[tor-commits] [tor/master] Have multiple guard contexts we can switch between.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Dec 16 16:26:18 UTC 2016
commit 404e9e5611eff39866c2e45133a60b40d7492f7e
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Nov 28 07:41:45 2016 -0500
Have multiple guard contexts we can switch between.
Currently, this code doesn't actually have the contexts behave
differently, (except for the legacy context), but it does switch
back and forth between them nicely.
---
src/or/config.c | 7 --
src/or/entrynodes.c | 270 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
src/or/entrynodes.h | 50 +++++++--
src/or/main.c | 7 +-
src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 59 +++++-----
5 files changed, 321 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index b7b5cff..22e5dfd 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -4536,13 +4536,6 @@ options_transition_allowed(const or_options_t *old,
return -1;
}
- if (old->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm !=
- new_val->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) {
- *msg = tor_strdup("While Tor is running, changing "
- "UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm is not allowed.");
- return -1;
- }
-
if (sandbox_is_active()) {
#define SB_NOCHANGE_STR(opt) \
do { \
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
index 6f6853e..59205a8 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -159,6 +159,10 @@ static void entry_guard_set_filtered_flags(const or_options_t *options,
entry_guard_t *guard);
static void pathbias_check_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
static void pathbias_check_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
+static int node_is_possible_guard(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *node);
+static int node_passes_guard_filter(const or_options_t *options,
+ guard_selection_t *gs,
+ const node_t *node);
/** Return 0 if we should apply guardfraction information found in the
* consensus. A specific consensus can be specified with the
@@ -186,12 +190,25 @@ should_apply_guardfraction(const networkstatus_t *ns)
* Allocate and return a new guard_selection_t, with the name <b>name</b>.
*/
STATIC guard_selection_t *
-guard_selection_new(const char *name)
+guard_selection_new(const char *name,
+ guard_selection_type_t type)
{
guard_selection_t *gs;
+ if (type == GS_TYPE_INFER) {
+ if (!strcmp(name, "legacy"))
+ type = GS_TYPE_LEGACY;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "bridges"))
+ type = GS_TYPE_BRIDGE;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "restricted"))
+ type = GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED;
+ else
+ type = GS_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ }
+
gs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*gs));
gs->name = tor_strdup(name);
+ gs->type = type;
gs->chosen_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
gs->sampled_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
gs->confirmed_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
@@ -206,7 +223,9 @@ guard_selection_new(const char *name)
* is none, and <b>create_if_absent</b> is false, then return NULL.
*/
STATIC guard_selection_t *
-get_guard_selection_by_name(const char *name, int create_if_absent)
+get_guard_selection_by_name(const char *name,
+ guard_selection_type_t type,
+ int create_if_absent)
{
if (!guard_contexts) {
guard_contexts = smartlist_new();
@@ -219,31 +238,42 @@ get_guard_selection_by_name(const char *name, int create_if_absent)
if (! create_if_absent)
return NULL;
- guard_selection_t *new_selection = guard_selection_new(name);
+ log_debug(LD_GUARD, "Creating a guard selection called %s", name);
+ guard_selection_t *new_selection = guard_selection_new(name, type);
smartlist_add(guard_contexts, new_selection);
- const char *default_name = get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm ?
- "legacy" : "default";
-
- if (!strcmp(name, default_name))
- curr_guard_context = new_selection;
-
return new_selection;
}
-/** Get current default guard_selection_t, creating it if necessary */
-guard_selection_t *
-get_guard_selection_info(void)
+/**
+ * Allocate the first guard context that we're planning to use,
+ * and make it the current context.
+ */
+static void
+create_initial_guard_context(void)
{
+ tor_assert(! curr_guard_context);
if (!guard_contexts) {
guard_contexts = smartlist_new();
}
+ guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
+ const char *name = choose_guard_selection(
+ get_options(),
+ networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),
+ NULL,
+ &type);
+ tor_assert(name); // "name" can only be NULL if we had an old name.
+ tor_assert(type != GS_TYPE_INFER);
+ log_notice(LD_GUARD, "Starting with guard context \"%s\"", name);
+ curr_guard_context = get_guard_selection_by_name_and_type(name, type);
+}
+/** Get current default guard_selection_t, creating it if necessary */
+guard_selection_t *
+get_guard_selection_info(void)
+{
if (!curr_guard_context) {
- const char *name = get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm ?
