[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.2.2] fold in changes entries so far

[arma at torproject.org]

commit a379b03b3cb381d14ef85b1f73bee29e1ab49f5d
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date:   Sun Aug 5 01:18:15 2012 -0400

    fold in changes entries so far
---
 ChangeLog                    |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 ReleaseNotes                 |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 changes/bug6530              |    5 -----
 changes/geoip-june2012       |    3 ---
 changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a      |   14 --------------
 changes/revert-geoip-may2012 |    6 ------
 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index fd9097a..70874ef 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-??
+  o Security fixes:
+    - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
+      when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
+      bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
+    - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
+      document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
+      lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
+    - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
+      choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
+      stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
+      had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
+      a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
+      timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
+      they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
+      a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
+      be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
+      other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
+      not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
+
+
 Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06
   Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation
   bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself
diff --git a/ReleaseNotes b/ReleaseNotes
index c4ff7f5..f265073 100644
--- a/ReleaseNotes
+++ b/ReleaseNotes
@@ -3,6 +3,27 @@ This document summarizes new features and bugfixes in each stable release
 of Tor. If you want to see more detailed descriptions of the changes in
 each development snapshot, see the ChangeLog file.
 
+Changes in version 0.2.2.38 - 2012-08-??
+  o Security fixes:
+    - Avoid read-from-freed-memory and double-free bugs that could occur
+      when a DNS request fails while launching it. Fixes bug 6480;
+      bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha.
+    - Avoid an uninitialized memory read when reading a vote or consensus
+      document that has an unrecognized flavor name. This read could
+      lead to a remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
+    - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
+      choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client would
+      stop iterating through the list of available relays as soon as it
+      had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier when it picked
+      a router earlier in the list. If an attacker can recover this
+      timing information (nontrivial but not proven to be impossible),
+      they could learn some coarse-grained information about which relays
+      a client was picking (middle nodes in particular are likelier to
+      be affected than exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by
+      other factors (see bug 6537 for some discussion), but it's best
+      not to take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
+
+
 Changes in version 0.2.2.37 - 2012-06-06
   Tor 0.2.2.37 introduces a workaround for a critical renegotiation
   bug in OpenSSL 1.0.1 (where 20% of the Tor network can't talk to itself
diff --git a/changes/bug6530 b/changes/bug6530
deleted file mode 100644
index 825bbb7..0000000
--- a/changes/bug6530
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-  o Major security fixes:
-    - Avoid a read of uninitializd RAM when reading a vote or consensus
-      document with an unrecognized flavor name. This could lead to a
-      remote crash bug. Fixes bug 6530; bugfix on 0.2.2.6-alpha.
-      
diff --git a/changes/geoip-june2012 b/changes/geoip-june2012
deleted file mode 100644
index f73bf35..0000000
--- a/changes/geoip-june2012
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-  o Minor features:
-    - Update to the June 6 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database.
-
diff --git a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a b/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e642c7..0000000
--- a/changes/pathsel-BUGGY-a
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-  o Security fixes:
-
-    - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
-      choosing to a side-channel attacker.  Previously, a Tor client
-      would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
-      soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
-      when it picked a router earlier in the list.  If an attacker
-      can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
-      proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
-      grained information about which relays a client was picking
-      (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
-      exits).  The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
-      (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
-      take chances.  Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
diff --git a/changes/revert-geoip-may2012 b/changes/revert-geoip-may2012
deleted file mode 100644
index e420947..0000000
--- a/changes/revert-geoip-may2012
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-  o Major bugfixes:
-    - Revert to the May 1 2012 Maxmind GeoLite Country database. In the
-      June 2012 database, Maxmind marked many Tor relays as country "A1",
-      which will cause risky behavior for clients that set EntryNodes
-      or ExitNodes. Addresses bug 6334; bugfix on 0.2.3.17-beta.
-