[tor-commits] [tor/master] Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Sep 5 18:18:13 UTC 2017
commit 234c5015f1536bc51fe5f87c5b7c1072d3f9dbd2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Aug 8 11:51:36 2017 -0400
Move protocol-specific functions out of buffers.c
This commit does not change the implementation of any function: it
only moves code and adds new includes as necessary. Part of #23149.
---
changes/refactor-buffer | 3 +
src/or/buffers.c | 982 +----------------------------------------
src/or/buffers.h | 26 +-
src/or/connection.c | 2 +
src/or/connection_edge.c | 1 +
src/or/connection_or.c | 1 +
src/or/control.c | 2 +
src/or/include.am | 8 +
src/or/proto_cell.c | 84 ++++
src/or/proto_cell.h | 17 +
src/or/proto_control0.c | 27 ++
src/or/proto_control0.h | 14 +
src/or/proto_http.c | 173 ++++++++
src/or/proto_http.h | 24 +
src/or/proto_socks.c | 723 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/or/proto_socks.h | 20 +
src/test/test_buffers.c | 5 +
src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c | 1 +
src/test/test_hs_cache.c | 1 +
src/test/test_socks.c | 1 +
20 files changed, 1117 insertions(+), 998 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/refactor-buffer b/changes/refactor-buffer
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36b029672
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/refactor-buffer
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+ o Code simplifications and refactoring:
+ - Split the portions of the buffer.c module that handle particular
+ protocols into separate modules. Part of ticket 23149.
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index bd84103c3..ef8676cd9 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -16,23 +16,10 @@
* buffers: one for incoming data, and one for outcoming data. These are fed
* and drained from functions in connection.c, trigged by events that are
* monitored in main.c.
- *
- * This module has basic support for reading and writing on buf_t objects. It
- * also contains specialized functions for handling particular protocols
- * on a buf_t backend, including SOCKS (used in connection_edge.c), Tor cells
- * (used in connection_or.c and channeltls.c), HTTP (used in directory.c), and
- * line-oriented communication (used in control.c).
**/
#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
-#include "addressmap.h"
#include "buffers.h"
-#include "config.h"
-#include "connection_edge.h"
-#include "connection_or.h"
-#include "control.h"
-#include "reasons.h"
-#include "ext_orport.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "torlog.h"
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
@@ -68,16 +55,6 @@
* forever.
*/
-static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req,
- socks5_reply_status_t reason);
-
-static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
- int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out,
- size_t *want_length_out);
-static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
- int state, char **reason,
- ssize_t *drain_out);
-
/* Chunk manipulation functions */
#define CHUNK_HEADER_LEN offsetof(chunk_t, mem[0])
@@ -227,7 +204,7 @@ preferred_chunk_size(size_t target)
* growing it as necessary, until buf->head has the first <b>bytes</b> bytes
* of data from the buffer, or until buf->head has all the data in <b>buf</b>.
*/
-STATIC void
+void
buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes)
{
chunk_t *dest, *src;
@@ -351,7 +328,7 @@ buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz)
#endif
/** Remove the first <b>n</b> bytes from buf. */
-static inline void
+void
buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n)
{
tor_assert(buf->datalen >= n);
@@ -907,7 +884,7 @@ write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
/** Helper: copy the first <b>string_len</b> bytes from <b>buf</b>
* onto <b>string</b>.
*/
-static inline void
+void
peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf)
{
chunk_t *chunk;
@@ -950,79 +927,6 @@ fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf)
return (int)buf->datalen;
}
-/** True iff the cell command <b>command</b> is one that implies a
- * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol <b>linkproto</b>. */
-static inline int
-cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto)
-{
- /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells
- * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells.
- * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate
- * them.
- */
- switch (linkproto) {
- case 1:
- /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */
- return 0;
- case 2:
- /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */
- return command == CELL_VERSIONS;
- case 0:
- case 3:
- default:
- /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown",
- * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is
- * grandfathered in. */
- return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128;
- }
-}
-
-/** Check <b>buf</b> for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link
- * protocol version <b>linkproto</b>. If one is found, pull it off the buffer
- * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *<b>out</b>, and return 1.
- * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length
- * cell. Return 1 and set *<b>out</b> to NULL if there seems to be the start
- * of a variable-length cell on <b>buf</b>, but the whole thing isn't there
- * yet. */
-int
-fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto)
-{
- char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
- var_cell_t *result;
- uint8_t command;
- uint16_t length;
- const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS;
- const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids);
- const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids);
- check();
- *out = NULL;
- if (buf->datalen < header_len)
- return 0;
- peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf);
-
- command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len);
- if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto)))
- return 0;
-
- length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1));
- if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length))
- return 1;
- result = var_cell_new(length);
- result->command = command;
- if (wide_circ_ids)
- result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr));
- else
- result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
-
- buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len);
- peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf);
- buf_remove_from_front(buf, length);
- check();
-
- *out = result;
- return 1;
-}
-
/** Move up to *<b>buf_flushlen</b> bytes from <b>buf_in</b> to
* <b>buf_out</b>, and modify *<b>buf_flushlen</b> appropriately.
* Return the number of bytes actually copied.
@@ -1150,7 +1054,7 @@ buf_matches_at_pos(const buf_pos_t *pos, const char *s, size_t n)
/** Return the first position in <b>buf</b> at which the <b>n</b>-character
* string <b>s</b> occurs, or -1 if it does not occur. */
-STATIC int
+int
buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n)
{
buf_pos_t pos;
@@ -1167,868 +1071,6 @@ buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n)
return -1;
}
-/**
- * Scan the HTTP headers in the <b>headerlen</b>-byte memory range at
- * <b>headers</b>, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set
- * *<b>result_out</b> to the numeric value of that header if possible.
- * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if
- * it was present and well-formed.
- */
-STATIC int
-buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen,
- size_t *result_out)
-{
- const char *p, *newline;
- char *len_str, *eos=NULL;
- size_t remaining, result;
- int ok;
- *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the
- * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */
-
-#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
- p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH);
- if (p == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen);
- remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p;
- p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
- remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
-
- newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining);
- if (newline == NULL)
- return -1;
-
- len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p);
- /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c
- * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */
- result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos);
- if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) {
- ok = 0;
- } else {
- *result_out = result;
- }
- tor_free(len_str);
-
- return ok ? 1 : -1;
-}
-
-/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on <b>buf</b>, of the
- * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.)
- * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in
- * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and
- * all headers are present, then:
- *
- * - strdup headers into <b>*headers_out</b>, and NUL-terminate it.
- * - memdup body into <b>*body_out</b>, and NUL-terminate it.
- * - Then remove them from <b>buf</b>, and return 1.
- *
- * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf.
- * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1.
- * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len,
- * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.)
- * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the
- * content has arrived.
- *
- * Else, change nothing and return 0.
- */
-int
-fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
- char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
- char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
- int force_complete)
-{
- char *headers;
- size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0;
- int crlf_offset;
- int r;
-
- check();
- if (!buf->head)
- return 0;
-
- crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4);
- if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen ||
- (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) {
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long.");
- return -1;
- } else if (crlf_offset < 0) {
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet.");
- return 0;
- }
- /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first
- * chunk. */
- if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4)
- buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4);
- headerlen = crlf_offset + 4;
-
- headers = buf->head->data;
- bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen;
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen);
-
- if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) {
- log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
- (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1);
- return -1;
- }
- if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) {
- log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
- (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1);
- return -1;
- }
-
- r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen);
- if (r == -1) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe "
- "someone is trying to crash us.");
- return -1;
- } else if (r == 1) {
- /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
- if (bodylen < contentlen) {
- if (!force_complete) {
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet.");
- return 0; /* not all there yet */
- }
- }
- if (bodylen > contentlen) {
- bodylen = contentlen;
- log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen);
- }
- } else {
- tor_assert(r == 0);
- /* Leave bodylen alone */
- }
-
- /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */
- if (headers_out) {
- *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1);
- fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf);
- (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
- }
- if (body_out) {
- tor_assert(body_used);
- *body_used = bodylen;
- *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1);
- fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf);
- (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
- }
- check();
- return 1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely
- * again. */
-#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5
-
-/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using
- * protocol <b>socks_protocol</b> on port <b>port</b>. Don't warn more than
- * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless <b>safe_socks</b> is set. */
-static void
-log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address,
- uint16_t port, int safe_socks)
-{
- static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL);
-
- if (safe_socks) {
- log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
- "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving "
- "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves "
- "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A "
- "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, "
- "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/"
- "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s",
- socks_protocol,
- (int)port,
- safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : "");
- }
- control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN,
- "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d",
- socks_protocol, address, (int)port);
-}
-
-/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is
- * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */
-#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512
-
-/** Return a new socks_request_t. */
-socks_request_t *
-socks_request_new(void)
-{
- return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t));
-}
-
-/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t <b>req</b>. */
-void
-socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req)
-{
- if (!req)
- return;
- if (req->username) {
- memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen);
- tor_free(req->username);
- }
- if (req->password) {
- memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen);
- tor_free(req->password);
- }
- memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t));
- tor_free(req);
-}
-
-/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on <b>buf</b>, of one
- * of the forms
- * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0"
- * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0"
- * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods"
- * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..."
- * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in
- * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf,
- * assign to <b>req</b>, and return 1.
- *
- * If it's invalid or too big, return -1.
- *
- * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0.
- *
- * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into <b>req->reply</b>
- * and set <b>req->replylen</b>, else leave <b>req->replylen</b> alone.
- *
- * If <b>log_sockstype</b> is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether
- * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not.
- *
- * If <b>safe_socks</b> is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols.
- *
- * If returning 0 or -1, <b>req->address</b> and <b>req->port</b> are
- * undefined.
- */
-int
-fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req,
- int log_sockstype, int safe_socks)
-{
- int res;
- ssize_t n_drain;
- size_t want_length = 128;
-
- if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */
- return 0;
-
- do {
- n_drain = 0;
- buf_pullup(buf, want_length);
- tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2);
- want_length = 0;
-
- res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype,
- safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length);
-
- if (n_drain < 0)
- buf_clear(buf);
- else if (n_drain > 0)
- buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain);
-
- } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen &&
- buf->datalen >= 2);
-
- return res;
-}
-
-/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for
- * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */
-#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4
-
-/** Read <b>buf</b>, which should contain an Extended ORPort message
- * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate
- * <b>out</b> with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the
- * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we
- * encountered an error while parsing it. */
-int
-fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out)
-{
- char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE];
- uint16_t len;
-
- check();
- if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
- return 0;
- peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf);
- len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2));
- if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
- return 0;
- *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len);
- (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
- (*out)->len = len;
- buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE);
- fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with <b>reason</b> in its REP field and
- * have Tor send it as error response to <b>req</b>.
- */
-static void
-socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req,
- socks5_reply_status_t reason)
-{
- req->replylen = 10;
- memset(req->reply,0,10);
-
- req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field.
- req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field.
- req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field.
