[tor-commits] [tor/master] Revise code for adding EntryNodes to guards.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Mon Jul 11 21:04:17 UTC 2011
commit 2797fd8f68df0a4ac9538cef6391b594e2cf9ecb
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Jul 11 10:48:46 2011 -0400
Revise code for adding EntryNodes to guards.
Previously, we'd just take all the nodes in EntryNodes, see which
ones were already in the guard list, and add the ones that weren't.
There were some problems there, though:
* We'd add _every_ entry in EntryNodes, and add them in the order
they appeared in the routerlist. This wasn't a problem
until we added the ability to give country-code or IP-range
entries in the EntryNodes set, but now that we did, it is.
(Fix: We now shuffle the entry nodes before adding them; only
add up to 10*NumEntryGuards)
* We didn't screen EntryNodes for the Guard flag. That's okay
if the user has specified two or three entry nodes manually,
but if they have listed a whole subcontinent, we should
restrict ourselves to the entries that are currently guards.
(Fix: separate out the new guard from the new non-guard nodes,
and add the Guards first.)
* We'd prepend new EntryNodes _before_ the already configured
EntryNodes. This could lead to churn.
(Fix: don't prepend these.)
This patch also pre-screens EntryNodes entries for
reachableaddresses/excludenodes, even though we check for that
later. This is important now, since we cap the number of entries
we'll add.
---
changes/bug2798 | 10 ++++++++++
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug2798 b/changes/bug2798
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4ab8e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug2798
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes:
+ - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes (as with
+ 'EntryNodes {cc}' or 'EntryNodes 1.1.1.1/16'), choose only a
+ random subset to be guards, and choose them in random
+ order. Bugfix on 0.2.3.1-alpha; fixes bug 2798.
+
+ o Minor features:
+ - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes, and there are
+ enough of them listed as Guard so that we don't need to consider
+ the non-guard entries, prefer the ones listed with the Guard flag.
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 90d9280..5d40e0d 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -3619,7 +3619,7 @@ control_event_guard_deferred(void)
* already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
* Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
static const node_t *
-add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status)
+add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend)
{
const node_t *node;
entry_guard_t *entry;
@@ -3651,9 +3651,9 @@ add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status)
* this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
- if (chosen) /* prepend */
+ if (prepend)
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
- else /* append */
+ else
smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry);
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW");
control_event_guard_deferred();
@@ -3671,7 +3671,7 @@ pick_entry_guards(const or_options_t *options)
tor_assert(entry_guards);
while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) {
- if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0))
+ if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0))
break;
changed = 1;
}
@@ -3989,7 +3989,7 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
static void
entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
{
- smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
+ smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
tor_assert(entry_guards);
@@ -4010,6 +4010,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
}
entry_nodes = smartlist_create();
+ worse_entry_nodes = smartlist_create();
entry_fps = smartlist_create();
old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_create();
old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_create();
@@ -4034,27 +4035,49 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e);
});
- /* Remove all currently configured entry guards from entry_routers. */
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
+ /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable
+ * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) {
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) {
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded");
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall");
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
+ continue;
+ } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
+ smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node);
+ SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
}
- });
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
/* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
/* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
+ /* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
+ smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
+
/* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
- add_an_entry_guard(node, 0);
- });
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
+ add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 0);
+ if (smartlist_len(entry_guards) > options->NumEntryGuards * 10)
+ break;
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards", smartlist_len(entry_guards));
/* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
* EntryNodes. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
entry_guard_free(e));
smartlist_free(entry_nodes);
+ smartlist_free(worse_entry_nodes);
smartlist_free(entry_fps);
smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list);
smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
@@ -4165,7 +4188,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
/* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
* to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
* be a long time til we get it. -RD */
- node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0);
+ node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0);
if (node) {
entry_guards_changed();
/* XXX we start over here in case the new node we added shares
@@ -4874,7 +4897,7 @@ learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache)
node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
tor_assert(node);
rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node);
- add_an_entry_guard(node, 1);
+ add_an_entry_guard(node, 1, 1);
log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s)", ri->nickname,
from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh");
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