[tor-commits] [torspec/master] If the consensus doesn't contain exits, don't build exit paths
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Dec 30 14:56:19 UTC 2014
commit 96f068af4430a1965cdd792fa318be82b2da37e6
Author: teor <teor2345 at gmail.com>
Date: Sat Dec 20 11:29:47 2014 +1100
If the consensus doesn't contain exits, don't build exit paths
If the consensus doesn't contain exits, we only build internal paths.
This is enough to allow reachability tests (which can enable exits to
bootstrap), and hidden services.
If we subsequently receive a consensus with exits, start building exit paths.
Update dir-spec and path-spec to document this.
Update control-spec to document changes in controller bootstrap messages.
Based on changes made in tor to resolve bug #13814.
---
control-spec.txt | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
dir-spec.txt | 18 ++++++++-
path-spec.txt | 23 +++++++++---
3 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt
index 1ac6bfd..04fa34e 100644
--- a/control-spec.txt
+++ b/control-spec.txt
@@ -1873,6 +1873,10 @@
ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
Tor now knows enough network-status documents and enough server
descriptors that it's going to start trying to build circuits now.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build
+ both exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal
+ circuits.]
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
@@ -2615,6 +2619,21 @@
Current Tor versions enter these phases in order, monotonically.
Future Tors MAY revisit earlier stages.
+ [XXXX: do we revisit earlier stages if the network fails?]
+
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready
+ to handle an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the
+ World Wide Web.
+
+ If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal
+ circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal"
+ as indicated above. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready to handle
+ an application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at
+ ".onion" addresses.
+
+ If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.]
Phase 0:
tag=starting summary="Starting"
@@ -2622,31 +2641,32 @@
Tor starts out in this phase.
Phase 5:
- tag=conn_dir summary="Connecting to directory mirror"
+ tag=conn_dir summary="Connecting to directory server"
- Tor sends this event as soon as Tor has chosen a directory mirror --
+ Tor sends this event as soon as Tor has chosen a directory server --
e.g. one of the authorities if bootstrapping for the first time or
after a long downtime, or one of the relays listed in its cached
directory information otherwise.
Tor will stay at this phase until it has successfully established
- a TCP connection with some directory mirror. Problems in this phase
+ a TCP connection with some directory server. Problems in this phase
generally happen because Tor doesn't have a network connection, or
because the local firewall is dropping SYN packets.
Phase 10:
- tag=handshake_dir summary="Finishing handshake with directory mirror"
+ tag=handshake_dir summary="Finishing handshake with directory server"
- This event occurs when Tor establishes a TCP connection with a relay used
- as a directory mirror (or its https proxy if it's using one). Tor remains
- in this phase until the TLS handshake with the relay is finished.
+ This event occurs when Tor establishes a TCP connection with a relay or
+ authority used as a directory server (or its https proxy if it's using
+ one). Tor remains in this phase until the TLS handshake with the relay
+ or authority is finished.
Problems in this phase generally happen because Tor's firewall is
doing more sophisticated MITM attacks on it, or doing packet-level
keyword recognition of Tor's handshake.
Phase 15:
- tag=onehop_create summary="Establishing one-hop circuit for dir info"
+ tag=onehop_create summary="Establishing an encrypted directory connection"
Once TLS is finished with a relay, Tor will send a CREATE_FAST cell
to establish a one-hop circuit for retrieving directory information.
@@ -2669,7 +2689,7 @@
phase is a good opportunity for using the "progress" keyword to indicate
partial progress.
- This phase could stall if the directory mirror we picked doesn't
+ This phase could stall if the directory server we picked doesn't
have a copy of the networkstatus consensus so we have to ask another,
or it does give us a copy but we don't find it valid.
@@ -2682,51 +2702,99 @@
fetched on hold and fetch the keys so we can verify the signatures.
Phase 45
- tag=requesting_descriptors summary="Asking for relay descriptors"
+ tag=requesting_descriptors summary="Asking for relay descriptors
+ [ for internal paths]"
Once we have a valid networkstatus consensus and we've checked all
its signatures, we start asking for relay descriptors. We stay in this
phase until we have received a 'connected' relay cell in response to
a request for descriptors.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will ask for
+ descriptors for both exit and internal paths. If not, Tor will only ask
+ for descriptors for internal paths. In this case, this status will
+ include "internal" as indicated above.]
+
Phase 50:
- tag=loading_descriptors summary="Loading relay descriptors"
+ tag=loading_descriptors summary="Loading relay descriptors[ for internal
+ paths]"
We will ask for relay descriptors from several different locations,
so this step will probably make up the bulk of the bootstrapping,
especially for users with slow connections. We stay in this phase until
- we have descriptors for at least 1/4 of the usable relays listed in
- the networkstatus consensus. This phase is also a good opportunity to
- use the "progress" keyword to indicate partial steps.
+ we have descriptors for a significant fraction of the usable relays
+ listed in the networkstatus consensus (this can be between 25% and 95%
+ depending on Tor's configuration and network consensus parameters).
+ This phase is also a good opportunity to use the "progress" keyword to
+ indicate partial steps.
+
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will download
+ descriptors for both exit and internal paths. If not, Tor will only
+ download descriptors for internal paths. In this case, this status will
+ include "internal" as indicated above.]
