[or-cvs] [tor/release-0.2.2] Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Sat Jan 15 22:31:47 UTC 2011
commit 66039d98430bfbbc921f386b41366b78579e07f0
Merge: 30b3475 989db9a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Jan 3 11:58:59 2011 -0500
Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
Conflicts:
src/or/routerparse.c
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 5 +++--
src/or/command.c | 3 ++-
src/or/onion.c | 4 ++--
src/or/rendmid.c | 6 ++++--
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --combined src/or/circuitbuild.c
index d89de38,065eb05..b174384
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@@ -9,45 -9,9 +9,45 @@@
* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
**/
+#define CIRCUIT_PRIVATE
+
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "circuituse.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "connection.h"
+#include "connection_edge.h"
+#include "connection_or.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "directory.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "networkstatus.h"
+#include "onion.h"
+#include "policies.h"
+#include "relay.h"
+#include "rephist.h"
+#include "router.h"
+#include "routerlist.h"
+#include "routerparse.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#undef log
+#include <math.h>
+
+#ifndef MIN
+#define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#define CBT_BIN_TO_MS(bin) ((bin)*CBT_BIN_WIDTH + (CBT_BIN_WIDTH/2))
/********* START VARIABLES **********/
+/** Global list of circuit build times */
+// FIXME: Add this as a member for entry_guard_t instead of global?
+// Then we could do per-guard statistics, as guards are likely to
+// vary in their own latency. The downside of this is that guards
+// can change frequently, so we'd be building a lot more circuits
+// most likely.
+circuit_build_times_t circ_times;
/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist;
@@@ -83,10 -47,6 +83,10 @@@ static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL
* and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */
static int entry_guards_dirty = 0;
+/** If set, we're running the unit tests: we should avoid clobbering
+ * our state file or accessing get_options() or get_or_state() */
+static int unit_tests = 0;
+
/********* END VARIABLES ************/
static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
@@@ -99,1236 -59,6 +99,1236 @@@ static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_
static void entry_guards_changed(void);
+static int
+circuit_build_times_disabled(void)
+{
+ if (unit_tests) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ int consensus_disabled = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtdisabled",
+ 0);
+ int config_disabled = !get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout;
+ int dirauth_disabled = get_options()->AuthoritativeDir;
+ int state_disabled = (get_or_state()->LastWritten == -1);
+
+ if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled ||
+ state_disabled) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. "
+ "Consensus=%d, Config=%d, AuthDir=%d, StateFile=%d",
+ consensus_disabled, config_disabled, dirauth_disabled,
+ state_disabled);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_max_timeouts(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmaxtimeouts",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT);
+ return num;
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtnummodes",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_NUM_XM_MODES);
+ return num;
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmincircs",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE);
+ return num;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>cbt</b> has recorded enough build times that we
+ * want to start acting on the timeout it implies. */
+int
+circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ return cbt->total_build_times >= circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe();
+}
+
+double
+circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtquantile",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_QUANTILE_CUTOFF);
+ return num/100.0;
+}
+
+static double
+circuit_build_times_close_quantile(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtclosequantile",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_CLOSE_QUANTILE);
+
+ return num/100.0;
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_test_frequency(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbttestfreq",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_TEST_FREQUENCY);
+ return num;
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_min_timeout(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmintimeout",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE);
+ return num;
+}
+
+int32_t
+circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtinitialtimeout",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE);
+ return num;
+}
+
+static int32_t
+circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count(void)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtrecentcount",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS);
+ return num;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This function is called when we get a consensus update.
+ *
+ * It checks to see if we have changed any consensus parameters
+ * that require reallocation or discard of previous stats.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ networkstatus_t *ns)
+{
+ int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(ns, "cbtrecentcount",
+ CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS);
+
+ if (num > 0 && num != cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs) {
+ int8_t *recent_circs;
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Changing recent timeout size from %d to %d",
+ cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs, num);
+
+ tor_assert(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop);
+
+ /*
+ * Technically this is a circular array that we are reallocating
+ * and memcopying. However, since it only consists of either 1s
+ * or 0s, and is only used in a statistical test to determine when
+ * we should discard our history after a sufficient number of 1's
+ * have been reached, it is fine if order is not preserved or
+ * elements are lost.
+ *
+ * cbtrecentcount should only be changing in cases of severe network
+ * distress anyway, so memory correctness here is paramount over
+ * doing acrobatics to preserve the array.
+ */
+ recent_circs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(int8_t)*num);
+ memcpy(recent_circs, cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop,
+ sizeof(int8_t)*MIN(num, cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs));
+
+ // Adjust the index if it needs it.
+ if (num < cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs) {
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx = MIN(num-1,
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop);
+ cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop = recent_circs;
+ cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs = num;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Make a note that we're running unit tests (rather than running Tor
+ * itself), so we avoid clobbering our state file. */
+void
+circuitbuild_running_unit_tests(void)
+{
+ unit_tests = 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the initial default or configured timeout in milliseconds
+ */
+static double
+circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout(void)
+{
+ double timeout;
+ if (!unit_tests && get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout) {
+ timeout = get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout*1000;
+ if (timeout < circuit_build_times_min_timeout()) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Config CircuitBuildTimeout too low. Setting to %ds",
+ circuit_build_times_min_timeout()/1000);
+ timeout = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
+ }
+ } else {
+ timeout = circuit_build_times_initial_timeout();
+ }
+ return timeout;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reset the build time state.
+ *
+ * Leave estimated parameters, timeout and network liveness intact
+ * for future use.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_reset(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ memset(cbt->circuit_build_times, 0, sizeof(cbt->circuit_build_times));
+ cbt->total_build_times = 0;
+ cbt->build_times_idx = 0;
+ cbt->have_computed_timeout = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Initialize the buildtimes structure for first use.
+ *
+ * Sets the initial timeout values based on either the config setting,
+ * the consensus param, or the default (CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE).
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_init(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ memset(cbt, 0, sizeof(*cbt));
+ cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs = circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count();
+ cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(int8_t)*
+ cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs);
+ cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
+ control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET);
+}
+
+#if 0
+/**
+ * Rewind our build time history by n positions.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_build_times_rewind_history(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, int n)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ cbt->build_times_idx -= n;
+ cbt->build_times_idx %= CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[(i+cbt->build_times_idx)
+ %CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE]=0;
+ }
+
+ if (cbt->total_build_times > n) {
+ cbt->total_build_times -= n;
+ } else {
+ cbt->total_build_times = 0;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Rewound history by %d places. Current index: %d. "
+ "Total: %d", n, cbt->build_times_idx, cbt->total_build_times);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Add a new build time value <b>time</b> to the set of build times. Time
+ * units are milliseconds.
+ *
+ * circuit_build_times <b>cbt</a> is a circular array, so loop around when
+ * array is full.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time)
+{
+ if (time <= 0 || time > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit build time is too large (%u)."
+ "This is probably a bug.", time);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", time);
+
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = time;
+ cbt->build_times_idx = (cbt->build_times_idx + 1) % CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE;
+ if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE)
+ cbt->total_build_times++;
+
+ if ((cbt->total_build_times % CBT_SAVE_STATE_EVERY) == 0) {
+ /* Save state every n circuit builds */
+ if (!unit_tests && !get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
+ or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return maximum circuit build time
+ */
+static build_time_t
+circuit_build_times_max(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ build_time_t max_build_time = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] > max_build_time
+ && cbt->circuit_build_times[i] != CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
+ max_build_time = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
+ }
+ return max_build_time;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/** Return minimum circuit build time */
+build_time_t
+circuit_build_times_min(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ build_time_t min_build_time = CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX;
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] && /* 0 <-> uninitialized */
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[i] < min_build_time)
+ min_build_time = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
+ }
+ if (min_build_time == CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "No build times less than CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX!");
+ }
+ return min_build_time;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Calculate and return a histogram for the set of build times.