-}
-
-static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] =
- "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n"
- "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n"
- "<html>\n"
- "<head>\n"
- "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n"
- "</head>\n"
- "<body>\n"
- "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n"
- "<p>\n"
- "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as "
- "an HTTP proxy.\n\n"
- "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n"
- "Please configure your client accordingly.\n"
- "</p>\n"
- "<p>\n"
- "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">"
- "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more "
- "information.\n"
- "<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so "
- " IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment "
- " comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n"
- "</p>\n"
- "</body>\n"
- "</html>\n";
-
-/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking
- * at a buffer's contents, we look at the <b>datalen</b> bytes of data in
- * <b>data</b>. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set
- * <b>drain_out</b> to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the
- * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first
- * chunk of the buffer, we set *<b>want_length_out</b> to the number of bytes
- * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */
-static int
-parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
- int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out,
- size_t *want_length_out)
-{
- unsigned int len;
- char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1];
- tor_addr_t destaddr;
- uint32_t destip;
- uint8_t socksver;
- char *next, *startaddr;
- unsigned char usernamelen, passlen;
- struct in_addr in;
-
- if (datalen < 2) {
- /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */
- *want_length_out = 2;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) {
- /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should
- also check whether we actually negotiated username/password
- authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication
- even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */
- if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */
- /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1
- usernamelen [1 byte]
- username [usernamelen bytes]
- passlen [1 byte]
- password [passlen bytes] */
- usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1);
- if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) {
- *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u;
- return 0;
- }
- passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen);
- if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) {
- *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen;
- return 0;
- }
- req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
- req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */
- req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */
- log_debug(LD_APP,
- "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking.");
- if (usernamelen) {
- req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen);
- req->usernamelen = usernamelen;
- }
- if (passlen) {
- req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen);
- req->passwordlen = passlen;
- }
- *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen;
- req->got_auth = 1;
- *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */
- return 0;
- } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) {
- /* unknown version byte */
- log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; "
- "rejecting.", (int)*data);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- socksver = *data;
-
- switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */
- case 5: /* socks5 */
-
- if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */
- unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1);
- int have_user_pass, have_no_auth;
- int r=0;
- tor_assert(!req->socks_version);
- if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) {
- *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!nummethods)
- return -1;
- req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
- req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */
- have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL);
- have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL);
- if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) {
- req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS;
- req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass"
- auth method */
- req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)");
- r=0;
- } else if (have_no_auth) {
- req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth
- method */
- req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)");
- r=0;
- } else {
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or "
- "username/password. Rejecting.");
- req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */
- r=-1;
- }
- /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra
- * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */
- *drain_out = 2u + nummethods;
-
- return r;
- }
- if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) {
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided");
- return -1;
- }
- /* we know the method; read in the request */
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request");
- if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */
- *want_length_out = 7;
- return 0; /* not yet */
- }
- req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1);
- if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
- req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE &&
- req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
- /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
-
- log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
- req->command);
- return -1;
- }
- switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */
- case 1: /* IPv4 address */
- case 4: /* IPv6 address */ {
- const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4;
- const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4;
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type");
- if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */
- *want_length_out = 6+addrlen;
- return 0; /* not yet */
- }
-
- if (is_v6)
- tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4);
- else
- tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4));
-
- tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1);
-
- if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. "
- "Rejecting.",
- (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
- return -1;
- }
- strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address));
- req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen));
- *drain_out = 6+addrlen;
- if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR &&
- !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) {
- log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks);
- if (safe_socks) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
- case 3: /* fqdn */
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type");
- if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,
- SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with "
- "hostname type. Rejecting.");
- return -1;
- }
- len = (unsigned char)*(data+4);
- if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */
- *want_length_out = 7+len;
- return 0; /* not yet */
- }
- if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in "
- "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(req->address,data+5,len);
- req->address[len] = 0;
- req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len));
- *drain_out = 5+len+2;
-
- if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
-
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor "
- "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
- req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address));
- return -1;
- }
- if (log_sockstype)
- log_notice(LD_APP,
- "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed "
- "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
- "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
- return 1;
- default: /* unsupported */
- socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,
- SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
- log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.",
- (int) *(data+3));
- return -1;
- }
- tor_assert(0);
- break;
- case 4: { /* socks4 */
- enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a;
- const char *authstart, *authend;
- /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */
- /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */
-
- req->socks_version = 4;
- if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */
- *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
- return 0; /* not yet */
- }
- // buf_pullup(buf, 1280);
- req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1);
- if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
- req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
- /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with
- * socks4.) */
- log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
- req->command);
- return -1;
- }
-
- req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2));
- destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4));
- if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) {
- log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting.");
- return -1;
- }
- if (destip >> 8) {
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x.");
- in.s_addr = htonl(destip);
- tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
- if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.",
- (int)strlen(tmpbuf));
- return -1;
- }
- log_debug(LD_APP,
- "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)",
- safe_str_client(tmpbuf));
- socks4_prot = socks4;
- }
-
- authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
- next = memchr(authstart, 0,
- datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN);
- if (!next) {
- if (datalen >= 1024) {
- log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting.");
- return -1;
- }
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet.");
- *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
- return 0;
- }
- authend = next;
- tor_assert(next < data+datalen);
-
- startaddr = NULL;
- if (socks4_prot != socks4a &&
- !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) {
- log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks);
-
- if (safe_socks)
- return -1;
- }
- if (socks4_prot == socks4a) {
- if (next+1 == data+datalen) {
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet.");
- *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
- return 0;
- }
- startaddr = next+1;
- next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr);
- if (!next) {
- if (datalen >= 1024) {
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long.");
- return -1;
- }
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet.");
- *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
- return 0;
- }
- if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) {
- log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting.");
- return -1;
- }
- // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen);
-
- if (log_sockstype)
- log_notice(LD_APP,
- "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed "
- "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
- "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
- }
- log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success.");
- strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,
- sizeof(req->address));
- if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
- "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor "
- "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
- req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address));
- return -1;
- }
- if (authend != authstart) {
- req->got_auth = 1;
- req->usernamelen = authend - authstart;
- req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart);
- }
- /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */
- *drain_out = next - data + 1;
- return 1;
- }
- case 'G': /* get */
- case 'H': /* head */
- case 'P': /* put/post */
- case 'C': /* connect */
- strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG,
- MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN);
- req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1;
- /* fall through */
- default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */
- log_warn(LD_APP,
- "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)",
- *(data));
- {
- /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */
- char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8);
- control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN,
- "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"",
- escaped(tmp));
- tor_free(tmp);
- }
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
-/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in <b>buf</b> according
- * to <b>state</b>, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on
- * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case
- * <b>reason</b> is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished
- * with it).
- *
- * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required
- * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured.
