[or-cvs] [tor/master 1/4] Rename all RELAY_* cell types to RELAY_COMMAND_*.
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Fri Jul 30 15:42:08 UTC 2010
Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing at gmx.net>
Date: Thu, 29 Jul 2010 10:57:51 +0200
Subject: Rename all RELAY_* cell types to RELAY_COMMAND_*.
Commit: f6e0dc2a6e2f4c95d4390ea1b7672faa4dd6a982
---
doc/spec/rend-spec.txt | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt b/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt
index e5bc18e..3de6d1d 100644
--- a/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt
+++ b/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt
@@ -104,14 +104,14 @@
0.3. Constants and new cell types
Relay cell types
- 32 -- RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO
- 33 -- RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
- 34 -- RELAY_INTRODUCE1
- 35 -- RELAY_INTRODUCE2
- 36 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1
- 37 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2
- 38 -- RELAY_INTRO_ESTABLISHED
- 39 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED
+ 32 -- RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO
+ 33 -- RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
+ 34 -- RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1
+ 35 -- RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2
+ 36 -- RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1
+ 37 -- RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2
+ 38 -- RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED
+ 39 -- RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED
40 -- RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK
0.4. Version overview
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@
The OP establishes a new introduction circuit to each introduction
point. These circuits MUST NOT be used for anything but hidden service
introduction. To establish the introduction, Bob sends a
- RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, containing:
+ RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, containing:
KL Key length [2 octets]
PK Introduction public key [KL octets]
@@ -429,15 +429,19 @@
check fails, the OP discards the cell; otherwise, it associates the
circuit with Bob's public key, and dissociates any other circuits
currently associated with PK. On success, the OR sends Bob a
- RELAY_INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell with an empty payload.
-
- Bob's OP does not include its own public key in the RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO
- cell, but the public key of a freshly generated introduction key pair.
- The OP also includes these fresh public keys in the v2 hidden service
- descriptor together with the other introduction point information. The
- reason is that the introduction point does not need to and therefore
- should not know for which hidden service it works, so as to prevent it
- from tracking the hidden service's activity.
+ RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell with an empty payload.
+
+ Bob's OP uses either Bob's public key or a freshly generated, single-use
+ service key in the RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, depending on the
+ configured hidden service descriptor version. The public key is used for
+ v0 descriptors, the service key for v2 descriptors. In the latter case, the
+ service keys of all introduction points are included in the v2 hidden
+ service descriptor together with the other introduction point information.
+ The reason is that the introduction point does not need to and therefore
+ should not know for which hidden service it works, so as to prevent it from
+ tracking the hidden service's activity. If the hidden service is configured
+ to publish both v0 and v2 descriptors, two separate sets of introduction
+ points are established.
1.4. Bob's OP advertises his service descriptor(s).
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@
and Alice's OP does not have an established circuit to that service,
the OP builds a rendezvous circuit. It does this by establishing
a circuit to a randomly chosen OR, and sending a
- RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell to that OR. The body of that cell
+ RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell to that OR. The body of that cell
contains:
RC Rendezvous cookie [20 octets]
@@ -561,9 +565,9 @@
The rendezvous cookie is an arbitrary 20-byte value, chosen randomly by
Alice's OP.
- Upon receiving a RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, the OR associates the
- RC with the circuit that sent it. It replies to Alice with an empty
- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell to indicate success.
+ Upon receiving a RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, the OR associates
+ the RC with the circuit that sent it. It replies to Alice with an empty
+ RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell to indicate success.
Alice's OP MUST NOT use the circuit which sent the cell for any purpose
other than rendezvous with the given location-hidden service.
@@ -571,7 +575,7 @@
1.8. Introduction: from Alice's OP to Introduction Point
Alice builds a separate circuit to one of Bob's chosen introduction
- points, and sends it a RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell containing:
+ points, and sends it a RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell containing:
Cleartext
PK_ID Identifier for Bob's PK [20 octets]
@@ -601,7 +605,7 @@
The hybrid encryption to Bob's PK works just like the hybrid
encryption in CREATE cells (see tor-spec). Thus the payload of the
- version 0 RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell on the wire will contain
+ version 0 RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell on the wire will contain
20+42+16+20+20+128=246 bytes, and the version 1 and version 2
introduction formats have other sizes.
