[tor-commits] r24682: {projects} kill some more widows your footnote 1 is on the wrong page n (projects/articles/browser-privacy)

[Roger Dingledine]

Author: arma
Date: 2011-04-27 05:43:55 +0000 (Wed, 27 Apr 2011)
New Revision: 24682

Modified:
   projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex
Log:
kill some more widows

your footnote 1 is on the wrong page now btw


Modified: projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex	2011-04-27 05:09:51 UTC (rev 24681)
+++ projects/articles/browser-privacy/W3CIdentity.tex	2011-04-27 05:43:55 UTC (rev 24682)
@@ -69,11 +69,11 @@
 These efforts have led to an even wider disconnect between users'
 perception of their privacy and the reality of their privacy. Users simply
 can't keep up with the ways they are being tracked.
-
+%
 When users are being coerced into ceding data about themselves without clear
 understanding or consent (and in fact, in many cases despite their explicit
 attempts to decline to consent), serious moral issues begin to arise.
-
+%
 To understand and evaluate potential solutions and improvements to this status
 quo, we must explore the disconnect between user experience and the way the
 web actually functions with respect to user tracking.
@@ -305,8 +305,8 @@
 This identifier transmission model is fundamentally flawed when viewed from
 the perspective of meeting the expectations of the user.
 
-So far, industry has resisted changes to the identifier transmission model due
-to both inertia and compatibility concerns. However, the disconnect is so
+Industry has so far resisted changes to the identifier transmission model due
+to compatibility concerns and inertia. However, the disconnect is so
 severe and the associated tracking is so pervasive that some level of
 temporary breakage must be tolerated to improve the status quo. Because of the
 retroactive nature of the linkability of cookies and other identifier storage,
@@ -322,13 +322,13 @@
 attributes exist, they can be obfuscated on a per-origin basis.
 
 The work done by the Stanford Applied Crypto Group shows that it is relatively
-straight-forward to isolate the browser cache to specific top-level origins,
+straightforward to isolate the browser cache to specific top-level origins,
 effectively binding identifiers hidden in cached elements to the pair of
 top-level and third-party origin~\cite{safecache}. Commonly sourced
 third-party content elements are then fetched and cached repeatedly, but this
 is necessary to prevent linkability: each of these content elements can be
 crafted to include an identifier unique to each user, thus tracking even users
-who attempt to avoid tracking by clearing normal cookies.
+who clear normal cookies.
 
 The Stanford group correctly observed that the problem with origin model
 improvements is that individually, they do not fully address the linkability
@@ -373,9 +373,9 @@
 of the web closer to what the user assumes is happening, they must be deployed
 uniformly, with a consistent top-level origin restriction model. Uniform
 deployment will take significant coordination and standardization efforts.
-Furthermore, even an vastly improved origin model still cannot prevent
+Furthermore, even a vastly improved origin model cannot prevent
 instances of explicit tracking partnerships between sites and third-party
-content providers. Therefore, both origin improvements as well as
+content providers. Therefore, both origin improvements and
 identity-isolation approaches are necessary.
 
 \section{Conclusions}
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@
 In Section~6, it also strongly suggested that informed consent and user
 control should govern the interaction of users to tracking identifiers.
 
-Without changes to both browser behavior and browser interface, such informed
+Without changes to both browser behavior and browser interface, informed
 consent is simply not possible on today's web. The lack of informed consent
 makes it impossible to expect privacy-by-design approaches to function
-properly. Users who do not even understand the basic properties of the
-tracking mechanisms they are subjected to cannot be expected to effectively
+properly. We cannot expect users who do not even understand the basic
+properties of these tracking mechanisms to effectively
 use privacy mechanisms to avoid, opt out of, or decline such tracking.
 
 \bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{W3CIdentity}