- */
-int
-fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason)
-{
- ssize_t drain = 0;
- int r;
- if (buf->datalen < 2)
- return 0;
-
- buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN);
- tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2);
-
- r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen,
- state, reason, &drain);
- if (drain > 0)
- buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain);
- else if (drain < 0)
- buf_clear(buf);
-
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */
-static int
-parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
- int state, char **reason,
- ssize_t *drain_out)
-{
- unsigned int addrlen;
- *drain_out = 0;
- if (datalen < 2)
- return 0;
-
- switch (state) {
- case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK:
- /* Wait for the complete response */
- if (datalen < 8)
- return 0;
-
- if (data[1] != 0x5a) {
- *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1]));
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Success */
- *drain_out = 8;
- return 1;
-
- case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE:
- /* we don't have any credentials */
- if (data[1] != 0x00) {
- *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our "
- "available authentication methods");
- return -1;
- }
-
- log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication");
- *drain_out = -1;
- return 1;
-
- case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929:
- /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without
- * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */
- switch (data[1]) {
- case 0x00:
- log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server "
- "doesn't require authentication.");
- *drain_out = -1;
- return 1;
- case 0x02:
- log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication.");
- *drain_out = -1;
- return 2;
- /* fall through */
- }
-
- *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available "
- "authentication methods");
- return -1;
-
- case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK:
- /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */
- if (data[1] != 0x00) {
- *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful.");
- *drain_out = -1;
- return 1;
-
- case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK:
- /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed
- * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all
- * the data used */
-
- /* wait for address type field to arrive */
- if (datalen < 4)
- return 0;
-
- switch (data[3]) {
- case 0x01: /* ip4 */
- addrlen = 4;
- break;
- case 0x04: /* ip6 */
- addrlen = 16;
- break;
- case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */
- if (datalen < 5)
- return 0;
- addrlen = 1 + data[4];
- break;
- default:
- *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* wait for address and port */
- if (datalen < 6 + addrlen)
- return 0;
-
- if (data[1] != 0x00) {
- *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1]));
- return -1;
- }
-
- *drain_out = 6 + addrlen;
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* shouldn't get here... */
- tor_assert(0);
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-/** Return true if <b>cmd</b> looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */
-int
-peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf)
-{
- if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") ||
- peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") ||
- peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") ||
- peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") ||
- peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " ))
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Return 1 iff <b>buf</b> starts with <b>cmd</b>. <b>cmd</b> must be a null
* terminated string, of no more than PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX bytes. */
int
@@ -2044,22 +1086,6 @@ peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd)
return fast_memeq(tmp, cmd, clen);
}
-/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller
- * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */
-int
-peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf)
-{
- if (buf->datalen >= 4) {
- char header[4];
- uint16_t cmd;
- peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf);
- cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2));
- if (cmd <= 0x14)
- return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Return the index within <b>buf</b> at which <b>ch</b> first appears,
* or -1 if <b>ch</b> does not appear on buf. */
static off_t
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.h b/src/or/buffers.h
index d88408438..5a6f510f5 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.h
+++ b/src/or/buffers.h
@@ -39,23 +39,13 @@ int write_to_buf(const char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf);
int write_to_buf_compress(buf_t *buf, tor_compress_state_t *state,
const char *data, size_t data_len, int done);
int move_buf_to_buf(buf_t *buf_out, buf_t *buf_in, size_t *buf_flushlen);
+void peek_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, const buf_t *buf);
+void buf_remove_from_front(buf_t *buf, size_t n);
int fetch_from_buf(char *string, size_t string_len, buf_t *buf);
-int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto);
-int fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
- char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
- char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
- int force_complete);
-socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void);
-void socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req);
-int fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req,
- int log_sockstype, int safe_socks);
-int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason);
int fetch_from_buf_line(buf_t *buf, char *data_out, size_t *data_len);
-int peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf);
#define PEEK_BUF_STARTSWITH_MAX 16
int peek_buf_startswith(const buf_t *buf, const char *cmd);
-int peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf);
int fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out);
@@ -64,14 +54,15 @@ int buf_set_to_copy(buf_t **output,
void assert_buf_ok(buf_t *buf);
+int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n);
+void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes);
+
#ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE
-STATIC int buf_find_string_offset(const buf_t *buf, const char *s, size_t n);
-STATIC void buf_pullup(buf_t *buf, size_t bytes);
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
void buf_get_first_chunk_data(const buf_t *buf, const char **cp, size_t *sz);
buf_t *buf_new_with_data(const char *cp, size_t sz);
#endif
-STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target);
+ATTR_UNUSED STATIC size_t preferred_chunk_size(size_t target);
#define DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
/** A single chunk on a buffer. */
@@ -103,10 +94,5 @@ struct buf_t {
};
#endif
-#ifdef BUFFERS_PRIVATE
-STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen,
- size_t *result_out);
-#endif
-
#endif
diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c
index 31a682387..637b38cec 100644
--- a/src/or/connection.c
+++ b/src/or/connection.c
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@
#include "hs_common.h"
#include "hs_ident.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
+#include "proto_socks.h"
#include "policies.h"
#include "reasons.h"
#include "relay.h"
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index a98b32450..4f990e0a0 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include "main.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "policies.h"
+#include "proto_socks.h"
#include "reasons.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rendclient.h"
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index fc304e6f1..8cd36d66b 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
#include "microdesc.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
+#include "proto_cell.h"
#include "reasons.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rephist.h"
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index bc173a6e1..cd78daa91 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@
#include "networkstatus.h"
#include "nodelist.h"
#include "policies.h"
+#include "proto_control0.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
#include "reasons.h"
#include "rendclient.h"
#include "rendcommon.h"
diff --git a/src/or/include.am b/src/or/include.am
index 69b505fcd..caea04197 100644
--- a/src/or/include.am
+++ b/src/or/include.am
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES = \
src/or/parsecommon.c \
src/or/periodic.c \
src/or/protover.c \
+ src/or/proto_cell.c \
+ src/or/proto_control0.c \
+ src/or/proto_http.c \
+ src/or/proto_socks.c \
src/or/policies.c \
src/or/reasons.c \
src/or/relay.c \
@@ -215,6 +219,10 @@ ORHEADERS = \
src/or/periodic.h \
src/or/policies.h \
src/or/protover.h \
+ src/or/proto_cell.h \
+ src/or/proto_control0.h \
+ src/or/proto_http.h \
+ src/or/proto_socks.h \
src/or/reasons.h \
src/or/relay.h \
src/or/rendcache.h \
diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.c b/src/or/proto_cell.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e5cdff42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_cell.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove.
