[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix some conversion problems

[nickm at torproject.org]

commit 241e6b093730106978ceef5b500c7049b9846084
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date:   Thu Apr 23 09:16:42 2015 -0400

    Fix some conversion problems
---
 src/common/crypto.c |   15 +++++++++++++++
 src/common/crypto.h |    2 ++
 src/common/tortls.c |    2 +-
 src/or/entrynodes.c |    4 ++--
 src/or/main.c       |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index e723f3d..f0d4fbb 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -2336,6 +2336,21 @@ crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max)
   return min + crypto_rand_int(max - min);
 }
 
+/** As crypto_rand_int_range, but supports uint64_t. */
+uint64_t
+crypto_rand_uint64_range(uint64_t min, uint64_t max)
+{
+  tor_assert(min < max);
+  return min + crypto_rand_uint64(max - min);
+}
+
+/** As crypto_rand_int_range, but supports time_t. */
+time_t
+crypto_rand_time_range(time_t min, time_t max)
+{
+  return (time_t) crypto_rand_uint64_range(min, max);
+}
+
 /** Return a pseudorandom 64-bit integer, chosen uniformly from the values
  * between 0 and <b>max</b>-1. */
 uint64_t
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index aa587fd..1ac02ea 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -255,6 +255,8 @@ MOCK_DECL(int,crypto_rand,(char *to, size_t n));
 int crypto_strongest_rand(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len);
 int crypto_rand_int(unsigned int max);
 int crypto_rand_int_range(unsigned int min, unsigned int max);
+uint64_t crypto_rand_uint64_range(uint64_t min, uint64_t max);
+time_t crypto_rand_time_range(time_t min, time_t max);
 uint64_t crypto_rand_uint64(uint64_t max);
 double crypto_rand_double(void);
 struct tor_weak_rng_t;
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index 7809c1a..bd7e95c 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
    * then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be
    * sure to start on a day boundary. */
   time_t now = time(NULL);
-  start_time = crypto_rand_int_range(now - cert_lifetime, now) + 2*24*3600;
+  start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(now - cert_lifetime, now) + 2*24*3600;
   start_time -= start_time % (24*3600);
 
   tor_assert(rsa);
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c
index 9f07d5a..ebf6751 100644
--- a/src/or/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend,
    * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
    * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
   time_t now = time(NULL);
-  entry->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_int_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
+  entry->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_time_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
   entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
 
   /* Are we picking this guard because all of our current guards are
@@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
      } else {
        if (state_version) {
          time_t now = time(NULL);
-         e->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_int_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
+         e->chosen_on_date = crypto_rand_time_range(now - 3600*24*30, now);
          e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
        }
      }
diff --git a/src/or/main.c b/src/or/main.c
index b9009db..22b006a 100644
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@ -1623,7 +1623,7 @@ run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
       time_to.check_for_correct_dns < now &&
       ! router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star()) {
     if (!time_to.check_for_correct_dns) {
-      time_to.check_for_correct_dns = crypto_rand_int_range(now, now + 120) + 60;
+      time_to.check_for_correct_dns = crypto_rand_time_range(now, now + 120) + 60;
     } else {
       dns_launch_correctness_checks();
       time_to.check_for_correct_dns = now + 12*3600 +