[or-cvs] r18396: {tor} If we're using bridges and our network goes away, be more wi (in tor/trunk: . doc src/or)
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Wed Feb 4 23:27:35 UTC 2009
Author: arma
Date: 2009-02-04 18:27:35 -0500 (Wed, 04 Feb 2009)
New Revision: 18396
Modified:
tor/trunk/ChangeLog
tor/trunk/doc/TODO.021
tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
Log:
If we're using bridges and our network goes away, be more willing
to forgive our bridges and try again when we get an application
request. Bugfix on 0.2.0.x.
Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
probe. Fixes bug 526. Bugfix on 0.1.2.1-alpha.
- Support changing value of ServerDNSRandomizeCase during SIGHUP.
Bugfix on 0.2.1.7-alpha.
+ - If we're using bridges and our network goes away, be more willing
+ to forgive our bridges and try again when we get an application
+ request. Bugfix on 0.2.0.x.
o Minor features:
- Support platforms where time_t is 64 bits long. (Congratulations,
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO.021
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO.021 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO.021 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@
so vidalia can say "recent activity (1-8 users) from sa".
R - investigate: it looks like if the bridge authority is unreachable,
we're not falling back on querying bridges directly?
-R - if "no running bridges known", an application request should make
+ o if "no running bridges known", an application request should make
us retry all our bridges.
For 0.2.1.x:
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -2260,10 +2260,15 @@
* is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0).
* If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status.
* Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection.
+ *
+ * If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this
+ * relay.
+ *
+ * XXX022 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
*/
int
entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
- time_t now)
+ int mark_relay_status, time_t now)
{
int changed = 0;
int refuse_conn = 0;
@@ -2333,6 +2338,11 @@
}
}
+ /* if the caller asked us to, also update the is_running flags for this
+ * relay */
+ if (mark_relay_status)
+ router_set_status(digest, succeeded);
+
if (first_contact) {
/* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps the network just
* came back? We should give our earlier entries another try too,
@@ -3139,6 +3149,7 @@
}
}
});
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "any_known %d, any_running %d", any_known, any_running);
return any_known && !any_running;
}
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuituse.c 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@
n_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
}
if (n_conn_id) {
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_conn_id, 0, time(NULL));
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_conn_id, 0, 1, time(NULL));
/* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail
* them now so they can retry elsewhere. */
connection_ap_fail_onehop(n_conn_id, circ->build_state);
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -572,9 +572,8 @@
if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_conn)) {
or_options_t *options = get_options();
rep_hist_note_connect_failed(or_conn->identity_digest, now);
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(or_conn->identity_digest,0,now);
- if (!options->HttpsProxy)
- router_set_status(or_conn->identity_digest, 0);
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(or_conn->identity_digest,0,
+ !options->HttpsProxy, now);
if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -783,11 +783,9 @@
/* If the connection failed immediately, and we're using
* an https proxy, our https proxy is down. Don't blame the
* Tor server. */
- if (!options->HttpsProxy) {
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0,
- time(NULL));
- router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0);
- }
+ if (!options->HttpsProxy)
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest,
+ 0, 1, time(NULL));
connection_or_connect_failed(conn,
errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
@@ -1036,8 +1034,8 @@
"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not "
"as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, expected, seen);
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest,0,time(NULL));
- router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0);
+ entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0, 1,
+ time(NULL));
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
@@ -1136,7 +1134,7 @@
if (started_here) {
rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn->identity_digest, now);
if (entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest,
- 1, now) < 0) {
+ 1, 0, now) < 0) {
/* Close any circuits pending on this conn. We leave it in state
* 'open' though, because it didn't actually *fail* -- we just
* chose not to use it. (Otherwise
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2009-02-04 23:26:39 UTC (rev 18395)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2009-02-04 23:27:35 UTC (rev 18396)
@@ -2741,7 +2741,7 @@
void entry_guards_compute_status(void);
int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
- time_t now);
+ int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void);
int entry_list_can_grow(or_options_t *options);
routerinfo_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
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