[tor-commits] [tor/master] Hook up all of the prop176 code; allow v3 negotiations to actually work
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Oct 11 03:22:16 UTC 2011
commit 83bb9742b541ff53e72c407f45093c137e13a073
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Sep 27 13:15:36 2011 -0400
Hook up all of the prop176 code; allow v3 negotiations to actually work
---
src/or/command.c | 273 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
src/or/connection_or.c | 242 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
src/or/connection_or.h | 12 ++-
src/or/or.h | 10 ++
4 files changed, 435 insertions(+), 102 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index a32671f..a8e68e1 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -46,6 +46,15 @@ uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0;
+/** How many CELL_VPADDING cells have we received, ever? */
+uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed = 0;
+/** How many CELL_CERTS cells have we received, ever? */
+uint64_t stats_n_cert_cells_processed = 0;
+/** How many CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE cells have we received, ever? */
+uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed = 0;
+/** How many CELL_AUTHENTICATE cells have we received, ever? */
+uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed = 0;
+
/* These are the main functions for processing cells */
static void command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
@@ -54,6 +63,12 @@ static void command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
+static void command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+ or_connection_t *conn);
+static void command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+ or_connection_t *conn);
+static void command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
+ or_connection_t *conn);
#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
/** This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the
@@ -93,7 +108,7 @@ command_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn, int *time,
void
command_process_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
- int handshaking = (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
+ int handshaking = (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
/* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better
* name. */
@@ -137,6 +152,10 @@ command_process_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS &&
cell->command != CELL_NETINFO)
return;
+ /* XXXX VERSIONS should be impossible; it's variable-length. */
+
+ if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
switch (cell->command) {
case CELL_PADDING:
@@ -206,15 +225,55 @@ command_process_var_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
}
#endif
- /* reject all when not handshaking. */
- if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2)
- return;
+ switch (conn->_base.state)
+ {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ if (cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS)
+ return;
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING:
+ /* If we're using bufferevents, it's entirely possible for us to
+ * notice "hey, data arrived!" before we notice "hey, the handshake
+ * finished!" And we need to be accepting both at once to handle both
+ * the v2 and v3 handshakes. */
+
+ /* fall through */
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ if (cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS)
+ return; /*XXXX023 log*/
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+ break; /* Everything is allowed */
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3)
+ return;
+ default:
+ /*XXXX023 log */
+ return;
+ }
switch (cell->command) {
case CELL_VERSIONS:
++stats_n_versions_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(versions, cell, conn);
break;
+ case CELL_VPADDING:
+ ++stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(versions, cell, conn);
+ break;
+ case CELL_CERT:
+ ++stats_n_cert_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(cert, cell, conn);
+ break;
+ case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE:
+ ++stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(auth_challenge, cell, conn);
+ break;
+ case CELL_AUTHENTICATE:
+ ++stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed;
+ PROCESS_CELL(authenticate, cell, conn);
+ break;
default:
log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.",
@@ -504,14 +563,40 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
const uint8_t *cp, *end;
+ const int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
if (conn->link_proto != 0 ||
- conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 ||
(conn->handshake_state && conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version "
"already set to %d; dropping", (int) conn->link_proto);
return;
}
+ switch (conn->_base.state)
+ {
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ if (started_here) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Received a versions cell while TLS-handshaking not in "
+ "OR_HANDSHAKING_V3 on a connection we originated.");
+ }
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+ if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0) {
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 1);
+ break;
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state");
+ return;
+ }
+
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
@@ -533,19 +618,80 @@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
"That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
+ } else if (highest_supported_version < 3 &&
+ conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS "
+ "handshake. Closing connection.");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
}
+
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
- log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
- highest_supported_version,
- safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
- conn->_base.port);
- tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 2);
+ if (conn->link_proto == 2) {
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
+ highest_supported_version,
+ safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
+ conn->_base.port);
- if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
- return;
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ const int send_versions = !started_here;
+ /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */
+ const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options());
+ /* If we're a relay that got a connection, ask for authentication. */
+ const int send_chall = !started_here && public_server_mode(get_options());
+ /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, or if we have no intention of
+ * authenticating, send a netinfo cell right now. */
+ const int send_netinfo =
+ !(started_here && public_server_mode(get_options()));
+ const int send_any =
+ send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo;
+ tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 3);
+
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s",
+ highest_supported_version,
+ safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
+ conn->_base.port,
+ send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell",
+ send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "",
+ send_certs ? " CERTS" : "",
+ send_versions ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "",
+ send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : "");
+
+ if (send_versions) {
+ if (connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (send_certs) {
+ if (connection_or_send_cert_cell(conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send cert cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (send_chall) {