@@ -612,7 +616,7 @@
If Alice has downloaded a v2 descriptor, she uses the contained public
key ("service-key") instead of Bob's public key to create the
- RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell as described above.
+ RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell as described above.
1.8.1. Other introduction formats we don't use.
@@ -637,24 +641,27 @@
If the Introduction Point recognizes PK_ID as a public key which has
established a circuit for introductions as in 1.3 above, it sends the body
- of the cell in a new RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell down the corresponding circuit.
- (If the PK_ID is unrecognized, the RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell is discarded.)
-
- After sending the RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell, the OR replies to Alice with an
- empty RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK cell. If no RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell can
- be sent, the OR replies to Alice with a non-empty cell to indicate an
- error. (The semantics of the cell body may be determined later; the
- current implementation sends a single '1' byte on failure.)
-
- When Bob's OP receives the RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell, it decrypts it with
- the private key for the corresponding hidden service, and extracts the
+ of the cell in a new RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell down the corresponding
+ circuit. (If the PK_ID is unrecognized, the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell is
+ discarded.)
+
+ After sending the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell, the OR replies to Alice
+ with an empty RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK cell. If no
+ RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell can be sent, the OR replies to Alice with a
+ non-empty cell to indicate an error. (The semantics of the cell body may be
+ determined later; the current implementation sends a single '1' byte on
+ failure.)
+
+ When Bob's OP receives the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell, it decrypts it
+ with the private key for the corresponding hidden service, and extracts the
rendezvous point's nickname, the rendezvous cookie, and the value of g^x
chosen by Alice.
1.10. Rendezvous
Bob's OP builds a new Tor circuit ending at Alice's chosen rendezvous
- point, and sends a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell along this circuit, containing:
+ point, and sends a RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 cell along this circuit,
+ containing:
RC Rendezvous cookie [20 octets]
g^y Diffie-Hellman [128 octets]
KH Handshake digest [20 octets]
@@ -662,7 +669,7 @@
(Bob's OP MUST NOT use this circuit for any other purpose.)
If the RP recognizes RC, it relays the rest of the cell down the
- corresponding circuit in a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2 cell, containing:
+ corresponding circuit in a RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2 cell, containing:
g^y Diffie-Hellman [128 octets]
KH Handshake digest [20 octets]
@@ -670,10 +677,10 @@
(If the RP does not recognize the RC, it discards the cell and
tears down the circuit.)
- When Alice's OP receives a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2 cell on a circuit which
- has sent a RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell but which has not yet received
- a reply, it uses g^y and H(g^xy) to complete the handshake as in the Tor
- circuit extend process: they establish a 60-octet string as
+ When Alice's OP receives a RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2 cell on a circuit which
+ has sent a RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell but which has not yet
+ received a reply, it uses g^y and H(g^xy) to complete the handshake as in
+ the Tor circuit extend process: they establish a 60-octet string as
K = SHA1(g^xy | [00]) | SHA1(g^xy | [01]) | SHA1(g^xy | [02])
and generate
KH = K[0..15]
@@ -692,7 +699,7 @@
1.11. Creating streams
To open TCP connections to Bob's location-hidden service, Alice's OP sends
- a RELAY_BEGIN cell along the established circuit, using the special
+ a RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN cell along the established circuit, using the special
address "", and a chosen port. Bob's OP chooses a destination IP and
port, based on the configuration of the service connected to the circuit,
and opens a TCP stream. From then on, Bob's OP treats the stream as an
@@ -700,9 +707,10 @@
[ Except he doesn't include addr in the connected cell or the end
cell. -RD]
- Alice MAY send multiple RELAY_BEGIN cells along the circuit, to open
- multiple streams to Bob. Alice SHOULD NOT send RELAY_BEGIN cells for any
- other address along her circuit to Bob; if she does, Bob MUST reject them.
+ Alice MAY send multiple RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN cells along the circuit, to open
+ multiple streams to Bob. Alice SHOULD NOT send RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN cells
+ for any other address along her circuit to Bob; if she does, Bob MUST reject
+ them.
2. Authentication and authorization.
--
1.7.1
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