[or-cvs] r24021: {blossom} implement small changes to wording suggested by Wendy and Ja (in blossom/trunk: . diagrams)

Geoffrey Goodell goodell at cantabrigia.org
Sun Jan 2 16:44:07 UTC 2011


Author: goodell
Date: 2011-01-02 16:44:07 +0000 (Sun, 02 Jan 2011)
New Revision: 24021

Modified:
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-2.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-3.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-4.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-5.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-6.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-7.dia
   blossom/trunk/diagrams/tor-1.dia
   blossom/trunk/index.html
Log:
implement small changes to wording suggested by Wendy and Jacob.


Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-2.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-3.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-4.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-5.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-6.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/blossom-7.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/diagrams/tor-1.dia
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Modified: blossom/trunk/index.html
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--- blossom/trunk/index.html	2011-01-02 03:51:45 UTC (rev 24020)
+++ blossom/trunk/index.html	2011-01-02 16:44:07 UTC (rev 24021)
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 <h1>A Menagerie of Blossom Applications</h1>
 
-<p>First, we consider what the Tor network provides:</p>
+<p>First, we consider what a mix network such as the Tor network provides:</p>
 
 <div class="element">
 
@@ -21,34 +21,35 @@
 
 <p><b>Direct Connection.</b> In a single transport domain, clients should be
 able to contact services directly, although without anonymity.  (This is the
-behavior of TCP clients when Tor is turned off.)</p>
+behavior of TCP clients when the mix network is not used.)</p>
 
 </div><p></p><div class="element">
 
 <p class="center"><img src="images/tor-1.png" alt="tor-1" width=412 height=242></p>
 
-<p><b>Anonymous Connection.</b> Tor clients build a three-hop circuit through
-which they send TCP streams.  The third node in the circuit connects directly
-to Internet services in the same transport domain.  (This is the behavior of
-TCP clients when Tor is turned on.)</p>
+<p><b>Anonymous Connection.</b> Mix network clients build a three-hop circuit
+through which they send TCP streams.  The third node in the circuit connects
+directly to Internet services in the same transport domain.  (This is the
+behavior of TCP clients when the mix network is enabled.)</p>
 
 </div>
 
-<p>Next, we show how Blossom can extend the set of possible uses for the Tor
-software to build new connectivity solutions:</p>
+<p>Next, we show how Blossom can extend the set of possible uses of
+circuit-oriented onion routing, such as that implemented by Tor, to build new
+connectivity solutions:</p>
 
 <div class="element">
 
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-0.png" alt="blossom-0" width=228 height=128></p>
 
 <p><b>[0] Overcoming Client-Side Filtering.</b> Suppose that a client seeking
-to access a resource is connected to the Internet via a blacklisting or
-monitored connection.  The client seeks to access resources that may only be
-accessed via a node on the other side of the filter, and does not seek
-anonymity from the perspective of the server or the Internet beyond the filter.
-An access provider may offer proxy service to the client, allowing the client
-to build a one-hop circuit to the access provider, from which connections to
-the server can be established.</p>
+to access a resource is connected to the Internet via a filtered or monitored
+connection.  The client seeks to access resources that may only be accessed via
+a node on the other side of the filter, and does not seek anonymity from the
+perspective of the server or the Internet beyond the filter.  An access
+provider may offer proxy service to the client, allowing the client to build a
+one-hop circuit to the access provider, from which connections to the server
+can be established.</p>
 
 </div><p></p><div class="element">
 
@@ -56,7 +57,7 @@
 
 <p><b>[1] Overcoming  Server-Side Filtering.</b> Suppose that a server is
 running on a private network or is otherwise connected to the Internet via a
-blacklisting or monitored connection.  The server seeks broad accessibility to
+filtered or monitored connection.  The server seeks broad accessibility to
 Internet clients but lacks a global point of presence.  With the aid of an
 Internet waypoint and a local access provider, the local access provider can
 establish a persistent connection to a waypoint, and clients can extend a
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@
 
 <p><b>[2] Anonymously Overcoming Server-Side Filtering.</b> Suppose that
 clients want to anonymously access a resource behind a private network.  With
-the aid of an Internet waypoint within a Tor network and a local access
+the aid of an Internet waypoint within a mix network and a local access
 provider, a client can extend a four-hop circuit for which the third hop is the
 waypoint and the fourth hop is the access provider.</p>
 
@@ -78,19 +79,19 @@
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-3.png" alt="blossom-3" width=412 height=242></p>
 
