[or-cvs] r23192: {projects} resync (projects/articles)

Roger Dingledine arma at torproject.org
Tue Sep 14 21:31:57 UTC 2010


Author: arma
Date: 2010-09-14 21:31:57 +0000 (Tue, 14 Sep 2010)
New Revision: 23192

Modified:
   projects/articles/circumvention-features.html
Log:
resync


Modified: projects/articles/circumvention-features.html
===================================================================
--- projects/articles/circumvention-features.html	2010-09-14 21:27:58 UTC (rev 23191)
+++ projects/articles/circumvention-features.html	2010-09-14 21:31:57 UTC (rev 23192)
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 
 For more recent examples, <a href="http://your-freedom.net/">Your
 Freedom</a> restricts free usage to a few countries like Burma,
-while systems like <a href="http://dit-inc.us/">Freegate</a> and <a
+while at times systems like <a href="http://dit-inc.us/">Freegate</a> and <a
 href="http://ultrareach.com/">Ultrasurf</a> outright block connections
 from all but the few countries that they care to serve (China and, in the
 case of Ultrasurf recently, Iran). On the one hand, this strategy makes
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
 useful tools are not an option for you.
 </p>
 
-<h3>3. Sustainable network and software development</h3>
+<h3>3. Has a sustainable network and software development strategy</h3>
 
 <p>
 If you're going to invest the time to figure out how to use a given tool,
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@
 the future.
 </p>
 
-<h3>4. Open design</h3>
+<h3>Has an open design</h3>
 
 <p>
 The first step to transparency and reusability of the tool's software and
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@
 forward too slowly.
 </p>
 
-<h3>5. Decentralized architecture</h3>
+<h3>Has a decentralized architecture</h3>
 
 <p>
 Another feature to look for in a circumvention tool is whether its network
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@
 Anybody who promises "100% security" is selling something.
 </p>
 
-<h3>8. Fast</h3>
+<h3>8. Provides consistently good latency and throughput</h3>
 
 <p>
 The next feature you might look for in a circumvention tool is speed. Some



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