# [tor-commits] [tech-reports/master] add tbb-forensic-analysis report

karsten at torproject.org karsten at torproject.org
Fri Jun 28 16:48:07 UTC 2013

commit 3c6e9e3e5876280616cba520744fe5386b4a318d
Author: Runa A. Sandvik <runa.sandvik at gmail.com>
Date:   Fri Jun 28 12:18:00 2013 -0400

---
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.../tbb-forensic-analysis.tex                      |  654 ++++++++++++++++++++
2013/tbb-forensic-analysis/tortechrep.cls          |    1 +
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+tbb-forensic-analysis.pdf
+tbb-forensic-analysis-2013-06-28.pdf
+
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+\documentclass{tortechrep}
+\usepackage{url}
+\usepackage{graphicx}
+\usepackage{enumerate}
+\usepackage{hyperref}
+
+\begin{document}
+
+\title{
+	Forensic Analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle \\
+	on OS X, Linux, and Windows
+}
+
+\author{Runa A. Sandvik}
+
+\contact{\href{mailto:runa at torproject.org}{runa at torproject.org}}
+\reportid{2013-06-001}
+\date{June 28, 2013}
+
+\maketitle
+
+\section{Introduction}
+% motivation
+month\footnote{\url{https://webstats.torproject.org/webalizer/www.torproject.org/usage\_201305.html}}
+the Tor Browser Bundle is the most popular software package offered on
+the Tor Project website. A lot of work has been put into making the Tor
+Browser safe for use with Tor\footnote{\url{https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/}},
+including the use of extra patches against this browser to enhance
+privacy and security. The Tor Browser Bundle also aims to ensure that
+the user is able to completely and safely remove the bundle without
+leaving other traces on her computer.
+
+In an effort to further enhance the security of the Tor Browser Bundle,
+we performed a forensic analysis of the bundle (version 2.3.25-6,
+64-bit) on three different operating systems: OS X 10.8, Debian 6.0
+Squeeze Linux, and Windows 7. Our objective was to find traces left by
+the Tor Browser Bundle and then find ways to counter forensic analysis
+in three different scenarios:
+
+\begin{enumerate}[(a)]
+    \item On a machine that the user does not own, such as a machine in
+        a library or Internet caf\'e.
+\end{enumerate}
+\begin{enumerate}[(b)]
+    \item On a machine that the user does own, but does not have
+\end{enumerate}
+\begin{enumerate}[(c)]
+    \item On a machine that the user does have administrative rights on,
+        but where the user is non-technical and does not know where to
+        find traces of the Tor Browser Bundle or how to remove them.
+\end{enumerate}
+
+In the following, we discuss the objective, scope, and limitations for
+this analysis. We then look into the traces found on the different
+operating systems and suggest possible mitigations for some of them. We
+conclude with ideas for further analysis work.
+
+\section{Scope}
+The primary scope of this forensic analysis was to set up, use, and
+analyze three operating systems for any changes that may have been made
+specifically by the use of the Tor Browser Bundle. We built three
+separate virtual machines, one for each operating system, with default
+a browser, but instead connected an external drive which we then copied
+the bundle from. We made a decision to only consider traces left by the
+Tor Browser Bundle after the bundle had been deleted and the system had
+been completely shut down.
+
+\section{Limitations}
+The objective, scope, and tools used during this analysis introduced a
+few limitations that we feel is worth considering when reading this
+user, her system, and how she is using the Tor Browser Bundle.
+
+\subsection{Objective}
+The objective assumes that the user either does not have administrative
+rights on the machine, or does not know how to find and remove traces of
+the Tor Browser Bundle. A technical user with administrative rights on
+her system will be able to mitigate a number of the traces found.
+
+\subsection{Scope}
+All three operating systems were installed with default settings and
+values. The Tor Browser Bundle was copied from an attached external
+drive to the user's Desktop or home directory. Once the user finished
+browsing, the Tor Browser Bundle directory and archive was moved to the
+trash can, and the trash can was then emptied. The system was completely
+shut down once the bundle had been deleted.
