[tor-commits] [webwml/master] Adding 'IP hijacking' project idea

[atagar at torproject.org]

commit 66eb29a2b8bf349c69dbd33a59db2d99e89e8eea
Author: Damian Johnson <atagar at torproject.org>
Date:   Tue Mar 8 08:35:41 2016 -0800

    Adding 'IP hijacking' project idea
    
    Idea from Aaron, Donncha and Yawnbox. Aaron is the only person that spoke up
    volunteering to mentor but might be worth nudging the others if we get
    students.
---
 getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+)

diff --git a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
index 6748023..88b6e0d 100644
--- a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
+++ b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
@@ -1453,6 +1453,46 @@ implementation.
       </li>
     </ol>
     </li>
+
+    <a id="ipHijacking"></a>
+    <li>
+    <b>IP hijacking detection for the Tor Network</b>
+    <br>
+    Likely Mentors: <i>Aaron Gibson (aagbsn)</i>
+    <br><br>
+    <p>
+    <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_hijacking">IP hijacking</a>
+    occurs when a bad actor creates false routing information to redirect
+    Internet traffic to or through themselves. This activity is straightforward
+    to detect, because the Internet routing tables are public information, but
+    currently there are no public services that monitor the Tor network. The
+    Tor Network is a dynamic set of relays, so monitoring must be Tor-aware in
+    order to keep the set of monitored relays accurate. Additionally, consensus
+    archives and historical Internet routing table snapshots are publicly
+    available, and this analysis can be performed retroactively.
+    </p>
+
+    <p>
+    The implications of IP hijacking are that Tor traffic can be redirected
+    through a network that an attacker controls, even if the attacker does not
+    normally have this capability - i.e. they are not in the network path. For
+    example, an adversary could hijack the prefix of a Tor Guard relay, in
+    order to learn who its clients are, or hijack a Tor Exit relay to tamper
+    with requests or name resolution.
+    </p>
+
+    <p>
+    This project comprises building a service that compares network prefixes of
+    relays in the consensus with present and historic routing table snapshots
+    from looking glass services such as <a
+    href="http://routeviews.org">Routeviews</a>, or aggregators such as <a
+    href="https://bgpstream.caida.org">Caida BGPStream</a> and then issues
+    email alerts to the contact-info in the relay descriptor and a mailing
+    list. Network operators are responsive to route injections, and these
+    alerts can be used to notify network operators to take immediate action, as
+    well as collect information about the occurrence of these type of attacks.
+    </p>
+    </li>
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