[tor-commits] [torspec/master] add proposal 246 from special and asn
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Sun Jul 12 22:11:14 UTC 2015
commit a91864ceaa6c4a83d4cd86fa146868e89599ea92
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Sun Jul 12 18:10:55 2015 -0400
add proposal 246 from special and asn
---
proposals/000-index.txt | 4 +-
proposals/246-merge-hsdir-and-intro.txt | 296 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 299 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt
index f8e959d..e22707f 100644
--- a/proposals/000-index.txt
+++ b/proposals/000-index.txt
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ Proposals by number:
243 Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag [OPEN]
244 Use RFC5705 Key Exporting in our AUTHENTICATE calls [DRAFT]
245 Deprecating and removing the TAP circuit extension protocol [DRAFT]
+246 Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points [OPEN]
Proposals by status:
@@ -224,9 +225,10 @@ Proposals by status:
233 Making Tor2Web mode faster
234 Adding remittance field to directory specification
236 The move to a single guard node
- 237 All relays are directory servers [for 0.2.6.x]
+ 237 All relays are directory servers [for 0.2.7.x]
242 Better performance and usability for the MyFamily option
243 Give out HSDir flag only to relays with Stable flag
+ 246 Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points
ACCEPTED:
140 Provide diffs between consensuses
172 GETINFO controller option for circuit information
diff --git a/proposals/246-merge-hsdir-and-intro.txt b/proposals/246-merge-hsdir-and-intro.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..874714f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/proposals/246-merge-hsdir-and-intro.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+Filename: 246-merge-hsdir-and-intro.txt
+Title: Merging Hidden Service Directories and Introduction Points
+Author: John Brooks, George Kadianakis
+Created: 2015-07-12
+Status: Open
+
+1. Overview and Motivation
+
+ This document describes a modification to proposal 224 ("Next-Generation
+ Hidden Services in Tor"), which simplifies and improves the architecture by
+ combining hidden service directories and introduction points at the same
+ relays.
+
+ A reader will want to be familiar with the existing hidden service design,
+ and with the changes in proposal 224. If accepted, this proposal should be
+ combined with proposal 224 to make a superseding specification.
+
+1.1. Overview
+
+ In the existing hidden service design and proposal 224, there are three
+ distinct steps building a connection: fetching the descriptor from a
+ directory, contacting an introduction point listed in the descriptor, and
+ rendezvous as specified during the introduction. The hidden service
+ directories are selected algorithmically, and introduction points are
+ selected at random by the service.
+
+ We propose to combine the responsibilities of the introduction point and
+ hidden service directory. The list of introduction points responsible for a
+ service will be selected using the algorithm specified for HSDirs [proposal
+ 224, section 2.2.3]. The service builds a long-term introduction circuit to
+ each of these, identified by its blinded public key. Clients can calculate
+ the same set of relays, build an introduction circuit, retrieve the
+ ephemeral keys, and proceed with sending an introduction to the service in
+ the same ways as before.
+
+1.2. Benefits over proposal 224
+
+ With this change, client connections are made more efficient by needing only
+ two circuits (for introduction and rendezvous), instead of the three needed
+ previously, and need to contact fewer relays. Clients also no longer cache
+ descriptors, which substantially simplifies code and removes a common source
+ of bugs and reliability issues.
+
+ Hidden services are able to stay online by simply maintaining their
+ introduction circuits; there is no longer a need to periodically update
+ descriptors. This reduces network load and traffic fingerprinting
+ opportunities for a hidden service.
+
+ The number and churn of relays a hidden service depends on is also reduced.
+ In particular, prior hidden service designs may frequently choose new
+ introduction points, and each of these has an opportunity to observe the
+ popularity or connection behavior of clients.
+
+1.3. Other effects on proposal 224
+
+ An adversarial introduction point is not significantly more capable than a
+ hidden service directory under proposal 224. The differences are:
+
+ 1. The introduction point maintains a long-lived circuit with the service
+ 2. The introduction point can break that circuit and cause the service to
+ rebuild it
+
+ See section 4 ("Discussion") for other impacts and open discussion
+ questions.
+
+2. Specification
+
+2.1. Picking introduction points for a service
+
+ Instead of picking HSDirs, hidden services pick their introduction points
+ using the same algorithm as defined in proposal 224 section 2.2 [HASHRING].
+
+ To be used as an introduction point, a relay must have the Stable flag in
+ the consensus and an uptime of at least twice the shared random period
+ defined in proposal 224 section 2.3.
+
+ This also specifies the lifetime of introduction points, since they will be
+ rotated with the change of time period and shared randomness.
