[or-cvs] [tor/master] Make EntryNodes config option much more aggressive.
arma at seul.org
arma at seul.org
Mon Dec 21 09:07:17 UTC 2009
Author: Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org>
Date: Sat, 19 Sep 2009 20:56:57 -0400
Subject: Make EntryNodes config option much more aggressive.
Commit: 1a65bdd2327f671bb4bb4f5828de10d1f2042f10
Before it would prepend your requested entrynodes to your list of guard
nodes, but feel free to use others after that. Now it chooses only
from your EntryNodes if any of those are available, and only falls back
to others if a) they're all down and b) StrictNodes is not set.
Also, now we refresh your entry guards from EntryNode at each consensus
fetch (rather than just at startup and then they slowly rot as the
network changes).
The goal here is to make users less likely to set StrictNodes, since
it's doing closer to what they expect it should be doing.
---
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
src/or/directory.c | 2 +-
src/or/or.h | 2 +-
3 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 9466192..56c49c2 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -3131,10 +3131,13 @@ entry_guards_compute_status(void)
int severity = LOG_DEBUG;
or_options_t *options;
digestmap_t *reasons;
+
if (! entry_guards)
return;
options = get_options();
+ if (options->EntryNodes) /* reshuffle the entry guard list if needed */
+ entry_nodes_should_be_added();
now = time(NULL);
@@ -3305,7 +3308,8 @@ static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
void
entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
{
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "New EntryNodes config option detected. Will use.");
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "EntryNodes config option set. Putting configured "
+ "relays at the front of the entry guard list.");
should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
}
@@ -3329,7 +3333,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
return;
}
- if (options->EntryNodes) {
+ {
char *string = routerset_to_string(options->EntryNodes);
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.", string);
tor_free(string);
@@ -3373,8 +3377,9 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0);
});
- /* Finally, the remaining EntryNodes, unless we're strict */
- if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes) {
+ /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
+ * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
entry_guard_free(e));
} else {
@@ -3388,16 +3393,30 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
entry_guards_changed();
}
-/** Return 1 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
- * directory to our entry guard list. Else return 0. */
+/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
+ * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a
+ * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it.
+ */
int
-entry_list_can_grow(or_options_t *options)
+entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->EntryNodes)
+ return 1;
+ if (options->UseBridges)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we
+ * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */
+static int
+entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes)
- return 0;
+ return 1;
if (options->UseBridges)
- return 0;
- return 1;
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
}
/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
@@ -3415,7 +3434,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
routerinfo_t *r = NULL;
int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
- int consider_exit_family = 0;
+ int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0;
if (chosen_exit) {
smartlist_add(exit_family, chosen_exit);
@@ -3429,9 +3448,8 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
if (should_add_entry_nodes)
entry_guards_prepend_from_config();
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options) &&
- (! entry_guards ||
- smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards))
+ if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
+ smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
pick_entry_guards();
retry:
@@ -3439,26 +3457,50 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
r = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0);
- if (r && (!consider_exit_family || !smartlist_isin(exit_family, r))) {
- smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
- if (!entry->made_contact) {
- /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
- * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
- * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
- * guard list without needing to. */
- goto choose_and_finish;
+ if (!r)
+ continue; /* down, no point */
+ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, r))
+ continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
+ if (options->EntryNodes &&
+ !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) {
+ /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards))
+ goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
+ /* in theory this case should never happen, since
+ * entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
}
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
- break; /* we have enough */
}
+ smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
+ if (!entry->made_contact) {
+ /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
+ * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
+ * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
+ * guard list without needing to. */
+ goto choose_and_finish;
+ }
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
+ break; /* we have enough */
});
- /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
- * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
- * using him.
- * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < 2) {
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options)) {
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least
+ * one choice, that's great. Use it. */
+ preferred_min = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
+ * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
+ * using him.
+ * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
+ preferred_min = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) {
+ if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) {
/* still no? try adding a new entry then */
/* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
* to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
@@ -3483,7 +3525,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
need_capacity = 0;
goto retry;
}
- if (!r && !entry_list_can_grow(options) && consider_exit_family) {
+ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
/* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
* set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
* bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */
@@ -3494,15 +3536,15 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
}
choose_and_finish:
- if (entry_list_can_grow(options)) {
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
+ * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
+ r = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
+ } else {
/* We choose uniformly at random here, because choose_good_entry_server()
* already weights its choices by bandwidth, so we don't want to
* *double*-weight our guard selection. */
r = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
- } else {
- /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
- * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
- r = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
}
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
smartlist_free(exit_family);
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index 282cd98..e5bae20 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ connection_dir_request_failed(dir_connection_t *conn)
if (directory_conn_is_self_reachability_test(conn)) {
return; /* this was a test fetch. don't retry. */
}
- if (entry_list_can_grow(get_options()))
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(get_options()))
router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0); /* don't try him again */
if (conn->_base.purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_V2_NETWORKSTATUS) {
log_info(LD_DIR, "Giving up on directory server at '%s'; retrying",
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index d30b537..dabc401 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -2989,7 +2989,7 @@ void entry_guards_compute_status(void);
int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void);
-int entry_list_can_grow(or_options_t *options);
+int entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options);
routerinfo_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg);
void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state);
--
1.5.6.5
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