+ *
+ * Returns an allocated array of histrogram bins representing
+ * the frequency of index*CBT_BIN_WIDTH millisecond
+ * build times. Also outputs the number of bins in nbins.
+ *
+ * The return value must be freed by the caller.
+ */
+static uint32_t *
+circuit_build_times_create_histogram(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ build_time_t *nbins)
+{
+ uint32_t *histogram;
+ build_time_t max_build_time = circuit_build_times_max(cbt);
+ int i, c;
+
+ *nbins = 1 + (max_build_time / CBT_BIN_WIDTH);
+ histogram = tor_malloc_zero(*nbins * sizeof(build_time_t));
+
+ // calculate histogram
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == 0
+ || cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
+ continue; /* 0 <-> uninitialized */
+
+ c = (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] / CBT_BIN_WIDTH);
+ histogram[c]++;
+ }
+
+ return histogram;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the Pareto start-of-curve parameter Xm.
+ *
+ * Because we are not a true Pareto curve, we compute this as the
+ * weighted average of the N=3 most frequent build time bins.
+ */
+static build_time_t
+circuit_build_times_get_xm(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ build_time_t i, nbins;
+ build_time_t *nth_max_bin;
+ int32_t bin_counts=0;
+ build_time_t ret = 0;
+ uint32_t *histogram = circuit_build_times_create_histogram(cbt, &nbins);
+ int n=0;
+ int num_modes = circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes();
+
+ // Only use one mode if < 1000 buildtimes. Not enough data
+ // for multiple.
+ if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE)
+ num_modes = 1;
+
+ nth_max_bin = (build_time_t*)tor_malloc_zero(num_modes*sizeof(build_time_t));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nbins; i++) {
+ if (histogram[i] >= histogram[nth_max_bin[0]]) {
+ nth_max_bin[0] = i;
+ }
+
+ for (n = 1; n < num_modes; n++) {
+ if (histogram[i] >= histogram[nth_max_bin[n]] &&
+ (!histogram[nth_max_bin[n-1]]
+ || histogram[i] < histogram[nth_max_bin[n-1]])) {
+ nth_max_bin[n] = i;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (n = 0; n < num_modes; n++) {
+ bin_counts += histogram[nth_max_bin[n]];
+ ret += CBT_BIN_TO_MS(nth_max_bin[n])*histogram[nth_max_bin[n]];
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Xm mode #%d: %u %u", n, CBT_BIN_TO_MS(nth_max_bin[n]),
+ histogram[nth_max_bin[n]]);
+ }
+
+ ret /= bin_counts;
+ tor_free(histogram);
+ tor_free(nth_max_bin);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Output a histogram of current circuit build times to
+ * the or_state_t state structure.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_update_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ or_state_t *state)
+{
+ uint32_t *histogram;
+ build_time_t i = 0;
+ build_time_t nbins = 0;
+ config_line_t **next, *line;
+
+ histogram = circuit_build_times_create_histogram(cbt, &nbins);
+ // write to state
+ config_free_lines(state->BuildtimeHistogram);
+ next = &state->BuildtimeHistogram;
+ *next = NULL;
+
+ state->TotalBuildTimes = cbt->total_build_times;
+ state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
+ state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount++;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nbins; i++) {
+ // compress the histogram by skipping the blanks
+ if (histogram[i] == 0) continue;
+ *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
+ line->key = tor_strdup("CircuitBuildTimeBin");
+ line->value = tor_malloc(25);
+ tor_snprintf(line->value, 25, "%d %d",
+ CBT_BIN_TO_MS(i), histogram[i]);
+ next = &(line->next);
+ }
+
+ if (!unit_tests) {
+ if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
+ or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(histogram);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Shuffle the build times array.
+ *
+ * Stolen from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher\u2013Yates_shuffle
+ */
+static void
+circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ build_time_t *raw_times,
+ int num_times)
+{
+ int n = num_times;
+ if (num_times > CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Decreasing circuit_build_times size from %d to %d",
+ num_times, CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE);
+ }
+
+ /* This code can only be run on a compact array */
+ while (n-- > 1) {
+ int k = crypto_rand_int(n + 1); /* 0 <= k <= n. */
+ build_time_t tmp = raw_times[k];
+ raw_times[k] = raw_times[n];
+ raw_times[n] = tmp;
+ }
+
+ /* Since the times are now shuffled, take a random CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE
+ * subset (ie the first CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE values) */
+ for (n = 0; n < MIN(num_times, CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE); n++) {
+ circuit_build_times_add_time(cbt, raw_times[n]);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Filter old synthetic timeouts that were created before the
+ * new right-censored Pareto calculation was deployed.
+ *
+ * Once all clients before 0.2.1.13-alpha are gone, this code
+ * will be unused.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_build_times_filter_timeouts(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int num_filtered=0, i=0;
+ double timeout_rate = 0;
+ build_time_t max_timeout = 0;
+
+ timeout_rate = circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt);
+ max_timeout = (build_time_t)cbt->close_ms;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] > max_timeout) {
+ build_time_t replaced = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
+ num_filtered++;
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[i] = CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED;
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Replaced timeout %d with %d", replaced,
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "We had %d timeouts out of %d build times, "
+ "and filtered %d above the max of %u",
+ (int)(cbt->total_build_times*timeout_rate),
+ cbt->total_build_times, num_filtered, max_timeout);
+
+ return num_filtered;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Load histogram from <b>state</b>, shuffling the resulting array
+ * after we do so. Use this result to estimate parameters and
+ * calculate the timeout.
+ *
+ * Return -1 on error.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_parse_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ or_state_t *state)
+{
+ int tot_values = 0;
+ uint32_t loaded_cnt = 0, N = 0;
+ config_line_t *line;
+ unsigned int i;
+ build_time_t *loaded_times;
+ int err = 0;
+ circuit_build_times_init(cbt);
+
+ if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* build_time_t 0 means uninitialized */
+ loaded_times = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(build_time_t)*state->TotalBuildTimes);
+
+ for (line = state->BuildtimeHistogram; line; line = line->next) {
+ smartlist_t *args = smartlist_create();
+ smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
+ if (smartlist_len(args) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
+ "Too few arguments to CircuitBuildTime");
+ err = 1;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ break;
+ } else {
+ const char *ms_str = smartlist_get(args,0);
+ const char *count_str = smartlist_get(args,1);
+ uint32_t count, k;
+ build_time_t ms;
+ int ok;
+ ms = (build_time_t)tor_parse_ulong(ms_str, 0, 0,
+ CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
+ "Unparsable bin number");
+ err = 1;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ break;
+ }
+ count = (uint32_t)tor_parse_ulong(count_str, 0, 0,
+ UINT32_MAX, &ok, NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
+ "Unparsable bin count");
+ err = 1;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (loaded_cnt+count+state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount
+ > state->TotalBuildTimes) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
+ "Too many build times in state file. "
+ "Stopping short before %d",
+ loaded_cnt+count);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ for (k = 0; k < count; k++) {
+ loaded_times[loaded_cnt++] = ms;
+ }
+ N++;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(args);
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Adding %d timeouts.", state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount);
+ for (i=0; i < state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount; i++) {
+ loaded_times[loaded_cnt++] = CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED;
+ }
+
+ if (loaded_cnt != state->TotalBuildTimes) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
+ "Corrupt state file? Build times count mismatch. "
+ "Read %d times, but file says %d", loaded_cnt,
+ state->TotalBuildTimes);
+ err = 1;
+ circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(cbt, loaded_times, loaded_cnt);
+
+ /* Verify that we didn't overwrite any indexes */
+ for (i=0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (!cbt->circuit_build_times[i])
+ break;
+ tot_values++;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Loaded %d/%d values from %d lines in circuit time histogram",
+ tot_values, cbt->total_build_times, N);
+
+ if (cbt->total_build_times != tot_values
+ || cbt->total_build_times > CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
+ "Corrupt state file? Shuffled build times mismatch. "
+ "Read %d times, but file says %d", tot_values,
+ state->TotalBuildTimes);
+ err = 1;
+ circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(cbt);
+
+ if (!state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount && cbt->total_build_times) {
+ circuit_build_times_filter_timeouts(cbt);
+ }
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(loaded_times);
+ return err ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Estimates the Xm and Alpha parameters using
+ * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation
+ *
+ * The notable difference is that we use mode instead of min to estimate Xm.
