeriod, ClientOnly, NoPublish, HttpProxy, HttpsProxy,
HttpProxyAuthenticator
- Stop warning about sigpipes in the logs. We're going to
- pretend that getting these occassionally is normal and fine.
+ pretend that getting these occasionally is normal and fine.
- Resolve OS X installer bugs: stop claiming to be 0.0.9.2 in
certain
installer screens; and don't put stuff into StartupItems unless
@@ -25432,7 +25432,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.1-rc - 2005-03-28
Changes in version 0.0.9.6 - 2005-03-24
o Bugfixes on 0.0.9.x (crashes and asserts):
- - Add new end stream reasons to maintainance branch. Fix bug where
+ - Add new end stream reasons to maintenance branch. Fix bug where
reason (8) could trigger an assert. Prevent bug from recurring.
- Apparently win32 stat wants paths to not end with a slash.
- Fix assert triggers in assert_cpath_layer_ok(), where we were
diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes
index 65b7c604b..4adba49d7 100644
--- a/ReleaseNotes
+++ b/ReleaseNotes
@@ -6476,7 +6476,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24
o Major bugfixes (pluggable transports):
- Initialize the extended OR Port authentication cookie before
launching pluggable transports. This prevents a race condition
- that occured when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
+ that occurred when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
authentication cookie before it has been (re)generated. Fixes bug
15240; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
@@ -6949,7 +6949,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24
some bugs where we would look at (but fortunately, not reveal)
uninitialized memory on the stack. Fixes bug 14013; bugfix on all
versions of Tor.
- - Clear all memory targetted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
+ - Clear all memory targeted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
just the part that's used. This makes it harder for data leak bugs
to occur in the event of other programming failures. Resolves
ticket 14041.
@@ -8126,7 +8126,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.10 - 2014-10-24
from Arlo Breault.
- Remove instances of strcpy() from the unit tests. They weren't
hurting anything, since they were only in the unit tests, but it's
- embarassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
+ embarrassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
tools don't like it. Fixes bug 8790; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha and
0.2.3.8-alpha. Patch from Arlo Breault.
- Remove is_internal_IP() function. Resolves ticket 4645.
@@ -8150,7 +8150,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.10 - 2014-10-24
directory authority options, remove the documentation for a
V2-directory fetching option that no longer exists. Resolves
ticket 11634.
- - Correct the documenation so that it lists the correct directory
+ - Correct the documentation so that it lists the correct directory
for the stats files. (They are in a subdirectory called "stats",
not "status".)
- In the manpage, move more authority-only options into the
@@ -10293,7 +10293,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.25 - 2012-11-19
bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
- The "--quiet" and "--hush" options now apply not only to Tor's
behavior before logs are configured, but also to Tor's behavior in
- the absense of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
+ the absence of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
0.2.0.10-alpha.
- Change the AllowDotExit rules so they should actually work.
We now enforce AllowDotExit only immediately after receiving an
@@ -11406,7 +11406,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.32 - 2011-08-27
algorithms for signatures and resource selection. Newer formats
are signed with SHA256, with a possibility for moving to a better
hash algorithm in the future.
- - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitary integer values as
+ - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitrary integer values as
part of the consensus process. This is designed to help set
network-wide parameters. Implements proposal 167.
@@ -16595,7 +16595,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.10 - 2005-06-14
- Use correct errno on win32 if libevent fails.
- Check and warn about known-bad/slow libevent versions.
- Stop warning about sigpipes in the logs. We're going to
- pretend that getting these occassionally is normal and fine.
+ pretend that getting these occasionally is normal and fine.
o New contrib scripts:
- New experimental script tor/contrib/exitlist: a simple python
@@ -16714,7 +16714,7 @@ Changes in version 0.0.9.7 - 2005-04-01
Changes in version 0.0.9.6 - 2005-03-24
o Bugfixes on 0.0.9.x (crashes and asserts):
- - Add new end stream reasons to maintainance branch. Fix bug where
+ - Add new end stream reasons to maintenance branch. Fix bug where
reason (8) could trigger an assert. Prevent bug from recurring.
- Apparently win32 stat wants paths to not end with a slash.
- Fix assert triggers in assert_cpath_layer_ok(), where we were
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 3cb187b0e..7eb189a0e 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(
# Apple messed up when they added two functions functions in Sierra: they
# forgot to decorate them with appropriate AVAILABLE_MAC_OS_VERSION
# checks. So we should only probe for those functions if we are sure that we
-# are not targetting OSX 10.11 or earlier.
+# are not targeting OSX 10.11 or earlier.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for a pre-Sierra OSX build target])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#ifdef __APPLE__
diff --git a/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh b/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh
index ea9e0ddaa..30ea5fc65 100644
--- a/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh
+++ b/contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ RATE_UP=5000
# machine does any other network activity. That is not very fun.
RATE_UP_TOR=1500
-# RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL is the maximum rate allowed for all Tor trafic in
+# RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL is the maximum rate allowed for all Tor traffic in
# kbits/sec.
RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL=5000
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md b/doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md
index 3d0038831..3f9cf82ea 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ the module calls. Modules which call fewer other modules are better targets.
Strive to change the C API as little as possible.
-We are currently targetting Rust nightly, *for now*. We expect this to change
+We are currently targeting Rust nightly, *for now*. We expect this to change
moving forward, as we understand more about which nightly features we need. It
is on our TODO list to try to cultivate good standing with various distro
maintainers of `rustc` and `cargo`, in order to ensure that whatever version we
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md b/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md
index a5fb5165e..349aade23 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/Tracing.md
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ tracing framework.
## Basics ###
-Event tracing is seperated in two concepts, trace events and a tracer. The
+Event tracing is separated in two concepts, trace events and a tracer. The
tracing subsystem can be found in `src/trace`. The `events.h` header file is
the main file that maps the different tracers to trace events.
diff --git a/doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md b/doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md
index c12558aed..25f39a3d2 100644
--- a/doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md
+++ b/doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) and Native Development Kit
repository and build an Orbot APK (Android Package) file with
debugging enabled. Make sure that when you build the native content of
the Orbot application that you run the `make -C external` command with
- an additional `DEBUG=1` as paramter to ensure that the Orbot build
+ an additional `DEBUG=1` as parameter to ensure that the Orbot build
process does not strip the debug symbols from the Tor binary.
2. (Optional) Uninstall and clean-up your old Orbot installation that
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt
index 5ad818365..9a4e70c76 100644
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
[[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
- an unlimited number of simultanous streams.) (Default: 0)
+ an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)
[[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
@@ -3186,7 +3186,7 @@ __CacheDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
- decribing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
+ describing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
main file contents.
__DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
diff --git a/scripts/maint/redox.py b/scripts/maint/redox.py
index 12aed6463..53d3d902e 100755
--- a/scripts/maint/redox.py
+++ b/scripts/maint/redox.py
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ def read():
def findline(lines, lineno, ident):
"""Given a list of all the lines in the file (adjusted so 1-indexing works),
- a line number that ident is alledgedly on, and ident, I figure out
+ a line number that ident is allegedly on, and ident, I figure out
the line where ident was really declared."""
lno = lineno
for lineno in xrange(lineno, 0, -1):
diff --git a/scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py b/scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py
index dbd15eb51..c854830e1 100755
--- a/scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py
+++ b/scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ MAX_FALLBACKS_PER_FAMILY = 7
## Fallback Bandwidth Requirements
-# Any fallback with the Exit flag has its bandwidth multipled by this fraction
+# Any fallback with the Exit flag has its bandwidth multiplied by this fraction
# to make sure we aren't further overloading exits
# (Set to 1.0, because we asked that only lightly loaded exits opt-in,
# and the extra load really isn't that much for large relays.)
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ class Candidate(object):
details['flags'] = []
if (not 'advertised_bandwidth' in details
or details['advertised_bandwidth'] is None):
- # relays without advertised bandwdith have it calculated from their
+ # relays without advertised bandwidth have it calculated from their
# consensus weight
details['advertised_bandwidth'] = 0
if (not 'effective_family' in details
@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ class CandidateList(dict):
excluded_count, initial_count)
# calculate each fallback's measured bandwidth based on the median
- # consensus weight to advertised bandwdith ratio
+ # consensus weight to advertised bandwidth ratio
def calculate_measured_bandwidth(self):
self.sort_fallbacks_by_cw_to_bw_factor()
median_fallback = self.fallback_median(True)
diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c
index d96ec514b..7ff81206e 100644
--- a/src/common/address.c
+++ b/src/common/address.c
@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ tor_addr_compare_masked(const tor_addr_t *addr1, const tor_addr_t *addr2,
case AF_UNIX:
/* HACKHACKHACKHACKHACK:
* tor_addr_t doesn't contain a copy of sun_path, so it's not
- * possible to comapre this at all.
+ * possible to compare this at all.
*
* Since the only time we currently actually should be comparing
* 2 AF_UNIX addresses is when dealing with ISO_CLIENTADDR (which
diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c
index 6a61c6c91..39d2f18f4 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.c
+++ b/src/common/compat.c
@@ -2455,7 +2455,7 @@ get_environment(void)
/** Get name of current host and write it to <b>name</b> array, whose
* length is specified by <b>namelen</b> argument. Return 0 upon
- * successfull completion; otherwise return return -1. (Currently,
+ * successful completion; otherwise return return -1. (Currently,
* this function is merely a mockable wrapper for POSIX gethostname().)
*/
MOCK_IMPL(int,
diff --git a/src/common/compat_openssl.h b/src/common/compat_openssl.h
index d1b871b0f..1299ac36b 100644
--- a/src/common/compat_openssl.h
+++ b/src/common/compat_openssl.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
/**
* \file compat_openssl.h
*
- * \brief compatability definitions for working with different openssl forks
+ * \brief compatibility definitions for working with different openssl forks
**/
#if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
diff --git a/src/common/compat_time.c b/src/common/compat_time.c
index 8cecff278..183a60a48 100644
--- a/src/common/compat_time.c
+++ b/src/common/compat_time.c
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ monotime_coarse_absolute_msec(void)
return monotime_coarse_absolute_nsec() / ONE_MILLION;
}
#else
-#define initalized_at_coarse initialized_at
+#define initialized_at_coarse initialized_at
#endif /* defined(MONOTIME_COARSE_FN_IS_DIFFERENT) */
/**
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 2ecf64c39..6e420ab05 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
#elif defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
static int getrandom_works = 1; /* Be optimitic about our chances... */
- /* getrandom() isn't as straight foward as getentropy(), and has
+ /* getrandom() isn't as straightforward as getentropy(), and has
* no glibc wrapper.
*
* As far as I can tell from getrandom(2) and the source code, the
@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
*
* We optimistically assume that getrandom() is available and functional
* because it is the way of the future, and 2 branch mispredicts pale in
- * comparision to the overheads involved with failing to open
+ * comparison to the overheads involved with failing to open
* /dev/srandom followed by opening and reading from /dev/urandom.
*/
if (PREDICT_LIKELY(getrandom_works)) {
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
index 26523e312..a5a61cba1 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_ed25519.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
/* Return a heap-allocated array that contains <b>msg</b> prefixed by the
* string <b>prefix_str</b>. Set <b>final_msg_len_out</b> to the size of the
- * final array. If an error occured, return NULL. It's the resonsibility of the
+ * final array. If an error occurred, return NULL. It's the resonsibility of the
* caller to free the returned array. */
static uint8_t *
get_prefixed_msg(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ get_prefixed_msg(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
* Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
* <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
*
- * Return 0 if we successfuly signed the message, otherwise return -1.
+ * Return 0 if we successfully signed the message, otherwise return -1.
*/
int
ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ ed25519_keypair_blind(ed25519_keypair_t *out,
/**
* Given an ed25519 public key in <b>inp</b>, generate a corresponding blinded
* public key in <b>out</b>, blinded with the 32-byte parameter in
- * <b>param</b>. Return 0 on sucess, -1 on railure.
+ * <b>param</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on railure.
*/
int
ed25519_public_blind(ed25519_public_key_t *out,
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ ed25519_impl_spot_check,(void))
return -1;
/* XXX/yawning: Someone that's more paranoid than I am, can write "Assume
- * ref0 is cannonical, and fuzz impl against it" if they want, but I doubt
+ * ref0 is canonical, and fuzz impl against it" if they want, but I doubt
* that will catch anything that the known answer tests won't.
*/
goto end;
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ pick_ed25519_impl(void)
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
-/* Initialize the Ed25519 implementation. This is neccessary if you're
+/* Initialize the Ed25519 implementation. This is necessary if you're
* going to use them in a multithreaded setting, and not otherwise. */
void
ed25519_init(void)
diff --git a/src/common/crypto_rsa.c b/src/common/crypto_rsa.c
index 92b5978ea..fa572580a 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto_rsa.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto_rsa.c
@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out)
/** Given a crypto_pk_t <b>pk</b>, allocate a new buffer containing the
* Base64 encoding of the DER representation of the private key as a NUL
* terminated string, and return it via <b>priv_out</b>. Return 0 on
- * sucess, -1 on failure.