+
+We did not consider traces which are not directly related to the Tor
+Browser Bundle, such as the presence of an external drive. Additionally,
+we did not consider traces left after using the Tor Browser Bundle while
+the bundle was still present on the system, or the system had not been
+completely shut down.
+
+We believe it is likely that a different scenario would reveal
+additional traces of the Tor Browser Bundle on the user's system.
+
+\subsection{Tools}
+We used a range of different tools to perform the forensic analysis, all
+of which are free and available online. The following three tools were
+all used both before and after we ran the Tor Browser Bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item
+        \textbf{dd}\footnote{\url{http://www.debianhelp.co.uk/ddcommand.htm}} -
+        create a backup image of the virtual drive.
+    \item
+        \textbf{rsync}\footnote{\url{http://packages.debian.org/squeeze/rsync}} -
+        copy all the files on the system over to an external drive.
+    \item \textbf{md5deep} and
+        \textbf{hashdeep}\footnote{\url{http://packages.debian.org/squeeze/md5deep}}
+        - compute hashes for every file on the drive, and later compare hashes
+        of the clean image against hashes of the tainted image. A new or
+        changed hash indicates a new or changed file.
+\end{itemize}
+
+We also performed a run-time analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on
+Windows 7 using
+Noriben\footnote{\url{https://www.novainfosec.com/2013/04/17/noriben-your-personal-portable-malware-sandbox/}}
+and
+procmon\footnote{\url{http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb896645.aspx}}.
+This allowed us to create a report of everything the Tor Browser Bundle
+did while it was running. A similar analysis was not performed on OS X
+or Linux due to time constraints.
+
+An analyst with access to a different set of tools, such as commercial
+tools, might find traces which we were unable to find.
+
+\section{Process}
+We followed roughly the same testing process for all three operating
+systems. We set up a separate virtual machine for each operating system,
+logged in with the account we created during the installation process,
+installed available updates and shut it down cleanly. We used a normal
+user account on Linux, a non-root administrative account on OS X, and an
+
+Once the operating system had been set up, we connected the virtual
+drive to another virtual machine, used dd to create an image of the
+drive, used hashdeep to compute hashes for every file on the drive, and
+then rsync to copy all the files over to an external drive. It is
+important to note that we used hashdeep and rsync on the original
+virtual drive, not on the copy we created with dd.
+
+After having secured a copy of the clean virtual machine, we rebooted
+the system, connected an external drive, and copied the Tor Browser
+Bundle from the external drive to the Desktop or user's home directory.
+
+We started the Tor Browser Bundle by clicking on the package archive to
+extract it, and then clicking on the Tor Browser Bundle executable to
+run it. On Debian Linux, we also used the command line to extract the
+archive with \textit{tar -zxvf} and start the bundle with
+\textit{./start-tor-browser}.
+
+We waited for the Tor Browser to confirm we were connected to the
+couple of different pages and clicked on a few links before shutting it
+down by closing the Tor Browser and clicking on the \textit{Exit}-button in
+Vidalia. The Tor Browser did not crash and we did not see any error
+messages.
+
+We deleted the Tor Browser Bundle folder and package archive by moving
+all components into the Trash/Recycle Bin, clicking on it and choosing
+Empty Trash/Empty Recycle Bin. On Linux, we also deleted the Tor Browser
+folder and package archive using \textit{rm -rf} on the command line.
+
+We repeated the steps with dd, rsync, and hashdeep to create a copy of
+the tainted virtual machine. On Windows, we also used Noriben and
+procmon as previously noted.
+
+\section{Results}
+The following sections list the traces found which directly relate to
+the Tor Browser Bundle. Each issue has its own ticket in the bug
+tracker\footnote{\url{https://bugs.torproject.org/}}. The full list of
+traces can be found in
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8166}{\#8166} for
+Linux,
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/6846}{\#6846} for
+OS X, and
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/6845}{\#6845} for
+Windows.