+#include "or.h"
+#include "buffers.h"
+#include "proto_cell.h"
+
+#include "connection_or.h"
+
+/** True iff the cell command <b>command</b> is one that implies a
+ * variable-length cell in Tor link protocol <b>linkproto</b>. */
+static inline int
+cell_command_is_var_length(uint8_t command, int linkproto)
+{
+ /* If linkproto is v2 (2), CELL_VERSIONS is the only variable-length cells
+ * work as implemented here. If it's 1, there are no variable-length cells.
+ * Tor does not support other versions right now, and so can't negotiate
+ * them.
+ */
+ switch (linkproto) {
+ case 1:
+ /* Link protocol version 1 has no variable-length cells. */
+ return 0;
+ case 2:
+ /* In link protocol version 2, VERSIONS is the only variable-length cell */
+ return command == CELL_VERSIONS;
+ case 0:
+ case 3:
+ default:
+ /* In link protocol version 3 and later, and in version "unknown",
+ * commands 128 and higher indicate variable-length. VERSIONS is
+ * grandfathered in. */
+ return command == CELL_VERSIONS || command >= 128;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Check <b>buf</b> for a variable-length cell according to the rules of link
+ * protocol version <b>linkproto</b>. If one is found, pull it off the buffer
+ * and assign a newly allocated var_cell_t to *<b>out</b>, and return 1.
+ * Return 0 if whatever is on the start of buf_t is not a variable-length
+ * cell. Return 1 and set *<b>out</b> to NULL if there seems to be the start
+ * of a variable-length cell on <b>buf</b>, but the whole thing isn't there
+ * yet. */
+int
+fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto)
+{
+ char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
+ var_cell_t *result;
+ uint8_t command;
+ uint16_t length;
+ const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS;
+ const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids);
+ const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids);
+ *out = NULL;
+ if (buf->datalen < header_len)
+ return 0;
+ peek_from_buf(hdr, header_len, buf);
+
+ command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len);
+ if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto)))
+ return 0;
+
+ length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1));
+ if (buf->datalen < (size_t)(header_len+length))
+ return 1;
+ result = var_cell_new(length);
+ result->command = command;
+ if (wide_circ_ids)
+ result->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr));
+ else
+ result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
+
+ buf_remove_from_front(buf, header_len);
+ peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf);
+ buf_remove_from_front(buf, length);
+
+ *out = result;
+ return 1;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_cell.h b/src/or/proto_cell.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91729a391
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_cell.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CELL_H
+#define TOR_PROTO_CELL_H
+
+struct buf_t;
+struct var_cell_t;
+
+int fetch_var_cell_from_buf(struct buf_t *buf, struct var_cell_t **out,
+ int linkproto);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.c b/src/or/proto_control0.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4c505fa6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_control0.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove.
+#include "or.h"
+#include "buffers.h"
+#include "proto_control0.h"
+
+/** Return 1 iff buf looks more like it has an (obsolete) v0 controller
+ * command on it than any valid v1 controller command. */
+int
+peek_buf_has_control0_command(buf_t *buf)
+{
+ if (buf->datalen >= 4) {
+ char header[4];
+ uint16_t cmd;
+ peek_from_buf(header, sizeof(header), buf);
+ cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(header+2));
+ if (cmd <= 0x14)
+ return 1; /* This is definitely not a v1 control command. */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_control0.h b/src/or/proto_control0.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6df6bebaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_control0.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H
+#define TOR_PROTO_CONTROL0_H
+
+struct buf_t;
+int peek_buf_has_control0_command(struct buf_t *buf);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.c b/src/or/proto_http.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ba3f93ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_http.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove.
+#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE
+#include "or.h"
+#include "buffers.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
+
+/** Return true if <b>cmd</b> looks like a HTTP (proxy) request. */
+int
+peek_buf_has_http_command(const buf_t *buf)
+{
+ if (peek_buf_startswith(buf, "CONNECT ") ||
+ peek_buf_startswith(buf, "DELETE ") ||
+ peek_buf_startswith(buf, "GET ") ||
+ peek_buf_startswith(buf, "POST ") ||
+ peek_buf_startswith(buf, "PUT " ))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** There is a (possibly incomplete) http statement on <b>buf</b>, of the
+ * form "\%s\\r\\n\\r\\n\%s", headers, body. (body may contain NULs.)
+ * If a) the headers include a Content-Length field and all bytes in
+ * the body are present, or b) there's no Content-Length field and
+ * all headers are present, then:
+ *
+ * - strdup headers into <b>*headers_out</b>, and NUL-terminate it.
+ * - memdup body into <b>*body_out</b>, and NUL-terminate it.
+ * - Then remove them from <b>buf</b>, and return 1.
+ *
+ * - If headers or body is NULL, discard that part of the buf.
+ * - If a headers or body doesn't fit in the arg, return -1.
+ * (We ensure that the headers or body don't exceed max len,
+ * _even if_ we're planning to discard them.)
+ * - If force_complete is true, then succeed even if not all of the
+ * content has arrived.
+ *
+ * Else, change nothing and return 0.
