[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix some leaks/missed checks in the unit tests
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Thu Mar 13 14:17:10 UTC 2014
commit 119896cd43f420a053c552afe390f6d66224b3b7
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Thu Mar 13 10:07:10 2014 -0400
Fix some leaks/missed checks in the unit tests
Coverity spotted these.
---
ChangeLog | 22 +++++++++++-----------
src/common/sandbox.c | 2 +-
src/test/test.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
src/test/test_routerkeys.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 8002e4e..3968337 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??
- o Major features:
+ o Major features (security, DoS-resistance):
- Also consider stream buffer sizes when calculating OOM
conditions. Rename MaxMemInCellQueues to MaxMemInQueues. Fixes
bug 10169.
+ - Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
+ SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
+ feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
+ client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
+ number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
+ hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
+ performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
+ from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
+ attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
+ Closes ticket 4900.
o Minor features:
- Bridges write the SHA1 digest of their identity key fingerprint to
@@ -23,16 +33,6 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.3-alpha - 2014-03-??
database.
- Decrease the lower limit of MaxMemInQueues to 256 MBytes, to
appease raspberry pi users. Fixes bug 9686.
- - Avoid hash-flooding denial-of-service attacks by using the secure
- SipHash-2-4 hash function for our hashtables. Without this
- feature, an attacker could degrade performance of a targeted
- client or server by flooding their data structures with a large
- number of data entries all calculated to be stored at the same
- hash table position, thereby degrading hash table
- performance. With this feature, hash table positions are derived
- from a randomized cryptographic key using SipHash-2-4, and an
- attacker cannot predict which entries will collide.
- Closes ticket 4900.
- Made PREDICTED_CIRCS_RELEVANCE_TIME configurable from config
file with a new option, PredictedPortsRelevanceTime. Implements
ticket #9176. Patch by unixninja92.
diff --git a/src/common/sandbox.c b/src/common/sandbox.c
index 6b78748..5775289 100644
--- a/src/common/sandbox.c
+++ b/src/common/sandbox.c
@@ -1326,7 +1326,7 @@ sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
if (!ctx)
return;
- syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
+ syscall = (int) ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
format_dec_number_sigsafe(syscall, number, sizeof(number));
tor_log_err_sigsafe("(Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall ",
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index 456dde1..0ba5da3 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -671,6 +671,7 @@ test_policies(void)
config_line_t line;
smartlist_t *sm = NULL;
char *policy_str = NULL;
+ short_policy_t *short_parsed = NULL;
policy = smartlist_new();
@@ -858,24 +859,28 @@ test_policies(void)
test_short_policy_parse("reject ,1-10,,,,30-40", "reject 1-10,30-40");
/* Try parsing various broken short policies */
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 200-199"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy(""));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rejekt 1,2,3"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject "));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("reject"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("rej"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3,100000"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2,3x,4"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 2-x"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parse_short_policy("accept 1-,3"));
+#define TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY(s) \
+ do { \
+ tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, (short_parsed = parse_short_policy((s)))); \
+ } while (0)
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 200-199");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rejekt 1,2,3");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject ");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("reject");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("rej");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3,100000");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2,3x,4");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 2-x");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");
+ TT_BAD_SHORT_POLICY("accept 1-,3");
+
/* Test a too-long policy. */
{
int i;
char *policy = NULL;
- short_policy_t *parsed;
smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("accept "));
for (i=1; i<10000; ++i)
@@ -884,9 +889,9 @@ test_policies(void)
policy = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, ch, tor_free(ch));
smartlist_free(chunks);
- parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
+ short_parsed = parse_short_policy(policy);/* shouldn't be accepted */
tor_free(policy);
- tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, parsed);
+ tt_ptr_op(NULL, ==, short_parsed);
}
/* truncation ports */
@@ -927,6 +932,7 @@ test_policies(void)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sm, char *, s, tor_free(s));
smartlist_free(sm);
}
+ short_policy_free(short_parsed);
}
/** Test encoding and parsing of rendezvous service descriptors. */
diff --git a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
index ff52a7e..1c8174b 100644
--- a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ test_routerkeys_write_fingerprint(void *arg)
set_server_identity_key(key);
set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(key));
- check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL);
+ tt_int_op(0, ==, check_private_dir(ddir, CPD_CREATE, NULL));
tt_int_op(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_server_identity_key(),key),==,0);
/* Write fingerprint file */
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