+ if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if (send_netinfo) {
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
}
}
@@ -571,13 +717,26 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1");
return;
}
- if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) {
+ if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 &&
+ conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping.");
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
conn->handshake_state->received_versions);
+
+ if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) {
+ tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 3);
+ if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
+ if (!conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got a NETINFO cell from server, "
+ "but no authentication. Closing the connection.");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Decode the cell. */
timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload));
if (labs(now - conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) {
@@ -692,8 +851,14 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!");
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell)
ERR("We already got one");
+ if (conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
+ /* Should be unreachable, but let's make sure. */
+ ERR("We're already authenticated!");
+ }
if (cell->payload_len < 1)
ERR("It had no body");
if (cell->circ_id)
@@ -750,7 +915,20 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1))
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
- /* XXXX okay, we just got authentication. Do something about that. */
+ conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ {
+ crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
+ const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
+ memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
+ id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
+ connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
+ }
+
+ if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn,
+ conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id) < 0)
+ ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id");
+
conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
id_cert = NULL;
@@ -803,10 +981,14 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake");
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
ERR("We didn't originate this connection");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge)
ERR("We already received one");
+ if (! conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell)
+ ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet");
if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
ERR("It was too short");
if (cell->circ_id)
@@ -829,7 +1011,19 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
- /* Send back authentication if we want, and if use_type is set */
+ if (use_type && public_server_mode(get_options())) {
+ if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(conn, use_type) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send authenticate cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
#undef ERR
}
@@ -842,7 +1036,7 @@ command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
* the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
*/
static void
-command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
+command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN];
const uint8_t *auth;
@@ -859,12 +1053,22 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake");
+ if (conn->link_proto < 3)
+ ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3");
if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
ERR("We originated this connection");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate)
ERR("We already got one!");
+ if (conn->handshake_state->authenticated) {
+ /* Should be impossible given other checks */
+ ERR("The peer is already authenticated");
+ }
+ if (! conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell)
+ ERR("We never got a cert cell");
if (conn->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL)
ERR("We never got an authentication certificate");
+ if (conn->handshake_state->id_cert == NULL)
+ ERR("We never got an identity certificate");
if (cell->payload_len < 4)
ERR("Cell was way too short");
@@ -915,6 +1119,8 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
tor_free(signed_data);
ERR("Not enough data was signed");
}
+ /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here,
+ * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */
if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
tor_free(signed_data);
ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
@@ -922,19 +1128,28 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
tor_free(signed_data);
}
- /* XXXX we're authenticated. Now remember the fact, and remember whom we're
- authenticated to. */
-
+ /* Okay, we are authenticated. */
conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1;
+ conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
+ {
+ crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd =
+ tor_tls_cert_get_key(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+ const digests_t *id_digests =
+ tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
+
+ memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
+ id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
+
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,
+ &conn->_base.addr,
+ conn->_base.port,
+ (const char*)conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
+ 0);
+ }
+
#undef ERR
}
-
-void dummy_function(void);
-void dummy_function(void)
-{
- /* this is only here to avoid 'static function isn't used' warnings */
- command_process_auth_challenge_cell(NULL, NULL);
- command_process_cert_cell(NULL, NULL);
- command_process_authenticate_cell(NULL, NULL);
-}
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index 4caa3d3..a391ca7 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -35,10 +35,8 @@
#endif
static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
+static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
-static int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn);
-static int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn,
- int started_here);
static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
int started_here,
char *digest_rcvd_out);
@@ -388,6 +386,7 @@ connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
#endif
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
default:
return 0; /* don't do anything */
@@ -627,7 +626,7 @@ connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns,
/** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
* have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
* by checking to see if this describes a router we know. */
-static void
+void
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest,
@@ -1180,16 +1179,22 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
- log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). "
- "Requesting renegotiation.");
- conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
- goto again;
+ if (tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls)) {
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "Client got a v3 cert! Moving on to v3 "
+ "handshake.");
+ return connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). "
+ "Requesting renegotiation.");
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
+ goto again;
+ }
}
// log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state);
} else {
- /* improved handshake, but not a client. */
+ /* v2/v3 handshake, but not a client. */
log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
- "Expecting renegotiation.");
+ "Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
conn);