+ * success, -1 on failure.
*
* It is the caller's responsibility to sanitize and free the resulting buffer.
*/
diff --git a/src/common/timers.c b/src/common/timers.c
index 93cde7de5..552080b11 100644
--- a/src/common/timers.c
+++ b/src/common/timers.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct timeout_cb {
#define TIMEOUT_CB_OVERRIDE
/* We're going to support timers that are pretty far out in advance. Making
* this big can be inefficient, but having a significant number of timers
- * above TIMEOUT_MAX can also be super-inefficent. Choosing 5 here sets
+ * above TIMEOUT_MAX can also be super-inefficient. Choosing 5 here sets
* timeout_max to 2^30 ticks, or 29 hours with our value for USEC_PER_TICK */
#define WHEEL_NUM 5
#include "src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c"
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index 86a876780..bff59833f 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
return r;
}
-/** Perform the final part of the intial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
* should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
* or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
* handshake as appropriate.
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index 67e97811c..90204befc 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out)
/** Removes enclosing quotes from <b>path</b> and unescapes quotes between the
* enclosing quotes. Backslashes are not unescaped. Return the unquoted
- * <b>path</b> on sucess or 0 if <b>path</b> is not quoted correctly. */
+ * <b>path</b> on success or 0 if <b>path</b> is not quoted correctly. */
char *
get_unquoted_path(const char *path)
{
@@ -3898,7 +3898,7 @@ format_number_sigsafe(unsigned long x, char *buf, int buf_len,
* call it with a signed int and an unsigned char, and since the C standard
* does not guarantee that an int is wider than a char (an int must be at
* least 16 bits but it is permitted for a char to be that wide as well), we
- * can't assume a signed int is sufficient to accomodate an unsigned char.
+ * can't assume a signed int is sufficient to accommodate an unsigned char.
* Thus, format_helper_exit_status() will still need to emit any require '-'
* on its own.
*
@@ -3928,7 +3928,7 @@ format_dec_number_sigsafe(unsigned long x, char *buf, int buf_len)
*
* The format of <b>hex_errno</b> is: "CHILD_STATE/ERRNO\n", left-padded
* with spaces. CHILD_STATE indicates where
- * in the processs of starting the child process did the failure occur (see
+ * in the process of starting the child process did the failure occur (see
* CHILD_STATE_* macros for definition), and SAVED_ERRNO is the value of
* errno when the failure occurred.
*
diff --git a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
index 44ec562f0..84fc3850a 100644
--- a/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
+++ b/src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ ED25519_FN(curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint) (curved25519_key pk, const curved25
}
/*
- Tor has a specific idea of how an Ed25519 implementaion should behave.
+ Tor has a specific idea of how an Ed25519 implementation should behave.
Implement such a beast using the ed25519-donna primitives/internals.
* Private key generation using Tor's CSPRNG.
diff --git a/src/or/bridges.c b/src/or/bridges.c
index 383c33fa6..d88d6c643 100644
--- a/src/or/bridges.c
+++ b/src/or/bridges.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
{
/* Iterate the already-registered bridge list:
- If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for
+ If you find a bridge with the same address and port, mark it for
removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with
the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different
digest or transport than <b>digest</b>/<b>transport_name</b>,
diff --git a/src/or/channel.c b/src/or/channel.c
index 1afd45190..e5cdf9bc7 100644
--- a/src/or/channel.c
+++ b/src/or/channel.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
* channel_set_cell_handlers(). Currently, this is passed back to the command
* subsystem which is command_process_cell().
*
- * NOTE: For now, the seperation between channels and specialized channels
+ * NOTE: For now, the separation between channels and specialized channels
* (like channeltls) is not that well defined. So the channeltls layer calls
* channel_process_cell() which originally comes from the connection subsytem.
* This should be hopefully be fixed with #23993.
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ channel_clear_remote_end(channel_t *chan)
*
* Two possible errors can happen. Either the channel is not opened or the
* lower layer (specialized channel) failed to write it. In both cases, it is
- * the caller responsability to free the cell.
+ * the caller responsibility to free the cell.
*/
static int
write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell)
@@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ channel_write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell)
ret = write_packed_cell(chan, cell);
end:
- /* Whatever happens, we free the cell. Either an error occured or the cell
+ /* Whatever happens, we free the cell. Either an error occurred or the cell
* was put on the connection outbuf, both cases we have ownership of the
* cell and we free it. */
packed_cell_free(cell);
@@ -1717,7 +1717,7 @@ channel_listener_change_state(channel_listener_t *chan_l,
}
}
-/* Maximum number of cells that is allowed to flush at once withing
+/* Maximum number of cells that is allowed to flush at once within
* channel_flush_some_cells(). */
#define MAX_CELLS_TO_GET_FROM_CIRCUITS_FOR_UNLIMITED 256
diff --git a/src/or/circpathbias.c b/src/or/circpathbias.c
index f4bd5ea2f..c1c1ca31b 100644
--- a/src/or/circpathbias.c
+++ b/src/or/circpathbias.c
@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
*
* XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done
* better by keeping separate pending counters that get
- * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
+ * transferred at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
*/
static void
pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
@@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
*
* XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done
* better by keeping separate pending counters that get
- * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
+ * transferred at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
*/
void
pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 9c049a24b..3bbcc5144 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
* Max number of restricted nodes before we alert the user and try
* to load balance for them.
*
- * The most agressive vanguard design had 16 nodes at layer3.
+ * The most aggressive vanguard design had 16 nodes at layer3.
* Let's give a small ceiling above that. */
#define MAX_SANE_RESTRICTED_NODES 20
/* If the user (or associated tor controller) selected only a few nodes,
diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c
index 8c02cd1c1..e134b157c 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -806,9 +806,9 @@ circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose)
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
return "Acting as intro point";
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
- return "Acting as rendevous (pending)";
+ return "Acting as rendezvous (pending)";
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
- return "Acting as rendevous (established)";
+ return "Acting as rendezvous (established)";
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
return "General-purpose client";
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c
index f1df19eb2..643831927 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitstats.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmaxtimeouts consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmaxtimeouts consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: When this many timeouts happen in the last 'cbtrecentcount'
* circuit attempts, the client should discard all of its history and
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ circuit_build_times_max_timeouts(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtnummodes consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtnummodes consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This value governs how many modes to use in the weighted
* average calculation of Pareto parameter Xm. A value of 3 introduces
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmincircs consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmincircs consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This is the minimum number of circuits to build before
* computing a timeout.