+ * This is because our distribution is frechet-like. We claim this is
+ * an acceptable approximation because we are only concerned with the
+ * accuracy of the CDF of the tail.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ build_time_t *x=cbt->circuit_build_times;
+ double a = 0;
+ int n=0,i=0,abandoned_count=0;
+ build_time_t max_time=0;
+
+ /* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation */
+ /* We sort of cheat here and make our samples slightly more pareto-like
+ * and less frechet-like. */
+ cbt->Xm = circuit_build_times_get_xm(cbt);
+
+ tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
+
+ for (i=0; i< CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (!x[i]) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (x[i] < cbt->Xm) {
+ a += tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm);
+ } else if (x[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED) {
+ abandoned_count++;
+ } else {
+ a += tor_mathlog(x[i]);
+ if (x[i] > max_time)
+ max_time = x[i];
+ }
+ n++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We are erring and asserting here because this can only happen
+ * in codepaths other than startup. The startup state parsing code
+ * performs this same check, and resets state if it hits it. If we
+ * hit it at runtime, something serious has gone wrong.
+ */
+ if (n!=cbt->total_build_times) {
+ log_err(LD_CIRC, "Discrepancy in build times count: %d vs %d", n,
+ cbt->total_build_times);
+ }
+ tor_assert(n==cbt->total_build_times);
+
+ if (max_time <= 0) {
+ /* This can happen if Xm is actually the *maximum* value in the set.
+ * It can also happen if we've abandoned every single circuit somehow.
+ * In either case, tell the caller not to compute a new build timeout. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Could not determine largest build time (%d). "
+ "Xm is %dms and we've abandoned %d out of %d circuits.", max_time,
+ cbt->Xm, abandoned_count, n);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ a += abandoned_count*tor_mathlog(max_time);
+
+ a -= n*tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm);
+ // Estimator comes from Eq #4 in:
+ // "Bayesian estimation based on trimmed samples from Pareto populations"
+ // by Arturo J. Fernández. We are right-censored only.
+ a = (n-abandoned_count)/a;
+
+ cbt->alpha = a;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This is the Pareto Quantile Function. It calculates the point x
+ * in the distribution such that F(x) = quantile (ie quantile*100%
+ * of the mass of the density function is below x on the curve).
+ *
+ * We use it to calculate the timeout and also to generate synthetic
+ * values of time for circuits that timeout before completion.
+ *
+ * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantile_function,
+ * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverse_transform_sampling and
+ * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Generating_a_
+ * random_sample_from_Pareto_distribution
+ * That's right. I'll cite wikipedia all day long.
+ *
+ * Return value is in milliseconds.
+ */
+double
+circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ double quantile)
+{
+ double ret;
+ tor_assert(quantile >= 0);
+ tor_assert(1.0-quantile > 0);
+ tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
+
+ ret = cbt->Xm/pow(1.0-quantile,1.0/cbt->alpha);
+ if (ret > INT32_MAX) {
+ ret = INT32_MAX;
+ }
+ tor_assert(ret > 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Pareto CDF */
+double
+circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x)
+{
+ double ret;
+ tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
+ ret = 1.0-pow(cbt->Xm/x,cbt->alpha);
+ tor_assert(0 <= ret && ret <= 1.0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate a synthetic time using our distribution parameters.
+ *
+ * The return value will be within the [q_lo, q_hi) quantile points
+ * on the CDF.
+ */
+build_time_t
+circuit_build_times_generate_sample(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ double q_lo, double q_hi)
+{
+ double randval = crypto_rand_double();
+ build_time_t ret;
+ double u;
+
+ /* Generate between [q_lo, q_hi) */
+ /*XXXX This is what nextafter is supposed to be for; we should use it on the
+ * platforms that support it. */
+ q_hi -= 1.0/(INT32_MAX);
+
+ tor_assert(q_lo >= 0);
+ tor_assert(q_hi < 1);
+ tor_assert(q_lo < q_hi);
+
+ u = q_lo + (q_hi-q_lo)*randval;
+
+ tor_assert(0 <= u && u < 1.0);
+ /* circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout returns <= INT32_MAX */
+ ret = (build_time_t)
+ tor_lround(circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt, u));
+ tor_assert(ret > 0);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Estimate an initial alpha parameter by solving the quantile
+ * function with a quantile point and a specific timeout value.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_initial_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ double quantile, double timeout_ms)
+{
+ // Q(u) = Xm/((1-u)^(1/a))
+ // Q(0.8) = Xm/((1-0.8))^(1/a)) = CircBuildTimeout
+ // CircBuildTimeout = Xm/((1-0.8))^(1/a))
+ // CircBuildTimeout = Xm*((1-0.8))^(-1/a))
+ // ln(CircBuildTimeout) = ln(Xm)+ln(((1-0.8)))*(-1/a)
+ // -ln(1-0.8)/(ln(CircBuildTimeout)-ln(Xm))=a
+ tor_assert(quantile >= 0);
+ tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
+ cbt->alpha = tor_mathlog(1.0-quantile)/
+ (tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm)-tor_mathlog(timeout_ms));
+ tor_assert(cbt->alpha > 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if we need circuits to be built
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ /* Return true if < MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE */
+ return !circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(cbt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if we should build a timeout test circuit
+ * right now.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ return circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(cbt) &&
+ approx_time()-cbt->last_circ_at > circuit_build_times_test_frequency();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Called to indicate that the network showed some signs of liveness,
+ * i.e. we received a cell.
+ *
+ * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_live() to decide
+ * if we should record the circuit build timeout or not.
+ *
+ * This function is called every time we receive a cell. Avoid
+ * syscalls, events, and other high-intensity work.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ time_t now = approx_time();
+ if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Tor now sees network activity. Restoring circuit build "
+ "timeout recording. Network was down for %d seconds "
+ "during %d circuit attempts.",
+ (int)(now - cbt->liveness.network_last_live),
+ cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts);
+ }
+ cbt->liveness.network_last_live = now;
+ cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Called to indicate that we completed a circuit. Because this circuit
+ * succeeded, it doesn't count as a timeout-after-the-first-hop.
+ *
+ * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_changed() to determine
+ * if we had too many recent timeouts and need to reset our learned timeout
+ * to something higher.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx] = 0;
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx++;
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx %= cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A circuit just timed out. If it failed after the first hop, record it
+ * in our history for later deciding if the network speed has changed.
+ *
+ * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_changed() to determine
+ * if we had too many recent timeouts and need to reset our learned timeout
+ * to something higher.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_build_times_network_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ int did_onehop)
+{
+ if (did_onehop) {
+ cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx]=1;
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx++;
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx %= cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * A circuit was just forcibly closed. If there has been no recent network
+ * activity at all, but this circuit was launched back when we thought the
+ * network was live, increment the number of "nonlive" circuit timeouts.
