[tor-commits] [torbutton/master] Bug 7255: Warn users about maximizing windows
mikeperry at torproject.org
mikeperry at torproject.org
Wed Mar 25 17:53:18 UTC 2015
commit 52ab4472601dfb9f0c6d83966a55178b33149464
Author: Georg Koppen <gk at torproject.org>
Date: Wed Mar 25 15:45:49 2015 +0000
Bug 7255: Warn users about maximizing windows
Maximized windows are very likely not rounded to multiples of 200x100.
Nevertheless, it is probably not uncommen for users to maximize their
windows as they are used to. We should at least warn them until a
proper fix is in place (see #14429 for an idea).
---
src/chrome/content/torbutton.js | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/chrome/locale/en/torbutton.properties | 2 +
src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js | 6 ++
3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
index 5eb704e..7e6149f 100644
--- a/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
+++ b/src/chrome/content/torbutton.js
@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ const k_tb_last_browser_version_pref = "extensions.torbutton.lastBrowserVersion"
const k_tb_browser_update_needed_pref = "extensions.torbutton.updateNeeded";
const k_tb_last_update_check_pref = "extensions.torbutton.lastUpdateCheck";
const k_tb_tor_check_failed_topic = "Torbutton:TorCheckFailed";
-
// status
var m_tb_wasinited = false;
var m_tb_prefs = false;
@@ -1072,6 +1071,10 @@ function torbutton_on_abouttor_load(aDoc) {
m_tb_prefs.
setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.show_slider_notification", false);
}
+
+ // OS-specific window maximization on start-up should be done by now. Disable
+ // the respective preference to make sure the user is seeing our notification.
+ m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.startup_resize_period", false);
}
function torbutton_is_abouttor_doc(aDoc) {
@@ -3094,6 +3097,9 @@ function torbutton_close_window(event) {
torbutton_tor_check_observer.unregister();
torbutton_console_observer.unregister();
+ window.removeEventListener("sizemodechange", m_tb_resize_handler,
+ false);
+
// TODO: This is a real ghetto hack.. When the original window
// closes, we need to find another window to handle observing
// unique events... The right way to do this is to move the
@@ -3301,6 +3307,9 @@ var torbutton_weblistener =
{ /*torbutton_eclog(1, 'called linkIcon'); */ return 0; }
}
+var m_tb_resize_handler = null;
+var m_tb_resize_date = null;
+
// Bug 1506 P1/P3: Setting a fixed window size is important, but
// probably not for android.
var torbutton_resizelistener =
@@ -3410,30 +3419,87 @@ var torbutton_resizelistener =
height = Math.floor(maxHeight/100.0)*100;
}
- var handler = function() {
+ m_tb_resize_handler = function() {
if (window.windowState === 1) {
- window.addEventListener("resize",
- function() {
- win.resizeBy(width - win.innerWidth, height - win.innerHeight);
- var calling_function = arguments.callee;
- setTimeout(function() {
- torbutton_log(3, "Removing resize listener..");
- window.removeEventListener("resize",
- calling_function, false);
- }, 1000);
- }, false);
+ if (m_tb_prefs.
+ getIntPref("extensions.torbutton.maximize_warning_counter") < 3) {
+
+ // Rate-limit showing our notification if needed.
+ if (m_tb_resize_date === null) {
+ m_tb_resize_date = Date.now();
+ } else {
+ // We at least another second before we show a new notification.
+ // Should be enough to rule out OSes that call our handler rapidly
+ // due to internal workings.
+ if (Date.now() - m_tb_resize_date < 1000) {
+ return;
+ }
+ // Resizing but we need to reset |m_tb_resize_date| now.
+ m_tb_resize_date = Date.now();
+ }
+
+ let sb = torbutton_get_stringbundle();
+ // No need to get "OK" translated again.
+ let sbSvc = Cc["@mozilla.org/intl/stringbundle;1"].
+ getService(Ci.nsIStringBundleService);
+ let bundle = sbSvc.
+ createBundle("chrome://global/locale/commonDialogs.properties");
+ let button_label = bundle.GetStringFromName("OK");
+ let box = gBrowser.getNotificationBox();
+
+ let buttons = [{
+ label: button_label,
+ accessKey: 'O',
+ popup: null,
+ callback:
+ function() {
+ m_tb_prefs.setIntPref("extensions.torbutton.maximize_warning_counter",
+ m_tb_prefs.getIntPref("extensions.torbutton.maximize_warning_counter") + 1);
+ }
+ }];
+
+ let priority = box.PRIORITY_WARNING_LOW;
+ let message =
+ torbutton_get_property_string("torbutton.maximize_warning");
+
+ box.appendNotification(message, 'new-menu-notification', null,
+ priority, buttons);
+
+ return;
+ }
+ // This is for some weird OS-specific behavior on start-up where,
+ // depending on the available screen size, the OS thinks it has to
+ // maximize the window. We don't want to do that AND don't want to
+ // show the user our notification in this case.
