[tor-commits] r25760: {website} Remove getinvolved/research which has moved to research.torp (website/trunk/getinvolved/en)

Karsten Loesing karsten at torproject.org
Mon Aug 20 07:23:26 UTC 2012

Author: kloesing
Date: 2012-08-20 07:23:26 +0000 (Mon, 20 Aug 2012)
New Revision: 25760

Remove getinvolved/research which has moved to research.torproject.org

Deleted: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/research.wml
--- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/research.wml	2012-08-20 06:12:23 UTC (rev 25759)
+++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/research.wml	2012-08-20 07:23:26 UTC (rev 25760)
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-## translation metadata
-# Revision: $Revision$
-# Translation-Priority: 4-optional
-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Research" CHARSET="UTF-8"
-<div id="content" class="clearfix">
-  <div id="breadcrumbs">
-    <a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
-    <a href="<page getinvolved/research>">Research</a>
-  </div>
-  <div id="maincol">
-<h2>Tor: Research</h2>
-<hr />
-Many people around the world are doing research on how to improve the Tor
-design, what's going on in the Tor network, and more generally on attacks
-and defenses for anonymous communication systems. This page summarizes
-the resources we provide to help make your Tor research more effective.
-The best way to reach us about research is through the <a href="<page
-about/contact>">tor-assistants</a> list.
-We've been <a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/data.html">collecting
-data to learn more about the Tor network</a>: how many relays and
-clients there are in the network, what capabilities they have, how
-fast the network is, how many clients are connecting via bridges,
-what traffic exits the network, etc. We are also developing
-tools to process these huge data archives and come up with
-<a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/graphs.html">useful
-statistics</a>. Let us know what other information you'd like to
-see, and we can work with you to help make sure it gets collected
-<a href="https://metrics.torproject.org/papers/wecsr10.pdf">safely</a>
-and robustly.
-If you're investigating Tor, or solving a Tor-related problem,
-<i>_please_</i> talk to us somewhere along the way — the earlier
-the better. These days we review too many conference paper submissions
-that make bad assumptions and end up solving the wrong problem. Since
-the Tor protocol and the Tor network are both moving targets, measuring
-things without understanding what's going on behind the scenes is going
-to result in bad conclusions. In particular, different groups often
-unwittingly run a variety of experiments in parallel, and at the same
-time we're constantly modifying the design to try new approaches. If
-you let us know what you're doing and what you're trying to learn,
-we can help you understand what other variables to expect and how to
-interpret your results.
-<b>Measurement and attack tools.</b>
-We're building a <a
-href="https://metrics.torproject.org/tools.html">repository</a> of tools
-that can be used to measure, analyze, or perform attacks on Tor. Many
-research groups end up needing to do similar measurements (for example,
-change the Tor design in some way and then see if latency improves),
-and we hope to help everybody standardize on a few tools and then make
-them really good. Also, while there are some really neat Tor attacks
-that people have published about, it's hard to track down a copy of
-the code they used. Let us know if you have new tools we should list,
-or improvements to the existing ones. The more the better, at this stage.
-<b>We need defenses too — not just attacks.</b>
-Most researchers find it easy and fun to come up with novel attacks on
-anonymity systems. We've seen this result lately in terms of improved
-congestion attacks, attacks based on remotely measuring latency or
-throughput, and so on. Knowing how things can go wrong is important,
-and we recognize that the incentives in academia aren't aligned with
-spending energy on designing defenses, but it sure would be great to
-get more attention to how to address the attacks. We'd love to help
-brainstorm about how to make Tor better. As a bonus, your paper might
-even end up with a stronger "countermeasures" section.
-<b>In-person help.</b>
-If you're doing interesting and important Tor research and need help
-understanding how the Tor network or design works, interpreting your
-data, crafting your experiments, etc, we can send a Tor researcher to
-your doorstep. As you might expect, we don't have a lot of free time;
-but making sure that research is done in a way that's useful to us is
-really important. So let us know, and we'll work something out.
-<a id="Groups"></a>
-<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Groups">Research Groups</a></h2>
-<p>Interested to find other anonymity researchers? Here are some
-research groups you should take a look at.</p>
-<li>Ian Goldberg's <a href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/">CrySP</a> group
-at Waterloo.
-<li><a href="http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/">Nick Hopper</a>'s
-group at UMN.
