[tor-commits] [tor/master] prop224: Prepare for superencrypted HS descriptors.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Mon Mar 13 20:21:27 UTC 2017
commit bb602f61972874aa03181ede877ee8e85ce0389d
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net>
Date: Wed Feb 8 14:16:20 2017 +0200
prop224: Prepare for superencrypted HS descriptors.
- Refactor our HS desc crypto funcs to be able to differentiate between
the superencrypted layer and the encrypted layer so that different
crypto constants and padding is used in each layer.
- Introduce some string constants.
- Add some comments.
---
src/or/hs_descriptor.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 91 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
index cb3e934..3b9ee8a 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_descriptor.c
@@ -4,6 +4,52 @@
/**
* \file hs_descriptor.c
* \brief Handle hidden service descriptor encoding/decoding.
+ *
+ * \details
+ * Here is a graphical depiction of an HS descriptor and its layers:
+ *
+ * +------------------------------------------------------+
+ * |DESCRIPTOR HEADER: |
+ * | hs-descriptor 3 |
+ * | descriptor-lifetime 180 |
+ * | ... |
+ * | superencrypted |
+ * |+---------------------------------------------------+ |
+ * ||SUPERENCRYPTED LAYER (aka OUTER ENCRYPTED LAYER): | |
+ * || desc-auth-type x25519 | |
+ * || desc-auth-ephemeral-key | |
+ * || auth-client | |
+ * || auth-client | |
+ * || ... | |
+ * || encrypted | |
+ * ||+-------------------------------------------------+| |
+ * |||ENCRYPTED LAYER (aka INNER ENCRYPTED LAYER): || |
+ * ||| create2-formats || |
+ * ||| intro-auth-required || |
+ * ||| introduction-point || |
+ * ||| introduction-point || |
+ * ||| ... || |
+ * ||+-------------------------------------------------+| |
+ * |+---------------------------------------------------+ |
+ * +------------------------------------------------------+
+ *
+ * The DESCRIPTOR HEADER section is completely unencrypted and contains generic
+ * descriptor metadata.
+ *
+ * The SUPERENCRYPTED LAYER section is the first layer of encryption, and it's
+ * encrypted using the blinded public key of the hidden service to protect
+ * against entities who don't know its onion address. The clients of the hidden
+ * service know its onion address and blinded public key, whereas third-parties
+ * (like HSDirs) don't know it (except if it's a public hidden service).
+ *
+ * The ENCRYPTED LAYER section is the second layer of encryption, and it's
+ * encrypted using the client authorization key material (if those exist). When
+ * client authorization is enabled, this second layer of encryption protects
+ * the descriptor content from unauthorized entities. If client authorization
+ * is disabled, this second layer of encryption does not provide any extra
+ * security but is still present. The plaintext of this layer contains all the
+ * information required to connect to the hidden service like its list of
+ * introduction points.
**/
/* For unit tests.*/
@@ -23,6 +69,7 @@
#define str_desc_cert "descriptor-signing-key-cert"
#define str_rev_counter "revision-counter"
#define str_superencrypted "superencrypted"
+#define str_encrypted "encrypted"
#define str_signature "signature"
#define str_lifetime "descriptor-lifetime"
/* Constant string value for the encrypted part of the descriptor. */
@@ -36,9 +83,14 @@
#define str_intro_point_start "\n" str_intro_point " "
/* Constant string value for the construction to encrypt the encrypted data
* section. */
-#define str_enc_hsdir_data "hsdir-superencrypted-data"
+#define str_enc_const_superencryption "hsdir-superencrypted-data"
+#define str_enc_const_encryption "hsdir-encrypted-data"
/* Prefix required to compute/verify HS desc signatures */
#define str_desc_sig_prefix "Tor onion service descriptor sig v3"
+#define str_desc_auth_type "desc-auth-type"
+#define str_desc_auth_key "desc-auth-ephemeral-key"
+#define str_desc_auth_client "auth-client"
+#define str_encrypted "encrypted"
/* Authentication supported types. */
static const struct {
@@ -393,7 +445,8 @@ build_secret_input(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, uint8_t *dst, size_t dstlen)
static void
build_kdf_key(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
- uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len)
+ uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len,
+ int is_superencrypted_layer)
{
uint8_t secret_input[HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_INPUT_LEN];
crypto_xof_t *xof;
@@ -409,8 +462,16 @@ build_kdf_key(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
/* Feed our KDF. [SHAKE it like a polaroid picture --Yawning]. */
crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, secret_input, sizeof(secret_input));
crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, salt, salt_len);
- crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, (const uint8_t *) str_enc_hsdir_data,
- strlen(str_enc_hsdir_data));
+
+ /* Feed in the right string constant based on the desc layer */
+ if (is_superencrypted_layer) {
+ crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, (const uint8_t *) str_enc_const_superencryption,
+ strlen(str_enc_const_superencryption));
+ } else {
+ crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, (const uint8_t *) str_enc_const_encryption,
+ strlen(str_enc_const_encryption));
+ }
+
/* Eat from our KDF. */
crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, key_out, key_out_len);
crypto_xof_free(xof);
@@ -425,7 +486,8 @@ build_secret_key_iv_mac(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_len,
uint8_t *iv_out, size_t iv_len,
- uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_len)
+ uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_len,
+ int is_superencrypted_layer)
{
size_t offset = 0;
uint8_t kdf_key[HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_KDF_OUTPUT_LEN];
@@ -436,7 +498,8 @@ build_secret_key_iv_mac(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
tor_assert(iv_out);
tor_assert(mac_out);
- build_kdf_key(desc, salt, salt_len, kdf_key, sizeof(kdf_key));
+ build_kdf_key(desc, salt, salt_len, kdf_key, sizeof(kdf_key),
+ is_superencrypted_layer);
/* Copy the bytes we need for both the secret key and IV. */
memcpy(key_out, kdf_key, key_len);
offset += key_len;
@@ -529,7 +592,8 @@ build_plaintext_padding(const char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
* data. Return size of the encrypted data buffer. */
static size_t
build_encrypted(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, const char *plaintext,
- size_t plaintext_len, uint8_t **encrypted_out)
+ size_t plaintext_len, uint8_t **encrypted_out,
+ int is_superencrypted_layer)
{
size_t encrypted_len;
uint8_t *padded_plaintext, *encrypted;
@@ -540,15 +604,21 @@ build_encrypted(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, const char *plaintext,
tor_assert(plaintext);
tor_assert(encrypted_out);
+ /* If we are encrypting the middle layer of the descriptor, we need to first
+ pad the plaintext */
+ if (is_superencrypted_layer) {
+ encrypted_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len,
+ &padded_plaintext);
+ /* Extra precautions that we have a valid padding length. */
+ tor_assert(!(encrypted_len % HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE));
+ } else { /* No padding required for inner layers */
+ padded_plaintext = tor_memdup(plaintext, plaintext_len);
+ encrypted_len = plaintext_len;
+ }
+
/* This creates a cipher for AES. It can't fail. */
cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_iv_and_bits(key, iv,
HS_DESC_ENCRYPTED_BIT_SIZE);
- /* This can't fail. */
- encrypted_len = build_plaintext_padding(plaintext, plaintext_len,
- &padded_plaintext);
- /* Extra precautions that we have a valie padding length. */
- tor_assert(encrypted_len <= HS_DESC_PADDED_PLAINTEXT_MAX_LEN);
- tor_assert(!(encrypted_len % HS_DESC_PLAINTEXT_PADDING_MULTIPLE));
/* We use a stream cipher so the encrypted length will be the same as the
* plaintext padded length. */
encrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_len);
@@ -562,12 +632,13 @@ build_encrypted(const uint8_t *key, const uint8_t *iv, const char *plaintext,
return encrypted_len;
}
-/* Encrypt the given plaintext buffer and using the descriptor to get the
+/* Encrypt the given <b>plaintext</b> buffer using <b>desc</b> to get the
* keys. Set encrypted_out with the encrypted data and return the length of
- * it. */
+ * it. <b>is_superencrypted_layer</b> is set if this is the outer encrypted
+ * layer of the descriptor. */
static size_t
encrypt_descriptor_data(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *plaintext,
- char **encrypted_out)
+ char **encrypted_out, int is_superencrypted_layer)
{
char *final_blob;
size_t encrypted_len, final_blob_len, offset = 0;
@@ -588,11 +659,13 @@ encrypt_descriptor_data(const hs_descriptor_t *desc, const char *plaintext,
build_secret_key_iv_mac(desc, salt, sizeof(salt),
secret_key, sizeof(secret_key),
secret_iv, sizeof(secret_iv),
- mac_key, sizeof(mac_key));
+ mac_key, sizeof(mac_key),
+ is_superencrypted_layer);
/* Build the encrypted part that is do the actual encryption. */
encrypted_len = build_encrypted(secret_key, secret_iv, plaintext,
- strlen(plaintext), &encrypted);
+ strlen(plaintext), &encrypted,
+ is_superencrypted_layer);
memwipe(secret_key, 0, sizeof(secret_key));
memwipe(secret_iv, 0, sizeof(secret_iv));
/* This construction is specified in section 2.5 of proposal 224. */
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