- "legacy" : "default";
- curr_guard_context = guard_selection_new(name);
- smartlist_add(guard_contexts, curr_guard_context);
+ create_initial_guard_context();
}
return curr_guard_context;
@@ -431,11 +461,185 @@ get_nonprimary_guard_idle_timeout(void)
{
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"guard-nonprimary-guard-idle-timeout",
- (10*60), 1, INT32_MAX);
+ DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT,
+ 1, INT32_MAX);
+}
+/**
+ * If our configuration retains fewer than this fraction of guards from the
+ * torrc, we are in a restricted setting.
+ */
+STATIC double
+get_meaningful_restriction_threshold(void)
+{
+ int32_t pct = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "guard-meaningful-restriction-percent",
+ DFLT_MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_PERCENT,
+ 1, INT32_MAX);
+ return pct / 100.0;
+}
+/**
+ * If our configuration retains fewer than this fraction of guards from the
+ * torrc, we are in an extremely restricted setting, and should warn.
+ */
+STATIC double
+get_extreme_restriction_threshold(void)
+{
+ int32_t pct = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "guard-extreme-restriction-percent",
+ DFLT_EXTREME_RESTRICTION_PERCENT,
+ 1, INT32_MAX);
+ return pct / 100.0;
}
/**@}*/
/**
+ * Given our options and our list of nodes, return the name of the
+ * guard selection that we should use. Return NULL for "use the
+ * same selection you were using before.
+ */
+STATIC const char *
+choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options,
+ const networkstatus_t *live_ns,
+ const char *old_selection,
+ guard_selection_type_t *type_out)
+{
+ tor_assert(options);
+ tor_assert(type_out);
+ if (options->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_LEGACY;
+ return "legacy";
+ }
+
+ if (options->UseBridges) {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_BRIDGE;
+ return "bridges";
+ }
+
+ if (! live_ns) {
+ /* without a networkstatus, we can't tell any more than that. */
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ return "default";
+ }
+
+ const smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
+ int n_guards = 0, n_passing_filter = 0;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
+ if (node_is_possible_guard(NULL, node)) {
+ ++n_guards;
+ if (node_passes_guard_filter(options, NULL, node)) {
+ ++n_passing_filter;
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+
+ /* XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- separate 'high' and 'low' thresholds
+ * to prevent flapping */
+ const int meaningful_threshold_high =
+ (int)(n_guards * get_meaningful_restriction_threshold() * 1.05);
+ const int meaningful_threshold_mid =
+ (int)(n_guards * get_meaningful_restriction_threshold());
+ const int meaningful_threshold_low =
+ (int)(n_guards * get_meaningful_restriction_threshold() * .95);
+ const int extreme_threshold =
+ (int)(n_guards * get_extreme_restriction_threshold());
+
+ /*
+ If we have no previous selection, then we're "restricted" iff we are
+ below the meaningful restriction threshold. That's easy enough.
+
+ But if we _do_ have a previous selection, we make it a little
+ "sticky": we only move from "restricted" to "default" when we find
+ that we're above the threshold plus 5%, and we only move from
+ "default" to "restricted" when we're below the threshold minus 5%.
+ That should prevent us from flapping back and forth if we happen to
+ be hovering very close to the default.
+
+ The extreme threshold is for warning only.
+ */
+
+ static int have_warned_extreme_threshold = 0;
+ if (n_passing_filter < extreme_threshold &&
+ ! have_warned_extreme_threshold) {
+ have_warned_extreme_threshold = 1;
+ const double exclude_frac =
+ (n_guards - n_passing_filter) / (double)n_guards;
+ log_warn(LD_GUARD, "Your configuration excludes %d%% of all possible "
+ "guards. That's likely to make you stand out from the "
+ "rest of the world.", (int)(exclude_frac * 100));
+ }
+
+ /* Easy case: no previous selection */
+ if (old_selection == NULL) {
+ if (n_passing_filter >= meaningful_threshold_mid) {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ return "default";
+ } else {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED;
+ return "restricted";
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Trickier case: we do have a previous selection */
+ if (n_passing_filter >= meaningful_threshold_high) {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_NORMAL;
+ return "default";
+ } else if (n_passing_filter < meaningful_threshold_low) {
+ *type_out = GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED;
+ return "restricted";
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check whether we should switch from our current guard selection to a
+ * different one. If so, switch and return 1. Return 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * On a 1 return, the caller should mark all currently live circuits
+ * unusable for new streams.
