[tor-commits] [tor/master] Make certificate skew into a protocol warning
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Nov 15 21:01:06 UTC 2011
commit 69dd993a922fcc65e931d816e1a3c916e98133f2
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Nov 15 11:56:21 2011 -0500
Make certificate skew into a protocol warning
---
src/common/tortls.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
src/common/tortls.h | 6 ++++--
src/or/command.c | 8 ++++----
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c
index ff0d329..a41a10d 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.c
+++ b/src/common/tortls.c
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime,
int is_client);
-static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(const X509 *cert,
+static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance);
/** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs
@@ -945,7 +945,8 @@ tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert)
* the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
* we couldn't check it. */
int
-tor_tls_cert_is_valid(const tor_cert_t *cert,
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+ const tor_cert_t *cert,
const tor_cert_t *signing_cert,
int check_rsa_1024)
{
@@ -961,7 +962,8 @@ tor_tls_cert_is_valid(const tor_cert_t *cert,
/* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the
* lifetime. */
- if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(cert->cert, 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
+ if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert,
+ 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
return 0;
cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
@@ -1924,7 +1926,7 @@ tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
static void
-log_cert_lifetime(const X509 *cert, const char *problem)
+log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem)
{
BIO *bio = NULL;
BUF_MEM *buf;
@@ -1934,9 +1936,10 @@ log_cert_lifetime(const X509 *cert, const char *problem)
struct tm tm;
if (problem)
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Certificate %s: is your system clock set incorrectly?",
- problem);
+ log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
+ "is wrong.",
+ problem);
if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
@@ -1958,9 +1961,9 @@ log_cert_lifetime(const X509 *cert, const char *problem)
strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
- s1,s2,mytime);
+ log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
+ s1,s2,mytime);
end:
/* Not expected to get invoked */
@@ -2069,7 +2072,8 @@ tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
* NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
*/
int
-tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
{
X509 *cert;
int r = -1;
@@ -2077,7 +2081,8 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
goto done;
- if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(cert, past_tolerance, future_tolerance) < 0)
+ if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert,
+ past_tolerance, future_tolerance) < 0)
goto done;
r = 0;
@@ -2095,7 +2100,7 @@ tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
* <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. If it is live, return 0. If it is not
* live, log a message and return -1. */
static int
-check_cert_lifetime_internal(const X509 *cert, int past_tolerance,
+check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert, int past_tolerance,
int future_tolerance)
{
time_t now, t;
@@ -2104,12 +2109,12 @@ check_cert_lifetime_internal(const X509 *cert, int past_tolerance,
t = now + future_tolerance;
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &t) > 0) {
- log_cert_lifetime(cert, "not yet valid");
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid");
return -1;
}
t = now - past_tolerance;
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &t) < 0) {
- log_cert_lifetime(cert, "already expired");
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired");
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/common/tortls.h b/src/common/tortls.h
index 6791586..673f18d 100644
--- a/src/common/tortls.h
+++ b/src/common/tortls.h
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ void tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls);
int tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
tor_cert_t *tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls);
int tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity);
-int tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance,
+int tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity,
+ tor_tls_t *tls, int past_tolerance,
int future_tolerance);
int tor_tls_read(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len);
int tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n);
@@ -124,7 +125,8 @@ int tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
crypto_pk_env_t *tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void);
crypto_pk_env_t *tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert);
int tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert);
-int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(const tor_cert_t *cert,
+int tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+ const tor_cert_t *cert,
const tor_cert_t *signing_cert,
int check_rsa_1024);
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index 5d0ebaa..a963d42 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -991,9 +991,9 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(conn->tls, link_cert)) {
ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key");
}
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(link_cert, id_cert, 0))
+ if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, link_cert, id_cert, 0))
ERR("The link certificate was not valid");
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1))
+ if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
@@ -1026,9 +1026,9 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
/* Remember these certificates so we can check an AUTHENTICATE cell */
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(auth_cert, id_cert, 1))
+ if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, auth_cert, id_cert, 1))
ERR("The authentication certificate was not valid");
- if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1))
+ if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, id_cert, id_cert, 1))
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
log_info(LD_OR, "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: "
More information about the tor-commits
mailing list