[tor-commits] r24981: {website} dev version is now 0.2.3.2-alpha, also fix stable manpage (in website/trunk: . docs/en)
Sebastian Hahn
tor-svn-commits at sebastianhahn.net
Mon Aug 29 22:28:36 UTC 2011
Author: sebastian
Date: 2011-08-29 22:28:35 +0000 (Mon, 29 Aug 2011)
New Revision: 24981
Modified:
website/trunk/Makefile
website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml
Log:
dev version is now 0.2.3.2-alpha, also fix stable manpage
Modified: website/trunk/Makefile
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/Makefile 2011-08-29 22:17:05 UTC (rev 24980)
+++ website/trunk/Makefile 2011-08-29 22:28:35 UTC (rev 24981)
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
export TORGIT=/home/runa/tordev/tor/.git
export STABLETAG=tor-0.2.2.32
-export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.2.32
+export DEVTAG=tor-0.2.3.2-alpha
WMLBASE=.
SUBDIRS=docs eff projects press about download getinvolved donate torbutton
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-08-29 22:17:05 UTC (rev 24980)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-08-29 22:28:35 UTC (rev 24981)
@@ -9,2321 +9,22 @@
<div id="breadcrumbs">
<a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
<a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a>
- <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a>
+ <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a>
</div>
- <div id="maincol">
- <h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2>
- <div class="sectionbody">
- <div class="paragraph"><p><strong>tor</strong> [<em>OPTION</em> <em>value</em>]…</p>
- </div>
- </div>
- <h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2>
- <div class="sectionbody">
- <div class="paragraph"><p><em>tor</em> is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
- service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
- negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
- knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
- the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
- the downstream node.<br /></p></div>
-
- <div class="paragraph"><p>Basically <em>tor</em> provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").
- Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the
- routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have
- difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</p></div>
- </div>
- <h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2>
- <div class="sectionbody">
- <div class="dlist"><dl>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>-h</strong>, <strong>-help</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Display a short help message and exit.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>-f</strong> <em>FILE</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--hash-password</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Generates a hashed password for control port access.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--list-fingerprint</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--verify-config</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Verify the configuration file is valid.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--nt-service</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- <strong>--service [install|remove|start|stop]</strong> Manage the Tor Windows
- NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at
- <a href="<wiki>doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a>
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--list-torrc-options</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- List all valid options.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--version</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Display Tor version and exit.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>--quiet</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.
- (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to
- the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
- </p>
- </dd>
- </dl>
- </div>
- <div class="paragraph">
- <p>Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
- value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").
- Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside
- quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over
- options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To
- split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before
- the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but
- they must start at the beginning of a line.</p>
- </div>
- <div class="dlist"><dl>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>BandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to
- the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
- bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
- public network, this needs to be <em>at the very least</em> 20 KB (that is,
- 20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>BandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
- number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>MaxAdvertisedBandwidth</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
- BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
- who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
- advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
- without impacting network performance.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>RelayBandwidthRate</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
- usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
- per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
- Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
- requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>RelayBandwidthBurst</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
- _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
- (Default: 0)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ConnLimit</strong> <em>NUM</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
- process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
- descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
- If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start.<br />
- <br />
- You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
- since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
- sockets to the size specified in <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong>. This is useful for
- virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
- be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
- creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
- likely experiencing this problem.<br />
- <br />
- The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
- the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
- this configuration option is a second-resort.<br />
- <br />
- The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
- cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
- the problem.<br />
- <br />
- You should <strong>not</strong> enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
- space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
- the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
- time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ConstrainedSockSize</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- When <strong>ConstrainedSockets</strong> is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
- all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
- 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ControlPort</strong> <em>Port</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
- connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
- (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
- <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> or <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong>, setting this option will
- cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This
- option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ControlListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
- to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
- recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing,
- since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
- dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple
- times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>ControlSocket</strong> <em>Path</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
- socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>HashedControlPassword</strong> <em>hashed_password</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- Don’t allow any connections on the control port except when the other
- process knows the password whose one-way hash is <em>hashed_password</em>. You
- can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
- <em>password</em>". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
- than one HashedControlPassword line.
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>CookieAuthentication</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections on the control port
- except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
- "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
- authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
- security. (Default: 0)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
- <strong>CookieAuthFile</strong> <em>Path</em>
- </dt>
- <dd>
- <p>
- If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
- for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
- </p>
- </dd>
- <dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>CookieAuthFileGroupReadable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<em>Groupname</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the
- cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
- the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
- implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DataDirectory</strong> <em>DIR</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirServer</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
- and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
- many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
- separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
- is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style
- directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is
- provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)
- directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will
- use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
- flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is <strong>not</strong> set.
- Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
- "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=<strong>port</strong>" is given, Tor will use the
- given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a
- flag "v3ident=<strong>fp</strong>" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
- whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint <strong>fp</strong>.<br />
-<br />
- If no <strong>dirserver</strong> line is given, Tor will use the default directory
- servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
- network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
- distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same
- authorities they do.
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateDirAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>
-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>AlternateHSAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em>fingerprint</em><br /></p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AlternateBridgeAuthority</strong> [<em>nickname</em>] [<strong>flags</strong>] <em>address</em>:<em>port</em> <em> fingerprint</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using
- AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
- leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.
- Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service
- authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FetchDirInfoEarly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
- directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching
- early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FetchHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
- rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor
- controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FetchServerDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
- descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
- you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
- (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FetchUselessDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
- authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless
- descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is
- useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor
- nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HTTPProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
- if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
- servers.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HTTPProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
- authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
- proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
- want it to support others.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> <em>host</em>[:<em>port</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
- host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
- directly to servers. You may want to set <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> to restrict
- the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
- allows connecting to certain ports.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HTTPSProxyAuthenticator</strong> <em>username:password</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
- authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
- proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
- want it to support others.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>KeepalivePeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
- every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
- has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
- idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>stderr</strong>|<strong>stdout</strong>|<strong>syslog</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Send all messages between <em>minSeverity</em> and <em>maxSeverity</em> to the standard
- output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
- "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
- debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
- since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
- attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
- messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>Log</strong> <em>minSeverity</em>[-<em>maxSeverity</em>] <strong>file</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
- "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
- Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
- level.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>OutboundBindAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
- is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
- of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be
- ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>PidFile</strong> <em>FILE</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
- FILE.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ProtocolWarnings</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not
- following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
- 'info'. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RunAsDaemon</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
- on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
- (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SafeLogging</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
- addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
- still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying
- information about what sites a user might have visited.<br />
-<br />
- If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
- set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>User</strong> <em>UID</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HardwareAccel</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
- available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AvoidDiskWrites</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
- This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
- only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TunnelDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build
- a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.
- (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>PreferTunneledDirConns</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled
- directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
-<strong>SocksPort</strong> is non-zero):</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AllowInvalidNodes</strong> <strong>entry</strong>|<strong>exit</strong>|<strong>middle</strong>|<strong>introduction</strong>|<strong>rendezvous</strong>|<strong>…</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
- authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not
- recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
- can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
- "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExcludeSingleHopRelays</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
- the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
- to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
- higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally
- included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,
- so using these relays might make your client stand out.
- (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>Bridge</strong> <em>IP</em>:<em>ORPort</em> [fingerprint]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
- "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
- is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
- the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
- fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
- it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>CircuitBuildTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
- open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>CircuitIdleTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
- close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
- of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
- making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re
- receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
- hour.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ClientOnly</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
- directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is
- configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at
- figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a
- useful server.) (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExcludeNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
- patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
- ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExcludeExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
- patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
- node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
- list.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>EntryNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address
- patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
- treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExitNodes</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
- patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
- are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>StrictEntryNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
- the first hop of a circuit.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>StrictExitNodes</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
- the last hop of a circuit.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FascistFirewall</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
- that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see <strong>FirewallPorts</strong>).