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtquantile consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtquantile consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
* timeout value. It is a percent (10-99).
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtclosequantile consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtclosequantile consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
* timeout value to use to actually close circuits. It is a percent
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ circuit_build_times_close_quantile(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbttestfreq consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbttestfreq consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: Describes how often in seconds to build a test circuit to
* gather timeout values. Only applies if less than 'cbtmincircs'
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ circuit_build_times_min_timeout(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtinitialtimeout consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtinitialtimeout consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This is the timeout value to use before computing a timeout,
* in milliseconds.
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void)
}
/**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtrecentcount consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtrecentcount consensus parameter.
*
* Effect: This is the number of circuit build times to keep track of
* for deciding if we hit cbtmaxtimeouts and need to reset our state
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index 700aa92ac..1ac950a3c 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
break;
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
/* That purpose means that the intro point circuit has been opened
- * succesfully but the INTRODUCE1 cell hasn't been sent yet because
+ * successfully but the INTRODUCE1 cell hasn't been sent yet because
* the client is waiting for the rendezvous point circuit to open.
* Keep this circuit open while waiting for the rendezvous circuit.
* We let the circuit idle timeout take care of cleaning this
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index e525624ac..c246bd00e 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -3146,7 +3146,7 @@ warn_if_option_path_is_relative(const char *option,
return 0;
}
-/** Scan <b>options</b> for occurances of relative file/directory
+/** Scan <b>options</b> for occurrences of relative file/directory
* path and log a warning whenever it is found.
*
* Return 1 if there were relative paths; 0 otherwise.
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index 5bbb61dfa..fb87e5b05 100644
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -4250,7 +4250,7 @@ connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, buf_t *buf)
/* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type
* and state. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using
- * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have owernship of the objects in the
+ * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the
* list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */
smartlist_t *
connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state)
@@ -4260,7 +4260,7 @@ connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state)
/* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type
* and purpose. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using
- * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have owernship of the objects in the
+ * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the
* list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */
smartlist_t *
connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose)
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index cce5c7953..948ac92bb 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -4458,11 +4458,11 @@ handle_control_hspost(control_connection_t *conn,
* used in pk is given to the HS subsystem so the caller must stop accessing
* it after.
*
- * The port_cfgs is a list of service port. Ownership transfered to service.
+ * The port_cfgs is a list of service port. Ownership transferred to service.
* The max_streams refers to the MaxStreams= key.
* The max_streams_close_circuit refers to the MaxStreamsCloseCircuit key.
* The auth_type is the authentication type of the clients in auth_clients.
- * The ownership of that list is transfered to the service.
+ * The ownership of that list is transferred to the service.
*
* On success (RSAE_OKAY), the address_out points to a newly allocated string
* containing the onion address without the .onion part. On error, address_out
@@ -4911,7 +4911,7 @@ add_onion_helper_keyarg(const char *arg, int discard_pk,
goto err;
}
- /* Succeded in loading or generating a private key. */
+ /* Succeeded in loading or generating a private key. */
ret = 0;
err:
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index c55f81bc6..983a3e2f3 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ directory_request_free_(directory_request_t *req)
/**
* Set the address and OR port to use for this directory request. If there is
* no OR port, we'll have to connect over the dirport. (If there are both,
- * the indirection setting determins which to use.)
+ * the indirection setting determines which to use.)
*/
void
directory_request_set_or_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ directory_request_set_or_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
/**
* Set the address and dirport to use for this directory request. If there
* is no dirport, we'll have to connect over the OR port. (If there are both,
- * the indirection setting determins which to use.)
+ * the indirection setting determines which to use.)
*/
void
directory_request_set_dir_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
@@ -3413,7 +3413,7 @@ connection_dir_process_inbuf(dir_connection_t *conn)
}
/** We are closing a dir connection: If <b>dir_conn</b> is a dir connection
- * that tried to fetch an HS descriptor, check if it successfuly fetched it,
+ * that tried to fetch an HS descriptor, check if it successfully fetched it,
* or if we need to try again. */
static void
refetch_hsdesc_if_needed(dir_connection_t *dir_conn)
@@ -4036,7 +4036,7 @@ find_best_diff(const smartlist_t *digests, int flav,
}
/** Lookup the cached consensus document by the flavor found in <b>flav</b>.
- * The prefered set of compression methods should be listed in the
+ * The preferred set of compression methods should be listed in the
* <b>compression_methods</b> bitfield. The compression method chosen (if any)
* is stored in <b>compression_used_out</b>. */
static struct consensus_cache_entry_t *
@@ -4948,7 +4948,7 @@ handle_get_robots(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args)
/* Given the <b>url</b> from a POST request, try to extract the version number
* using the provided <b>prefix</b>. The version should be after the prefix and
- * ending with the seperator "/". For instance:
+ * ending with the separator "/". For instance:
* /tor/hs/3/publish
*
* On success, <b>end_pos</b> points to the position right after the version
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index d3bae241f..fc6358a72 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
* the directory authority functionality. The directory.c module delegates
* here in order to handle incoming requests from clients, via
* connection_dirserv_flushed_some() and its kin. In order to save RAM, this
- * module is reponsible for spooling directory objects (in whole or in part)
+ * module is responsible for spooling directory objects (in whole or in part)
* onto buf_t instances, and then closing the dir_connection_t once the
* objects are totally flushed.
*
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ router_is_active(const routerinfo_t *ri, const node_t *node, time_t now)
if (!node->is_running || !node->is_valid || ri->is_hibernating) {
return 0;
}
- /* Only require bandwith capacity in non-test networks, or
+ /* Only require bandwidth capacity in non-test networks, or
* if TestingTorNetwork, and TestingMinExitFlagThreshold is non-zero */
if (!ri->bandwidthcapacity) {
if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.h b/src/or/dirserv.h
index 0fd7b7915..b9af68ff6 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.h
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.h
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ void dirserv_set_cached_consensus_networkstatus(const char *consensus,
void dirserv_clear_old_networkstatuses(time_t cutoff);
int dirserv_get_routerdesc_spool(smartlist_t *spools_out, const char *key,
dir_spool_source_t source,
- int conn_is_encrytped,
+ int conn_is_encrypted,
const char **msg_out);
int dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key,
const char **msg);
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 465c4148b..c3cd0d3cd 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ static int
consensus_method_is_supported(int method)
{
if (method == MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD) {
- /* This method was broken due to buggy code accidently left in
+ /* This method was broken due to buggy code accidentally left in
* dircollate.c; do not actually use it.