+ *
+ * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_live() to decide
+ * if we should record the circuit build timeout or not.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_build_times_network_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ int did_onehop, time_t start_time)
+{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ /*
+ * Check if this is a timeout that was for a circuit that spent its
+ * entire existence during a time where we have had no network activity.
+ */
+ if (cbt->liveness.network_last_live < start_time) {
+ if (did_onehop) {
+ char last_live_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char start_time_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char now_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_local_iso_time(last_live_buf, cbt->liveness.network_last_live);
+ format_local_iso_time(start_time_buf, start_time);
+ format_local_iso_time(now_buf, now);
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Circuit somehow completed a hop while the network was "
+ "not live. Network was last live at %s, but circuit launched "
+ "at %s. It's now %s.", last_live_buf, start_time_buf,
+ now_buf);
+ }
+ cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts++;
+ if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts == 1) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Tor has not observed any network activity for the past %d "
+ "seconds. Disabling circuit build timeout code.",
+ (int)(now - cbt->liveness.network_last_live));
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Got non-live timeout. Current count is: %d",
+ cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * When the network is not live, we do not record circuit build times.
+ *
+ * The network is considered not live if there has been at least one
+ * circuit build that began and ended (had its close_ms measurement
+ * period expire) since we last received a cell.
+ *
+ * Also has the side effect of rewinding the circuit time history
+ * in the case of recent liveness changes.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_network_check_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns true if we have seen more than MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT of
+ * the past RECENT_CIRCUITS time out after the first hop. Used to detect
+ * if the network connection has changed significantly, and if so,
+ * resets our circuit build timeout to the default.
+ *
+ * Also resets the entire timeout history in this case and causes us
+ * to restart the process of building test circuits and estimating a
+ * new timeout.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int total_build_times = cbt->total_build_times;
+ int timeout_count=0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* how many of our recent circuits made it to the first hop but then
+ * timed out? */
+ for (i = 0; i < cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs; i++) {
+ timeout_count += cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[i];
+ }
+
+ /* If 80% of our recent circuits are timing out after the first hop,
+ * we need to re-estimate a new initial alpha and timeout. */
+ if (timeout_count < circuit_build_times_max_timeouts()) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
+ memset(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop, 0,
+ sizeof(*cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop)*
+ cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs);
+ cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx = 0;
+
+ /* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout
+ * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
+ if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) {
+ if (cbt->timeout_ms > INT32_MAX/2 || cbt->close_ms > INT32_MAX/2) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. "
+ "(timeout = %lfmsec, close = %lfmsec)",
+ cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms);
+ } else {
+ cbt->timeout_ms *= 2;
+ cbt->close_ms *= 2;
+ }
+ } else {
+ cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
+ = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
+ }
+
+ control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET);
+
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting "
+ "timeout to %lds after %d timeouts and %d buildtimes.",
+ tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000), timeout_count,
+ total_build_times);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Count the number of timeouts in a set of cbt data.
+ */
+double
+circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int i=0,timeouts=0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] >= cbt->timeout_ms) {
+ timeouts++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cbt->total_build_times)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ((double)timeouts)/cbt->total_build_times;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Count the number of closed circuits in a set of cbt data.
+ */
+double
+circuit_build_times_close_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ int i=0,closed=0;
+ for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
+ if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED) {
+ closed++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!cbt->total_build_times)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ((double)closed)/cbt->total_build_times;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Store a timeout as a synthetic value.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the store was successful and we should possibly
+ * update our timeout estimate.
+ */
+int
+circuit_build_times_count_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ int did_onehop,
+ time_t start_time)
+{
+ if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
+ cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
+ = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Record this force-close to help determine if the network is dead */
+ circuit_build_times_network_close(cbt, did_onehop, start_time);
+
+ /* Only count timeouts if network is live.. */
+ if (!circuit_build_times_network_check_live(cbt)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ circuit_build_times_add_time(cbt, CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Update timeout counts to determine if we need to expire
+ * our build time history due to excessive timeouts.
+ *
+ * We do not record any actual time values at this stage;
+ * we are only interested in recording the fact that a timeout
+ * happened. We record the time values via
+ * circuit_build_times_count_close() and circuit_build_times_add_time().
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_count_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
+ int did_onehop)
+{
+ if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
+ cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
+ = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Register the fact that a timeout just occurred. */
+ circuit_build_times_network_timeout(cbt, did_onehop);
+
+ /* If there are a ton of timeouts, we should reset
+ * the circuit build timeout. */
+ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(cbt);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Estimate a new timeout based on history and set our timeout
+ * variable accordingly.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ build_time_t max_time;
+ if (!circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(cbt))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!circuit_build_times_update_alpha(cbt))
+ return 0;
+
+ cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt,
+ circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff());
+
+ cbt->close_ms = circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt,
+ circuit_build_times_close_quantile());
+
+ max_time = circuit_build_times_max(cbt);
+
+ /* Sometimes really fast guard nodes give us such a steep curve
+ * that this ends up being not that much greater than timeout_ms.
+ * Make it be at least 1 min to handle this case. */
+ cbt->close_ms = MAX(cbt->close_ms, circuit_build_times_initial_timeout());
+
+ if (cbt->timeout_ms > max_time) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit build timeout of %dms is beyond the maximum build "
+ "time we have ever observed. Capping it to %dms.",
+ (int)cbt->timeout_ms, max_time);
+ cbt->timeout_ms = max_time;
+ }
+
+ if (max_time < INT32_MAX/2 && cbt->close_ms > 2*max_time) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit build measurement period of %dms is more than twice "
+ "the maximum build time we have ever observed. Capping it to "
+ "%dms.", (int)cbt->close_ms, 2*max_time);
+ cbt->close_ms = 2*max_time;
+ }
+
+ cbt->have_computed_timeout = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Exposed function to compute a new timeout. Dispatches events and
+ * also filters out extremely high timeout values.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
+{
+ long prev_timeout = tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000);
+ double timeout_rate;
+
+ if (!circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker(cbt))
+ return;
+
+ if (cbt->timeout_ms < circuit_build_times_min_timeout()) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Set buildtimeout to low value %lfms. Setting to %dms",
+ cbt->timeout_ms, circuit_build_times_min_timeout());
+ cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
+ if (cbt->close_ms < cbt->timeout_ms) {
+ /* This shouldn't happen because of MAX() in timeout_worker above,
+ * but doing it just in case */
+ cbt->close_ms = circuit_build_times_initial_timeout();
+ }
+ }
+
+ control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED);
+
+ timeout_rate = circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt);
+
+ if (prev_timeout > tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000)) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Based on %d circuit times, it looks like we don't need to "
+ "wait so long for circuits to finish. We will now assume a "
+ "circuit is too slow to use after waiting %ld seconds.",
+ cbt->total_build_times,
+ tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000));
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit timeout data: %lfms, %lfms, Xm: %d, a: %lf, r: %lf",
+ cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha,
+ timeout_rate);
+ } else if (prev_timeout < tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000)) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Based on %d circuit times, it looks like we need to wait "
+ "longer for circuits to finish. We will now assume a "
+ "circuit is too slow to use after waiting %ld seconds.",
+ cbt->total_build_times,
+ tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000));
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit timeout data: %lfms, %lfms, Xm: %d, a: %lf, r: %lf",
+ cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha,
+ timeout_rate);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Set circuit build timeout to %lds (%lfms, %lfms, Xm: %d, a: %lf,"
+ " r: %lf) based on %d circuit times",
+ tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000),
+ cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha, timeout_rate,
+ cbt->total_build_times);
+ }
+}
+
/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
* and with the high bit specified by conn-\>circ_id_type, until we get
* a circ_id that is not in use by any other circuit on that conn.