-<li><a href="http://www.hatswitch.org/~nikita/">Nikita Borisov</a>'s
-group at Illinois.
-<li>Micah Sherr's <a href="https://security.cs.georgetown.edu/">SecLab</a>
-group at Georgetown.
-<li>Matt Wright's <a href="http://isec.uta.edu/">iSec</a> group at
-<a id="Ideas"></a>
-<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Ideas">Research Ideas</a></h2>
-If you're interested in anonymity research, you must make it to the
-<a href="http://petsymposium.org/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies
-Symposium</a>. Everybody who's anybody in the anonymity research world
-will be there. Stipends are generally available for people whose presence
-will benefit the community.
-<p>To get up to speed on anonymity research, read <a
-href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">these papers</a> (especially the
-ones in boxes).</p>
-<p>We need people to attack the system, quantify defenses,
-etc. Here are some example projects:</p>
-<li>What algorithm should we use to assign Guard flags such that a)
-we assign the flag to as many relays as possible, yet b) we minimize
-the chance that Alice will use an attacker's node as a guard? See the
-<a href="<blog>/research-problem-better-guard-rotation-parameters">blog
-post</a> for details.
-<li>For various diversity metrics, how has the diversity of
-the Tor network changed over time? How robust is it to change or
-attack? These results can help us make better design decisions. See the <a
-href="<blog>/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-network">blog post</a>
-for details.
-<li>If we prevent the really loud users from using too much of the Tor
-network, how much can it help? We've instrumented Tor's entry relays
-so they can rate-limit connections from users, and we've instrumented
-the directory authorities so they can change the rate-limiting
-parameters globally across the network. Which parameter values improve
-performance for the Tor network as a whole? How should relays adapt
-their rate-limiting parameters based on their capacity and based on
-the network load they see, and what rate-limiting algorithms will work
-best? See the <a
-post</a> for details.
-<li>Right now Tor clients are willing to reuse a given circuit for ten
-minutes after it's first used. The goal is to avoid loading down the
-network with too many circuit creations, yet to also avoid having
-clients use the same circuit for so long that the exit node can build a
-useful pseudonymous profile of them. Alas, ten minutes is probably way
-too long, especially if connections from multiple protocols (e.g. IM and
-web browsing) are put on the same circuit. If we keep fixed the overall
-number of circuit extends that the network needs to do, are there more
-efficient and/or safer ways for clients to allocate streams to circuits,
-or for clients to build preemptive circuits? Perhaps this research item
-needs to start with gathering some traces of what requests typical
-clients try to launch, so you have something realistic to try to optimize.
-<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
-hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
-"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
-you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
-(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
-this attack on the deployed Tor design? The problem with all the
-previous attack papers is that they look at timing and counting of
-IP packets on the wire. But OpenSSL's TLS records, plus Tor's use of
-TCP pushback to do rate limiting, means that tracing by IP packets
-produces very poor results. The right approach is to realize that
-Tor uses OpenSSL, look inside the TLS record at the TLS headers, and
-figure out how many 512-byte cells are being sent or received. Then
-start exploring defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell
-size from 512 bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques
-like <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive
-dropping</a>, or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do
-these have, and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric)
-is there from a successful defense in each case?</li>
-Path selection algorithms, directory fetching schedules for Tor-on-mobile
-that are compatible anonymity-wise with our current approaches.
-<li>More coming soon. See also the "Research" section of the <a
-href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">volunteer</a> page for
-other topics.
-  </div>
-  <!-- END MAINCOL -->
-  <div id = "sidecol">
-#include "side.wmi"
-#include "info.wmi"
-  </div>
-  <!-- END SIDECOL -->
-<!-- END CONTENT -->
-#include <foot.wmi>

Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/sidenav.wmi
--- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/sidenav.wmi	2012-08-20 06:12:23 UTC (rev 25759)
+++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/sidenav.wmi	2012-08-20 07:23:26 UTC (rev 25760)
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
         {'url'  => 'getinvolved/relays',
          'txt'  => 'Set up relays',
-        {'url'  => 'getinvolved/research',
+        {'url'  => 'https://research.torproject.org/',
          'txt'  => 'Research',
         {'url'  => 'donate/donate',

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