[tor-commits] [research-web/master] break out index into groups and ideas file. muck with header too.
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Mon Aug 13 07:26:56 UTC 2012
commit bfb9d189e3adebbce09b26a6b876ed15c7e9d06a
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Aug 13 03:25:20 2012 -0400
break out index into groups and ideas file. muck with header too.
some further mucking with the header is probably in order, for example
to change the color of the page you're on.
---
groups.html | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
ideas.html | 130 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
index.html | 6 ++-
techreports.html | 6 ++-
4 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/groups.html b/groups.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..165d267
--- /dev/null
+++ b/groups.html
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Tor Research: Research Groups</title>
+<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
+<link href="css/stylesheet-ltr.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet">
+<link href="/images/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" rel="shortcut icon">
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<table class="banner" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="">
+<tr>
+ <td class="banner-left">
+ <a href="index.html">
+ <img src="/images/top-left.png" alt="Click to go to home page"
+ width="193" height="79"></a></td>
+ <td class="banner-middle">
+ <a href="index.html">Home</a><br>
+ Groups<br>
+ <a href="ideas.html">Ideas</a><br>
+ <a href="techreports.html">Tech Reports</a><br>
+ </td>
+ <td class="banner-right"></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="center">
+<div class="main-column">
+<h2>Research Groups</h2>
+<br>
+
+<p>Interested to find other anonymity researchers? Here are some
+research groups you should take a look at.</p>
+
+<ul>
+<li>Ian Goldberg's <a href="http://crysp.uwaterloo.ca/">CrySP</a> group
+at Waterloo.
+</li>
+<li><a href="http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/">Nick Hopper</a>'s
+group at UMN.
+</li>
+<li><a href="http://www.hatswitch.org/~nikita/">Nikita Borisov</a>'s
+group at Illinois.
+</li>
+<li>Micah Sherr's <a href="https://security.cs.georgetown.edu/">SecLab</a>
+group at Georgetown.
+</li>
+<li>Matt Wright's <a href="http://isec.uta.edu/">iSec</a> group at
+UTA.
+</li>
+</ul>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+</body>
+</html>
+
diff --git a/ideas.html b/ideas.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7947755
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ideas.html
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Tor Research: Research Ideas</title>
+<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1">
+<link href="css/stylesheet-ltr.css" type="text/css" rel="stylesheet">
+<link href="/images/favicon.ico" type="image/x-icon" rel="shortcut icon">
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<table class="banner" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" summary="">
+<tr>
+ <td class="banner-left">
+ <a href="index.html">
+ <img src="/images/top-left.png" alt="Click to go to home page"
+ width="193" height="79"></a></td>
+ <td class="banner-middle">
+ <a href="index.html">Home</a><br>
+ <a href="groups.html">Groups</a><br>
+ Ideas<br>
+ <a href="techreports.html">Tech Reports</a><br>
+ </td>
+ <td class="banner-right"></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<div class="center">
+<div class="main-column">
+<h2>Research Ideas</h2>
+<br>
+
+<p>
+If you're interested in anonymity research, you must make it to the
+<a href="http://petsymposium.org/">Privacy Enhancing Technologies
+Symposium</a>. Everybody who's anybody in the anonymity research world
+will be there. Stipends are generally available for people whose presence
+will benefit the community.
+</p>
+
+<p>To get up to speed on anonymity research, read <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/">these papers</a> (especially the
+ones in boxes).
+We also keep a list of <a href="techreports.html">Tor Tech Reports</a>
+that are (co-)authored by Tor developers.</p>
+
+<p>We need people to attack the system, quantify defenses,
+etc. Here are some example projects:</p>
+
+<ul>
+
+<li>What algorithm should we use to assign Guard flags such that a)
+we assign the flag to as many relays as possible, yet b) we minimize
+the chance that Alice will use an attacker's node as a guard? See the
+<a href="https://blog.torproject.org/research-problem-better-guard-rotation-parameters">blog
+post</a> for details.
+</li>
+
+<li>For various diversity metrics, how has the diversity of
+the Tor network changed over time? How robust is it to change or
+attack? These results can help us make better design decisions. See the <a
+href="https://blog.torproject.org/research-problem-measuring-safety-tor-network">blog post</a>
+for details.
+</li>
+
+<li>If we prevent the really loud users from using too much of the Tor
+network, how much can it help? We've instrumented Tor's entry relays
+so they can rate-limit connections from users, and we've instrumented
+the directory authorities so they can change the rate-limiting
+parameters globally across the network. Which parameter values improve
+performance for the Tor network as a whole? How should relays adapt
+their rate-limiting parameters based on their capacity and based on
+the network load they see, and what rate-limiting algorithms will work
+best? See the <a
+href="https://blog.torproject.org/research-problem-adaptive-throttling-tor-clients-entry-guards">blog
+post</a> for details.
+</li>
+
+<li>Right now Tor clients are willing to reuse a given circuit for ten
+minutes after it's first used. The goal is to avoid loading down the
+network with too many circuit creations, yet to also avoid having
+clients use the same circuit for so long that the exit node can build a
+useful pseudonymous profile of them. Alas, ten minutes is probably way
+too long, especially if connections from multiple protocols (e.g. IM and
+web browsing) are put on the same circuit. If we keep fixed the overall
+number of circuit extends that the network needs to do, are there more
+efficient and/or safer ways for clients to allocate streams to circuits,
+or for clients to build preemptive circuits? Perhaps this research item
+needs to start with gathering some traces of what requests typical
+clients try to launch, so you have something realistic to try to optimize.
+</li>
+
+<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
+hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
+"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
+you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
+(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
+this attack on the deployed Tor design? The problem with all the
+previous attack papers is that they look at timing and counting of
+IP packets on the wire. But OpenSSL's TLS records, plus Tor's use of
+TCP pushback to do rate limiting, means that tracing by IP packets
+produces very poor results. The right approach is to realize that
+Tor uses OpenSSL, look inside the TLS record at the TLS headers, and
+figure out how many 512-byte cells are being sent or received. Then
+start exploring defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell
+size from 512 bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques
+like <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004">defensive
+dropping</a>, or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do
+these have, and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric)
+is there from a successful defense in each case?</li>
+
+<!--
+<li>
+Path selection algorithms, directory fetching schedules for Tor-on-mobile
+that are compatible anonymity-wise with our current approaches.
+</li>
+
+-->
+
+<li>More coming soon. See also the "Research" section of the <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Research">volunteer</a> page for
+other topics.
+</li>
+
+</ul>
+
+</div>
+</div>
+
+</body>
+</html>
+
diff --git a/index.html b/index.html
index 54b1e85..450824c 100644
--- a/index.html
+++ b/index.html
@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@
<img src="/images/top-left.png" alt="Click to go to home page"
width="193" height="79"></a></td>
<td class="banner-middle">
- Tor Research<br></td>
+ Home<br>
+ <a href="groups.html">Groups</a><br>
+ <a href="ideas.html">Ideas</a><br>
+ <a href="techreports.html">Tech Reports</a><br>
+ </td>
<td class="banner-right"></td>
</tr>
</table>
diff --git a/techreports.html b/techreports.html
index 4242910..5eadafc 100644
--- a/techreports.html
+++ b/techreports.html
@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@
<img src="/images/top-left.png" alt="Click to go to home page"
width="193" height="79"></a></td>
<td class="banner-middle">
- Tor Research</td>
+ <a href="index.html">Home</a><br>
+ <a href="groups.html">Groups</a><br>
+ <a href="ideas.html">Ideas</a><br>
+ Tech Reports<br>
+ </td>
<td class="banner-right"></td>
</tr>
</table>
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