@@@ -1382,21 -112,21 +1382,21 @@@ circuit_list_path_impl(origin_circuit_
crypt_path_t *hop;
smartlist_t *elements;
const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
- char buf[128];
char *s;
elements = smartlist_create();
if (verbose) {
const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
+ char *cp;
+ tor_asprintf(&cp, "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : ", exit ",
circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" :
(nickname?nickname:"*unnamed*"));
- smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
+ smartlist_add(elements, cp);
}
hop = circ->cpath;
@@@ -1418,7 -148,8 +1418,7 @@@
router_get_verbose_nickname(elt, ri);
} else if ((rs = router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id))) {
routerstatus_get_verbose_nickname(elt, rs);
- } else if (hop->extend_info->nickname &&
- is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
+ } else if (is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
elt[0] = '$';
base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
elt[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]= '~';
@@@ -1486,7 -217,7 +1486,7 @@@ voi
circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
- log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
+ tor_log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
tor_free(s);
}
@@@ -1538,7 -269,7 +1538,7 @@@ static in
onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
{
int r;
-again:
+ again:
r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
@@@ -1630,10 -361,9 +1630,10 @@@ circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit
if (!n_conn) {
/* not currently connected in a useful way. */
- const char *name = firsthop->extend_info->nickname ?
+ const char *name = strlen(firsthop->extend_info->nickname) ?
firsthop->extend_info->nickname : fmt_addr(&firsthop->extend_info->addr);
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Next router is %s: %s ", safe_str(name), msg?msg:"???");
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Next router is %s: %s ",
+ safe_str_client(name), msg?msg:"???");
circ->_base.n_hop = extend_info_dup(firsthop->extend_info);
if (should_launch) {
@@@ -1776,8 -506,7 +1776,8 @@@ circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *
cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
- append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circ, circ->n_conn, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT);
+ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circ, circ->n_conn, &cell,
+ CELL_DIRECTION_OUT, 0);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
/* mark it so it gets better rate limiting treatment. */
@@@ -1807,7 -536,7 +1807,7 @@@ inform_testing_reachability(void
"CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
me->address, me->dir_port);
}
- log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
"(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
"messages indicating success)",
me->address, me->or_port,
@@@ -1840,18 -569,6 +1840,18 @@@ should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(orig
return 1;
}
+/** Return true if <b>circ</b> is the type of circuit we want to count
+ * timeouts from. In particular, we want it to have not completed yet
+ * (already completing indicates we cannibalized it), and we want it to
+ * have exactly three hops.
+ */
+int
+circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ return !circ->has_opened
+ && circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
+}
+
/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
*
* If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
@@@ -1925,42 -642,15 +1925,42 @@@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_cir
if (!hop) {
/* done building the circuit. whew. */
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
+ if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(circ)) {
+ struct timeval end;
+ long timediff;
+ tor_gettimeofday(&end);
+ timediff = tv_mdiff(&circ->_base.highres_created, &end);
+
+ /*
+ * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut
+ * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath,
+ * and we should discard the value.
+ */
+ if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. "
+ "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d", timediff,
+ circ->_base.purpose);
+ } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
+ /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */
+ if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) {
+ circuit_build_times_add_time(&circ_times, (build_time_t)timediff);
+ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times);
+ }
+
+ if (circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
+ circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(&circ_times);
+ }
+ }
+ }
log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0);
- if (!has_completed_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
or_options_t *options = get_options();
- has_completed_circuit=1;
+ can_complete_circuit=1;
/* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */
- log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL,
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
"Tor has successfully opened a circuit. "
"Looks like client functionality is working.");
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0);
@@@ -1972,10 -662,6 +1972,10 @@@
}
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
+
+ /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */
+ if (circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
return 0;
}
@@@ -2019,13 -705,13 +2019,13 @@@ voi
circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed)
{
int severity = server_mode(get_options()) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_NOTICE;
- log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Your system clock just jumped %d seconds %s; "
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Your system clock just jumped %d seconds %s; "
"assuming established circuits no longer work.",
seconds_elapsed >=0 ? seconds_elapsed : -seconds_elapsed,
seconds_elapsed >=0 ? "forward" : "backward");
control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "CLOCK_JUMPED TIME=%d",
seconds_elapsed);
- has_completed_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
+ can_complete_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
control_event_client_status(severity, "CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED REASON=%s",
"CLOCK_JUMPED");
circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
@@@ -2082,7 -768,8 +2082,8 @@@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t
n_addr32 = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
onionskin = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
- id_digest = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
+ id_digest = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+
+ ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&n_addr, n_addr32);
if (!n_port || !n_addr32) {
@@@ -2237,7 -924,7 +2238,7 @@@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit
tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
- if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)reply, keys,
+ if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)reply,keys,
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
@@@ -2257,9 -944,10 +2258,9 @@@
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
- if (hop->dh_handshake_state) {
- crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
- hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
+ hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
+
memset(hop->fast_handshake_state, 0, sizeof(hop->fast_handshake_state));
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
@@@ -2347,8 -1035,8 +2348,8 @@@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, ui
cell_type == CELL_CREATED ? ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN : DIGEST_LEN*2);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
- (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys),
- (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys+20));
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
@@@ -2369,7 -1057,7 +2370,7 @@@
circ->is_first_hop = (cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
- circ->p_conn, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN);
+ circ->p_conn, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending 'created' cell.");
if (!is_local_addr(&circ->p_conn->_base.addr) &&
@@@ -2398,7 -1086,7 +2399,7 @@@ new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_i
tor_assert(routers);
- routelen = 3;
+ routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
if (exit &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
@@@ -2463,8 -1151,6 +2464,8 @@@ circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(tim
smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
tor_assert(need_uptime);
tor_assert(need_capacity);
+ // Always predict need_capacity
+ *need_capacity = 1;
enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
@@@ -2487,8 -1173,6 +2488,8 @@@ router_handles_some_port(routerinfo_t *
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
addr_policy_result_t r;
+ /* alignment issues aren't a worry for this dereference, since
+ needed_ports is explicitly a smartlist of uint16_t's */
port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
tor_assert(port);
r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy(0, port, router->exit_policy);
@@@ -2571,16 -1255,9 +2572,16 @@@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerl
n_supported[i] = -1;
continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */
}
- if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
+ if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) &&
+ (!options->ExitNodes ||
+ !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router))) {
+ /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names
+ * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this
+ * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country
+ * they ask for is rare. Or something. */
n_supported[i] = -1;
- continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable */
+ continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have
+ * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */
}
if (!(router->is_valid || options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) {
/* if it's invalid and we don't want it */
@@@ -2605,7 -1282,7 +2606,7 @@@
{
if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
- if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router)) {
+ if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router, 1)) {
++n_supported[i];
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
@@@ -2647,8 -1324,7 +2648,8 @@@
routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes,