+
+2.2. Hidden service sets up introduction points
+
+ After a hidden service has picked its intro points, it needs to establish
+ long-term introduction circuits to them and also send them an encrypted
+ descriptor that should be forwarded to potential clients. The descriptor
+ contains a service key that should be used by clients to encrypt the
+ INTRODUCE1 cell that will be sent to the hidden service. The encrypted parts
+ of the descriptor are encrypted with the symmetric keys specified in prop224
+ section [ENCRYPTED-DATA].
+
+2.2.1. Hidden service uploads a descriptor
+
+ Services post a descriptor by opening a directory stream with BEGIN_DIR, and
+ sending a HTTP POST request as described in proposal 224, section 2.2.4.
+
+ The relay must verify the signatures of the descriptor, and check whether it
+ is responsible for that blinded public key in the hash ring. Relays should
+ connect the descriptor to the circuit used to upload it, which will be
+ repurposed as the service introduction circuit. The descriptor does not need
+ to be cached by the introduction point after that introduction circuit has
+ closed.
+
+ It is unexpected and invalid to send more than one descriptor on the same
+ introduction circuit.
+
+2.2.2. Descriptor format
+
+ The format for the hidden service descriptor is as described in proposal 224
+ sections 2.4 and 2.5, with the following modifications:
+
+ * The "revision-counter" field is removed
+ * The introduction-point section is removed
+ * The "auth-key" field is removed
+ * The "enc-key legacy" field is removed
+ * The "enc-key ntor" field must be specified exactly once per descriptor
+
+ Unlike previous versions, the descriptor does not encode the entire list of
+ introduction points. The descriptor only contains a key for the particular
+ introduction point it was sent to.
+
+2.2.3. ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
+
+ When a hidden service is establishing a new introduction point, it sends the
+ ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, which is formatted as described by proposal 224
+ section 3.1.1, except for the following:
+
+ The AUTH_KEY_TYPE value 02 is changed to:
+
+ [02] -- Signing key certificate cross-certified with the blinded key, in
+ the same format as in the hidden service descriptor.
+
+ In this case, SIG is a signature of the cell with the signing key specified
+ in AUTH_KEY. The relay must verify this signature, as well as the
+ certification with the blinded key. The relay should also verify that it has
+ received a valid descriptor with this blinded key.
+
+ [XXX: Other options include putting only the blinded key, or only the
+ signing key in this cell. In either of these cases, we must look up the
+ descriptor to fully validate the contents, but we require the descriptor
+ to be present anyway. -special]
+
+ [XXX: What happens with the MAINT_INTRO process defined in proposal 224
+ section 3.1.3? -special]
+
+2.3. Client connection to a service
+
+ A client that wants to connect to a hidden service should first calculate
+ the responsible introduction points for the onion address as described in
+ section 2.1 above.
+
+ The client chooses one introduction point at random, builds a circuit, and
+ fetches the descriptor. Once it has received, verified, and decrypted the
+ descriptor, the client can use the same circuit to send the INTRODUCE1 cell.
+
+2.3.1. Client requests a descriptor
+
+ Clients can request a descriptor by opening a directory stream with
+ BEGIN_DIR, and sending a HTTP GET request as described in proposal 224,
+ section 2.2.4.
+
+ The client must verify the signatures of the descriptor, and decrypt the
+ encrypted portion to access the "enc-key". This key is used to encrypt the
+ contents of the INTRODUCE1 cell to the service.
+
+ Because the descriptor is specific to each introduction point, client-side
+ descriptor caching changes significantly. There is little point in caching
+ these descriptors, because they are inexpensive to request and will always
+ be available when a service-side introduction circuit is available. A client
+ that does caching must be prepared to handle INTRODUCE1 failures due to
+ rotated keys.
+
+2.3.2. Client sends INTRODUCE1
+
+ After requesting the descriptor, the client can use the same circuit to send
+ an INTRODUCE1 cell, which is forwarded to the service and begins the
+ rendezvous process.
+
+ The INTRODUCE1 cell is the same as proposal 224 section 3.2.1, except that
+ the AUTH_KEYID is the blinded public key, instead of the now-removed
+ introduction point authentication key.
+
+ The relay must permit this circuit to change purpose from the directory
+ request to a client or server introduction.
+
+3. Other changes to proposal 224
+
+3.1. Removing proposal 224 legacy relay support
+
+ Proposal 224 defines a process for using legacy relays as introduction
+ points; see section 3.1.2 [LEGACY_EST_INTRO], and 3.2.3 [LEGACY-INTRODUCE1].
