[or-cvs] [tor/release-0.2.2 157/162] Make payloads into uint8_t.
arma at torproject.org
arma at torproject.org
Mon Dec 20 03:06:43 UTC 2010
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Mon, 13 Dec 2010 19:34:01 -0500
Subject: Make payloads into uint8_t.
Commit: b8a7bad7995fceee83e61f2f403685d42d8759ce
This will avoid some signed/unsigned assignment-related bugs.
---
src/common/compat.c | 12 +++++-----
src/common/compat.h | 16 ++++++------
src/or/buffers.c | 2 +-
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 13 +++++-----
src/or/command.c | 17 +++++++------
src/or/connection_edge.c | 26 ++++++++++++++-------
src/or/connection_or.c | 5 ++-
src/or/onion.c | 14 +++++-----
src/or/or.h | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
src/or/relay.c | 34 +++++++++++++--------------
src/or/rendclient.c | 9 ++++---
src/or/rendcommon.c | 2 +-
src/or/rendmid.c | 30 ++++++++++++------------
src/or/rendservice.c | 9 ++++---
14 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c
index e853bc7..4cc8d99 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.c
+++ b/src/common/compat.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ tor_fix_source_file(const char *fname)
* unaligned memory access.
*/
uint16_t
-get_uint16(const char *cp)
+get_uint16(const void *cp)
{
uint16_t v;
memcpy(&v,cp,2);
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ get_uint16(const char *cp)
* unaligned memory access.
*/
uint32_t
-get_uint32(const char *cp)
+get_uint32(const void *cp)
{
uint32_t v;
memcpy(&v,cp,4);
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ get_uint32(const char *cp)
* unaligned memory access.
*/
uint64_t
-get_uint64(const char *cp)
+get_uint64(const void *cp)
{
uint64_t v;
memcpy(&v,cp,8);
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ get_uint64(const char *cp)
* *(uint16_t*)(cp) = v, but will not cause segfaults on platforms that forbid
* unaligned memory access. */
void
-set_uint16(char *cp, uint16_t v)
+set_uint16(void *cp, uint16_t v)
{
memcpy(cp,&v,2);
}
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ set_uint16(char *cp, uint16_t v)
* *(uint32_t*)(cp) = v, but will not cause segfaults on platforms that forbid
* unaligned memory access. */
void
-set_uint32(char *cp, uint32_t v)
+set_uint32(void *cp, uint32_t v)
{
memcpy(cp,&v,4);
}
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ set_uint32(char *cp, uint32_t v)
* *(uint64_t*)(cp) = v, but will not cause segfaults on platforms that forbid
* unaligned memory access. */
void
-set_uint64(char *cp, uint64_t v)
+set_uint64(void *cp, uint64_t v)
{
memcpy(cp,&v,8);
}
diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h
index fbbbb3f..209d9fc 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.h
+++ b/src/common/compat.h
@@ -448,18 +448,18 @@ typedef enum {
/* ===== OS compatibility */
const char *get_uname(void);
-uint16_t get_uint16(const char *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
-uint32_t get_uint32(const char *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
-uint64_t get_uint64(const char *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
-void set_uint16(char *cp, uint16_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
-void set_uint32(char *cp, uint32_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
-void set_uint64(char *cp, uint64_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+uint16_t get_uint16(const void *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+uint32_t get_uint32(const void *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+uint64_t get_uint64(const void *cp) ATTR_PURE ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+void set_uint16(void *cp, uint16_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+void set_uint32(void *cp, uint32_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
+void set_uint64(void *cp, uint64_t v) ATTR_NONNULL((1));
/* These uint8 variants are defined to make the code more uniform. */
#define get_uint8(cp) (*(const uint8_t*)(cp))
-static void set_uint8(char *cp, uint8_t v);
+static void set_uint8(void *cp, uint8_t v);
static INLINE void
-set_uint8(char *cp, uint8_t v)
+set_uint8(void *cp, uint8_t v)
{
*(uint8_t*)cp = v;
}
diff --git a/src/or/buffers.c b/src/or/buffers.c
index b96b82d..f26c202 100644
--- a/src/or/buffers.c
+++ b/src/or/buffers.c
@@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ fetch_var_cell_from_buf(buf_t *buf, var_cell_t **out, int linkproto)
result->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
buf_remove_from_front(buf, VAR_CELL_HEADER_SIZE);
- peek_from_buf(result->payload, length, buf);
+ peek_from_buf((char*) result->payload, length, buf);
buf_remove_from_front(buf, length);
check();
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 94057c3..0ec5aae 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
* and a DH operation. */
cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST;
memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
- crypto_rand(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
+ crypto_rand((char*) circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
memcpy(payload, circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
@@ -767,8 +767,8 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
n_addr32 = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
- onionskin = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
- id_digest = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
