[tor-commits] [tor/master] Refactor ...compute_authenticate_cell_body() to return a var_cell_t.

nickm at torproject.org nickm at torproject.org
Thu Nov 3 13:18:59 UTC 2016


commit 4ef42e7c529a95b69d3e830e115e5d0453d38dfb
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date:   Tue May 19 13:10:01 2015 -0400

    Refactor ...compute_authenticate_cell_body() to return a var_cell_t.
    
    This means we don't need to precompute the length.
    
    Helps simplify the implementation of 19156.
---
 src/or/channeltls.c    | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++-------
 src/or/connection_or.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 src/or/connection_or.h |  3 +--
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c
index 8009c0b..9e92aad 100644
--- a/src/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/or/channeltls.c
@@ -2112,9 +2112,11 @@ channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 STATIC void
 channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
 {
-  uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN+256];
+  var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL;
   const uint8_t *auth;
   int authlen;
+  const int authtype = 1; /* XXXX extend this */
+  int bodylen;
 
   tor_assert(cell);
   tor_assert(chan);
@@ -2127,6 +2129,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
            safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address),                 \
            chan->conn->base_.port, (s));                        \
     connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0);               \
+    var_cell_free(expected_cell);                               \
     return;                                                     \
   } while (0)
 
@@ -2158,7 +2161,7 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
     if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
       ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
 
-    if (type != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
+    if (type != authtype)
       ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
 
     auth += 4;
@@ -2168,14 +2171,26 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
   if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
     ERR("Authenticator was too short");
 
-  ssize_t bodylen =
-    connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
-                chan->conn, expected, sizeof(expected),
-                AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, NULL, NULL, 1);
-  if (bodylen < 0 || bodylen != V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN)
+  expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
+                chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1);
+  if (! expected_cell)
     ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
 
-  if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, bodylen))
+  if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET ||
+      authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) {
+    bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN;
+  } else {
+    bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN; /* XXXX  DOCDOC */
+  }
+  if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) {
+    ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected.");
+  }
+
+  /* Length of random part. */
+  if (bodylen < 24)
+    ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible");
+
+  if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24))
     ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
 
   {
@@ -2246,6 +2261,8 @@ channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
              chan->conn->base_.port);
   }
 
+  var_cell_free(expected_cell);
+
 #undef ERR
 }
 
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index fed933b..ed91595 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -2292,8 +2292,8 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 }
 
 /** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
- * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>.  Write it to the
- * <b>outlen</b>-byte buffer at <b>out</b>.
+ * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>.  Return it
+ * in a var_cell_t.
  *
  * If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
  * V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
@@ -2309,9 +2309,8 @@ connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
  *
  * Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
  */
-int
+var_cell_t *
 connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
-                                             uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
                                              const int authtype,
                                              crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
                                              ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
@@ -2319,7 +2318,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
 {
   auth1_t *auth = NULL;
   auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
-  int result;
+  var_cell_t *result = NULL;
   int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
   const char *authtype_str = NULL;
 
@@ -2444,7 +2443,22 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
    * checks it.  That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
   crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
 
+  ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
+  if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
+    maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
+  } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
+    maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
+  }
+
+  const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
+  result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
+  uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+  const size_t outlen = maxlen;
   ssize_t len;
+
+  result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
+  set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
+
   if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
     goto err;
@@ -2457,7 +2471,8 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
       log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data.");
       goto err;
     }
-    result = (int) (tmp->end_of_fixed_part - out);
+    result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
+    
     auth1_free(tmp);
     if (len2 != len) {
       log_warn(LD_OR, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
@@ -2488,7 +2503,6 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
     }
 
     auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
-
   }
 
   len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
@@ -2496,12 +2510,15 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
     log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
     goto err;
   }
+  tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
+  result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
+  set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
 
-  result = (int) len;
   goto done;
 
  err:
-  result = -1;
+  var_cell_free(result);
+  result = NULL;
  done:
   auth1_free(auth);
   auth_ctx_free(ctx);
@@ -2515,8 +2532,6 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
 {
   var_cell_t *cell;
   crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
-  int authlen;
-  size_t cell_maxlen;
   /* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
 
   if (!pk) {
@@ -2529,33 +2544,15 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
     return -1;
   }
 
-  /* XXXX stop precomputing this. */
-  cell_maxlen = 4 + /* overhead */
-    V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + /* Authentication body */
-    crypto_pk_keysize(pk) + /* Max signature length */
-    16 /* add a few extra bytes just in case. */;
-
-  cell = var_cell_new(cell_maxlen);
-  cell->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
-  set_uint16(cell->payload, htons(AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET));
-  /* skip over length ; we don't know that yet. */
-
-  authlen = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
-                                                         cell->payload+4,
-                                                         cell_maxlen-4,
+  cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
                                              AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET,
                                                          pk,
                                                          NULL,
                                                          0 /* not server */);
-  if (authlen < 0) {
+  if (! cell) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
-    var_cell_free(cell);
     return -1;
   }
-  tor_assert(authlen + 4 <= cell->payload_len);
-  set_uint16(cell->payload+2, htons(authlen));
-  cell->payload_len = authlen + 4;
-
   connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
   var_cell_free(cell);
 
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h
index 8373ed9..65a8ac1 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.h
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.h
@@ -84,8 +84,7 @@ int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus);
 MOCK_DECL(int,connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn));
 int connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
 int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
-int connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
-                                             uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
+var_cell_t *connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
                                              const int authtype,
                                              crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
                                              ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,





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