+ */
+int
+update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (!curr_guard_context) {
+ create_initial_guard_context();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ const char *cur_name = curr_guard_context->name;
+ guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
+ const char *new_name = choose_guard_selection(
+ options,
+ networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),
+ cur_name,
+ &type);
+ tor_assert(new_name);
+ tor_assert(type != GS_TYPE_INFER);
+
+ if (! strcmp(cur_name, new_name)) {
+ log_debug(LD_GUARD,
+ "Staying with guard context \"%s\" (no change)", new_name);
+ return 0; // No change
+ }
+
+ log_notice(LD_GUARD, "Switching to guard context \"%s\" (was using \"%s\")",
+ new_name, cur_name);
+ guard_selection_t *new_guard_context;
+ new_guard_context = get_guard_selection_by_name(new_name, type, 1);
+ tor_assert(new_guard_context);
+ tor_assert(new_guard_context != curr_guard_context);
+ curr_guard_context = new_guard_context;
+
+ /*
+ Be sure to call:
+ circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
+ circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable();
+ */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
* Return true iff <b>node</b> has all the flags needed for us to consider it
* a possible guard when sampling guards.
*/
@@ -446,7 +650,7 @@ node_is_possible_guard(guard_selection_t *gs, const node_t *node)
* holds. */
/* XXXX -- prop271 spec deviation. We require node_is_dir() here. */
- (void)gs;
+ (void)gs; /* Remove this argument */
tor_assert(node);
return (node->is_possible_guard &&
node->is_stable &&
@@ -552,7 +756,7 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs)
int n_sampled = smartlist_len(gs->sampled_entry_guards);
entry_guard_t *added_guard = NULL;
- smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
+ const smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
/* Construct eligible_guards as GUARDS - SAMPLED_GUARDS */
smartlist_t *eligible_guards = smartlist_new();
int n_guards = 0; // total size of "GUARDS"
@@ -565,13 +769,13 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs)
digestset_add(sampled_guard_ids, guard->identity);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, node_t *, node) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
if (! node_is_possible_guard(gs, node))
continue;
++n_guards;
if (digestset_contains(sampled_guard_ids, node->identity))
continue;
- smartlist_add(eligible_guards, node);
+ smartlist_add(eligible_guards, (node_t*)node);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Now we can free that bloom filter. */
@@ -817,6 +1021,8 @@ static int
node_passes_guard_filter(const or_options_t *options, guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *node)
{
+ /* XXXX prop271 remote the gs option; it is unused, and sometimes NULL. */
+
/* NOTE: Make sure that this function stays in sync with
* options_transition_affects_entry_guards */
@@ -2221,7 +2427,8 @@ entry_guards_load_guards_from_state(or_state_t *state, int set)
if (set) {
guard_selection_t *gs;
- gs = get_guard_selection_by_name(guard->selection_name, 1);
+ gs = get_guard_selection_by_name(guard->selection_name,
+ GS_TYPE_INFER, 1);
tor_assert(gs);
smartlist_add(gs->sampled_entry_guards, guard);
} else {
@@ -3854,7 +4061,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
int r1 = entry_guards_load_guards_from_state(state, set);
int r2 = entry_guards_parse_state_for_guard_selection(
- get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", 1),
+ get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 1),
state, set, msg);
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
@@ -3926,7 +4133,8 @@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
- guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", 0);
+ guard_selection_t *gs;
+ gs = get_guard_selection_by_name("legacy", GS_TYPE_LEGACY, 0);
if (!gs)
return; // nothign to save.
tor_assert(gs->chosen_entry_guards != NULL);
@@ -4212,12 +4420,20 @@ entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options)
int
guards_update_all(void)
{
- if (get_options()->UseDeprecatedGuardAlgorithm) {
+ int mark_circuits = 0;
+ if (update_guard_selection_choice(get_options()))
+ mark_circuits = 1;
+
+ tor_assert(curr_guard_context);
+
+ if (curr_guard_context->type == GS_TYPE_LEGACY) {
entry_guards_compute_status(get_options(), approx_time());
- return 0;
} else {
- return entry_guards_update_all(get_guard_selection_info());
+ if (entry_guards_update_all(get_guard_selection_info()))
+ mark_circuits = 1;
}
+
+ return mark_circuits;
}
/** Helper: pick a guard for a circuit, with whatever algorithm is
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.h b/src/or/entrynodes.h
index a0f4c2e..0164667 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.h
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.h
@@ -195,6 +195,26 @@ struct entry_guard_t {
};
/**
+ * Possible rules for a guard selection to follow
+ */
+typedef enum guard_selection_type_t {
+ /** Infer the type of this selection from its name. */
+ GS_TYPE_INFER=0,
+ /** Use the normal guard selection algorithm, taking our sample from the
+ * complete list of guards in the consensus. */
+ GS_TYPE_NORMAL=1,
+ /** Use the normal guard selection algorithm, taking our sample from the
+ * configured bridges, and allowing it to grow as large as all the configured
+ * bridges */
+ GS_TYPE_BRIDGE,
+ /** Use the normal guard selection algorithm, taking our sample from the
+ * set of filtered nodes. */
+ GS_TYPE_RESTRICTED,
+ /** Use the legacy (pre-prop271) guard selection algorithm and fields */
+ GS_TYPE_LEGACY,
+} guard_selection_type_t;
+
+/**
* All of the the context for guard selection on a particular client.