+ onionskin = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
+ id_digest = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&n_addr, n_addr32);
if (!n_port || !n_addr32) {
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
*/
int
circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
- const char *reply)
+ const uint8_t *reply)
{
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypt_path_t *hop;
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
- if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, reply, keys,
+ if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)reply, keys,
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
@@ -931,7 +931,8 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
/* Remember hash of g^xy */
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
} else if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST && !hop->dh_handshake_state) {
- if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply, keys,
+ if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply,
+ (uint8_t*)keys,
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"fast_client_handshake failed.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index 181bad8..011cc5a 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -286,7 +286,8 @@ command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
char reply[DIGEST_LEN*2];
tor_assert(cell->command == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
- if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, reply, keys, sizeof(keys))<0) {
+ if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, (uint8_t*)reply,
+ (uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys))<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
@@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
int err_reason = 0;
log_debug(LD_OR,"at OP. Finishing handshake.");
if ((err_reason = circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circ, cell->command,
- cell->payload)) < 0) {
+ cell->payload)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"circuit_finish_handshake failed.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
return;
@@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
log_debug(LD_OR,
"Converting created cell to extended relay cell, sending.");
relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED,
- cell->payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN,
+ (char*)cell->payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN,
NULL);
}
}
@@ -476,7 +477,7 @@ static void
command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
- const char *cp, *end;
+ const uint8_t *cp, *end;
if (conn->link_proto != 0 ||
conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING ||
(conn->handshake_state && conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
@@ -529,8 +530,8 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
time_t timestamp;
uint8_t my_addr_type;
uint8_t my_addr_len;
- const char *my_addr_ptr;
- const char *cp, *end;
+ const uint8_t *my_addr_ptr;
+ const uint8_t *cp, *end;
uint8_t n_other_addrs;
time_t now = time(NULL);
@@ -558,7 +559,7 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
my_addr_type = (uint8_t) cell->payload[4];
my_addr_len = (uint8_t) cell->payload[5];
- my_addr_ptr = cell->payload + 6;
+ my_addr_ptr = (uint8_t*) cell->payload + 6;
end = cell->payload + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
cp = cell->payload + 6 + my_addr_len;
if (cp >= end) {
@@ -575,7 +576,7 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
/* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is
* "canonical." */
tor_addr_t addr;
- const char *next = decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
+ const uint8_t *next = decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
if (next == NULL) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index ded02e9..9ecdf5c 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
tor_snprintf(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address), "REVERSE[%s]",
orig_address);
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME,
- strlen(result), result, -1,
+ strlen(result), (uint8_t*)result,
+ -1,
map_expires);
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
@@ -1562,7 +1563,8 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
/* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */
strlcpy(socks->address, orig_address, sizeof(socks->address));
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,4,
- (char*)&answer,-1,map_expires);
+ (uint8_t*)&answer,
+ -1,map_expires);
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn,
END_STREAM_REASON_DONE |
END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED);
@@ -2311,7 +2313,7 @@ void
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn,
int answer_type,
size_t answer_len,
- const char *answer,
+ const uint8_t *answer,
int ttl,
time_t expires)
{
@@ -2325,7 +2327,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn,
client_dns_set_addressmap(conn->socks_request->address, a,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
} else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) {
- char *cp = tor_strndup(answer, answer_len);
+ char *cp = tor_strndup((char*)answer, answer_len);
client_dns_set_reverse_addressmap(conn->socks_request->address,
cp,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
@@ -2336,14 +2338,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn,