@@ -1234,17 +1239,24 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
- conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
- tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
- if (bufferevent_ssl_renegotiate(conn->_base.bufev)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_OR, "Start_renegotiating went badly.");
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls)) {
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "Client got a v3 cert!");
+ if (connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn) < 0)
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return;
+ } else {
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
+ if (bufferevent_ssl_renegotiate(conn->_base.bufev)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Start_renegotiating went badly.");
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ }
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
+ return; /* ???? */
}
- tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(conn->tls);
- return; /* ???? */
}
} else if (tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(conn->tls) == 1) {
- /* improved handshake, as a server. Only got one handshake, so
+ /* v2 or v3 handshake, as a server. Only got one handshake, so
* wait for the next one. */
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
@@ -1256,7 +1268,7 @@ connection_or_handle_event_cb(struct bufferevent *bufev, short event,
const int handshakes = tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(conn->tls);
tor_assert(handshakes >= 2);
if (handshakes == 2) {
- /* improved handshake, as a server. Two handshakes happened already,
+ /* v2 handshake, as a server. Two handshakes happened already,
* so we treat renegotiation as done.
*/
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(conn->tls, conn);
@@ -1300,6 +1312,29 @@ connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
}
+/** Set the circid_type field of <b>conn</b> (which determines which part of
+ * the circuit ID space we're willing to use) based on comparing our ID to
+ * <b>identity_rcvd</b> */
+void
+connection_or_set_circid_type(or_connection_t *conn,
+ crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd)
+{
+ const int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
+ crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity =
+ started_here ? get_tlsclient_identity_key() :
+ get_server_identity_key();
+
+ if (identity_rcvd) {
+ if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity, identity_rcvd)<0) {
+ conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
+ } else {
+ conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
+ }
+ } else {
+ conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER;
+ }
+}
+
/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
* return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
*
@@ -1337,10 +1372,7 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
started_here ? conn->_base.address :
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address);
const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
- crypto_pk_env_t *our_identity =
- started_here ? get_tlsclient_identity_key() :
- get_server_identity_key();
- int has_cert = 0, has_identity=0;
+ int has_cert = 0;
check_no_tls_errors();
has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
@@ -1375,21 +1407,46 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
}
if (identity_rcvd) {
- has_identity = 1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out);
- if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(our_identity, identity_rcvd)<0) {
- conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
- } else {
- conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
- }
- crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
} else {
memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
- conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER;
}
- if (started_here && tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) {
- connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, digest_rcvd_out);
+ connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
+
+ if (started_here)
+ return connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn,
+ (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
+ * authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
+ * side of <b>conn</b> is <b>peer_id</b>. For v1 and v2 handshakes,
+ * this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
+ * or renegotiation. For v3 handshakes, this is right after we get a
+ * certificate chain in a CERT cell.
+ *
+ * If we want any particular ID before, record the one we got.
+ *
+ * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get it, log a warning and return -1.
+ *
+ * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const uint8_t *peer_id)
+{
+ int as_expected = 1;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
+
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) {
+ connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, (const char*)peer_id);
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
@@ -1401,43 +1458,39 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
/* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
* we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
learned_router_identity(&conn->_base.addr, conn->_base.port,
- digest_rcvd_out);
+ (const char*)peer_id);
}
- if (started_here) {
- int as_advertised = 1;
- tor_assert(has_cert);
- tor_assert(has_identity);
- if (tor_memneq(digest_rcvd_out, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
- /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
- char seen[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
- char expected[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
- base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), digest_rcvd_out, DIGEST_LEN);
- base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN);
- log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
- "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not "
- "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",
- conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, expected, seen);
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1,
- time(NULL));
- control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
- END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
- if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
- control_event_bootstrap_problem("foo", END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
- as_advertised = 0;
- }
- if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
- dirserv_orconn_tls_done(conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port,
- digest_rcvd_out, as_advertised);
- }
- if (!as_advertised)
- return -1;
+ if (tor_memneq(peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
+ char seen[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char expected[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), (const char*)peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not "
+ "as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",
+ conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, expected, seen);
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1,
+ time(NULL));
+ control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
+ END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
+ if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
+ control_event_bootstrap_problem("foo", END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
+ as_expected = 0;
+ }
+ if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
+ dirserv_orconn_tls_done(conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port,
+ (const char*)peer_id, as_expected);
}
+ if (!as_expected)
+ return -1;
+
return 0;
}
-/** The tls handshake is finished.