*
* (XXXX prop271 this paragraph below is not actually implemented yet.)
@@ -213,6 +233,11 @@ struct guard_selection_s {
char *name;
/**
+ * What rules does this guard-selection object follow?
+ */
+ guard_selection_type_t type;
+
+ /**
* A value of 1 means that primary_entry_guards is up-to-date; 0
* means we need to recalculate it before using primary_entry_guards
* or the is_primary flag on any guard.
@@ -340,6 +365,8 @@ int entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits(guard_selection_t *gs,
int entry_guard_state_should_expire(circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state);
void entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(guard_selection_t *gs);
+int update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options);
+
/* Used by bridges.c only. */
void add_bridge_as_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *chosen);
@@ -396,15 +423,17 @@ int num_bridges_usable(void);
* If a circuit has been sitting around in 'waiting for better guard' state
* for at least this long, we'll expire it.
*/
-#define DLFT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT (10*60)
+#define DFLT_NONPRIMARY_GUARD_IDLE_TIMEOUT (10*60)
/**
- * DOCDOC. not yet used; see prop271.
+ * If our configuration retains fewer than this fraction of guards from the
+ * torrc, we are in a restricted setting.
*/
-#define DFLT_MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_FRAC 0.2
+#define DFLT_MEANINGFUL_RESTRICTION_PERCENT 20
/**
- * DOCDOC. not yet used. see prop271.
+ * If our configuration retains fewer than this fraction of guards from the
+ * torrc, we are in an extremely restricted setting, and should warn.
*/
-#define DFLT_EXTREME_RESTRICTION_FRAC 0.01
+#define DFLT_EXTREME_RESTRICTION_PERCENT 1
/**@}*/
STATIC double get_max_sample_threshold(void);
@@ -416,13 +445,20 @@ STATIC int get_n_primary_guards(void);
STATIC int get_internet_likely_down_interval(void);
STATIC int get_nonprimary_guard_connect_timeout(void);
STATIC int get_nonprimary_guard_idle_timeout(void);
+STATIC double get_meaningful_restriction_threshold(void);
+STATIC double get_extreme_restriction_threshold(void);
// ---------- XXXX these functions and definitions are post-prop271.
HANDLE_DECL(entry_guard, entry_guard_t, STATIC)
-STATIC guard_selection_t *guard_selection_new(const char *name);
+STATIC guard_selection_t *guard_selection_new(const char *name,
+ guard_selection_type_t type);
STATIC guard_selection_t *get_guard_selection_by_name(
- const char *name, int create_if_absent);
+ const char *name, guard_selection_type_t type, int create_if_absent);
STATIC void guard_selection_free(guard_selection_t *gs);
+STATIC const char *choose_guard_selection(const or_options_t *options,
+ const networkstatus_t *ns,
+ const char *old_selection,
+ guard_selection_type_t *type_out);
STATIC entry_guard_t *get_sampled_guard_with_id(guard_selection_t *gs,
const uint8_t *rsa_id);
diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c
index 96ff442..25f8b12 100644
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@ -980,8 +980,11 @@ directory_info_has_arrived(time_t now, int from_cache, int suppress_logs)
/* if we have enough dir info, then update our guard status with
* whatever we just learned. */
int invalidate_circs = guards_update_all();
- // This shouldn't be able to occur at this point.