if (conn->is_dns_request) {
if (conn->dns_server_request) {
/* We had a request on our DNS port: answer it. */
- dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, answer, ttl);
+ dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, (char*)answer, ttl);
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
return;
} else {
/* This must be a request from the controller. We already sent
* a mapaddress if there's a ttl. */
tell_controller_about_resolved_result(conn, answer_type, answer_len,
- answer, ttl, expires);
+ (char*)answer, ttl, expires);
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1;
return;
}
@@ -2487,6 +2489,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
+ if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
+ return -1;
/* Note: we have to use relay_send_command_from_edge here, not
* connection_edge_end or connection_edge_send_command, since those require
@@ -2510,7 +2514,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL, NULL);
return 0;
}
- if (parse_addr_port(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
+ if (parse_addr_port(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
+ (char*)(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE),
&address,NULL,&port)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unable to parse addr:port in relay begin cell. Closing.");
@@ -2661,6 +2666,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ)
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
+ if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE)
+ return -1;
/* This 'dummy_conn' only exists to remember the stream ID
* associated with the resolve request; and to make the
@@ -2671,8 +2678,9 @@ connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *cell, or_circuit_t *circ)
*/
dummy_conn = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET);
dummy_conn->stream_id = rh.stream_id;
- dummy_conn->_base.address = tor_strndup(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
- rh.length);
+ dummy_conn->_base.address = tor_strndup(
+ (char*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
+ rh.length);
dummy_conn->_base.port = 0;
dummy_conn->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED;
dummy_conn->_base.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE;
diff --git a/src/or/connection_or.c b/src/or/connection_or.c
index 3ac0bf5..ab0d561 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_or.c
@@ -1201,7 +1201,8 @@ connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(const var_cell_t *cell,
tor_assert(conn);
var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr);
connection_write_to_buf(hdr, sizeof(hdr), TO_CONN(conn));
- connection_write_to_buf(cell->payload, cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
+ connection_write_to_buf((char*)cell->payload,
+ cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
if (cell->command != CELL_PADDING)
conn->timestamp_last_added_nonpadding = approx_time();
}
@@ -1332,7 +1333,7 @@ connection_or_send_netinfo(or_connection_t *conn)
time_t now = time(NULL);
routerinfo_t *me;
int len;
- char *out;
+ uint8_t *out;
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c
index 8ee59f2..42e02c6 100644
--- a/src/or/onion.c
+++ b/src/or/onion.c
@@ -336,9 +336,9 @@ onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
* Return 0 on success, <0 on failure.
**/
int
-fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
- char *handshake_reply_out, /* DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes */
- char *key_out,
+fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
+ uint8_t *handshake_reply_out, /* DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes */
+ uint8_t *key_out,
size_t key_out_len)
{
char tmp[DIGEST_LEN+DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
size_t out_len;
int r = -1;
- if (crypto_rand(handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN)<0)
+ if (crypto_rand((char*)handshake_reply_out, DIGEST_LEN)<0)
return -1;
memcpy(tmp, key_in, DIGEST_LEN);
@@ -379,9 +379,9 @@ fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
* and protected by TLS).
*/
int
-fast_client_handshake(const char *handshake_state, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
- const char *handshake_reply_out, /* DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes */
- char *key_out,
+fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state, /* DIGEST_LEN bytes */
+ const uint8_t *handshake_reply_out, /* DIGEST_LEN*2 bytes */
+ uint8_t *key_out,
size_t key_out_len)
{
char tmp[DIGEST_LEN+DIGEST_LEN];
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 910e612..2a25118 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ typedef struct cell_t {
circid_t circ_id; /**< Circuit which received the cell. */
uint8_t command; /**< Type of the cell: one of CELL_PADDING, CELL_CREATE,
* CELL_DESTROY, etc */
- char payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /**< Cell body. */
+ uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /**< Cell body. */
} cell_t;
/** Parsed variable-length onion routing cell. */
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ typedef struct var_cell_t {
uint8_t command;
circid_t circ_id;
uint16_t payload_len;
- char payload[1];
+ uint8_t payload[1];
} var_cell_t;
/** A cell as packed for writing to the network. */
@@ -1831,7 +1831,7 @@ typedef struct crypt_path_t {
* authentication, secrecy, and integrity we need, and we're already
* distinguishable from an OR.
