[tor-commits] [torspec/master] fixup Add IPv4 and IPv6, make an auth connection early
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Oct 21 15:55:32 UTC 2015
commit e468e802980b2b4846b33fa615b19a1eab215956
Author: teor (Tim Wilson-Brown) <teor2345 at gmail.com>
Date: Fri Oct 2 17:39:46 2015 +0200
fixup Add IPv4 and IPv6, make an auth connection early
Make one authority connection early so the client can check its clock.
Redo the analysis for the new timing schedule.
Add IPv4 and IPv6 alternation scheme for clients that have both an
IPv4 and IPv6 address.
Add retry timer maximum and retry timer reset events.
Include min and max fallback directory weights.
---
.../210-faster-headless-consensus-bootstrap.txt | 82 +++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/proposals/210-faster-headless-consensus-bootstrap.txt b/proposals/210-faster-headless-consensus-bootstrap.txt
index 42726e5..79770d8 100644
--- a/proposals/210-faster-headless-consensus-bootstrap.txt
+++ b/proposals/210-faster-headless-consensus-bootstrap.txt
@@ -21,30 +21,53 @@ Design: Bootstrap Process Changes
the first connection that completes.
Connection attempts will be performed on an exponential backoff basis.
- Initially, connections will be performed to randomly chosen hard
- coded directory mirrors. If none of these connections complete within
- 5 seconds, connections will also be performed to randomly chosen
- canonical directory authorities.
+ Initially, connections will be performed to a randomly chosen hard
+ coded directory mirror and a randomly chosen canonical directory
+ authority. If neither of these connections complete, additional mirror
+ and authority connections are tried. Mirror connections are tried at
+ a faster rate than authority connections.
We specify that mirror connections retry after half a second, and then
double the retry time with every connection:
- 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, ...
+ 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ...
- We specify that directory authority connections start after a 5 second
- delay, and retry after 5 seconds, doubling the retry time with every
- connection:
- 5, 10, 20, ...
+ We specify that directory authority connections retry after 5 seconds,
+ and then double the retry time with every connection:
+ 0, 10, 20, ...
+
+ If the client has both an IPv4 and IPv6 address, we try IPv4 and IPv6
+ mirrors and authorities on the following schedule:
+ IPv4, IPv6, IPv4, IPv6, ...
+
+ We try IPv4 first to avoid overloading IPv6-enabled authorities and
+ mirrors. Mirrors and auths get a separate IPv4/IPv6 schedule. This
+ ensures that we try an IPv6 authority within the first 10 seconds.
+ This helps implement #8374 and related tickets.
+
+ The maximum retry time for both timers is 3 days + 1 hour. This places a
+ small load on the mirrors and authorities, while allowing a client that
+ regains a network connection to eventually download a consensus.
+
+ The retry timers must reset on HUP and any network reachability events,
+ [ TODO: do we have network reachability events? ]
+ so that clients that have unreliable networks can recover from network
+ failures.
The first connection to complete will be used to download the consensus
document and the others will be closed, after which bootstrapping will
proceed as normal.
+ A benefit of connecting to directory authorities is that clients are
+ warned if their clock is wrong. Therefore, when closing a directory
+ authority connection, we check to see if we have successfully connected
+ to an authority during this run of the Tor client. If not, we allow the
+ authority TLS connection to complete, then close the connection.
+
We expect the vast majority of clients to succeed within 4 seconds,
- after making up to 5 connection attempts to mirrors. Clients which can't
- connect in the first 5 seconds, will then try to contact a directory
- authority. We expect almost all clients to succeed within 10 seconds,
- after up to 6 connection attempts to mirrors and up to 2 connection
- attempts to authorities. This is a much better success rate than the
+ after making up to 4 connection attempts to mirrors. Clients which can't
+ connect in the first 10 seconds, will try 1 more mirror, then try to
+ contact another directory authority. We expect almost all clients to
+ succeed within 10 seconds. This is a much better success rate than the
current Tor implementation, which fails k/n of clients if k of the n
directory authorities are down. (Or, if the connection fails in
certain ways, (k/n)^2.)
@@ -60,7 +83,11 @@ Design: Fallback Dir Mirror Selection
the 100 Guard nodes with the longest uptime.
The fallback weights will be set using each mirror's fraction of
- consensus bandwidth out of the total of all 100 mirrors.
+ consensus bandwidth out of the total of all 100 mirrors, adjusted to
+ ensure no fallback directory sees more than 10% of clients. We will
+ also exclude fallback directories that are less than 1/1000 of the
+ consensus weight, as they are not large enough to make it worthwhile
+ including them.
This list of fallback dir mirrors should be updated with every
major Tor release. In future releases, the number of dir mirrors
@@ -84,7 +111,7 @@ Performance: Additional Load with Current Parameter Choices
The dangerous case is in the event of a prolonged consensus failure
that induces all clients to enter into the bootstrap process. In this
case, the number of TLS connections to the fallback dir mirrors within
- the first second would be 3*C/100, or 60,000 for C=2,000,000 users. If
+ the first second would be 2*C/100, or 40,000 for C=2,000,000 users. If
no connections complete before the 10 retries, 7 of which go to
mirrors, this could reach as high as 140,000 connection attempts, but
this is extremely unlikely to happen in full aggregate.
@@ -111,7 +138,7 @@ Implementation Notes: Code Modifications
There appear to be a few options for altering this code to retry multiple
simultaneous connections. Without refactoring, one approach would be to
- set mirror and authority retry helper function timers in
+ set a connection retry helper function timer in
directory_initiate_command_routerstatus() from
directory_get_from_dirserver() if the purpose is
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS and the only directory servers available
@@ -130,7 +157,7 @@ Implementation Notes: Code Modifications
altered to examine the list of pending dircons, determine if this one is
the first to complete, and if so, then call directory_send_command() to
download the consensus and close the other pending dircons.
- connection_dir_finished_connecting() would also cancel both timers.
+ connection_dir_finished_connecting() would also cancel the timer.
Reliability Analysis
@@ -140,22 +167,21 @@ Reliability Analysis
uptime.)
We expect the first 10 connection retry times to be:
- Mirror: 0s 0.5s 1s 2s 4s 8s 16s
- Auth: 5s 10s 20s
- Success: 50% 75% 87% 94% 97% 99.4% 99.7% 99.94% 99.97% 99.99%
-
- 97% of clients succeed while only using directory mirrors.
- 2.4% of clients succeed on their first auth connection.
- 0.24% of clients succeed after one more mirror and auth connection.
- 0.05% of clients succeed after two more mirror and auth connections.
- 0.01% of clients remain, but in this scenario, 3 authorities are down,
+ Mirror: 0s 1s 2s 4s 8s 16s 32s
+ Auth: 0s 10s 20s
+ Success: 90% 95% 97% 98.7% 99.4% 99.89% 99.94% 99.988% 99.994%
+
+ 97% of clients succeed in the first 2 seconds.
+ 99.4% of clients succeed without trying a second authority.
+ 99.89% of clients succeed in the first 10 seconds.
+ 0.11% of clients remain, but in this scenario, 2 authorities are down,
so the client is most likely blocked from the Tor network.
The current implementation makes 1 or 2 authority connections within the
first second, depending on exactly how the first connection fails. Under
the 20% authority failure assumption, these clients would have a success
rate of either 80% or 96% within a few seconds. The scheme above has a
- similar success rate in the first few seconds, while spreading the load
+ greater success rate in the first few seconds, while spreading the load
among a larger number of directory mirrors. In addition, if all the
authorities are blocked, current clients will inevitably fail, as they
do not have a list of directory mirrors.
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