[tor-commits] [tor/master] Remove code to support OpenSSL 0.9.8
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed May 20 19:35:55 UTC 2015
commit 971f0f8e18c0f3ea9f2aa74a54951235269a1cd1
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue May 19 16:14:20 2015 -0400
Remove code to support OpenSSL 0.9.8
---
changes/ticket16034 | 6 +++
src/common/crypto.c | 36 +++------------
src/common/tortls.c | 128 ++++-----------------------------------------------
src/test/bench.c | 3 +-
4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/ticket16034 b/changes/ticket16034
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b909946
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/ticket16034
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+ o Removed features:
+
+ - Tor no longer supports versions of OpenSSL before 1.0. (If you
+ are on an operating system that has not upgraded to OpenSSL 1.0
+ or later, and you compile Tor from source, you will need to
+ install a more recent OpenSSL to link Tor against.)
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index a68294a..0feed1c 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "sandbox.h"
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8)
-#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8"
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
+#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0"
#endif
#ifdef ANDROID
@@ -300,13 +300,6 @@ crypto_early_init(void)
SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
}
- if (SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)) {
- log_notice(LD_CRYPTO,
- "Your OpenSSL version seems to be %s. We recommend 1.0.0 "
- "or later.",
- crypto_openssl_get_version_str());
- }
-
crypto_force_rand_ssleay();
if (crypto_seed_rng(1) < 0)
@@ -2423,15 +2416,6 @@ crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_t *dh)
* work for us too. */
#define ADD_ENTROPY 32
-/** True iff it's safe to use RAND_poll after setup.
- *
- * Versions of OpenSSL prior to 0.9.7k and 0.9.8c had a bug where RAND_poll
- * would allocate an fd_set on the stack, open a new file, and try to FD_SET
- * that fd without checking whether it fit in the fd_set. Thus, if the
- * system has not just been started up, it is unsafe to call */
-#define RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'c'))
-
/** Set the seed of the weak RNG to a random value. */
void
crypto_seed_weak_rng(tor_weak_rng_t *rng)
@@ -2506,14 +2490,14 @@ crypto_seed_rng(int startup)
int rand_poll_ok = 0, load_entropy_ok = 0;
uint8_t buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
+ (void) startup;
+
/* OpenSSL has a RAND_poll function that knows about more kinds of
* entropy than we do. We'll try calling that, *and* calling our own entropy
* functions. If one succeeds, we'll accept the RNG as seeded. */
- if (startup || RAND_POLL_IS_SAFE) {
- rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll();
- if (rand_poll_ok == 0)
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed.");
- }
+ rand_poll_ok = RAND_poll();
+ if (rand_poll_ok == 0)
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "RAND_poll() failed.");
load_entropy_ok = !crypto_strongest_rand(buf, sizeof(buf));
if (load_entropy_ok) {
@@ -3123,13 +3107,11 @@ openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_(struct CRYPTO_dynlock_value *v,
tor_free(v);
}
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
static void
tor_set_openssl_thread_id(CRYPTO_THREADID *threadid)
{
CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric(threadid, tor_get_thread_id());
}
-#endif
/** @{ */
/** Helper: Construct mutexes, and set callbacks to help OpenSSL handle being
@@ -3144,11 +3126,7 @@ setup_openssl_threading(void)
for (i=0; i < n; ++i)
openssl_mutexes_[i] = tor_mutex_new();
CRYPTO_set_locking_callback(openssl_locking_cb_);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
- CRYPTO_set_id_callback(tor_get_thread_id);
-#else
CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback(tor_set_openssl_thread_id);
-#endif
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback(openssl_dynlock_create_cb_);
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback(openssl_dynlock_lock_cb_);
CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback(openssl_dynlock_destroy_cb_);
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index e0265b4..cc76537 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -75,8 +75,8 @@
#include "container.h"
#include <string.h>
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,8)
-#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.8"
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
+#error "We require OpenSSL >= 1.0.0"
#endif
/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake.
@@ -93,10 +93,8 @@
#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') || \
- (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) && \
- OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')))
-/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 0.9.8s/1.0.0f. It does not have
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
+/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
* the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
* SSL3 safely at the same time.