 <p><b>[3] Direct Circumvention.</b> Suppose that a client seeking to access a
-resource is connected to the Internet via a blacklisting or monitored
-connection and seeks strong anonymity while connecting to resources accessible
-via a Tor network.  Then, the client may connect directly to a Tor network via
-a persistent connection to a specific first hop.  Once the client has reached
-the Tor network, it may extend the second and third hops as usual, and access
-the server from the three-hop circuit.  The circumvention motivation is
-arguably the motivation for some Tor users today.  Although such users may not
-need the three-hop circuit to achieve their goals (see Example 0 above), the
-Tor routers have a serious motivation to not act as general-purpose one-hop
-proxies (e.g., lest they become the target of further investigation).
+resource is connected to the Internet via a filtered or monitored connection
+and seeks strong anonymity while connecting to resources accessible via a mix
+network.  Then, the client may connect directly to a mix network via a
+persistent connection to a specific first hop.  Once the client has reached the
+mix network, it may extend the second and third hops as usual, and access the
+server from the three-hop circuit.  The circumvention motivation is arguably
+the motivation for some users of the Tor network today.  Although such users
+may not need the three-hop circuit to achieve their goals (see Example 0
+above), the mix routers have a serious motivation to not act as general-purpose
+one-hop proxies (e.g., lest they become the target of further investigation).
 Nevertheless, it may be the case that clients explicitly not seeking anonymity
 can find satisfaction in the one-hop solution.  Similarly, there is a concern
-that a motivated filtering regime could easily block a Tor network wholesale,
+that a motivated filtering regime could easily block a mix network wholesale,
 in which point a more sophisticated solution becomes necessary.</p>
 
 </div><p></p><div class="element">
@@ -98,21 +99,21 @@
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-4.png" alt="blossom-4" width=497 height=242></p>
 
 <p><b>[4] Bridging.</b> Suppose that a client seeks direct circumvention around
-a filter that has blocked access to Tor routers.  One solution is to have an
-intermediary node provide access to the Tor network.  As long as a client can
-access the bridge, which need not be a node in the Tor network, it can extend a
-circuit through the bridge to the Tor network, and from there access the
-server.</p>
+a filter that has blocked access to the mix network.  One solution is to have
+an intermediary node provide access to the mix network.  As long as a client
+can access the bridge, which need not be a node in the mix network, it can
+extend a circuit through the bridge to the mix network, and from there access
+the server.</p>
 
 </div><p></p><div class="element">
 
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-5.png" alt="blossom-5" width=767 height=242></p>
 
 <p><b>[5] Indirect Circumvention.</b> Suppose that a client seeks to access a
-remote Tor network via a bridge but seeks anonymity from the bridge as well.
-Then we need two Tor networks, one on the side of the bridge proximate to the
+remote mix network via a bridge but seeks anonymity from the bridge as well.
+Then we need two mix networks, one on the side of the bridge proximate to the
 client, and one on the side of the bridge proximate to the server.  The client
-can extend a seven-hop circuit: three hops through the Tor network on its side
+can extend a seven-hop circuit: three hops through the mix network on its side
 of the bridge, followed by the bridge itself and three hops on the remote side
 of the bridge.</p>
 
@@ -121,10 +122,10 @@
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-6.png" alt="blossom-6" width=682 height=242></p>
 
 <p><b>[6] Active Boundary.</b> Suppose that a filtering regime is highly
-effective at purging bridges.  Then, given one Tor network on either side of
-the filter, access providers on the server-side Tor network can establish
+effective at purging bridges.  Then, given one mix network on either side of
+the filter, access providers on the server-side mix network can establish
 persistent, perhaps via a proxy tunnel, connections to waypoints on the
-client-side Tor network.  Then, a client can systematically attempt to build
+client-side mix network.  Then, a client can systematically attempt to build
 six-hop circuits through the first network followed by a pre-established
 persistent connection, followed by the second network, from which it can access
 the server.</p>
@@ -134,10 +135,10 @@
 <p class="center"><img src="images/blossom-7.png" alt="blossom-7" width=554 height=242></p>
 
 <p><b>[7] Non-Exclusive (Overlapping) Anonymity Networks.</b> It may be
-possible for a client to build longer circuits through multiple Tor networks,
-given Tor routers that participate in multiple Tor networks.  Clients require a
-means of accessing information about Tor networks to which they are not
-directly connected; such information can be provided by the multi-networked Tor
+possible for a client to build longer circuits through multiple mix networks,
+given mix routers that participate in multiple mix networks.  Clients require a
+means of accessing information about mix networks to which they are not
+directly connected; such information can be provided by the multi-networked mix
 routers themselves, or via an external source.</p>
 
 </div>



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