- This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
- restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
- a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
- ReachableAddresses instead.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FirewallPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
- <strong>FascistFirewall</strong> is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
- instead. (Default: 80, 443)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HidServAuth</strong> <em>onion-address</em> <em>auth-cookie</em> [<em>service-name</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
- characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
- characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
- purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
- for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
- this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
- services can be configured to require authorization using the
- <strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> option.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]…
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
- you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
- that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
- example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
- *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
- 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
- 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]…
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
- these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
- GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
- <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> is set then these
- connections will go through that proxy.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]…
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong>, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
- these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
- set explicitly then the value of <strong>ReachableAddresses</strong> is used. If
- <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong> is set then these connections will go through that proxy.<br />
-<br />
- The separation between <strong>ReachableORAddresses</strong> and
- <strong>ReachableDirAddresses</strong> is only interesting when you are connecting
- through proxies (see <strong>HTTPProxy</strong> and <strong>HTTPSProxy</strong>). Most proxies limit
- TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
- and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
- information) to port 80.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>LongLivedPorts</strong> <em>PORTS</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
- (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
- ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
- will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
- 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>MapAddress</strong> <em>address</em> <em>newaddress</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress
- before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
- www.indymedia.org to exit via <em>torserver</em> (where <em>torserver</em> is the
- nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org
- www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NewCircuitPeriod</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
- seconds)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>MaxCircuitDirtiness</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
- but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10
- minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NodeFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
- constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
- any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
- when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
- can be used multiple times.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>EnforceDistinctSubnets</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
- the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
- the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SocksPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
- applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application
- connections. (Default: 9050)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SocksListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
- applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
- 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
- to multiple addresses/ports.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SocksPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
- SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
- policies below.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SocksTimeout</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
- unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
- 2 minutes.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TrackHostExits</strong> <em>host</em>,<em>.domain</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
- connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
- exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as
- matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means
- match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
- that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
- your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
- of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
- user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
- through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TrackHostExitsExpire</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
- association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
- 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>UpdateBridgesFromAuthority</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
- from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
- a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>UseBridges</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
- config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
- guards. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>UseEntryGuards</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
- to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
- increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
- fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NumEntryGuards</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
- as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SafeSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
- use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP
- address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
- Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
- (Defaults to 0.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestSocks</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
- each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
- safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
- helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
- DNS requests. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> <em>Address</em>/<em>bits</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
- command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
- picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:
- 127.192.0.0/10)<br />
-<br />
- When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
- like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or
- "172.16.0.0/12". The default <strong>VirtualAddrNetwork</strong> address range on a
- properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For
- local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
- characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
- resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
- (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FastFirstHopPK</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
- hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
- already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
- keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower.<br />
-<br />
- Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s
- operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
- doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TransPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on <em>PORT</em> (by convention,
- 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
- Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
- a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
- default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
- the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TransListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
- 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
- entire network.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NATDPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)
- to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is
- only for people who cannot use TransPort.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NATDListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
- that ends with one of the suffixes in <strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong>, we map an
- unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
- This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
- resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AutomapHostsSuffixes</strong> <em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>SUFFIX</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with <strong>AutomapHostsOnResolve</strong>.
- The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DNSPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves
- them anonymously. (Default: 0).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DNSListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
- tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
- 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t
- turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DownloadExtraInfo</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
- contain information about servers other than the information in their
- regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
- itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>FallbackNetworkstatusFile</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this
- one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to
- learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the
- authorities. (Default: None).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>WarnPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
- connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
- to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
- 23,109,110,143).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RejectPlaintextPorts</strong> <em>port</em>,<em>port</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
- will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
-is non-zero):</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>Address</strong> <em>address</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.
- moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP
- address.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AllowSingleHopExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
- proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
- the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use
- servers that set this option, since most clients have
- ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AssumeReachable</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
- don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
- immediately. If <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> is also set, this option
- instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
- all connected servers as running.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>BridgeRelay</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
- from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
- server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay
- descriptor to the public directory authorities.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ContactInfo</strong> <em>email_address</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked
- up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an
- email address.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExitPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
- "<strong>accept</strong>|<strong>reject</strong> <em>ADDR</em>[/<em>MASK</em>][:<em>PORT</em>]". If /<em>MASK</em> is
- omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
- a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).
- <em>PORT</em> can be a single port number, an interval of ports
- "<em>FROM_PORT</em>-<em>TO_PORT</em>", or "*". If <em>PORT</em> is omitted, that means
- "*".<br />
-<br />
- For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
- reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
- anything else.<br />
-<br />
- To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
- 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
- 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
- These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
- policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
- ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done
- that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
- internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that
- may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
- public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
- about internal and reserved IP address space.<br />
-<br />
- This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it
- all on one line.<br />
-<br />
- Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
- want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
- either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_
- (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:<br />
-</p>
-<div class="literalblock">
-<div class="content">
-<pre><tt>reject *:25^M
-reject *:119^M
-reject *:135-139^M
-reject *:445^M
-reject *:563^M
-reject *:1214^M
-reject *:4661-4666^M
-reject *:6346-6429^M
-reject *:6699^M
-reject *:6881-6999^M
-accept *:*</tt></pre>
-</div></div>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ExitPolicyRejectPrivate</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,
- at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.
- (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>MaxOnionsPending</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject
- new ones. (Default: 100)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>MyFamily</strong> <em>node</em>,<em>node</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
- organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
- their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare
- that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
- same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
- family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>Nickname</strong> <em>name</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
- characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NumCPUs</strong> <em>num</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ORPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ORListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
- servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
- specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
- multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>PublishServerDescriptor</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>|<strong>v1</strong>|<strong>v2</strong>|<strong>v3</strong>|<strong>bridge</strong>,<strong>…</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
- a relay. You can
- choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
-<br />
- If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
- descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing
- out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory
- publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all
- type(s) specified. The default is "1",
- which means "if running as a server, publish the
- appropriate descriptors to the authorities".