*/
@@ -114,20 +112,6 @@
#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
#endif
-/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
- * SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
-static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 0;
-/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
- * SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
-static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 0;
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
-/* If we have openssl 1.1, we just trust that the "mode" will work, and don't
- * use the "flag" at all. Nobody would forward-port that weird little glitch
- * from 0.9.8l to 1.1, would they?
- */
-#define SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
-#endif
-
/** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */
struct tor_cert_t {
X509 *cert;
@@ -492,56 +476,6 @@ tor_tls_init(void)
version = SSLeay();
- /* OpenSSL 0.9.8l introduced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
- * here, but without thinking too hard about it: it turns out that the
- * flag in question needed to be set at the last minute, and that it
- * conflicted with an existing flag number that had already been added
- * in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 betas. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully replaced
- * the flag with an option and (it seems) broke anything that used
- * SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need to know how to do both,
- * and we mustn't use the SSL3_FLAGS option with anything besides
- * OpenSSL 0.9.8l.
- *
- * No, we can't just set flag 0x0010 everywhere. It breaks Tor with
- * OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3 and later. On the other hand, we might be able to
- * set option 0x00040000L everywhere.
- *
- * No, we can't simply detect whether the flag or the option is present
- * in the headers at build-time: some vendors (notably Apple) like to
- * leave their headers out of sync with their libraries.
- *
- * Yes, it _is_ almost as if the OpenSSL developers decided that no
- * program should be allowed to use renegotiation unless it first passed
- * a test of intelligence and determination.
- */
- if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k') && version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) {
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l, but "
- "some vendors have backported renegotiation code from "
- "0.9.8m without updating the version number. "
- "I will try SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP to enable renegotation.",
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
- use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
- } else if (version > OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'l')) {
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; "
- "I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation",
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
- } else if (version <= OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'k')) {
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s [%lx] looks like it's older than "
- "0.9.8l, but some vendors have backported 0.9.8l's "
- "renegotiation code to earlier versions, and some have "
- "backported the code from 0.9.8m or 0.9.8n. I'll set both "
- "SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP just to be safe.",
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
- use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
- use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
- } else {
- /* this is dead code, yes? */
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s has version %lx",
- SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
- }
-
#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
@@ -1333,24 +1267,6 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
}
#endif
- /* XXX This block is now obsolete. */
- if (
-#ifdef DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
- 1 ||
-#endif
- SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(0,9,8,'s') ||
- (SSLeay() >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(0,9,9) &&
- SSLeay() < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f'))) {
- /* And not SSL3 if it's subject to CVE-2011-4576. */
- log_info(LD_NET, "Disabling SSLv3 because this OpenSSL version "
- "might otherwise be vulnerable to CVE-2011-4576 "
- "(compile-time version %08lx (%s); "
- "runtime version %08lx (%s))",
- (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT,
- (unsigned long)SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
- SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
- }
-
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
@@ -1361,7 +1277,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*/
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
+ {
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
@@ -1410,8 +1326,7 @@ tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, crypto_dh_get_dh_(dh));
crypto_dh_free(dh);
}
-#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) && \
- OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
if (! is_client) {
int nid;
EC_KEY *ec_key;
@@ -1769,10 +1684,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
if (tls) {
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
-#if (defined(USE_BUFFEREVENTS) && defined(SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTATION_FLAG))
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag)
- tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
-#endif
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
}
@@ -1780,7 +1691,6 @@ tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
}
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0)
/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
* the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
*
@@ -1818,9 +1728,6 @@ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
}
-#else
-#define tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tls) STMT_NIL
-#endif
/** Explain which ciphers we're missing. */
static void
@@ -2098,15 +2005,8 @@ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
-#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
- tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
- }
-#endif
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
- SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
- }
+ SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
@@ -2127,16 +2027,8 @@ tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
void
tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
-#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
- tor_assert(0 != (tls->ssl->s3->flags &
- SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
- }
-#endif
- if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
- long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
- tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
- }
+ long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
diff --git a/src/test/bench.c b/src/test/bench.c
index 5cbc072..6909e73 100644
--- a/src/test/bench.c
+++ b/src/test/bench.c
@@ -502,8 +502,7 @@ bench_dh(void)
" %f millisec each.\n", NANOCOUNT(start, end, iters)/1e6);
}
-#if (!defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) \
- && OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,0))
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
#define HAVE_EC_BENCHMARKS
static void
bench_ecdh_impl(int nid, const char *name)
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