+ */
+int
+fetch_from_buf_http(buf_t *buf,
+ char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
+ char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
+ int force_complete)
+{
+ char *headers;
+ size_t headerlen, bodylen, contentlen=0;
+ int crlf_offset;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!buf->head)
+ return 0;
+
+ crlf_offset = buf_find_string_offset(buf, "\r\n\r\n", 4);
+ if (crlf_offset > (int)max_headerlen ||
+ (crlf_offset < 0 && buf->datalen > max_headerlen)) {
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers too long.");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (crlf_offset < 0) {
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headers not all here yet.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Okay, we have a full header. Make sure it all appears in the first
+ * chunk. */
+ if ((int)buf->head->datalen < crlf_offset + 4)
+ buf_pullup(buf, crlf_offset+4);
+ headerlen = crlf_offset + 4;
+
+ headers = buf->head->data;
+ bodylen = buf->datalen - headerlen;
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d, bodylen %d.", (int)headerlen, (int)bodylen);
+
+ if (max_headerlen <= headerlen) {
+ log_warn(LD_HTTP,"headerlen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
+ (int)headerlen, (int)max_headerlen-1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (max_bodylen <= bodylen) {
+ log_warn(LD_HTTP,"bodylen %d larger than %d. Failing.",
+ (int)bodylen, (int)max_bodylen-1);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ r = buf_http_find_content_length(headers, headerlen, &contentlen);
+ if (r == -1) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Content-Length is bogus; maybe "
+ "someone is trying to crash us.");
+ return -1;
+ } else if (r == 1) {
+ /* if content-length is malformed, then our body length is 0. fine. */
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"Got a contentlen of %d.",(int)contentlen);
+ if (bodylen < contentlen) {
+ if (!force_complete) {
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"body not all here yet.");
+ return 0; /* not all there yet */
+ }
+ }
+ if (bodylen > contentlen) {
+ bodylen = contentlen;
+ log_debug(LD_HTTP,"bodylen reduced to %d.",(int)bodylen);
+ }
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(r == 0);
+ /* Leave bodylen alone */
+ }
+
+ /* all happy. copy into the appropriate places, and return 1 */
+ if (headers_out) {
+ *headers_out = tor_malloc(headerlen+1);
+ fetch_from_buf(*headers_out, headerlen, buf);
+ (*headers_out)[headerlen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
+ }
+ if (body_out) {
+ tor_assert(body_used);
+ *body_used = bodylen;
+ *body_out = tor_malloc(bodylen+1);
+ fetch_from_buf(*body_out, bodylen, buf);
+ (*body_out)[bodylen] = 0; /* NUL terminate it */
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Scan the HTTP headers in the <b>headerlen</b>-byte memory range at
+ * <b>headers</b>, looking for a "Content-Length" header. Try to set
+ * *<b>result_out</b> to the numeric value of that header if possible.
+ * Return -1 if the header was malformed, 0 if it was missing, and 1 if
+ * it was present and well-formed.
+ */
+STATIC int
+buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen,
+ size_t *result_out)
+{
+ const char *p, *newline;
+ char *len_str, *eos=NULL;
+ size_t remaining, result;
+ int ok;
+ *result_out = 0; /* The caller shouldn't look at this unless the
+ * return value is 1, but let's prevent confusion */
+
+#define CONTENT_LENGTH "\r\nContent-Length: "
+ p = (char*) tor_memstr(headers, headerlen, CONTENT_LENGTH);
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ tor_assert(p >= headers && p < headers+headerlen);
+ remaining = (headers+headerlen)-p;
+ p += strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
+ remaining -= strlen(CONTENT_LENGTH);
+
+ newline = memchr(p, '\n', remaining);
+ if (newline == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ len_str = tor_memdup_nulterm(p, newline-p);
+ /* We limit the size to INT_MAX because other parts of the buffer.c
+ * code don't like buffers to be any bigger than that. */
+ result = (size_t) tor_parse_uint64(len_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ok, &eos);
+ if (eos && !tor_strisspace(eos)) {
+ ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ *result_out = result;
+ }
+ tor_free(len_str);
+
+ return ok ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_http.h b/src/or/proto_http.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbff823cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_http.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H
+#define TOR_PROTO_HTTP_H
+
+struct buf_t;
+
+int fetch_from_buf_http(struct buf_t *buf,
+ char **headers_out, size_t max_headerlen,
+ char **body_out, size_t *body_used, size_t max_bodylen,
+ int force_complete);
+int peek_buf_has_http_command(const struct buf_t *buf);
+
+#ifdef PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE
+STATIC int buf_http_find_content_length(const char *headers, size_t headerlen,
+ size_t *result_out);
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.c b/src/or/proto_socks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..20804455c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_socks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,723 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE // XXXX remove.
+#include "or.h"
+#include "addressmap.h"
+#include "buffers.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "ext_orport.h"
+#include "proto_socks.h"
+#include "reasons.h"
+
+static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req,
+ socks5_reply_status_t reason);
+
+static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
+ int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out,
+ size_t *want_length_out);
+static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+ int state, char **reason,
+ ssize_t *drain_out);
+/**
+ * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely
+ * again. */
+#define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5
+
+/** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using
+ * protocol <b>socks_protocol</b> on port <b>port</b>. Don't warn more than
+ * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless <b>safe_socks</b> is set. */
+static void
+log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address,
+ uint16_t port, int safe_socks)
+{
+ static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL);
+
+ if (safe_socks) {
+ log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
+ "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving "
+ "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves "
+ "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A "
+ "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, "
+ "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/"
+ "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s",
+ socks_protocol,
+ (int)port,
+ safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : "");
+ }
+ control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN,
+ "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d",
+ socks_protocol, address, (int)port);
+}
+
+/** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is
+ * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */
+#define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512
+
+/** Return a new socks_request_t. */
+socks_request_t *
+socks_request_new(void)
+{
+ return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t));
+}
+
+/** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t <b>req</b>. */
+void
+socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req)
+{
+ if (!req)
+ return;
+ if (req->username) {
+ memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen);
+ tor_free(req->username);
+ }
+ if (req->password) {
+ memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen);
+ tor_free(req->password);
+ }
+ memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t));
+ tor_free(req);
+}
+
+/** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on <b>buf</b>, of one
+ * of the forms
+ * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0"
+ * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0"
+ * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods"
+ * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..."
+ * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in
+ * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf,
+ * assign to <b>req</b>, and return 1.
+ *
+ * If it's invalid or too big, return -1.
+ *
+ * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0.
+ *
+ * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into <b>req->reply</b>
+ * and set <b>req->replylen</b>, else leave <b>req->replylen</b> alone.
+ *
+ * If <b>log_sockstype</b> is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether
+ * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not.
+ *
+ * If <b>safe_socks</b> is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols.
+ *
+ * If returning 0 or -1, <b>req->address</b> and <b>req->port</b> are
+ * undefined.