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ShutdownWaitLength</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down:
- we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After <strong>NUM</strong>
- seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-
- ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AccountingMax</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>bytes</strong>|<strong>KB</strong>|<strong>MB</strong>|<strong>GB</strong>|<strong>TB</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
- period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with
- AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB
- and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1
- GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new
- connections and circuits. When the number of bytes
- is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
- time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at
- the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period
- before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation
- is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
- collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more
- useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AccountingStart</strong> <strong>day</strong>|<strong>week</strong>|<strong>month</strong> [<em>day</em>] <em>HH:MM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Specify how long accounting periods last. If <strong>month</strong> is given, each
- accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> on the <em>dayth</em> day of one
- month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and
- 28.) If <strong>week</strong> is given, each accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em>
- of the <em>dayth</em> day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,
- with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If <strong>day</strong> is given, each
- accounting period runs from the time <em>HH:MM</em> each day to the same time on
- the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
- "month 1 0:00".)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSResolvConfFile</strong> <em>filename</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
- <em>filename</em>. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
- "<strong>resolv.conf</strong>" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
- only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
- (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
- parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
- Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
- it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSSearchDomains</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
- For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
- "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
- connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
- your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSDetectHijacking</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
- whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
- requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
- correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
- on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSTestAddresses</strong> <em>address</em>,<em>address</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these <em>valid</em> addresses
- aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
- and we’ll reset our exit policy to "reject <strong>:</strong>". This option only affects
- name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to
- "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
- containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
- exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
- URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
- on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>BridgeRecordUsageByCountry</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
- GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client
- addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
- which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>ServerDNSRandomizeCase</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
- outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
- This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
- For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
- 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
- does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>GeoIPFile</strong> <em>filename</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
-if DirPort is non-zero):</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
- server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
- good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
- already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
- to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
- <a href="mailto:tor-ops at torproject.org">tor-ops at torproject.org</a> if you think you should be a directory.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirPortFrontPage</strong> <em>FILENAME</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
- the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
- to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in
- contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V1AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
- generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
- Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V2AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
- generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
- described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
- 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V3AuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
- generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
- described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
- least 0.2.0.x).
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
- Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
- version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
- authorities provide this service optionally. See <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>,
- <strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong>, and <strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong>.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
- opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
- opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
- the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint
- has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to
- accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
- <strong>approved-routers</strong> in the <strong>FILES</strong> section below.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to
- <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor also accepts and serves hidden
- service descriptors. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HSAuthorityRecordStats</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to <strong>HSAuthoritativeDir</strong>,
- Tor periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service
- usage to a file <strong>hsusage</strong> in its data directory. (Default:
- 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HidServDirectoryV2</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
- descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
- connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>BridgeAuthoritativeDir</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- When this option is set in addition to <strong>AuthoritativeDirectory</strong>, Tor
- accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
- networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
- authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirPort</strong> <em>PORT</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Advertise the directory service on this port.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirListenAddress</strong> <em>IP</em>[:<em>PORT</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
- this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
- This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
- addresses/ports.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirPolicy</strong> <em>policy</em>,<em>policy</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
- directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RecommendedVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
- safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
- directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
- multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
- this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should be set too.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RecommendedClientVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
- safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
- directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>
- is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should
- be set too.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RecommendedServerVersions</strong> <em>STRING</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
- safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
- directories. If this is not set then the value of <strong>RecommendedVersions</strong>
- is used. When this is set then <strong>VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory</strong> should
- be set too.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>DirAllowPrivateAddresses</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
- elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
- address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirBadDir</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
- will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this
- authority publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> is set.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirBadExit</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
- will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
- publishes, if <strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> is set.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirInvalid</strong> <em>AddressPattern…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
- will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
- authority publishes.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirReject</strong> <em>AddressPattern</em>…
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
- will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
- authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
- submitted for publication by this authority.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirListBadDirs</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
- opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set
- this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
- otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared
- directory.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirListBadExits</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
- opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
- 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
- effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirRejectUnlisted</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects
- all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the
- fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil
- attack. (Default: 0)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
- list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
- (Default: 2)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies
- to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V3AuthVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting
- interval. Note that voting will <em>actually</em> happen at an interval chosen
- by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
- SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V3AuthVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay
- between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
- other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s
- preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V3AuthDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay
- between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
- signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
- is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
- (Default: 5 minutes.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>V3AuthNIntervalsValid</strong> <em>NUM</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
- for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
- increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
- directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
- server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
- least 2. (Default: 3.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HiddenServiceDir</strong> <em>DIRECTORY</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
- must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
- specify multiple services.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HiddenServicePort</strong> <em>VIRTPORT</em> [<em>TARGET</em>]
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
- option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
- recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
- the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
- both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
- multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
- VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>PublishHidServDescriptors</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t
- advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
- you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
- (Default: 1)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HiddenServiceVersion</strong> <em>version</em>,<em>version</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
- service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient</strong> <em>auth-type</em> <em>client-name</em>,<em>client-name</em>,<em>…</em>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
- only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose
- authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
- hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
- listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
- are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
- spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
- clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
- found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
- their configuration file using <strong>HidServAuth</strong>.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>RendPostPeriod</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>seconds</strong>|<strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>|<strong>days</strong>|<strong>weeks</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
- service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
- uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> <strong>0</strong>|<strong>1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
- so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
- non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
- (Default: 0)<br />
-</p>
-<div class="literalblock">
-<div class="content">
-<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1^M
-DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1^M
-EnforceDistinctSubnets 0^M
-AssumeReachable 1^M
-AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0^M
-AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0^M
-ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0^M
-ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0^M
-V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes^M
-V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds^M
-V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds^M
-TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes^M
-TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds^M
-TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds^M
-TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes^M
-TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre>
-</div></div>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
- consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
- <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
- the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
- <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
- the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
- <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
- are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
- that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime</strong> <em>N</em> <strong>minutes</strong>|<strong>hours</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
- time. Changing this requires that <strong>TestingTorNetwork</strong> is set. (Default:
- 10 minutes)
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>Tor catches the following signals:</p></div>
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGTERM</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGINT</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
- slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
- (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGHUP</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
- reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGUSR1</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGUSR2</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
- sending a SIGHUP.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGCHLD</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
- can clean up.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGPIPE</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>SIGXFSZ</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="dlist"><dl>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>@CONFDIR@/torrc</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<strong>@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The tor process stores keys and other data here.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-status/</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
- Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
- identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-descriptors</strong> and <strong>cached-descriptors.new</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
- than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
- beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
- a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
- too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/cached-routers</strong> and <strong>cached-routers.new</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
- Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/state</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
- the file. These include:
-</p>
-<div class="ulist"><ul>
-<li>
-<p>
-The current entry guards and their status.
-</p>
-</li>
-<li>
-<p>
-The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
- below).
-</p>
-</li>
-<li>
-<p>
-When the file was last written
-</p>
-</li>
-<li>
-<p>
-What version of Tor generated the state file
-</p>
-</li>
-<li>
-<p>
-A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
- descriptors.
-</p>
-</li>
-</ul></div>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/bw_accounting</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
- and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
- is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only
- used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/control_auth_cookie</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
- overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
- control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is
- enabled.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/keys/</strong>*
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/fingerprint</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/approved-routers</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
- <strong>NamingAuthoritativeDirectory</strong>). This file lists nickname to identity
- bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
- whitespace. See your <strong>fingerprint</strong> file in the <em>DataDirectory</em> for an
- example line. If the nickname is <strong>!reject</strong> then descriptors from the
- given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
- <strong>!invalid</strong> then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
- not valid, that is, not recommended.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>DataDirectory</em><strong>/router-stability</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
- router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
- how to set their Stable flags.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/hostname</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
- If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
- also contains authorization data for all clients.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/private_key</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- The private key for this hidden service.
-</p>
-</dd>
-<dt class="hdlist1">
-<em>HiddenServiceDirectory</em><strong>/client_keys</strong>
-</dt>
-<dd>
-<p>
- Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
- authorized clients.
-</p>
-</dd>
-</dl></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>privoxy</strong>(1), <strong>tsocks</strong>(1), <strong>torify</strong>(1)<br /></p></div>
-<div class="paragraph"><p><strong>https://www.torproject.org/</strong></p></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</p></div>
-</div>
-<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2>
-<div class="sectionbody">
-<div class="paragraph"><p>Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</p></div>
-</div>
-</div>
+ <div id="maincol">
+ <:
+ die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)";
+ my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`;
+ die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man;
+ print $man;
+ :>
+ </div>
<!-- END MAINCOL -->
-<div id = "sidecol">
+ <div id = "sidecol">
#include "side.wmi"
#include "info.wmi"
+ </div>
+ <!-- END SIDECOL -->
</div>
-<!-- END SIDECOL -->
-</div>
<!-- END CONTENT -->
-#include <foot.wmi>
+#include <foot.wmi>
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