options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && !options->StrictExitNodes) {
+ if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes &&
+ !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */
routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL,
options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
}
@@@ -2660,7 -1336,7 +2661,7 @@@
* possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
* at least one predicted exit port. */
- int try;
+ int attempt;
smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting, *use;
if (best_support == -1) {
@@@ -2673,20 -1349,19 +2674,20 @@@
tor_free(n_supported);
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir, 0, 0);
}
- log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or won't exit -- choosing a "
- "doomed exit at random.");
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or won't exit%s -- "
+ "choosing a doomed exit at random.",
+ options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? " or are Excluded" : "");
}
supporting = smartlist_create();
use = smartlist_create();
needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
- for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) {
+ for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
/* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
* then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) {
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
if (n_supported[i] != -1 &&
- (try || router_handles_some_port(router, needed_ports))) {
+ (attempt || router_handles_some_port(router, needed_ports))) {
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.",
// try, router->nickname);
smartlist_add(supporting, router);
@@@ -2695,14 -1370,12 +2696,14 @@@
routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes,
options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
- if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && !options->StrictExitNodes) {
+ if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes &&
+ !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */
routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL,
options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1);
}
- /* XXX sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
- * exit node is down. we should pick it anyway. */
+ /* FFF sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
+ * exit node is considered down by the consensus. we should pick
+ * it anyway, since the user asked for it. */
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
if (router)
break;
@@@ -2720,10 -1393,10 +2721,10 @@@
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname);
return router;
}
- if (options->StrictExitNodes) {
+ if (options->ExitNodes && options->StrictNodes) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"No specified exit routers seem to be running, and "
- "StrictExitNodes is set: can't choose an exit.");
+ "StrictNodes is set: can't choose an exit.");
}
return NULL;
}
@@@ -2754,13 -1427,15 +2755,13 @@@ choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose
if (options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
- return router_choose_random_node(NULL, NULL,
- options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
+ return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
else
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir,need_uptime,need_capacity);
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
if (options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS)
flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
- return router_choose_random_node(NULL, NULL,
- options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
+ return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
}
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
tor_fragile_assert();
@@@ -2880,7 -1555,8 +2881,7 @@@ circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_
state = circ->build_state;
tor_assert(state);
- if (state->chosen_exit)
- extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
+ extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
@@@ -3002,7 -1678,8 +3003,7 @@@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpo
flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
if (options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
- choice = router_choose_random_node(NULL,
- excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
+ choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
smartlist_free(excluded);
return choice;
}
@@@ -3066,7 -1743,11 +3067,7 @@@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpos
if (options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY)
flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
- choice = router_choose_random_node(
- NULL,
- excluded,
- options->ExcludeNodes,
- flags);
+ choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
smartlist_free(excluded);
return choice;
}
@@@ -3187,9 -1868,9 +3188,9 @@@ extend_info_from_router(routerinfo_t *r
void
extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
{
- tor_assert(info);
- if (info->onion_key)
- crypto_free_pk_env(info->onion_key);
+ if (!info)
+ return;
+ crypto_free_pk_env(info->onion_key);
tor_free(info);
}
@@@ -3248,6 -1929,8 +3249,6 @@@ entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e
char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
int changed = 0;
- tor_assert(options);
-
*reason = NULL;
/* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */
@@@ -3310,58 -1993,35 +3311,58 @@@ entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e
* - Listed as either up or never yet contacted;
* - Present in the routerlist;
* - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver consensus,
- * if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>;
- * (This check is currently redundant with the Guard flag, but in
- * the future that might change. Best to leave it in for now.)
+ * if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>
+ * (unless it's a configured EntryNode);
* - Allowed by our current ReachableORAddresses config option; and
- * - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless assume_reachable
+ * - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless <b>assume_reachable</b>
* is true).
+ *
+ * If the answer is no, set *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why.
*/
static INLINE routerinfo_t *
entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
- int assume_reachable)
+ int assume_reachable, const char **msg)
{
routerinfo_t *r;
- if (e->bad_since)
+ or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ tor_assert(msg);
+
+ if (e->bad_since) {
+ *msg = "bad";
return NULL;
+ }
/* no good if it's unreachable, unless assume_unreachable or can_retry. */
if (!assume_reachable && !e->can_retry &&
- e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL)))
+ e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL))) {
+ *msg = "unreachable";
return NULL;
+ }
r = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
- if (!r)
+ if (!r) {
+ *msg = "no descriptor";
return NULL;
- if (get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
+ }
+ if (get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
+ *msg = "not a bridge";
return NULL;
- if (!get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
+ }
+ if (!get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) {
+ *msg = "not general-purpose";
return NULL;
- if (router_is_unreliable(r, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0))
+ }
+ if (options->EntryNodes &&
+ routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) {
+ /* they asked for it, they get it */
+ need_uptime = need_capacity = 0;
+ }
+ if (router_is_unreliable(r, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
+ *msg = "not fast/stable";
return NULL;
- if (!fascist_firewall_allows_or(r))
+ }
+ if (!fascist_firewall_allows_or(r)) {
+ *msg = "unreachable by config";
return NULL;
+ }
return r;
}
@@@ -3370,12 -2030,11 +3371,12 @@@ static in
num_live_entry_guards(void)
{
int n = 0;
+ const char *msg;
if (! entry_guards)
return 0;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
- if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0))
+ if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
++n;
});
return n;
@@@ -3399,21 -2058,16 +3400,21 @@@ static voi
log_entry_guards(int severity)
{
smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_create();
- char buf[1024];
char *s;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
- tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s (%s%s)",
- e->nickname,
- entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 0) ? "up " : "down ",
- e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
- smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
+ const char *msg = NULL;
+ char *cp;
+ if (entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
+ tor_asprintf(&cp, "%s (up %s)",
+ e->nickname,
+ e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
+ else
+ tor_asprintf(&cp, "%s (%s, %s)",
+ e->nickname, msg,
+ e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
+ smartlist_add(elements, cp);
});
s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
@@@ -3437,13 -2091,12 +3438,13 @@@ control_event_guard_deferred(void
**/
#if 0
int n = 0;
+ const char *msg;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!entry_guards)
return;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
- if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0)) {
+ if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg)) {
if (n++ == options->NumEntryGuards) {
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DEFERRED");
return;
@@@ -3505,8 -2158,9 +3506,8 @@@ add_an_entry_guard(routerinfo_t *chosen
/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards
* until we have enough in the list. */
static void
-pick_entry_guards(void)
+pick_entry_guards(or_options_t *options)
{
- or_options_t *options = get_options();
int changed = 0;
tor_assert(entry_guards);
@@@ -3528,8 -2182,7 +3529,8 @@@
static void
entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e)
{
- tor_assert(e);
+ if (!e)
+ return;
tor_free(e->chosen_by_version);
tor_free(e);
}
@@@ -3538,9 -2191,10 +3539,9 @@@
* or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select
* entry guards badly. */
static int
-remove_obsolete_entry_guards(void)
+remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now)
{
int changed = 0, i;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
@@@ -3600,10 -2254,11 +3601,10 @@@
* long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we
* removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */
static int
-remove_dead_entry_guards(void)
+remove_dead_entry_guards(time_t now)
{
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
- time_t now = time(NULL);
int i;
int changed = 0;
@@@ -3638,17 -2293,19 +3639,17 @@@
* think that things are unlisted.
