[or-cvs] r16726: {tor} Backport r16450 to 0.2.0.x: open /dev/pf before dropping pri (in tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches: . doc src/or)

[nickm at seul.org]

Author: nickm
Date: 2008-09-01 18:05:32 -0400 (Mon, 01 Sep 2008)
New Revision: 16726

Modified:
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/ChangeLog
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/doc/TODO.020
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/config.c
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c
   tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/or.h
Log:
Backport r16450 to 0.2.0.x: open /dev/pf before dropping privileges.

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/ChangeLog	2008-09-01 22:00:07 UTC (rev 16725)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/ChangeLog	2008-09-01 22:05:32 UTC (rev 16726)
@@ -22,6 +22,10 @@
       trying session resumption at this point, but apparently some
       did, in ways that caused the handshake to fail.  Bugfix on
       0.2.0.20-rc.  Bug found by Geoff Goodell.
+    - When using the TransPort option on OpenBSD, and using the User
+      option to change UID and drop privileges, make sure to open
+      /dev/pf before dropping privileges.  Fixes bug 782.  Patch from
+      Christopher Davis.  Bugfix on 0.1.2.1-alpha.
 
 
 Changes in version 0.2.0.30 - 2008-07-15

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/doc/TODO.020
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/doc/TODO.020	2008-09-01 22:00:07 UTC (rev 16725)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/doc/TODO.020	2008-09-01 22:05:32 UTC (rev 16726)
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
   o r15821: fix bug related to TLS session negotiation.
   o r16136: prevent circid collision.  [Also backport to 0.1.2.x??]
   - r16143: generate stream close events from connection_edge_destroy().
-  - r16450: open /dev/pf before dropping privileges.
+  o r16450: open /dev/pf before dropping privileges.
   - r16605: relays reject risky extend cells.
   - r16698: don't use a new entry guard that's also your exit.
 

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/config.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/config.c	2008-09-01 22:00:07 UTC (rev 16725)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/config.c	2008-09-01 22:05:32 UTC (rev 16726)
@@ -1022,6 +1022,16 @@
     }
   }
 
+#if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H)
+  /* Open /dev/pf before dropping privileges. */
+  if (options->TransPort) {
+    if (get_pf_socket() < 0) {
+      *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to open /dev/pf for transparent proxy.");
+      goto rollback;
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
   /* Setuid/setgid as appropriate */
   if (options->User || options->Group) {
     /* XXXX021 We should only do this the first time through, not on

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c	2008-09-01 22:00:07 UTC (rev 16725)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/connection_edge.c	2008-09-01 22:05:32 UTC (rev 16726)
@@ -1636,11 +1636,11 @@
 
 #ifdef TRANS_PF
 static int pf_socket = -1;
-static int
+int
 get_pf_socket(void)
 {
   int pf;
-  /*  Ideally, this should be opened before dropping privs. */
+  /* This should be opened before dropping privs. */
   if (pf_socket >= 0)
     return pf_socket;
 

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/or.h	2008-09-01 22:00:07 UTC (rev 16725)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/src/or/or.h	2008-09-01 22:05:32 UTC (rev 16726)
@@ -2856,6 +2856,10 @@
 } hostname_type_t;
 hostname_type_t parse_extended_hostname(char *address);
 
+#if defined(HAVE_NET_IF_H) && defined(HAVE_NET_PFVAR_H)
+int get_pf_socket(void);
+#endif
+
 /********************************* connection_or.c ***************************/
 
 void connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(or_connection_t *conn);