+ if (m_tb_prefs.
+ getBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.startup_resize_period")) {
+ window.addEventListener("resize",
+ function() {
+ win.resizeBy(width - win.innerWidth, height - win.innerHeight);
+ var calling_function = arguments.callee;
+ setTimeout(function() {
+ torbutton_log(3, "Removing resize listener..");
+ window.removeEventListener("resize",
+ calling_function, false);
+ }, 1000);
+ }, false);
+ }
}
};
// We need to handle OSes that auto-maximize windows depending on user
- // settings and/or screen resolution. We add a listener which is
- // triggerred as soon as the window gets maximized (windowState = 1).
+ // settings and/or screen resolution in the start-up phase and users that
+ // try to shoot themselves in the foot by maximizing the window manually.
+ // We add a listener which is triggerred as soon as the window gets
+ // maximized (windowState = 1). We are resizing during start-up but not
+ // later as the user should see only a warning there as a stopgap before
+ // #14229 lands.
// Alas, the Firefox window code is handling the event not itself:
// "// Note the current implementation of SetSizeMode just stores
// // the new state; it doesn't actually resize. So here we store
// // the state and pass the event on to the OS."
- // (See: https://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-esr24/source/xpfe/appshell/src/
- // nsWebShellWindow.cpp#353)
+ // (See: https://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-esr31/source/xpfe/appshell/src/
+ // nsWebShellWindow.cpp#348)
// This means we have to cope with race conditions and resizing in the
// sizemodechange listener is likely to fail. Thus, we add a specific
// resize listener that is doing the work for us. It seems (at least on
@@ -3441,14 +3507,9 @@ var torbutton_resizelistener =
// the window triggers more than one resize event the first being not the
// one we need. Thus we can't remove the listener after the first resize
// event got fired. Thus, we have the rather klunky setTimeout() call.
- window.addEventListener("sizemodechange", handler, false);
-
- // We like to remove the sizemodechange listener for everybody again in
- // order to allow resizing the window after the start-up
- setTimeout(function() {
- torbutton_log(3, "Removing sizemodechange listener..");
- window.removeEventListener("sizemodechange", handler, false);
- }, 1000);
+ m_tb_prefs.setBoolPref("extensions.torbutton.startup_resize_period",
+ true);
+ window.addEventListener("sizemodechange", m_tb_resize_handler, false);
// This is fun. any attempt to directly set the inner window actually
// resizes the outer width to that value instead. Must use resizeBy()
diff --git a/src/chrome/locale/en/torbutton.properties b/src/chrome/locale/en/torbutton.properties
index 8fc4600..a3be7e0 100644
--- a/src/chrome/locale/en/torbutton.properties
+++ b/src/chrome/locale/en/torbutton.properties
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ torbutton.popup.confirm_newnym = Tor Browser will close all windows and tabs. Al
torbutton.slider_notification = The green onion menu has now a security slider which lets you adjust your security level. Check it out!
torbutton.slider_notification_button = Open security settings
+torbutton.maximize_warning = Maximizing Tor Browser can allow websites to determine information about your monitor size, which can be used to track you. We recommend you leave Tor Browser windows in their original default size.
+
# Canvas permission prompt. Strings are kept here for ease of translation.
canvas.siteprompt=This website (%S) attempted to extract HTML5 canvas image data, which may be used to uniquely identify your computer.\n\nShould Tor Browser allow this website to extract HTML5 canvas image data?
canvas.notNow=Not Now
diff --git a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js
index a8ed3e1..c85c7f4 100644
--- a/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js
+++ b/src/defaults/preferences/preferences.js
@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ pref("extensions.torbutton.warned_ff3",false);
pref("extensions.torbutton.inserted_button",false);
pref("extensions.torbutton.prompted_language",false);
+// TODO: This is just part of a stopgap until #14429 gets properly implemented.
+// See #7255 for details. We display the warning three times to make sure the
+// user did not click on it by accident.
+pref("extensions.torbutton.maximize_warning_counter", 0);
+pref("extensions.torbutton.startup_resize_period", true);
+
// Security prefs:
pref("extensions.torbutton.no_tor_plugins",true);
pref("extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies",false);
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