*/
return 0;
diff --git a/src/or/dns.c b/src/or/dns.c
index 1f00fe5b4..e4dc8048e 100644
--- a/src/or/dns.c
+++ b/src/or/dns.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
* dns_seems_to_be_broken().
* <li>When a client has asked the relay, in a RELAY_BEGIN cell, to connect
* to a given server by hostname. This happens via dns_resolve().
- * <li>When a client has asked the rela, in a RELAY_RESOLVE cell, to look
+ * <li>When a client has asked the relay, in a RELAY_RESOLVE cell, to look
* up a given server's IP address(es) by hostname. This also happens via
* dns_resolve().
* </ol>
diff --git a/src/or/hs_cache.c b/src/or/hs_cache.c
index ed38a603b..b852feb02 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_cache.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_cache.c
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ cache_clean_v3_as_client(time_t now)
/* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */
cache_client_desc_free(entry);
/* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
- * a loop so we have to explicitely decrement. */
+ * a loop so we have to explicitey decrement. */
rend_cache_decrement_allocation(entry_size);
/* Logging. */
{
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ hs_cache_purge_as_client(void)
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
cache_client_desc_free(entry);
/* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
- * a loop so we have to explicitely decrement. */
+ * a loop so we have to explicitly decrement. */
rend_cache_decrement_allocation(entry_size);
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c
index 2999f85d3..d3978f22f 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_client.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_client.c
@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip)
smartlist_add(lspecs, lspec);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(desc_lspec);
- /* Explicitely put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client
+ /* Explicitly put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client
* side and there is no such thing as a non anonymous client. */
ei = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(lspecs, &ip->onion_key, 0);
diff --git a/src/or/hs_config.c b/src/or/hs_config.c
index fa5c1ab17..be223503a 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_config.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_config.c
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ hs_config_service_all(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
}
/* In non validation mode, we'll stage those services we just successfully
- * configured. Service ownership is transfered from the list to the global
+ * configured. Service ownership is transferred from the list to the global
* state. If any service is invalid, it will be removed from the list and
* freed. All versions are handled in that function. */
if (!validate_only) {
diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
index 98942e868..34c7b4a52 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ get_fake_auth_client_lines(void)
/* Create the inner layer of the descriptor (which includes the intro points,
* etc.). Return a newly-allocated string with the layer plaintext, or NULL if
- * an error occured. It's the responsibility of the caller to free the returned
+ * an error occurred. It's the responsibility of the caller to free the returned
* string. */
static char *
get_inner_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ get_inner_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
/* Create the middle layer of the descriptor, which includes the client auth
* data and the encrypted inner layer (provided as a base64 string at
* <b>layer2_b64_ciphertext</b>). Return a newly-allocated string with the
- * layer plaintext, or NULL if an error occured. It's the responsibility of the
+ * layer plaintext, or NULL if an error occurred. It's the responsibility of the
* caller to free the returned string. */
static char *
get_outer_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ decode_intro_legacy_key(const directory_token_t *tok,
/* The check on the expiration date is for the entire lifetime of a
* certificate which is 24 hours. However, a descriptor has a maximum
* lifetime of 12 hours meaning we have a 12h difference between the two
- * which ultimately accomodate the clock skewed client. */
+ * which ultimately accommodate the clock skewed client. */
if (rsa_ed25519_crosscert_check(ip->legacy.cert.encoded,
ip->legacy.cert.len, ip->legacy.key,
&desc->plaintext_data.signing_pubkey,
diff --git a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c
index 4a5202f61..8c6453e6f 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_intropoint.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_intropoint.c
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell)
/* We just received a non legacy INTRODUCE1 cell on <b>client_circ</b> with
* the payload in <b>request</b> of size <b>request_len</b>. Return 0 if
- * everything went well, or -1 if an error occured. This function is in charge
+ * everything went well, or -1 if an error occurred. This function is in charge
* of sending back an INTRODUCE_ACK cell and will close client_circ on error.
*/
STATIC int
diff --git a/src/or/hs_service.c b/src/or/hs_service.c
index 64ab9c9ee..8ae00df48 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_service.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static const char address_tld[] = "onion";
/* Staging list of service object. When configuring service, we add them to
* this list considered a staging area and they will get added to our global
- * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are seperated because
+ * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are separated because
* loading keys requires that we are an actual running tor process. */
static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list;
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ find_service(hs_service_ht *map, const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
/* Register the given service in the given map. If the service already exists
* in the map, -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned and the service
- * ownership has been transfered to the global map. */
+ * ownership has been transferred to the global map. */
STATIC int
register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
{
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ describe_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
static int32_t
get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
{
- /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
* in the future. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_introduce2",
INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
static int32_t
get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void)
{
- /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
* in the future. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_introduce2",
INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void)
return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
}
- /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
* in the future. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime",
INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void)
return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
}
- /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+ /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
* in the future. */
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime",
INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS,
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service,
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
}
-/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section fomr the given service object.
+/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section from the given service object.
* This will generate a valid list of introduction points that can be used
* after for circuit creation. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
static int
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ build_service_desc_encrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
return 0;
}
-/* Populare the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
+/* Populate the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
* The caller must make sure that the keys in the descriptors are valid that
* is are non-zero. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
static int
@@ -2978,7 +2978,7 @@ hs_service_add_ephemeral(ed25519_secret_key_t *sk, smartlist_t *ports,
service = hs_service_new(get_options());
/* Setup the service configuration with specifics. A default service is
- * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitely set it. */
+ * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitly set it. */
service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
service->config.max_streams_close_circuit = !!max_streams_close_circuit;
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
}
/* Find a virtual port of that service mathcing the one in the connection if
- * succesful, set the address in the connection. */
+ * successful, set the address in the connection. */
if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->config.ports, conn) < 0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d for "
"hidden service %s.",
diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c
index 98566c0c9..800efd68c 100644
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@ -2830,7 +2830,7 @@ run_main_loop_once(void)
if (get_options()->MainloopStats) {
/* Update our main loop counters. */
if (loop_result == 0) {
- // The call was succesful.