+
+The majority of the issues found show traces of the Tor Browser Bundle
+package on the user's system. \textit{Issue 6} describes the only known
+instance of browsing history leakage, other than perhaps swap
+files/partitions.
+
+A number of the issues below are related to default operating system
+behavior, such as the use of Spotlight on OS X and Windows Search. The
+easiest way to avoid leaving traces on a computer system is to use
+\textit{The Amnesic Incognito Live System (TAILS)}\footnote{\url{https://tails.boum.org/}}.
+
+\subsection{OS X}
+\subsubsection{Issue 1: Apple System Log (ASL)}
+The Apple System Log is a background process that allows messages from
+different parts of the operating system to be recorded in several ways.
+We were able to find traces of the Tor Browser Bundle in the following
+files:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/log/asl/2013.05.22.U0.G80.asl
+    \item /var/log/asl/2013.05.22.U501.asl
+\end{itemize}
+
+We were not able to examine the following files, but they may contain
+traces of the bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/log/asl/StoreData
+    \item /var/log/asl/SweepStore
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8982}{\#8982}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 2: Crash Reporter and Diagnostic Messages}
+The Crash Reporter on OS X will collect information about any
+application that crashes or hangs. We did not encounter any problems
+when running the Tor Browser Bundle, but we still found traces of the
+bundle in the following files:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /Library/Application Support/CrashReporter/ \\ Intervals\_00000000-0000-1000-8000-000C2976590B.plist
+    \item /var/log/DiagnosticMessages/2013.05.22.asl
+\end{itemize}
+
+We were not able to examine the following file, but it might contain
+traces of the bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/log/DiagnosticMessages/StoreData
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8983}{\#8983}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 3: FSEvents API}
+The FSEvents API allows applications to register for notifications of
+changes to a given directory tree. Whenever the filesystem is changed,
+the kernel passes notifications to a process called fseventsd.
+
+The following file contains the path to the attached external drive, the
+path to the Tor Browser Bundle on the Desktop, and the path to the Tor
+Browser Bundle in the Trash:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /.fseventsd/0000000000172019
+\end{itemize}
+
+We were not able to examine the other files in the \textit{.fseventsd}
+directory, which may also contain traces of the bundle. This issue has
+been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8984}{\#8984}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 4: HFS+}
+HFS+ is the default filesystem on OS X; it supports journaling, quotas,
+HFS+ also supports hot file clustering, which tracks read-only files
+that are frequently requested and then moves them into a "hot zone". The
+hot file clustering scheme uses an on-disk B-Tree file for tracking.
+
+We were not able to examine the following files, which may contain
+traces of the bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /.hotfiles.btree
+    \item /.journal
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8985}{\#8985}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 5: Preferences}
+OS X applications store preference settings in plist files, and the
+files below are related to system fonts, the file manager, recent items,
+and the Tor Browser Bundle. These files all contain traces of the Tor
+Browser Bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Preferences/com.apple.ATS.plist
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Preferences/com.apple.finder.plist
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Preferences/com.apple.recentitems.plist
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Preferences/org.mozilla.torbrowser.plist
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8986}{\#8986}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 6: Saved Application State}
+Resume is one of the new features in OS X 10.7 and 10.8. The feature
+allows applications to save their last known state when they are closed,
+
+While the Tor Browser does not use this feature, it does leak
+information in the files which are written to the
+\textit{/Users/runa/Library/Saved Application State/} directory:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Saved Application State/org.mozilla.torbrowser.savedState/data.data
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Saved Application State/org.mozilla.torbrowser.savedState/window\_3.data
+    \item /Users/runa/Library/Saved Application State/org.mozilla.torbrowser.savedState/windows.plist
+\end{itemize}
+
+The \textit{windows.plist} file contains the HTML title tag of the last
+active tab in the Tor Browser (or currently active tab, if the browser
+is still open). This has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8987}{\#8987}.