*/
- char fast_handshake_state[DIGEST_LEN];
+ uint8_t fast_handshake_state[DIGEST_LEN];
/** Negotiated key material shared with the OR at this step. */
char handshake_digest[DIGEST_LEN];/* KH in tor-spec.txt */
@@ -2733,7 +2733,7 @@ int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ);
int circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
int reverse);
int circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type,
- const char *reply);
+ const uint8_t *reply);
int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer);
int onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type,
const char *payload, const char *keys);
@@ -3053,7 +3053,7 @@ void connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(edge_connection_t *conn, char *reply,
void connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn,
int answer_type,
size_t answer_len,
- const char *answer,
+ const uint8_t *answer,
int ttl,
time_t expires);
@@ -3835,14 +3835,14 @@ int onion_skin_client_handshake(crypto_dh_env_t *handshake_state,
char *key_out,
size_t key_out_len);
-int fast_server_handshake(const char *key_in,
- char *handshake_reply_out,
- char *key_out,
+int fast_server_handshake(const uint8_t *key_in,
+ uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
+ uint8_t *key_out,
size_t key_out_len);
-int fast_client_handshake(const char *handshake_state,
- const char *handshake_reply_out,
- char *key_out,
+int fast_client_handshake(const uint8_t *handshake_state,
+ const uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
+ uint8_t *key_out,
size_t key_out_len);
void clear_pending_onions(void);
@@ -3926,8 +3926,8 @@ extern uint64_t stats_n_relay_cells_delivered;
int circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
cell_direction_t cell_direction);
-void relay_header_pack(char *dest, const relay_header_t *src);
-void relay_header_unpack(relay_header_t *dest, const char *src);
+void relay_header_pack(uint8_t *dest, const relay_header_t *src);
+void relay_header_unpack(relay_header_t *dest, const uint8_t *src);
int relay_send_command_from_edge(streamid_t stream_id, circuit_t *circ,
uint8_t relay_command, const char *payload,
size_t payload_len, crypt_path_t *cpath_layer);
@@ -3961,9 +3961,9 @@ void assert_active_circuits_ok(or_connection_t *orconn);
void make_circuit_inactive_on_conn(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *conn);
void make_circuit_active_on_conn(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *conn);
-int append_address_to_payload(char *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr);
-const char *decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out,
- const char *payload,
+int append_address_to_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr);
+const uint8_t *decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out,
+ const uint8_t *payload,
int payload_len);
/********************************* rephist.c ***************************/
@@ -4034,15 +4034,18 @@ void hs_usage_free_all(void);
void rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ);
void rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ);
-int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
void rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query);
void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query);
int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
const rend_data_t *rend_query);
-int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
-int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query, int rend_version);
@@ -4108,7 +4111,8 @@ rend_data_free(rend_data_t *data)
int rend_cmp_service_ids(const char *one, const char *two);
void rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint,
- int command, size_t length, const char *payload);
+ int command, size_t length,
+ const uint8_t *payload);
void rend_service_descriptor_free(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc);
int rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
@@ -4171,10 +4175,10 @@ void rend_consider_descriptor_republication(void);
void rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit);
int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
- const char *request,
+ const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
void rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit);
-int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
+int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
void rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc);
int rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn,
@@ -4183,13 +4187,13 @@ void rend_service_dump_stats(int severity);
void rend_service_free_all(void);
/********************************* rendmid.c *******************************/
-int rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
-int rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
-int rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
-int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+int rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len);
/********************************* router.c ***************************/
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index b3d2fbb..0267147 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ relay_set_digest(crypto_digest_env_t *digest, cell_t *cell)
char integrity[4];
relay_header_t rh;
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, integrity, 4);
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Putting digest of %u %u %u %u into relay cell.",
// integrity[0], integrity[1], integrity[2], integrity[3]);
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_env_t *digest, cell_t *cell)
// received_integrity[0], received_integrity[1],
// received_integrity[2], received_integrity[3]);
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*) cell->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, calculated_integrity, 4);
if (memcmp(received_integrity, calculated_integrity, 4)) {
@@ -112,12 +112,12 @@ relay_digest_matches(crypto_digest_env_t *digest, cell_t *cell)
* Return -1 if the crypto fails, else return 0.