+ // The call was successful.
increment_main_loop_success_count();
} else if (loop_result == -1) {
// The call was erroneous.
diff --git a/src/or/onion_fast.c b/src/or/onion_fast.c
index 56c954829..de9103b1f 100644
--- a/src/or/onion_fast.c
+++ b/src/or/onion_fast.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
* [*]Actually, it's possible that TAP _was_ a little better than TLS with
* RSA1024 certificates and EDH1024 for forward secrecy, if you
* hypothesize an adversary who can compute discrete logarithms on a
- * small number of targetted DH1024 fields, but who can't break all that
+ * small number of targeted DH1024 fields, but who can't break all that
* many RSA1024 keys.
**/
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 311a1faf3..51f7d4333 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -3142,7 +3142,7 @@ typedef struct circuit_t {
/** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
*
- * XXXX Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
+ * XXXX Note that some code will artificially adjust this value backward
* in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
* streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
* That's a kludge we should fix.
@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
uint32_t global_identifier;
/** True if we have associated one stream to this circuit, thereby setting
- * the isolation paramaters for this circuit. Note that this doesn't
+ * the isolation parameters for this circuit. Note that this doesn't
* necessarily mean that we've <em>attached</em> any streams to the circuit:
* we may only have marked up this circuit during the launch process.
*/
@@ -4182,7 +4182,7 @@ typedef struct {
int UseEntryGuards_option;
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
* UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
- * Single Onion Service, it is alwasy false, otherwise we use the value of
+ * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
* UseEntryGuards_option. */
int UseEntryGuards;
diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c
index e14b33c8e..f718ded32 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.c
+++ b/src/or/policies.c
@@ -2407,7 +2407,7 @@ policy_summary_item_split(policy_summary_item_t* old, uint16_t new_starts)
#define REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV6 (64)
/* Ports are rejected in an IPv6 summary if they are rejected in more than one
* IPv6 /16 address block.
- * This is rougly equivalent to the IPv4 cutoff, as only five IPv6 /12s (and
+ * This is roughly equivalent to the IPv4 cutoff, as only five IPv6 /12s (and
* some scattered smaller blocks) have been allocated to the RIRs.
* Network providers are typically allocated one or more IPv6 /32s.
*/
diff --git a/src/or/reasons.c b/src/or/reasons.c
index 03d49418d..ce1259b8f 100644
--- a/src/or/reasons.c
+++ b/src/or/reasons.c
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ socks5_response_code_to_string(uint8_t code)
}
}
-/** Return a string corresponding to a bandwidht_weight_rule_t */
+/** Return a string corresponding to a bandwidth_weight_rule_t */
const char *
bandwidth_weight_rule_to_string(bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule)
{
diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.c b/src/or/rendcache.c
index 6f56df671..30115d0bb 100644
--- a/src/or/rendcache.c
+++ b/src/or/rendcache.c
@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ STATIC digestmap_t *rend_cache_v2_dir = NULL;
* ID, that were NOT present in the descriptor are removed from this cache.
* Which means that if at least one IP was not in this cache, thus usuable,
* it's considered a new descriptor so we keep it. Else, if all IPs were in
- * this cache, we discard the descriptor as it's considered unsuable.
+ * this cache, we discard the descriptor as it's considered unusable.
*
* Once a descriptor is removed from the rend cache or expires, the entry
* in this cache is also removed for the service ID.
*
- * This scheme allows us to not realy on the descriptor's timestamp (which
+ * This scheme allows us to not relay on the descriptor's timestamp (which
* is rounded down to the hour) to know if we have a newer descriptor. We
* only rely on the usability of intro points from an internal state. */
STATIC strmap_t *rend_cache_failure = NULL;
diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.h b/src/or/rendcache.h
index 66e978564..8b6fd5b67 100644
--- a/src/or/rendcache.h
+++ b/src/or/rendcache.h
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ typedef struct rend_cache_entry_t {
/* Introduction point failure type. */
typedef struct rend_cache_failure_intro_t {
- /* When this intro point failure occured thus we allocated this object and
+ /* When this intro point failure occurred thus we allocated this object and
* cache it. */
time_t created_ts;
rend_intro_point_failure_t failure_type;
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 07fa33306..57815815b 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id,
/** Fetch a v2 descriptor using the onion address in the given query object.
* This will compute the descriptor id for each replicas and fetch it on the
- * given hsdir(s) if any or the responsible ones that are choosen
+ * given hsdir(s) if any or the responsible ones that are chosen
* automatically.
*
* On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index f38895d5f..b07a7a7a7 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst,
}
/** Derive all rend_service_t internal material based on the service's key.
- * Returns 0 on sucess, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static int
rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s)
@@ -3196,7 +3196,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
/* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
* redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending.
- * Substract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
+ * Subtract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
* still opened. */
if (valid_ip_circuits > service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
@@ -4121,7 +4121,7 @@ rend_consider_services_intro_points(time_t now)
n_intro_points_to_open);
break;
}
- /* Add the choosen node to the exclusion list in order to avoid picking
+ /* Add the chosen node to the exclusion list in order to avoid picking
* it again in the next iteration. */
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)node);
intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h
index 88da7b866..cc872ab57 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.h
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.h
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t {
/** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported
* ports. */
int allow_unknown_ports;
- /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed
+ /** The maximum number of simultaneous streams-per-circuit that are allowed
* to be established, or 0 if no limit is set.
