[tor-commits] [tor/master] Refactor circuit_init_cpath_crypto() to do prop224 rend circuits.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Jul 7 15:19:28 UTC 2017
commit 83249015c2741be55cf3d084660e6209323b5a1a
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net>
Date: Tue May 2 16:19:12 2017 +0300
Refactor circuit_init_cpath_crypto() to do prop224 rend circuits.
circuit_init_cpath_crypto() is responsible for creating the cpath of legacy
SHA1/AES128 circuits currently. We want to use it for prop224 circuits, so we
refactor it to create circuits with SHA3-256 and AES256 as well.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet at torproject.org>
---
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/or/circuitbuild.h | 2 +-
src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendservice.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 240c64b..ec7ca2c 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1325,9 +1325,14 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
return 0;
}
-/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
- * key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
- * used as follows:
+/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in key_data.
+ *
+ * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is set, this cpath will be used for next gen hidden
+ * service circuits and <b>key_data</b> must be at least
+ * HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN bytes in length.
+ *
+ * If <b>is_hs_v3</b> is not set, key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL
+ * bytes, which are used as follows:
* - 20 to initialize f_digest
* - 20 to initialize b_digest
* - 16 to key f_crypto
@@ -1337,28 +1342,49 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
*/
int
circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
- int reverse)
+ int reverse, int is_hs_v3)
{
crypto_digest_t *tmp_digest;
crypto_cipher_t *tmp_crypto;
+ size_t digest_len = 0;
+ size_t cipher_key_len = 0;
tor_assert(cpath);
tor_assert(key_data);
tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
- cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest_new();
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
- cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest_new();
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* If we are using this cpath for next gen onion services use SHA3-256,
+ otherwise use good ol' SHA1 */
+ if (is_hs_v3) {
+ digest_len = DIGEST256_LEN;
+ cipher_key_len = CIPHER256_KEY_LEN;
+ cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
+ } else {
+ digest_len = DIGEST_LEN;
+ cipher_key_len = CIPHER_KEY_LEN;
+ cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest_new();
+ cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest_new();
+ }
- if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
- crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)))) {
+ tor_assert(digest_len != 0);
+ tor_assert(cipher_key_len != 0);
+
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, digest_len);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+digest_len, digest_len);
+
+ cpath->f_crypto = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits(key_data+(2*digest_len),
+ cipher_key_len*8);
+ if (!cpath->f_crypto) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Forward cipher initialization failed.");
return -1;
}
- if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
- crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN))) {
+
+ cpath->b_crypto = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits(
+ key_data+(2*digest_len)+cipher_key_len,
+ cipher_key_len*8);
+ if (!cpath->b_crypto) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Backward cipher initialization failed.");
return -1;
}
@@ -1424,7 +1450,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,
onion_handshake_state_release(&hop->handshake_state);
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0, 0)<0) {
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
@@ -1512,7 +1538,7 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
(unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
(unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
return -1;
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
index 45d9b2f..ae6864e 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.h
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed);
int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ);
int circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
- int reverse);
+ int reverse, int is_hs_v3);
struct created_cell_t;
int circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,
const struct created_cell_t *created_cell);
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 9bc2d62..3cf67b5 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -1184,7 +1184,7 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
goto err;
}
/* ... and set up cpath. */
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys+DIGEST_LEN, 0)<0)
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys+DIGEST_LEN, 0, 0)<0)
goto err;
/* Check whether the digest is right... */
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index f3b78c4..d389a87 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -2195,7 +2195,7 @@ rend_service_receive_introduction(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = dh;
dh = NULL;
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1, 0)<0)
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->rend_circ_nonce, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
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