+ With the changes to the introduction point in this proposals, it's no longer
+ possible to maintain support for legacy introduction points.
+
+ These sections of proposal 224 are removed, along with other references to
+ legacy introduction points and RSA introduction point keys. We will need to
+ handle the migration process to ensure that sufficient relays are available
+ as introduction points. See the discussion in section 4.1 for more details.
+
+3.2. Removing the "introduction point authentication key"
+
+ The "introduction point authentication key" defined in proposal 224 is
+ removed. The "descriptor signing key" is used to sign descriptors and the
+ ESTABLISH_INTRO2 cell. Descriptors are unique for each introduction point,
+ and there is no point in generating a new key used only to sign the
+ ESTABLISH_INTRO2 cell.
+
+4. Discussion
+
+4.1. No backwards compatibility with legacy relays
+
+ By changing the introduction procedure in such a way, we are unable to
+ maintain backwards compatibility. That is, hidden services will be unable to
+ use old relays as their introduction points, and similarly clients will be
+ unable to introduce through old relays.
+
+ To maintain an adequate anonymity set of intro points, clients and hidden
+ services should perform this introduction method only after most relays have
+ upgraded. For this reason we introduce the consensus parameter
+ HSMergedIntroduction which controls whether hidden services should perform
+ this merged introduction or fall back to the old one.
+
+ [XXX: Do we? This sounds like we have to implement both in the client, which
+ I thought we wanted to avoid. An alternative is to make sure that the intro
+ point side is done early enough, and that clients know not to rely on the
+ security of 224 services until enough relays are upgraded and the
+ implementation is done. -special]
+
+4.2. Restriction on the number of intro points and impact on load balancing
+
+ One drawback of this proposal is that the number of introduction points of a
+ hidden service is now a constant global parameter. Hence, a hidden service
+ can no longer adjust how many introduction points it uses, or select the
+ nodes that will serve as its introduction points.
+
+ While bad, we don't consider this a major drawback since we don't believe
+ that introduction points are a significant bottleneck on hidden services
+ performance.
+
+ However, our system significantly impacts the way some load balancing
+ schemes for hidden services work. For example, onionbalance is a third-party
+ application that manages the introduction points of a hidden service in a
+ way that allows traffic load-balancing. This is achieved by compiling a
+ master descriptor that mixes and matches the introduction points of
+ underlying hidden service instances.
+
+ With our system there are no descriptors that onionbalance can use to mix
+ and match introduction points. A variant of the onionbalance idea that could
+ work with our system would involve onionbalance starting a hidden service,
+ not establishing any intro points, and then ordering the underlying hidden
+ service load-balancing instances to establish intro points to all the right
+ introduction points.
+
+4.3. Behavior when introduction points go offline or misbehave
+
+ In this new system, it's the Tor network that decides which relays should be
+ used as the intro points of a hidden service for every time period. This
+ means, that a hidden service is forced to use those relays as intro points
+ if it wants clients to connect to it.
+
+ This brings up the topic of what should happen when the designated relays go
+ offline or refuse connections. Our behavior here should block guard
+ discovery attacks (as in #8239) while allowing maximum reachability for
+ clients.
+
+ We should also make sure that an adversary cannot manipulate the hash ring
+ in such a way that forces us to rotate introduction points quickly. This is
+ enforced by the uptime check that is necessary for acquiring the HSDir flag
+ (#8243).
+
+ For this reason we propose the following rules:
+
+ - After every consensus and when the blinded public key changes as a result
+ of the time period, hidden services need to recalculate their
+ introduction points and adjust themselves by establishing intro points to
+ the new relays.
+
+ - When an introduction point goes offline or drops connections, we attempt
+ to re-establish to it INTRO_RETRIES times per consensus. If the intro
+ point failed more than INTRO_RETRIES times for a consensus period, we
+ abandon it and stay with one less intro point.
+
+ If a new consensus is released and that relay is still listed as online,
+ then we reset our retry counter and start trying again.
+
+ [XXX: Is this crazy? -asn]
+ [XXX: INTRO_RETRIES = 3? -asn]
+
+4.4. Defining constants; how many introduction points for a service?
+
+ We keep the same intro point configuration as in proposal 224. That is, each
+ hidden service uses 6 relays and keeps them for a whole time period.
+
+ [XXX: Are these good constants? We don't have a chance to change them
+ in the future!! -asn]
+ [XXX: 224 makes them consensus parameters, which we can keep, but they
+ can still only be changed on a network-wide basis. -special]
+
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