+
+Thanks to community review of our findings, we have a potential fix for
+this issue which we will include in version 3.0alpha2 of the Tor Browser
+Bundle.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 7: Spotlight}
+Spotlight, and the Metadata Server (mds), indexes all items and files on
+a system and allows the user to perform system-wide searches for all
+sorts of items; documents, pictures, applications, system preferences,
+etc.
+
+We were not able to examine the following files, but it is likely that
+Spotlight and mds picked up the Tor Browser Bundle at some point:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/db/mds/messages/se\_SecurityMessages
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8988}{\#8988}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 8: Swap}
+OS X relies on swap files and paging for memory and cache management. We
+were not able to examine the swap file, but it is likely that the
+following file contains traces of the bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/vm/swapfile0
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8989}{\#8989}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 9: Temporary data}
+OS X stores per-user temporary files and caches in \textit{/var/folders/}. The
+following files contain the path to the Tor Browser Bundle on the Desktop and
+in the Trash:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /var/folders/fb/v5wqpgls029d8tp\_pcjy0yth0000gn/C/com.apple.LaunchServices-036501.csstore
+    \item /var/folders/fb/v5wqpgls029d8tp\_pcjy0yth0000gn/C/ \\ com.apple.QuickLook.thumbnailcache/index.sqlite
+    \item /var/folders/zz/zyxvpxvq6csfxvn\_n0000000000000/C/com.apple.LaunchServices-0360.csstore
+    \item /var/folders/fb/v5wqpgls029d8tp\_pcjy0yth0000gn/C/ \\ com.apple.QuickLook.thumbnailcache/thumbnails.data
+\end{itemize}
+
+These files also contain strings such as
+\textit{org.torproject.torbrowserbundle}, \textit{org.mozilla.torbrowser},
+\textit{torbrowser\_en-us.app}, \textit{torbrowser.app},
+\textit{net.vidalia-project.vidalia}, and \textit{vidalia.app}.
+
+We were not able to examine the last file, \textit{thumbnails.data}, but it
+might contain traces of the bundle as well. This issue has been
+documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8990}{\#8990}.
+
+\subsection{Debian GNU/Linux with GNOME}
+\subsubsection{Issue 10: Bash History}
+Bash is the default shell/command processor on Linux and keeps a record
+of commands typed by the user. The file below contains lines showing we
+extracted and ran the Tor Browser Bundle. This trace is specific to the
+user shell being \textit{/bin/bash}. Other shells and window managers
+will give different results:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /home/runa/.bash\_history:
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8697}{\#8697}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 11: GVFS}
+GVFS is the virtual filesystem for the GNOME desktop. This result will
+vary depending on the window manager used. The following file contains
+the filename of the Tor Browser Bundle tarball,
+\textit{tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86\_64-2.3.25-5-dev-en-US.tar.gz}:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8695}{\#8695}.
+
+After deleting the Tor Browser Bundle by moving the folder and package
+archive into the Trash/Recycle Bin, clicking on it and choosing Empty
+Trash/Empty Recycle Bin, we noticed that the following file contained
+lines indicating that the Tor Browser Bundle had been deleted:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+
+Traces in this file include lines such as
+\textit{/.local/share/Trash/expunged/3864782161/start-tor-browser} and
+\textit{/.local/share/Trash/expunged/3864782161/App/tor}. This issue has
+been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8707}{\#8707}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 12: Recently Used}
+The following file contains information about recently used files,
+including the Tor Browser Bundle. The file contains the filename of the
+Tor Browser Bundle tarball,
+\textit{tor-browser-gnu-linux-x86\_64-2.3.25-5-dev-en-US.tar.gz}, as
+well as the time and date the bundle was added, modified, and visited:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /home/runa/.recently-used.xbel
+\end{itemize}
+
+The file \textit{.recently-used} could also exist. This issue has been
+documented as \href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8706}{\#8706}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 13: X Session Manager}
+In the X Window System, an X session manager is a session management
+program, a program that can save and restore the current state of a set
+of running applications. The file listed below contains the following
+string, \textit{"Window manager warning: Buggy client sent a
+\_NET\_ACTIVE\_WINDOW message with a timestamp of 0 for 0x3800089 (Tor
+Browse)"}:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item /home/runa/.xsession-errors
+\end{itemize}
+
+The file \textit{.xsession-errors.old} could also exist. This issue has been
+documented as \href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8696}{\#8696}.
