[tor-commits] r24795: {website} minor faq cleanups (website/trunk/docs/en)

Roger Dingledine arma at torproject.org
Tue May 31 20:34:13 UTC 2011


Author: arma
Date: 2011-05-31 20:34:13 +0000 (Tue, 31 May 2011)
New Revision: 24795

Modified:
   website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
Log:
minor faq cleanups


Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-05-30 12:13:48 UTC (rev 24794)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-05-31 20:34:13 UTC (rev 24795)
@@ -157,15 +157,17 @@
     <p>
     Simple proxy providers also create a single point of failure.  The provider
 knows who you are and where you browse on the Internet.  They can see your
-traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can see your
+traffic as it passes through their server.  In some cases, they can even see
+inside your
 encrypted traffic as they relay it to your banking site or to ecommerce stores.
 You have to trust the provider isn't doing any number of things, such as
 watching your traffic, injecting their own advertisements into your traffic
-stream, and isn't recording your personal details.
+stream, and recording your personal details.
     </p>
     <p>
     Tor passes your traffic through at least 3 different servers before sending
-it on to the destination.  Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are
+it on to the destination. Because there's a separate layer of encryption for
+each of the three relays, Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are
 sending into it.  It merely relays your traffic, completely encrypted through
 the Tor network and has it pop out somewhere else in the world, completely
 intact.  The Tor client is required because we assume you trust your local
@@ -1256,7 +1258,7 @@
     <p>Right now, there are a small number of places in the world that filter
     connections to the Tor network. So getting a lot of bridges running
     right now is mostly a backup measure, a) in case the Tor network does
-    get blocked somewhere, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
+    get blocked in more places, and b) for people who want an extra layer of
     security because they're worried somebody will recognize that it's a
     public Tor relay IP address they're contacting.
     </p>



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