*/
static int
-relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher, char *in,
+relay_crypt_one_payload(crypto_cipher_env_t *cipher, uint8_t *in,
int encrypt_mode)
{
int r;
(void)encrypt_mode;
- r = crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+ r = crypto_cipher_crypt_inplace(cipher, (char*) in, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
if (r) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Error during relay encryption");
@@ -432,10 +432,9 @@ relay_lookup_conn(circuit_t *circ, cell_t *cell,
* about the wire format.
*/
void
-relay_header_pack(char *dest, const relay_header_t *src)
+relay_header_pack(uint8_t *dest, const relay_header_t *src)
{
- *(uint8_t*)(dest) = src->command;
-
+ set_uint8(dest, src->command);
set_uint16(dest+1, htons(src->recognized));
set_uint16(dest+3, htons(src->stream_id));
memcpy(dest+5, src->integrity, 4);
@@ -446,10 +445,9 @@ relay_header_pack(char *dest, const relay_header_t *src)
* relay_header_t structure <b>dest</b>.
*/
void
-relay_header_unpack(relay_header_t *dest, const char *src)
+relay_header_unpack(relay_header_t *dest, const uint8_t *src)
{
- dest->command = *(uint8_t*)(src);
-
+ dest->command = get_uint8(src);
dest->recognized = ntohs(get_uint16(src+1));
dest->stream_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src+3));
memcpy(dest->integrity, src+5, 4);
@@ -1069,13 +1067,13 @@ connection_edge_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
}
stats_n_data_bytes_received += rh.length;
- connection_write_to_buf(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE,
+ connection_write_to_buf((char*)(cell->payload + RELAY_HEADER_SIZE),
rh.length, TO_CONN(conn));
connection_edge_consider_sending_sendme(conn);
return 0;
case RELAY_COMMAND_END:
reason = rh.length > 0 ?
- *(uint8_t *)(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
+ get_uint8(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE) : END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
if (!conn) {
log_info(domain,"end cell (%s) dropped, unknown stream.",
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason));
@@ -1897,7 +1895,7 @@ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circuit_t *circ, or_connection_t *orconn,
* ADDRESS [length bytes]
* Return the number of bytes added, or -1 on error */
int
-append_address_to_payload(char *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr)
+append_address_to_payload(uint8_t *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr)
{
uint32_t a;
switch (tor_addr_family(addr)) {
@@ -1922,13 +1920,13 @@ append_address_to_payload(char *payload_out, const tor_addr_t *addr)
* encoded as by append_address_to_payload(), try to decode the address into
* *<b>addr_out</b>. Return the next byte in the payload after the address on
* success, or NULL on failure. */
-const char *
-decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const char *payload,
+const uint8_t *
+decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const uint8_t *payload,
int payload_len)
{
if (payload_len < 2)
return NULL;
- if (payload_len < 2+(uint8_t)payload[1])
+ if (payload_len < 2+payload[1])
return NULL;
switch (payload[0]) {
@@ -1940,13 +1938,13 @@ decode_address_from_payload(tor_addr_t *addr_out, const char *payload,
case RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6:
if (payload[1] != 16)
return NULL;
- tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, payload+2);
+ tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(addr_out, (char*)(payload+2));
break;
default:
tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out);
break;
}
- return payload + 2 + (uint8_t)payload[1];
+ return payload + 2 + payload[1];
}
/** Fail with an assert if the active circuits ring on <b>orconn</b> is
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 7023b7f..feecf23 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
*/
int
rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
- const char *request, size_t request_len)
+ const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len)
{
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc;
(void) request; // XXXX Use this.
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro,
* the circuit to C_REND_READY.
*/
int
-rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
(void) request;
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
/** Bob sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */
int
-rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
@@ -682,7 +682,8 @@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
- if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, request, DH_KEY_LEN,
+ if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)request,
+ DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
goto err;
diff --git a/src/or/rendcommon.c b/src/or/rendcommon.c
index 1f9596d..9ee86f6 100644
--- a/src/or/rendcommon.c
+++ b/src/or/rendcommon.c
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
void
rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, const crypt_path_t *layer_hint,
int command, size_t length,
- const char *payload)
+ const uint8_t *payload)
{
or_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL;
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = NULL;
diff --git a/src/or/rendmid.c b/src/or/rendmid.c
index c9f4bf8..23add31 100644
--- a/src/or/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/or/rendmid.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
* setting the circuit's purpose and service pk digest.