+
+\subsection{Windows}
+\subsubsection{Issue 14: Prefetch}
+Windows keeps track of the way the system starts and which programs the
+user commonly opens. This information is saved as a number of small
+files in the \textit{Prefetch} folder. The files below may contain data
+and elements of executable code:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Prefetch\textbackslash{}START TOR BROWSER.EXE-F5557FAC.pf
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Prefetch\textbackslash{}TBB-FIREFOX.EXE-350502C5.pf
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Prefetch\textbackslash{}TOR-BROWSER-2.3.25-6\_EN-US.EX-1354A499.pf
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Prefetch\textbackslash{}TOR.EXE-D7159D93.pf
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Prefetch\textbackslash{}VIDALIA.EXE-5167E0BC.pf
+\end{itemize}
+
+The following cache files are most likely similar to prefetch files. We
+were not able to examine these files, but they may contain traces of the
+Tor Browser Bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Caches\textbackslash{}cversions.1.db
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-C647E37CA0D9\}.1.ver0x0000000000000006.db
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}AppCompat\textbackslash{}Programs\textbackslash{}RecentFileCache.bcf
+\end{itemize}
+
+This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8916}{\#8916}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 15: Thumbnail Cache}
+Windows stores thumbnails of graphics files, and certain document and
+movie files, in Thumbnail Cache files. The following files contain the
+Onion Logo icon associated with the Tor Browser Bundle:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}Runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Explorer\textbackslash{}thumbcache\_32.db
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}Runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Explorer\textbackslash{}thumbcache\_96.db
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}Runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Explorer\textbackslash{}thumbcache\_256.db
+\end{itemize}
+
+Other Thumbnail Cache files, such as \textit{thumbcache\_1024.db},
+\textit{thumbcache\_sr.db}, \textit{thumbcache\_idx.db}, and
+\textit{IconCache.db}, may also contain the Onion Logo icon. This issue
+has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8921}{\#8921}.
+
+One possible solution would be to drop the Onion Logo icon and use a
+standard Windows icon instead, assuming this does not confuse our
+Windows users too much.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 16: Windows Paging File}
+Microsoft Windows uses a paging file, called \textit{pagefile.sys,} to store
+frames of memory that do not currently fit into physical memory. The
+the attached external drive, as well as the filename for the Tor Browser
+Bundle executable. This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8918}{\#8918}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 17: Windows Registry}
+The Windows Registry is a database that stores various configuration
+settings and options for the operating system. \textit{HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER},
+abbreviated \textit{HKCU}, stores settings that are specific to the currently
+logged-in user. Each user's settings are stored in files called
+\textit{NTUSER.DAT} and \textit{UsrClass.dat}.
+
+The path to the Tor Browser Bundle executable is listed in the following
+two files:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}UsrClass.dat
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}Users\textbackslash{}runa\textbackslash{}AppData\textbackslash{}Local\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}UsrClass.dat.LOG1
+\end{itemize}
+
+We did not find traces of the Tor Browser Bundle in any of the
+\textit{NTUSER.DAT} files. It is likely that we would have seen
+different results had we used Windows XP, due to a change in registry
+handling between Windows XP/Vista and Windows 7. This issue has been
+documented as \href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8919}{\#8919}.