Phase 80:
- tag=conn_or summary="Connecting to entry guard"
+ tag=conn_or summary="Connecting to the Tor network[ internally]"
Once we have a valid consensus and enough relay descriptors, we choose
- some entry guards and start trying to build some circuits. This step
+ entry guard(s) and start trying to build some circuits. This step
is similar to the "conn_dir" phase above; the only difference is
the context.
If a Tor starts with enough recent cached directory information,
its first bootstrap status event will be for the conn_or phase.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal circuits.
+ In this case, this status will include "internal(ly)" as indicated above.]
+
Phase 85:
- tag=handshake_or summary="Finishing handshake with entry guard"
+ tag=handshake_or summary="Finishing handshake with first hop[ of internal
+ circuit]"
This phase is similar to the "handshake_dir" phase, but it gets reached
if we finish a TCP connection to a Tor relay and we have already reached
the "conn_or" phase. We'll stay in this phase until we complete a TLS
handshake with a Tor relay.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor may be finishing
+ a handshake with the first hop if either an exit or internal circuit. In
+ this case, it won't specify which type. If the consensus contains no Exits,
+ Tor will only build internal circuits. In this case, this status will
+ include "internal" as indicated above.]
+
Phase 90:
- tag=circuit_create summary="Establishing circuits"
+ tag=circuit_create summary="Establishing a[n internal] Tor circuit"
+
+ Once we've finished our TLS handshake with the first hop of a circuit,
+ we will set about trying to make some 3-hop circuits in case we need them
+ soon.
- Once we've finished our TLS handshake with an entry guard, we will
- set about trying to make some 3-hop circuits in case we need them soon.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. If not, Tor will only build internal circuits.
+ In this case, this status will include "internal" as indicated above.]
Phase 100:
tag=done summary="Done"
- A full 3-hop exit circuit has been established. Tor is ready to handle
+ A full 3-hop circuit has been established. Tor is ready to handle
application connections now.
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. At this stage, Tor will be ready to handle
+ an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the World
+ Wide Web.
+
+ If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal
+ circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal"
+ as indicated above. At this stage, Tor will be ready to handle an
+ application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at ".onion"
+ addresses.
+
+ If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.]
diff --git a/dir-spec.txt b/dir-spec.txt
index 54a0437..9049c35 100644
--- a/dir-spec.txt
+++ b/dir-spec.txt
@@ -2689,7 +2689,23 @@
On failure, the client waits briefly, then tries that network-status
document again from another cache. The client does not build circuits
until it has a live network-status consensus document, and it has
- descriptors for more than 1/4 of the routers that it believes are running.
+ descriptors for a significant proportion of the routers that it believes
+ are running (this is configurable using torrc options and consensus
+ parameters).
+
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready
+ to handle an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the
+ World Wide Web.
+
+ If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal
+ circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal"
+ as indicated above. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready to handle
+ an application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at
+ ".onion" addresses.
+
+ If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.]
(Note: clients can and should pick caches based on the network-status
information they have: once they have first fetched network-status info
diff --git a/path-spec.txt b/path-spec.txt
index f3c7c9f..192bbc7 100644
--- a/path-spec.txt
+++ b/path-spec.txt
@@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ of their choices.
that no current circuit can handle, for testing the network or our
reachability, and so on).
+ [Newer versions of Tor (0.2.6.1-alpha and later):
+ If the consensus contains Exits (the typical case), Tor will build both
+ exit and internal circuits. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready
+ to handle an application requesting an exit circuit to services like the
+ World Wide Web.
+
+ If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal
+ circuits. In this case, earlier statuses will have included "internal"
+ as indicated above. When bootstrap completes, Tor will be ready to handle
+ an application requesting an internal circuit to hidden services at
+ ".onion" addresses.
+
+ If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.]
+
When a client application creates a new stream (by opening a SOCKS
connection or launching a resolve request), we attach it to an appropriate
open circuit if one exists, or wait if an appropriate circuit is
@@ -659,12 +673,12 @@ of their choices.
Clients maintain two usage counts for each of their guards: a count
of the number of usage attempts, and a count of the number of
successful usages.
-
+
A usage attempt means any attempt to attach a stream to a circuit.
Usage success status is temporarily recorded by state flags on circuits.
Guard usage success counts are not incremented until circuit close. A
- circuit is marked as successfully used if we receive a properly
+ circuit is marked as successfully used if we receive a properly
recognized RELAY cell on that circuit that was expected for the current
circuit purpose.
@@ -733,7 +747,7 @@ of their choices.
Min: 0
Max: 100
Effect: If the circuit success rate falls below this percentage,
- we emit a more alarmist warning log message. If
+ we emit a more alarmist warning log message. If
pb_dropguard is set to 1, we also disable the use of the
guard.
@@ -791,7 +805,7 @@ of their choices.
version of the defense is unlikely to be deployed until the ntor
circuit handshake is enabled, or the nature of CPU overload induced
failure is better understood.
-
+
X. Old notes
@@ -844,4 +858,3 @@ X.3. Some stuff that worries me about entry guards. 2006 Jun, Nickm.
[Do we do any of this now? If not, this should move into 099-misc or
098-todo. -NM]
-
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