- tor_assert_nonfatal(! invalidate_circs);
+
+ if (invalidate_circs) {
+ circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
+ circuit_mark_all_dirty_circs_as_unusable();
+ }
/* Don't even bother trying to get extrainfo until the rest of our
* directory info is up-to-date */
diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
index eaaadce..4595e5d 100644
--- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c
@@ -1243,30 +1243,30 @@ test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name(void *arg)
(void)arg;
guard_selection_t *gs1, *gs2, *gs3;
- gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", 0);
+ gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
tt_assert(gs1 == NULL);
- gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", 1);
+ gs1 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
tt_assert(gs1 != NULL);
- gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", 1);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
tt_assert(gs2 == gs1);
- gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", 0);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("unlikely", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
tt_assert(gs2 == gs1);
- gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", 0);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
tt_assert(gs2 == NULL);
- gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", 1);
+ gs2 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
tt_assert(gs2 != NULL);
tt_assert(gs2 != gs1);
- gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", 0);
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("implausible", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
tt_assert(gs3 == gs2);
- gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", 0);
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 0);
tt_assert(gs3 == NULL);
- gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", 1);
+ gs3 = get_guard_selection_by_name("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL, 1);
tt_assert(gs3 != NULL);
tt_assert(gs3 != gs2);
tt_assert(gs3 != gs1);
- tt_assert(gs3 == get_guard_selection_info());
+ // XXXX prop271 re-enable this. tt_assert(gs3 == get_guard_selection_info());
#if 0
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
@@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_add_single_guard(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
/* 1: Add a single guard to the sample. */
node_t *n1 = smartlist_get(big_fake_net_nodes, 0);
@@ -1327,7 +1327,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_node_filter(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
bridge_line_t *bl = NULL;
/* Initialize a bunch of node objects that are all guards. */
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_expand_sample(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
digestmap_t *node_by_id = digestmap_new();
entry_guard_t *guard = entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_expand_sample_small_net(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
/* Fun corner case: not enough guards to make up our whole sample size. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n, {
@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_status(void *arg)
(void)arg;
int i;
time_t start = approx_time();
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
networkstatus_t *ns_tmp = NULL;
/* Don't randomly backdate stuff; it will make correctness harder to check.*/
@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_repair(void *arg)
(void)arg;
int i;
time_t start = approx_time();
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
/* Don't randomly backdate stuff; it will make correctness harder to check.*/
MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
@@ -1711,7 +1711,7 @@ test_entry_guard_update_from_consensus_remove(void *arg)
(void)arg;
//int i;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
smartlist_t *keep_ids = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *remove_ids = smartlist_new();
@@ -1809,7 +1809,7 @@ test_entry_guard_confirming_guards(void *arg)
(void)arg;
/* Now let's check the logic responsible for manipulating the list
* of confirmed guards */
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
MOCK(randomize_time, mock_randomize_time_no_randomization);
/* Create the sample. */
@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
const int N = 10000;
bitarray_t *selected = NULL;
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_sample_reachable_filtered_empty(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
/* What if we try to sample from a set of 0? */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(big_fake_net_nodes, node_t *, n,
n->is_possible_guard = 0);
@@ -1966,7 +1966,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_retry_unreachable(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry_guards_expand_sample(gs);
/* Let's say that we have two guards, and they're down.
@@ -2025,7 +2025,7 @@ static void
test_entry_guard_manage_primary(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
smartlist_t *prev_guards = smartlist_new();
/* If no guards are confirmed, we should pick a few reachable guards and
@@ -2146,7 +2146,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_no_confirmed(void *arg)
{
/* Simpler cases: no gaurds are confirmed yet. */
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
/* simple starting configuration */
entry_guards_update_primary(gs);
@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_confirmed(void *arg)
guards, we use a confirmed guard. */
(void)arg;
int i;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
const int N_CONFIRMED = 10;
/* slightly more complicated simple starting configuration */
@@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg)
/* Play around with selecting primary guards for circuits and markign
* them up and down */
(void)arg;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
time_t start = approx_time();
@@ -2426,7 +2426,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_confirm_other(void *arg)
* primary, and we should get it next time. */
time_t start = approx_time();
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
circuit_guard_state_t *guard = NULL;
int i, r;
const node_t *node = NULL;
@@ -2488,7 +2488,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary_retry(void *arg)
* primary, and we should get it next time. */
time_t start = approx_time();
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
circuit_guard_state_t *guard = NULL, *guard2 = NULL;
int i, r;
const node_t *node = NULL;
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_and_cancel(void *arg)
int i,r;
const node_t *node = NULL;
circuit_guard_state_t *guard;
- guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
entry_guard_t *g;
/* Once more, we mark all the primary guards down. */
@@ -2624,7 +2624,8 @@ static void *
upgrade_circuits_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase)
{
upgrade_circuits_data_t *data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*data));
- guard_selection_t *gs = data->gs = guard_selection_new("default");
+ guard_selection_t *gs = data->gs =
+ guard_selection_new("default", GS_TYPE_NORMAL);
circuit_guard_state_t *guard;
const node_t *node;
entry_guard_t *g;
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