*/
int max_streams_per_circuit;
diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c
index 15fb674ff..c0abbb272 100644
--- a/src/or/rephist.c
+++ b/src/or/rephist.c
@@ -2736,7 +2736,7 @@ rep_hist_desc_stats_write(time_t now)
}
/** Called to note that we've served a given descriptor (by
- * digest). Incrememnts the count of descriptors served, and the number
+ * digest). Increments the count of descriptors served, and the number
* of times we've served this descriptor. */
void
rep_hist_note_desc_served(const char * desc)
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 061eba2d2..1bd6d5db5 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ list_authority_ids_with_downloads, (void))
smartlist_add(ids, tmp);
}
}
- /* else definitely no downlaods going since nothing even has a cert list */
+ /* else definitely no downloads going since nothing even has a cert list */
return ids;
}
@@ -2652,7 +2652,7 @@ compute_weighted_bandwidths(const smartlist_t *sl,
is_dir = node_is_dir(node);
if (node->rs) {
if (!node->rs->has_bandwidth) {
- /* This should never happen, unless all the authorites downgrade
+ /* This should never happen, unless all the authorities downgrade
* to 0.2.0 or rogue routerstatuses get inserted into our consensus. */
if (! warned_missing_bw) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.c b/src/or/shared_random.c
index 7723ad461..13416d6bc 100644
--- a/src/or/shared_random.c
+++ b/src/or/shared_random.c
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ sr_parse_srv(const smartlist_t *args)
srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*srv));
srv->num_reveals = num_reveals;
- /* We substract one byte from the srclen because the function ignores the
+ /* We subtract one byte from the srclen because the function ignores the
* '=' character in the given buffer. This is broken but it's a documented
* behavior of the implementation. */
ret = base64_decode((char *) srv->value, sizeof(srv->value), value,
diff --git a/src/or/shared_random_state.c b/src/or/shared_random_state.c
index d6109b2de..53782af59 100644
--- a/src/or/shared_random_state.c
+++ b/src/or/shared_random_state.c
@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ sr_state_get_previous_srv(void)
}
/* Set the current SRV value from our state. Value CAN be NULL. The srv
- * object ownership is transfered to the state object. */
+ * object ownership is transferred to the state object. */
void
sr_state_set_previous_srv(const sr_srv_t *srv)
{
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ sr_state_get_current_srv(void)
}
/* Set the current SRV value from our state. Value CAN be NULL. The srv
- * object ownership is transfered to the state object. */
+ * object ownership is transferred to the state object. */
void
sr_state_set_current_srv(const sr_srv_t *srv)
{
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ sr_state_get_commit(const char *rsa_identity)
}
/* Add <b>commit</b> to the permanent state. The commit object ownership is
- * transfered to the state so the caller MUST not free it. */
+ * transferred to the state so the caller MUST not free it. */
void
sr_state_add_commit(sr_commit_t *commit)
{
diff --git a/src/or/status.c b/src/or/status.c
index 3b4c60585..ec025a1cc 100644
--- a/src/or/status.c
+++ b/src/or/status.c
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ log_heartbeat(time_t now)
const uint64_t main_loop_idle_count = get_main_loop_idle_count();
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE, LD_HEARTBEAT, "Main event loop statistics: "
- U64_FORMAT " succesful returns, "
+ U64_FORMAT " successful returns, "
U64_FORMAT " erroneous returns, and "
U64_FORMAT " idle returns.",
U64_PRINTF_ARG(main_loop_success_count),
diff --git a/src/or/transports.c b/src/or/transports.c
index 1e6307b7d..b08dcd161 100644
--- a/src/or/transports.c
+++ b/src/or/transports.c
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ pt_configure_remaining_proxies(void)
}
/* If the proxy is not fully configured, try to configure it
- futher. */
+ further. */
if (!proxy_configuration_finished(mp))
if (configure_proxy(mp) == 1)
at_least_a_proxy_config_finished = 1;
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 2293822f8..810cbafb1 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg)
s_buf, s_keys, 40));
c_buf[64] ^= 33;
- /* (Let the server procede) */
+ /* (Let the server proceed) */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ,
onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
s_buf, s_keys, 40));
diff --git a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
index 007f7e3d3..88cdef383 100644
--- a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
+++ b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ test_cfmt_create_cells(void *arg)
cell.command = CELL_CREATED;
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, create_cell_parse(&cc, &cell));
- /* You can't acutally make an unparseable CREATE or CREATE_FAST cell. */
+ /* You can't actually make an unparseable CREATE or CREATE_FAST cell. */
/* Try some CREATE2 cells. First with a bad type. */
cell.command = CELL_CREATE2;
diff --git a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
index 4cc33cbe7..9e570b81a 100644
--- a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
+++ b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg)
tt_assert(relay3_client->padding_enabled);
tt_assert(client_relay3->padding_enabled);
get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1;
- /* For the relay to recieve the negotiate: */
+ /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */
get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg)
// Test client side (it should stop immediately)
get_options_mutable()->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode = 1;
get_options_mutable()->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode = 1;
- /* For the relay to recieve the negotiate: */
+ /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */
get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ test_channelpadding_negotiation(void *arg)
get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 0;
/* Test case #2: Torrc options */
- /* ConnectionPadding auto; Relay doesn't suport us */
+ /* ConnectionPadding auto; Relay doesn't support us */
((channel_tls_t*)relay3_client)->conn->link_proto = 4;
relay3_client->padding_enabled = 0;
tried_to_write_cell = 0;
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ test_channelpadding_negotiation(void *arg)
((channel_tls_t*)relay3_client)->conn->link_proto = 5;
relay3_client->padding_enabled = 1;
- /* ConnectionPadding 1; Relay doesn't suport us */
+ /* ConnectionPadding 1; Relay doesn't support us */
get_options_mutable()->ConnectionPadding = 1;
tried_to_write_cell = 0;
decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
diff --git a/src/test/test_config.c b/src/test/test_config.c
index 4290d0dc6..d42335de3 100644
--- a/src/test/test_config.c
+++ b/src/test/test_config.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ test_config_write_to_data_subdir(void *arg)
tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory, 0700), OP_EQ, 0);
#endif
- // Write attempt shoudl fail, if subdirectory doesn't exist.
+ // Write attempt should fail, if subdirectory doesn't exist.
tt_assert(write_to_data_subdir(subdir, fname, str, NULL));
tt_assert(! check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir));
@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ test_config_resolve_my_address(void *arg)
* if running on.
* 3. Hostname from previous step cannot be converted to
* address by using tor_inet_aton() function.
- * 4. However, tor_lookup_hostname() succeds in resolving the
+ * 4. However, tor_lookup_hostname() succeeds in resolving the
* hostname from step 2.
* 5. Unfortunately, tor_addr_is_internal() deems this address
* to be internal.
diff --git a/src/test/test_connection.c b/src/test/test_connection.c
index 314b90cfd..33f453b8b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_connection.c
+++ b/src/test/test_connection.c
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ test_conn_download_status(void *arg)
#define CONNECTION_TESTCASE(name, fork, setup) \
{ #name, test_conn_##name, fork, &setup, NULL }
-/* where arg is an expression (constant, varaible, compound expression) */
+/* where arg is an expression (constant, variable, compound expression) */
#define CONNECTION_TESTCASE_ARG(name, fork, setup, arg) \
{ #name "_" #arg, test_conn_##name, fork, &setup, (void *)arg }
diff --git a/src/test/test_dir.c b/src/test/test_dir.c
index f2223ee17..0c7c571b2 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dir.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dir.c
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ test_dir_versions(void *arg)
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, tor_version_as_new_as(
"Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-00)",
"Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-01)"));
- /* In #21278, we comapre without integer overflows.