+
+\subsubsection{Issue 18: Windows Search}
+Windows Search, which is enabled by default, builds a full-text index of
+files on the computer. One component of Windows Search is the Indexer,
+which crawls the file system on initial setup, and then listens for file
+system notifications to index changed files. Windows Search writes a
+number of files to
+\textit{C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}}:
+
+\begin{itemize}
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}
+        \\ GatherLogs\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}SystemIndex.1.Crwl
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}
+        \\ GatherLogs\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}SystemIndex.1.gthr
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}MSS.chk
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}MSS.log
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}MSS00007.log
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}MSS00008.log
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}00010004.ci
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}00010004.dir
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}00010004.wid
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}00010004.wsb
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}CiAB0002.001
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}CiAB0002.002
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}INDEX.000
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}INDEX.001
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ Indexer\textbackslash{}CiFiles\textbackslash{}INDEX.002
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ PropMap\textbackslash{}CiPT0000.000
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ PropMap\textbackslash{}CiPT0000.001
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ PropMap\textbackslash{}CiPT0000.002
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ SecStore\textbackslash{}CiST0000.000
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ SecStore\textbackslash{}CiST0000.001
+    \item
+        C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Projects\textbackslash{}SystemIndex\textbackslash{}
+        \\ SecStore\textbackslash{}CiST0000.002
+    \item C:\textbackslash{}ProgramData\textbackslash{}Microsoft\textbackslash{}Search\textbackslash{}Data\textbackslash{}Applications\textbackslash{}Windows\textbackslash{}Windows.edb
+\end{itemize}
+
+We were not able to examine the Windows Search database files, but
+it is likely that Windows Search picked up the Tor Browser Bundle at
+some point. This issue has been documented as
+\href{https://bugs.torproject.org/8920}{\#8920}.
+
+\section{Further work}
+The Tor Browser Bundle aims to ensure that no traces are left on the
+user's system. However, a number of the traces listed in this report are
+related to default operating system settings, some of which the bundle
+might not be able to remove. We therefore propose the creation of a
+document which lists steps our users can take to mitigate these traces
+on the different operating systems.
+
+The scope of this analysis covered traces left by the Tor Browser Bundle
+bundle. The results in this report would have been slightly different
+propose to expand the scope of a future analysis to also include
+
+The goal of this analysis was to identify traces left behind by the Tor
+Browser Bundle after extracting, using, and deleting the bundle. The Tor
+Browser Bundle uses Firefox Private Browsing mode by default, which
+should prevent browsing history from being written to disk. We propose
+to watch the Tor Browser Bundle directory itself for browsing history
+leaks, before the bundle is deleted, for example via automated tests to
+watch for regressions by either Mozilla or us.
+
+The forensic analysis was performed with one specific version of the Tor
+Browser Bundle. Other packages, such as the Pluggable Transports Tor
+Browser
+and the experimental Tor Browser Bundle without
+Vidalia\footnote{\url{https://blog.torproject.org/blog/announcing-tor-browser-bundle-30alpha1}},
+and newer versions of the bundle may leave a different set of traces on
+the user's system. We propose to include forensic analysis in our build
+infrastructure so that we can test a number of Tor Browser Bundle
+packages on a regular basis.
+
+As noted in the tools section, we performed a run-time analysis of the
+Tor Browser Bundle on Windows 7. We were not able to perform a similar
+analysis on OS X and Linux due to time constraints. We propose to
+perform a run-time analysis of the Tor Browser Bundle on OS X and Linux
+to rule out any additional traces.
+
+\section*{Acknowledgments}
+Thanks to Mike Perry, Philipp Winter, and Steve Lord, for providing
+valuable feedback for this technical report.
+
+\end{document}
diff --git a/2013/tbb-forensic-analysis/tortechrep.cls b/2013/tbb-forensic-analysis/tortechrep.cls
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