+/** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
*
* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with.
*
@@ -1447,6 +1500,8 @@ connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
* If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
* that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
* directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
+ *
+ * If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
*/
static int
connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
@@ -1483,13 +1538,35 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->_base.addr,
conn->_base.port, digest_rcvd, 0);
}
- return connection_or_send_versions(conn);
+ return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
}
}
+/**
+ * Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
+ * that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
+ * Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
+ * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ tor_assert(connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn));
+ tor_assert(tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(conn->tls));
+
+ circuit_build_times_network_is_live(&circ_times);
+
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3;
+ if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
+}
+
+
/** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
* <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
-static int
+int
connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
{
or_handshake_state_t *s;
@@ -1639,6 +1716,9 @@ connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
connection_write_to_buf(networkcell.body, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
+
if (cell->command != CELL_PADDING)
conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = approx_time();
}
@@ -1658,6 +1738,8 @@ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
connection_write_to_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), TO_CONN(conn));
connection_write_to_buf((char*)cell->payload,
cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
+ if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
+ or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
if (cell->command != CELL_PADDING)
conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = approx_time();
}
@@ -1742,7 +1824,7 @@ connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
}
/** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
-static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2 };
+static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3 };
/** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
(int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
@@ -1761,20 +1843,33 @@ is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
}
/** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
- * link protocol versions that this Tor can support. */
-static int
-connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn)
+ * link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
+ *
+ * If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
+ * allow protocol version v3 or later. If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
+ * not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
+ * later.
+ **/
+int
+connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
{
var_cell_t *cell;
int i;
+ int n_versions = 0;
+ const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
+ const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
!conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at);
cell = var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions * 2);
cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
- set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*i), htons(v));
+ if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
+ continue;
+ set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
+ ++n_versions;
}
+ cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
@@ -2047,7 +2142,7 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0 on
* success, -1 on failure */
int
-connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
+connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype)
{
var_cell_t *cell;
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
@@ -2057,6 +2152,9 @@ connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
if (!pk)
return -1;/*XXXX log*/
+ if (authtype != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
+ return -1;/*XXXX log*/
+
cell_maxlen = 4 + /* overhead */
V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + /* Authentication body */
crypto_pk_keysize(pk) + /* Max signature length */
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.h b/src/or/connection_or.h
index a4d3be0..de3a989 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.h
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.h
@@ -41,6 +41,15 @@ void connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain);
int connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving);
int connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
+int connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here);
+void connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *id_digest,
+ int started_here);
+int connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
+ const uint8_t *peer_id);
+void connection_or_set_circid_type(or_connection_t *conn,
+ crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd);
void or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state);
void or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_handshake_state_t *state,
const cell_t *cell,
@@ -56,6 +65,7 @@ void connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_destroy(circid_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn,
int reason);
+int connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus);
int connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_cert_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
@@ -63,7 +73,7 @@ int connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
uint8_t *out, size_t outlen,
crypto_pk_env_t *signing_key,
int server);
-int connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn);
+int connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, int type);
int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t version);
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index a40598f..887dcb6 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -1142,6 +1142,16 @@ typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
/** True iff we have received and processed an AUTHENTICATE cell */
unsigned int received_authenticate : 1;
+ /* True iff we've received valid authentication to some identity. */
+ unsigned int authenticated : 1;
+
+ /** Identity digest that we have received and authenticated for our peer
+ * on this connection. */
+ uint8_t authenticated_peer_id[DIGEST_LEN];
+
+ /** DOCDOC */
+ uint8_t auth_challenge[OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN];
+
/** Digests of the cells that we have sent or received as part of a V3
* handshake. Used for making and checking AUTHENTICATE cells.
*
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