[tor-commits] [webwml/master] be more accurate about guard probability

[arma at torproject.org]

commit 40ca9a48bfdaaa920dd95784ac8f19614d374bc5
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date:   Sun Apr 26 14:25:57 2015 -0400

    be more accurate about guard probability
---
 docs/en/faq.wml |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml
index bc1fa0e..381e050 100644
--- a/docs/en/faq.wml
+++ b/docs/en/faq.wml
@@ -3622,7 +3622,7 @@ information on the two sides.
 So, what should we do? Suppose the attacker controls, or can observe,
 <i>C</i> relays. Suppose there are <i>N</i> relays total. If you select
 new entry and exit relays each time you use the network, the attacker
-will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability
+will be able to correlate all traffic you send with probability around
 <i>(c/n)<sup>2</sup></i>. But profiling is, for most users, as bad
 as being traced all the time: they want to do something often without
 an attacker noticing, and the attacker noticing once is as bad as the