*/
void
-entry_guards_compute_status(void)
+entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
{
- time_t now;
int changed = 0;
int severity = LOG_DEBUG;
- or_options_t *options;
digestmap_t *reasons;
+
if (! entry_guards)
return;
- options = get_options();
-
- now = time(NULL);
+ if (options->EntryNodes) /* reshuffle the entry guard list if needed */
+ entry_nodes_should_be_added();
reasons = digestmap_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry)
@@@ -3665,7 -2322,7 +3666,7 @@@
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
- if (remove_dead_entry_guards())
+ if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now))
changed = 1;
severity = changed ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_INFO;
@@@ -3673,16 -2330,13 +3674,16 @@@
if (changed) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity);
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry '%s' is %s, %s%s%s, and %s.",
+ const char *live_msg = "";
+ routerinfo_t *r = entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &live_msg);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry '%s' is %s, %s%s%s, and %s%s.",
entry->nickname,
entry->unreachable_since ? "unreachable" : "reachable",
entry->bad_since ? "unusable" : "usable",
reason ? ", ": "",
reason ? reason : "",
- entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0) ? "live" : "not live");
+ r ? "live" : "not live / ",
+ r ? "" : live_msg);
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
log_info(LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)",
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
@@@ -3753,7 -2407,6 +3754,7 @@@ entry_guard_register_connect_status(con
"Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
entry->nickname, buf,
num_live_entry_guards()-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1);
+ control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
entry_guard_free(entry);
smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, idx);
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
@@@ -3790,8 -2443,7 +3791,8 @@@
if (e == entry)
break;
if (e->made_contact) {
- routerinfo_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1);
+ const char *msg;
+ routerinfo_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1, &msg);
if (r && e->unreachable_since) {
refuse_conn = 1;
e->can_retry = 1;
@@@ -3822,16 -2474,16 +3823,16 @@@ static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0
void
entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
{
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "New EntryNodes config option detected. Will use.");
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "EntryNodes config option set. Putting configured "
+ "relays at the front of the entry guard list.");
should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
}
/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list
* of guard nodes, at the front. */
static void
-entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
+entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options)
{
- or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *entry_routers, *entry_fps;
smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
tor_assert(entry_guards);
@@@ -3846,7 -2498,7 +3847,7 @@@
return;
}
- if (options->EntryNodes) {
+ {
char *string = routerset_to_string(options->EntryNodes);
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.", string);
tor_free(string);
@@@ -3890,9 -2542,8 +3891,9 @@@
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0);
});
- /* Finally, the remaining EntryNodes, unless we're strict */
- if (options->StrictEntryNodes) {
+ /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
+ * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
entry_guard_free(e));
} else {
@@@ -3906,30 -2557,16 +3907,30 @@@
entry_guards_changed();
}
-/** Return 1 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
- * directory to our entry guard list. Else return 0. */
+/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
+ * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a
+ * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it.
+ */
int
-entry_list_can_grow(or_options_t *options)
+entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options)
{
- if (options->StrictEntryNodes)
- return 0;
+ if (options->EntryNodes)
+ return 1;
if (options->UseBridges)
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we
+ * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */
+static int
+entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes)
+ return 1;
+ if (options->UseBridges)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
@@@ -3947,7 -2584,7 +3948,7 @@@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_
routerinfo_t *r = NULL;
int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
- int consider_exit_family = 0;
+ int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0;
if (chosen_exit) {
smartlist_add(exit_family, chosen_exit);
@@@ -3959,62 -2596,38 +3960,62 @@@
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
if (should_add_entry_nodes)
- entry_guards_prepend_from_config();
+ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(options);
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options) &&
- (! entry_guards ||
- smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards))
- pick_entry_guards();
+ if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
+ smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
+ pick_entry_guards(options);
retry:
smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
- r = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0);
- if (r && (!consider_exit_family || !smartlist_isin(exit_family, r))) {
- smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
- if (!entry->made_contact) {
- /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
- * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
- * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
- * guard list without needing to. */
- goto choose_and_finish;
+ const char *msg;
+ r = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0, &msg);
+ if (!r)
+ continue; /* down, no point */
+ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, r))
+ continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
+ if (options->EntryNodes &&
+ !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) {
+ /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards))
+ goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
+ /* in theory this case should never happen, since
+ * entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
}
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
- break; /* we have enough */
}
+ smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
+ if (!entry->made_contact) {
+ /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
+ * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
+ * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
+ * guard list without needing to. */
+ goto choose_and_finish;
+ }
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
+ break; /* we have enough */
});
- /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
- * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
- * using him.
- * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < 2) {
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options)) {
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least
+ * one choice, that's great. Use it. */
+ preferred_min = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
+ * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
+ * using him.
+ * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
+ preferred_min = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) {
+ if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) {
/* still no? try adding a new entry then */
/* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
* to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
@@@ -4039,7 -2652,7 +4040,7 @@@
need_capacity = 0;
goto retry;
}
- if (!r && !entry_list_can_grow(options) && consider_exit_family) {
+ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
/* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
* set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
* bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */
@@@ -4050,15 -2663,15 +4051,15 @@@
}
choose_and_finish:
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options)) {
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
+ * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
+ r = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
+ } else {
/* We choose uniformly at random here, because choose_good_entry_server()
* already weights its choices by bandwidth, so we don't want to
* *double*-weight our guard selection. */
r = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
- } else {
- /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
- * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
- r = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
}
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
smartlist_free(exit_family);
@@@ -4192,7 -2805,7 +4193,7 @@@ entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *st
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
/* XXX022 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
* few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */
- if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards())
+ if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
entry_guards_dirty = 1;
}
digestmap_free(added_by, _tor_free);
@@@ -4291,11 -2904,9 +4292,11 @@@ entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *s
* */
int
getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
- const char *question, char **answer)
+ const char *question, char **answer,
+ const char **errmsg)
{
- int use_long_names = conn->use_long_names;
+ (void) conn;
+ (void) errmsg;
if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") ||
!strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) {
@@@ -4304,13 -2915,12 +4305,13 @@@
char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
- {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
size_t len = MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+32;
char *c = tor_malloc(len);
const char *status = NULL;
time_t when = 0;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+
if (!e->made_contact) {
status = "never-connected";
} else if (e->bad_since) {
@@@ -4319,17 -2929,19 +4320,17 @@@
} else {
status = "up";
}
- if (use_long_names) {
- routerinfo_t *ri = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
- if (ri) {
- router_get_verbose_nickname(nbuf, ri);
- } else {
- nbuf[0] = '$';
- base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
- /* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about
- * this router any longer; don't include it. */
- }
+
+ ri = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
+ if (ri) {
+ router_get_verbose_nickname(nbuf, ri);
} else {
- base16_encode(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ nbuf[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ /* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about
+ * this router any longer; don't include it. */
}
+
if (when) {
format_iso_time(tbuf, when);
tor_snprintf(c, len, "%s %s %s\n", nbuf, status, tbuf);
@@@ -4337,7 -2949,7 +4338,7 @@@
tor_snprintf(c, len, "%s %s\n", nbuf, status);
}
smartlist_add(sl, c);
- });
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
*answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
smartlist_free(sl);
@@@ -4378,56 -2990,29 +4379,56 @@@ clear_bridge_list(void
* (either by comparing keys if possible, else by comparing addr/port).
* Else return NULL. */
static bridge_info_t *
-routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri)
+get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
+ const char *digest)
{
if (!bridge_list)
return NULL;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
{
if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
- tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&bridge->addr, ri->addr) &&
- bridge->port == ri->or_port)
+ !tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
+ bridge->port == port)
return bridge;
- if (!memcmp(bridge->identity, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN))
+ if (!memcmp(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return bridge;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
return NULL;
}
+/** Wrapper around get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest() to look
+ * it up via router descriptor <b>ri</b>. */
+static bridge_info_t *
+get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr);
+ return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(&addr,
+ ri->or_port, ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
+}
+
/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges, else 0. */
int
routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri)
{
- return routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(ri) ? 1 : 0;
+ return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/** We made a connection to a router at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>
+ * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be <b>digest</b>.
+ * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it.