+ /* In #21278, we compare without integer overflows.
* But since #21450 limits version components to [0, INT32_MAX], it is no
* longer possible to cause an integer overflow in tor_version_compare() */
tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, tor_version_as_new_as(
diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
index 1cff3828c..92a860360 100644
--- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
@@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg)
tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_NE, g_prev->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, start+60);
- tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); // not confirmd now.
+ tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); // not confirmed now.
/* Call this one up; watch it get confirmed. */
update_approx_time(start+90);
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c
index 55c6218dd..9189bb65b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs.c
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ test_prune_services_on_reload(void *arg)
set_rend_service_list(old);
set_rend_rend_service_staging_list(new);
rend_service_prune_list_impl_();
- /* Check if they've all been transfered. */
+ /* Check if they've all been transferred. */
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(old), OP_EQ, 0);
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(new), OP_EQ, 2);
}
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c
index 9ec183db0..8e9d461c4 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ test_decode_invalid_intro_point(void *arg)
(void) arg;
- /* Seperate pieces of a valid encoded introduction point. */
+ /* Separate pieces of a valid encoded introduction point. */
const char *intro_point =
"introduction-point AQIUMDI5OUYyNjhGQ0E5RDU1Q0QxNTc=";
const char *auth_key =
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
index 66832087a..55dfafbea 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ helper_create_introduce1_cell(void)
memcpy(auth_key_ptr, auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len);
}
- /* Set the cell extentions to none. */
+ /* Set the cell extensions to none. */
{
trn_cell_extension_t *ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ test_circuitmap_free_all(void)
;
}
-/** Successfuly register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
+/** Successfully register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
* circuitmap is maintained properly. */
static void
test_intro_point_registration(void *arg)
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c
index fad65e61f..7fade6379 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ test_intro_circuit_opened(void *arg)
UNMOCK(relay_send_command_from_edge_);
}
-/** Test the operations we do on a circuit after we learn that we successfuly
+/** Test the operations we do on a circuit after we learn that we successfully
* established an intro point on it */
static void
test_intro_established(void *arg)
diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c
index 62732cabf..b8898766e 100644
--- a/src/test/test_options.c
+++ b/src/test/test_options.c
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
"Address 100.200.10.1\n"
"BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
"ContactInfo hello at hello.com\n"
- "V3BandwidthsFile non-existant-file\n");
+ "V3BandwidthsFile non-existent-file\n");
mock_clean_saved_logs();
options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
"Address 100.200.10.1\n"
"BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
"ContactInfo hello at hello.com\n"
- "V3BandwidthsFile non-existant-file\n");
+ "V3BandwidthsFile non-existent-file\n");
mock_clean_saved_logs();
options_validate(NULL, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
"Address 100.200.10.1\n"
"BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
"ContactInfo hello at hello.com\n"
- "GuardfractionFile non-existant-file\n");
+ "GuardfractionFile non-existent-file\n");
mock_clean_saved_logs();
options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
"Address 100.200.10.1\n"
"BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
"ContactInfo hello at hello.com\n"
- "GuardfractionFile non-existant-file\n");
+ "GuardfractionFile non-existent-file\n");
mock_clean_saved_logs();
options_validate(NULL, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ test_options_validate__transproxy(void *ignored)
// Test unknown trans proxy
free_options_test_data(tdata);
- tdata = get_options_test_data("TransProxyType non-existant\n");
+ tdata = get_options_test_data("TransProxyType non-existent\n");
ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Unrecognized value for TransProxyType");
diff --git a/src/test/test_shared_random.c b/src/test/test_shared_random.c
index 96494904e..4fe9ee45f 100644
--- a/src/test/test_shared_random.c
+++ b/src/test/test_shared_random.c
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ test_sr_commit(void *arg)
sizeof(our_commit->hashed_reveal)));
/* Do we have a valid encoded commit and reveal. Note the following only
* tests if the generated values are correct. Their could be a bug in
- * the decode function but we test them seperately. */
+ * the decode function but we test them separately. */
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, reveal_decode(our_commit->encoded_reveal,
&test_commit));
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, commit_decode(our_commit->encoded_commit,
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ test_vote(void *arg)
ret = smartlist_split_string(chunks, lines, "\n", SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 4);
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(chunks, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-participate");
- /* Get our commitment line and will validate it agains our commit. The
+ /* Get our commitment line and will validate it against our commit. The
* format is as follow:
* "shared-rand-commitment" SP version SP algname SP identity
* SP COMMIT [SP REVEAL] NL
diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c
index 1fd41a348..ba4ac3c06 100644
--- a/src/test/test_util.c
+++ b/src/test/test_util.c
@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
* a "correct" retrospective gregorian negative year value,
* which I'm pretty sure is:
* -1*(2^63)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = -292277022657
- * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days */
+ * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days */
a_time.tm_year = -292277022657-1900;
CAPTURE();
tt_int_op((time_t) -1,OP_EQ, tor_timegm(&a_time));
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
* a "correct" proleptic gregorian year value,
* which I'm pretty sure is:
* (2^63-1)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = 292277026596
- * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days */
+ * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days */
a_time.tm_year = 292277026596-1900;
CAPTURE();
tt_int_op((time_t) -1,OP_EQ, tor_timegm(&a_time));
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
* a "correct" retrospective gregorian negative year value,
* which I'm pretty sure is:
* -1*(2^63)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = -292277022657
- * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days
+ * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days
* (int64_t)b_time.tm_year == (-292277022657LL-1900LL) without clamping */
t_res = INT64_MIN;
CAPTURE();
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
* a "correct" proleptic gregorian year value,
* which I'm pretty sure is:
* (2^63-1)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = 292277026596
- * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days
+ * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days
* (int64_t)b_time.tm_year == (292277026596L-1900L) without clamping */
t_res = INT64_MAX;
CAPTURE();
@@ -5465,7 +5465,7 @@ is_there_a_localhost(int family)
#endif /* 0 */
/* Test for socketpair and ersatz_socketpair(). We test them both, since
- * the latter is a tolerably good way to exersize tor_accept_socket(). */
+ * the latter is a tolerably good way to exercise tor_accept_socket(). */
static void
test_util_socketpair(void *arg)
{
diff --git a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel
index 7577c1526..574382b16 100644
--- a/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel
+++ b/src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20;
/* INTRODUCE1 payload. See details in section 3.2.1. */
struct trn_cell_introduce1 {
- /* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitely by the caller. */
+ /* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitly by the caller. */
u8 legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN];
/* Authentication key material. */
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