+ */
+int
+fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req,
+ int log_sockstype, int safe_socks)
+{
+ int res;
+ ssize_t n_drain;
+ size_t want_length = 128;
+
+ if (buf->datalen < 2) /* version and another byte */
+ return 0;
+
+ do {
+ n_drain = 0;
+ buf_pullup(buf, want_length);
+ tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2);
+ want_length = 0;
+
+ res = parse_socks(buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen, req, log_sockstype,
+ safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length);
+
+ if (n_drain < 0)
+ buf_clear(buf);
+ else if (n_drain > 0)
+ buf_remove_from_front(buf, n_drain);
+
+ } while (res == 0 && buf->head && want_length < buf->datalen &&
+ buf->datalen >= 2);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+/** The size of the header of an Extended ORPort message: 2 bytes for
+ * COMMAND, 2 bytes for BODYLEN */
+#define EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE 4
+
+/** Read <b>buf</b>, which should contain an Extended ORPort message
+ * from a transport proxy. If well-formed, create and populate
+ * <b>out</b> with the Extended ORport message. Return 0 if the
+ * buffer was incomplete, 1 if it was well-formed and -1 if we
+ * encountered an error while parsing it. */
+int
+fetch_ext_or_command_from_buf(buf_t *buf, ext_or_cmd_t **out)
+{
+ char hdr[EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE];
+ uint16_t len;
+
+ if (buf->datalen < EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+ peek_from_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), buf);
+ len = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr+2));
+ if (buf->datalen < (unsigned)len + EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+ *out = ext_or_cmd_new(len);
+ (*out)->cmd = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
+ (*out)->len = len;
+ buf_remove_from_front(buf, EXT_OR_CMD_HEADER_SIZE);
+ fetch_from_buf((*out)->body, len, buf);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with <b>reason</b> in its REP field and
+ * have Tor send it as error response to <b>req</b>.
+ */
+static void
+socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req,
+ socks5_reply_status_t reason)
+{
+ req->replylen = 10;
+ memset(req->reply,0,10);
+
+ req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field.
+ req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field.
+ req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field.
+}
+
+static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] =
+ "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n"
+ "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n"
+ "<html>\n"
+ "<head>\n"
+ "<title>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</title>\n"
+ "</head>\n"
+ "<body>\n"
+ "<h1>Tor is not an HTTP Proxy</h1>\n"
+ "<p>\n"
+ "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as "
+ "an HTTP proxy.\n\n"
+ "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n"
+ "Please configure your client accordingly.\n"
+ "</p>\n"
+ "<p>\n"
+ "See <a href=\"https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html\">"
+ "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html</a> for more "
+ "information.\n"
+ "<!-- Plus this comment, to make the body response more than 512 bytes, so "
+ " IE will be willing to display it. Comment comment comment comment "
+ " comment comment comment comment comment comment comment comment.-->\n"
+ "</p>\n"
+ "</body>\n"
+ "</html>\n";
+
+/** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking
+ * at a buffer's contents, we look at the <b>datalen</b> bytes of data in
+ * <b>data</b>. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set
+ * <b>drain_out</b> to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the
+ * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first
+ * chunk of the buffer, we set *<b>want_length_out</b> to the number of bytes
+ * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */
+static int
+parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req,
+ int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out,
+ size_t *want_length_out)
+{
+ unsigned int len;
+ char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1];
+ tor_addr_t destaddr;
+ uint32_t destip;
+ uint8_t socksver;
+ char *next, *startaddr;
+ unsigned char usernamelen, passlen;
+ struct in_addr in;
+
+ if (datalen < 2) {
+ /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */
+ *want_length_out = 2;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) {
+ /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should
+ also check whether we actually negotiated username/password
+ authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication
+ even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */
+ if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */
+ /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1
+ usernamelen [1 byte]
+ username [usernamelen bytes]
+ passlen [1 byte]
+ password [passlen bytes] */
+ usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1);
+ if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) {
+ *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen);
+ if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) {
+ *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
+ req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */
+ req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */
+ log_debug(LD_APP,
+ "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking.");
+ if (usernamelen) {
+ req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen);
+ req->usernamelen = usernamelen;
+ }
+ if (passlen) {
+ req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen);
+ req->passwordlen = passlen;
+ }
+ *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen;
+ req->got_auth = 1;
+ *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */
+ return 0;
+ } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) {
+ /* unknown version byte */
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; "
+ "rejecting.", (int)*data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ socksver = *data;
+
+ switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */
+ case 5: /* socks5 */
+
+ if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */
+ unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1);
+ int have_user_pass, have_no_auth;
+ int r=0;
+ tor_assert(!req->socks_version);
+ if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) {
+ *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!nummethods)
+ return -1;
+ req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */
+ req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */
+ have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL);
+ have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL);
+ if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) {
+ req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS;
+ req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass"
+ auth method */
+ req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)");
+ r=0;
+ } else if (have_no_auth) {
+ req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth
+ method */
+ req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)");
+ r=0;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or "
+ "username/password. Rejecting.");
+ req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */
+ r=-1;
+ }
+ /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra
+ * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */
+ *drain_out = 2u + nummethods;
+
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* we know the method; read in the request */
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request");
+ if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */
+ *want_length_out = 7;
+ return 0; /* not yet */
+ }
+ req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1);
+ if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
+ req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE &&
+ req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
+ /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
+ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
+ req->command);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */
+ case 1: /* IPv4 address */
+ case 4: /* IPv6 address */ {
+ const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4;
+ const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4;
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type");
+ if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */
+ *want_length_out = 6+addrlen;
+ return 0; /* not yet */
+ }
+
+ if (is_v6)
+ tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4);
+ else
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4));
+
+ tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1);
+
+ if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. "
+ "Rejecting.",
+ (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address));
+ req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen));
+ *drain_out = 6+addrlen;
+ if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR &&
+ !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) {
+ log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks);
+ if (safe_socks) {
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ case 3: /* fqdn */
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type");
+ if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) {
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,
+ SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with "
+ "hostname type. Rejecting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ len = (unsigned char)*(data+4);
+ if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */
+ *want_length_out = 7+len;
+ return 0; /* not yet */
+ }
+ if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in "
+ "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(req->address,data+5,len);
+ req->address[len] = 0;
+ req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len));
+ *drain_out = 5+len+2;
+
+ if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR);
+
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor "
+ "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
+ req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (log_sockstype)
+ log_notice(LD_APP,
+ "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed "
+ "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