+ */
+void
+learned_router_identity(tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest)
+{
+ bridge_info_t *bridge =
+ get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest);
+ if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) {
+ memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s:%d",
+ hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addr(addr), port);
+ }
}
/** Remember a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. If <b>digest</b>
@@@ -4497,8 -3082,9 +4498,8 @@@ retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(
* descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly
* from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */
void
-fetch_bridge_descriptors(time_t now)
+fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
{
- or_options_t *options = get_options();
int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_AUTHORITY);
int ask_bridge_directly;
int can_use_bridge_authority;
@@@ -4566,7 -3152,7 +4567,7 @@@ learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t
tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE);
if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
int first = !any_bridge_descriptors_known();
- bridge_info_t *bridge = routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(ri);
+ bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri);
time_t now = time(NULL);
ri->is_running = 1;
@@@ -4622,38 -3208,26 +4623,38 @@@ any_pending_bridge_descriptor_fetches(v
return 0;
}
-/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for a bridge and
- * all descriptors we know are down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is
- * 1, then mark the down bridges up; else just observe and report. */
+/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for an entry guard
+ * (bridge or member of EntryNodes) and all descriptors we know are
+ * down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is 1, then mark the down guards
+ * up; else just observe and report. */
static int
-bridges_retry_helper(int act)
+entries_retry_helper(or_options_t *options, int act)
{
routerinfo_t *ri;
int any_known = 0;
int any_running = 0;
+ int purpose = options->UseBridges ?
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
ri = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
- if (ri && ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
+ if (ri && ri->purpose == purpose) {
any_known = 1;
if (ri->is_running)
- any_running = 1; /* some bridge is both known and running */
- else if (act) { /* mark it for retry */
- ri->is_running = 1;
+ any_running = 1; /* some entry is both known and running */
+ else if (act) {
+ /* Mark all current connections to this OR as unhealthy, since
+ * otherwise there could be one that started 30 seconds
+ * ago, and in 30 seconds it will time out, causing us to mark
+ * the node down and undermine the retry attempt. We mark even
+ * the established conns, since if the network just came back
+ * we'll want to attach circuits to fresh conns. */
+ connection_or_set_bad_connections(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1);
+
+ /* mark this entry node for retry */
+ router_set_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1);
e->can_retry = 1;
e->bad_since = 0;
}
@@@ -4664,21 -3238,19 +4665,21 @@@
return any_known && !any_running;
}
-/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges, and are they all
- * down? */
+/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges / entrynodes, and are
+ * all the ones we have descriptors for down? */
int
-bridges_known_but_down(void)
+entries_known_but_down(or_options_t *options)
{
- return bridges_retry_helper(0);
+ tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
+ return entries_retry_helper(options, 0);
}
-/** Mark all down known bridges up. */
+/** Mark all down known bridges / entrynodes up. */
void
-bridges_retry_all(void)
+entries_retry_all(or_options_t *options)
{
- bridges_retry_helper(1);
+ tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
+ entries_retry_helper(options, 1);
}
/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards and related
diff --combined src/or/command.c
index 6a3ca13,9269456..00d9af3
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@@ -16,19 -16,6 +16,19 @@@
*/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "command.h"
+#include "connection.h"
+#include "connection_or.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "control.h"
+#include "cpuworker.h"
+#include "hibernate.h"
+#include "onion.h"
+#include "relay.h"
+#include "router.h"
+#include "routerlist.h"
/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0;
@@@ -288,14 -275,7 +288,14 @@@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cel
/* hand it off to the cpuworkers, and then return. */
if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(NULL, circ, onionskin) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to hand off onionskin. Closing.");
+#define WARN_HANDOFF_FAILURE_INTERVAL (6*60*60)
+ static ratelim_t handoff_warning =
+ RATELIM_INIT(WARN_HANDOFF_FAILURE_INTERVAL);
+ char *m;
+ if ((m = rate_limit_log(&handoff_warning, approx_time()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to hand off onionskin. Closing.%s",m);
+ tor_free(m);
+ }
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
@@@ -416,18 -396,15 +416,18 @@@ command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell
* gotten no more than MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT of them. */
if (cell->command == CELL_RELAY_EARLY) {
if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) {
- /* XXX Allow an unlimited number of inbound relay_early cells for
- * now, for hidden service compatibility. See bug 1038. -RD */
+ /* Allow an unlimited number of inbound relay_early cells,
+ * for hidden service compatibility. There isn't any way to make
+ * a long circuit through inbound relay_early cells anyway. See
+ * bug 1038. -RD */
} else {
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (or_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells == 0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received too many RELAY_EARLY cells on circ %d from %s:%d."
" Closing circuit.",
- cell->circ_id, safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port);
+ cell->circ_id, safe_str(conn->_base.address),
+ conn->_base.port);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
@@@ -535,8 -512,7 +535,8 @@@ command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
- highest_supported_version, safe_str(conn->_base.address),
+ highest_supported_version,
+ safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 2);
@@@ -600,7 -576,8 +600,8 @@@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *ce
/* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is
* "canonical." */
tor_addr_t addr;
- const uint8_t *next = decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
+ const uint8_t *next =
+ decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
if (next == NULL) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
@@@ -650,8 -627,8 +651,8 @@@
else
log_info(LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now "
"open, using protocol version %d",
- safe_str(conn->_base.address), conn->_base.port,
- (int)conn->link_proto);
+ safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
+ conn->_base.port, (int)conn->link_proto);
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),time(NULL));
}
diff --combined src/or/onion.c
index b8f3019,45c75b0..9db9145
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@@ -11,10 -11,6 +11,10 @@@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "onion.h"
+#include "rephist.h"
/** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker
* to process a waiting onion handshake. */
@@@ -62,18 -58,11 +62,18 @@@ onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, c
tor_assert(!ol_tail->next);
if (ol_length >= get_options()->MaxOnionsPending) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit "
- "creation requests! Please consider using the "
- "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more "
- "restricted exit policy.");
+#define WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL (60)
+ static ratelim_t last_warned =
+ RATELIM_INIT(WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL);
+ char *m;
+ if ((m = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, approx_time()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit "
+ "creation requests! Please consider using the "
+ "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more "
+ "restricted exit policy.%s",m);
+ tor_free(m);
+ }
tor_free(tmp);
return -1;
}
@@@ -264,9 -253,8 +264,9 @@@ onion_skin_server_handshake(const char
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN+key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
- len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, challenge, DH_KEY_LEN,
- key_material, key_material_len);
+ len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, challenge,
+ DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ key_material_len);
if (len < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "crypto_dh_compute_secret failed.");
goto err;
@@@ -316,9 -304,8 +316,9 @@@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_e
key_material_len = DIGEST_LEN + key_out_len;
key_material = tor_malloc(key_material_len);
- len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(handshake_state, handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN,
- key_material, key_material_len);
+ len = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, handshake_state,
+ handshake_reply, DH_KEY_LEN, key_material,
+ key_material_len);
if (len < 0)
goto err;
@@@ -392,8 -379,8 +392,8 @@@ fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *ke
* and protected by TLS).
*/
int
- fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
- const uint8_t *handshake_reply_out, /* DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes */
+ fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state,/*DIGEST_LEN bytes*/
+ const uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,/*DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes*/
uint8_t *key_out,
size_t key_out_len)
{
diff --combined src/or/rendmid.c
index baa8329,064f1be..5e2dd98
--- a/src/or/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/or/rendmid.c
@@@ -8,11 -8,6 +8,11 @@@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "relay.h"
+#include "rendmid.h"
+#include "rephist.h"
/** Respond to an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell by checking the signed data and
* setting the circuit's purpose and service pk digest.
@@@ -69,7 -64,8 +69,8 @@@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *
}
/* Rest of body: signature of previous data */
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_MID);
- if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk, (char*)request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
+ if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk,
+ (char*)request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
(char*)(request+2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len),
request_len-(2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len))<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
@@@ -130,7 -126,8 +131,8 @@@
* INTRODUCE2 cell.
*/
int
- rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len)
+ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
+ size_t request_len)
{
or_circuit_t *intro_circ;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
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