*/
int
-rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = NULL;
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
/* Next asn1len bytes: asn1-encoded key. */
if (request_len < 2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len)
goto truncated;
- pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(request+2, asn1len);
+ pk = crypto_pk_asn1_decode((char*)(request+2), asn1len);
if (!pk) {
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decode public key.");
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
}
/* Rest of body: signature of previous data */
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_MID);
- if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk, request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
- request+2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len,
+ if (crypto_pk_public_checksig_digest(pk, (char*)request, 2+asn1len+DIGEST_LEN,
+ (char*)(request+2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len),
request_len-(2+DIGEST_LEN+asn1len))<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Incorrect signature on ESTABLISH_INTRO cell; rejecting.");
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_intro(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
* INTRODUCE2 cell.
*/
int
-rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
+rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len)
{
or_circuit_t *intro_circ;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
}
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ (char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
/* The first 20 bytes are all we look at: they have a hash of Bob's PK. */
- intro_circ = circuit_get_intro_point(request);
+ intro_circ = circuit_get_intro_point((char*)request);
if (!intro_circ) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"No intro circ found for INTRODUCE1 cell (%s) from circuit %d; "
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
/* Great. Now we just relay the cell down the circuit. */
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2,
- request, request_len, NULL)) {
+ (char*)request, request_len, NULL)) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
"Unable to send INTRODUCE2 cell to Tor client.");
goto err;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ rend_mid_introduce(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len)
* rendezvous cookie.
*/
int
-rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
char hexid[9];
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
goto err;
}
- if (circuit_get_rendezvous(request)) {
+ if (circuit_get_rendezvous((char*)request)) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Duplicate rendezvous cookie in ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS.");
goto err;
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING;
memcpy(circ->rend_token, request, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
- base16_encode(hexid,9,request,4);
+ base16_encode(hexid,9,(char*)request,4);
log_info(LD_REND,
"Established rendezvous point on circuit %d for cookie %s",
@@ -262,13 +262,13 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
* connecting the two circuits.
*/
int
-rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
+rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
or_circuit_t *rend_circ;
char hexid[9];
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
- base16_encode(hexid,9,request,request_len<4?request_len:4);
+ base16_encode(hexid,9,(char*)request,request_len<4?request_len:4);
if (request_len>=4) {
log_info(LD_REND,
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
goto err;
}
- rend_circ = circuit_get_rendezvous(request);
+ rend_circ = circuit_get_rendezvous((char*)request);
if (!rend_circ) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Rejecting RENDEZVOUS1 cell with unrecognized rendezvous cookie %s.",
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ rend_mid_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const char *request,
/* Send the RENDEZVOUS2 cell to Alice. */
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(rend_circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2,
- request+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
+ (char*)(request+REND_COOKIE_LEN),
request_len-REND_COOKIE_LEN, NULL)) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
"Unable to send RENDEZVOUS2 cell to client on circuit %d.",
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index 289d64d..f5917bc 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now)
* rendezvous point.
*/
int
-rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
+rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
char *ptr, *r_cookie;
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, intro_key_digest);
if (memcmp(intro_key_digest, request, DIGEST_LEN)) {
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
- request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
+ (char*)request, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for the wrong service (%s).",
escaped(serviceid));
return -1;
@@ -979,7 +979,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
/* Next N bytes is encrypted with service key */
note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER);
r = crypto_pk_private_hybrid_decrypt(
- intro_key,buf,request+DIGEST_LEN,request_len-DIGEST_LEN,
+ intro_key,buf,(char*)(request+DIGEST_LEN),request_len-DIGEST_LEN,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,1);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Couldn't decrypt INTRODUCE2 cell.");
@@ -1451,7 +1451,8 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
* live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is
* now out-of-date.*/
int
-rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const char *request,
+rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit,
+ const uint8_t *request,
size_t request_len)
{
rend_service_t *service;
--
1.7.1
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