[or-cvs] r24127: {website} apply nil's faq patch from ticket 1965. (website/trunk/docs/en)

[Andrew Lewman]

Author: phobos
Date: 2011-01-26 19:29:49 +0000 (Wed, 26 Jan 2011)
New Revision: 24127

Modified:
   website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
Log:
apply nil's faq patch from ticket 1965.


Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-01-26 16:46:58 UTC (rev 24126)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-01-26 19:29:49 UTC (rev 24127)
@@ -992,34 +992,35 @@
 
 <p>
 Sometimes, after you've used Gmail over Tor, Google presents a
-pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised. The
-notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations throughout
-the world recently used to access your account.
+pop-up notification that your account may have been compromised.
+The notification window lists a series of IP addresses and locations
+throughout the world recently used to access your account.
 </p>
 
 <p>
 In general this is a false alarm: Google saw a bunch of logins from
-different places  and wanted to let
-you know. If you use Tor to access a Google service, then it will appear
-like you're coming from lots of different places. Nothing to worry about
-in particular.
+different places, as a result of running the service via Tor, and decided
+it was a good idea to confirm the account was being accessed by it's
+rightful owner.
 </p>
 
 <p>
-But that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It's
-<i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be. It is possible
-that somebody could at some point steal your Google cookie, which would
-allow them to log in to the Google service as you. They might steal it
-by breaking into your computer, or by watching your network traffic at
-Starbucks or sniffing your wireless at home (when you're not using Tor),
-or by watching traffic going over the Tor network. In theory none of
-this should be possible because Gmail and similar services should only
-send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a
-href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking">way
-more complex than that</a>.
+Even though this may be a biproduct of using the service via tor,
+that doesn't mean you can entirely ignore the warning. It is
+<i>probably</i> a false positive, but it might not be since it is
+possible for someone to hijack your Google cookie.
 </p>
 
 <p>
+Cookie hijacking is possible by either physical access to your computer
+or by watching your network traffic.  In theory only physical access
+should compromise your system because Gmail and similar services
+should only send the cookie over an SSL link. In practice, alas, it's <a
+href="http://fscked.org/blog/fully-automated-active-https-cookie-hijacking">
+way more complex than that</a>.
+</p>
+
+<p>
 And if somebody <i>did</i> steal your google cookie, they might end
 up logging in from unusual places (though of course they also might
 not). So the summary is that since you're using Tor, this security