+ "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
+ return 1;
+ default: /* unsupported */
+ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,
+ SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.",
+ (int) *(data+3));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ tor_assert(0);
+ break;
+ case 4: { /* socks4 */
+ enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a;
+ const char *authstart, *authend;
+ /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */
+ /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */
+
+ req->socks_version = 4;
+ if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */
+ *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
+ return 0; /* not yet */
+ }
+ // buf_pullup(buf, 1280);
+ req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1);
+ if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
+ req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
+ /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with
+ * socks4.) */
+ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.",
+ req->command);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2));
+ destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4));
+ if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (destip >> 8) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x.");
+ in.s_addr = htonl(destip);
+ tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
+ if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.",
+ (int)strlen(tmpbuf));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_APP,
+ "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)",
+ safe_str_client(tmpbuf));
+ socks4_prot = socks4;
+ }
+
+ authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN;
+ next = memchr(authstart, 0,
+ datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN);
+ if (!next) {
+ if (datalen >= 1024) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet.");
+ *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ authend = next;
+ tor_assert(next < data+datalen);
+
+ startaddr = NULL;
+ if (socks4_prot != socks4a &&
+ !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) {
+ log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks);
+
+ if (safe_socks)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (socks4_prot == socks4a) {
+ if (next+1 == data+datalen) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet.");
+ *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ startaddr = next+1;
+ next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr);
+ if (!next) {
+ if (datalen >= 1024) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet.");
+ *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) {
+ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf->datalen);
+
+ if (log_sockstype)
+ log_notice(LD_APP,
+ "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed "
+ "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if "
+ "necessary. This is good.", req->port);
+ }
+ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success.");
+ strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf,
+ sizeof(req->address));
+ if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) {
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor "
+ "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.",
+ req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (authend != authstart) {
+ req->got_auth = 1;
+ req->usernamelen = authend - authstart;
+ req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart);
+ }
+ /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */
+ *drain_out = next - data + 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ case 'G': /* get */
+ case 'H': /* head */
+ case 'P': /* put/post */
+ case 'C': /* connect */
+ strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG,
+ MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN);
+ req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1;
+ /* fall through */
+ default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */
+ log_warn(LD_APP,
+ "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)",
+ *(data));
+ {
+ /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */
+ char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8);
+ control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN,
+ "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"",
+ escaped(tmp));
+ tor_free(tmp);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in <b>buf</b> according
+ * to <b>state</b>, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on
+ * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case
+ * <b>reason</b> is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished
+ * with it).
+ *
+ * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required
+ * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured.
+ */
+int
+fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason)
+{
+ ssize_t drain = 0;
+ int r;
+ if (buf->datalen < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN);
+ tor_assert(buf->head && buf->head->datalen >= 2);
+
+ r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)buf->head->data, buf->head->datalen,
+ state, reason, &drain);
+ if (drain > 0)
+ buf_remove_from_front(buf, drain);
+ else if (drain < 0)
+ buf_clear(buf);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */
+static int
+parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+ int state, char **reason,
+ ssize_t *drain_out)
+{
+ unsigned int addrlen;
+ *drain_out = 0;
+ if (datalen < 2)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (state) {
+ case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK:
+ /* Wait for the complete response */
+ if (datalen < 8)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (data[1] != 0x5a) {
+ *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1]));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Success */
+ *drain_out = 8;
+ return 1;
+
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE:
+ /* we don't have any credentials */
+ if (data[1] != 0x00) {
+ *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our "
+ "available authentication methods");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication");
+ *drain_out = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929:
+ /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without
+ * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */
+ switch (data[1]) {
+ case 0x00:
+ log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server "
+ "doesn't require authentication.");
+ *drain_out = -1;
+ return 1;
+ case 0x02:
+ log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication.");
+ *drain_out = -1;
+ return 2;
+ /* fall through */
+ }
+
+ *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available "
+ "authentication methods");
+ return -1;
+
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK:
+ /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */
+ if (data[1] != 0x00) {
+ *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful.");
+ *drain_out = -1;
+ return 1;
+
+ case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK:
+ /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed
+ * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all
+ * the data used */
+
+ /* wait for address type field to arrive */
+ if (datalen < 4)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (data[3]) {
+ case 0x01: /* ip4 */
+ addrlen = 4;
+ break;
+ case 0x04: /* ip6 */
+ addrlen = 16;
+ break;
+ case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */
+ if (datalen < 5)
+ return 0;
+ addrlen = 1 + data[4];
+ break;
+ default:
+ *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* wait for address and port */
+ if (datalen < 6 + addrlen)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (data[1] != 0x00) {
+ *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1]));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *drain_out = 6 + addrlen;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* shouldn't get here... */
+ tor_assert(0);
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/or/proto_socks.h b/src/or/proto_socks.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a2477319
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/or/proto_socks.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#ifndef TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H
+#define TOR_PROTO_SOCKS_H
+
+struct socks_request_t;
+struct buf_t;
+
+struct socks_request_t *socks_request_new(void);
+void socks_request_free(struct socks_request_t *req);
+int fetch_from_buf_socks(struct buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req,
+ int log_sockstype, int safe_socks);
+int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason);
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/test/test_buffers.c b/src/test/test_buffers.c
index a85fb95f0..3eb4ac2a3 100644
--- a/src/test/test_buffers.c
+++ b/src/test/test_buffers.c
@@ -4,9 +4,14 @@
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#define BUFFERS_PRIVATE
+#define PROTO_HTTP_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
#include "buffers.h"
#include "ext_orport.h"
+#include "proto_cell.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
+#include "proto_control0.h"
+#include "proto_socks.h"
#include "test.h"
/** Run unit tests for buffers.c */
diff --git a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c
index 75fe6249a..c4c74df66 100644
--- a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c
+++ b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include "entrynodes.h"
#include "routerparse.h"
#include "networkstatus.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
#include "geoip.h"
#include "dirserv.h"
#include "dirvote.h"
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
index cbd88acff..950c0483d 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_cache.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "rendcache.h"
#include "directory.h"
#include "connection.h"
+#include "proto_http.h"
#include "hs_test_helpers.h"
#include "test_helpers.h"
diff --git a/src/test/test_socks.c b/src/test/test_socks.c
index 7c0960f0f..571f45735 100644
--- a/src/test/test_socks.c
+++ b/src/test/test_socks.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include "or.h"
#include "buffers.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "proto_socks.h"
#include "test.h"
typedef struct socks_test_data_t {
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