[or-cvs] r14616: * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls. * (tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian)
weasel at seul.org
weasel at seul.org
Wed May 14 20:29:47 UTC 2008
Author: weasel
Date: 2008-05-14 16:29:47 -0400 (Wed, 14 May 2008)
New Revision: 14616
Added:
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.NEWS
Modified:
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/changelog
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/control
tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.postinst
Log:
* backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls.
* backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: On upgrading from versions prior to,
including, 0.1.2.19-2 if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys
directory)
- move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.
- move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.
- move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was
created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad
libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.
* backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Add a NEWS file explaining this change.
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/changelog 2008-05-14 18:53:02 UTC (rev 14615)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/changelog 2008-05-14 20:29:47 UTC (rev 14616)
@@ -1,10 +1,20 @@
-tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstableunreleased; urgency=low
+tor (0.1.2.19-3) unstable; urgency=critical
* It's 2008. Now is the time to add copyright statements for 2007.
* Work around fig2dev failing to build the images on all archs -
backport from 0.2.0.22-rc-1 (re #457568).
+ * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Conflict with old libssls.
+ * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: On upgrading from versions prior to,
+ including, 0.1.2.19-2 if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys
+ directory)
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was
+ created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad
+ libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.
+ * backport from 0.2.0.26-rc-1: Add a NEWS file explaining this change.
- -- Peter Palfrader <weasel at debian.org> Wed, 14 May 2008 15:00:47 +0200
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel at debian.org> Wed, 14 May 2008 15:05:47 +0200
tor (0.1.2.19-2) unstable; urgency=low
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/control
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/control 2008-05-14 18:53:02 UTC (rev 14615)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/control 2008-05-14 20:29:47 UTC (rev 14616)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
Package: tor
Architecture: any
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks
+Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9)
Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat
Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy
Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP
Copied: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.NEWS (from rev 14607, tor/branches/tor-0_2_0-patches/debian/tor.NEWS)
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.NEWS (rev 0)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.NEWS 2008-05-14 20:29:47 UTC (rev 14616)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical
+
+ * weak cryptographic keys
+
+ It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+ openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
+ Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
+ result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+ See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+ http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+ If you run a Tor server using this package please see
+ /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel at debian.org> Tue, 13 May 2008 12:49:05 +0200
Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.postinst
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.postinst 2008-05-14 18:53:02 UTC (rev 14615)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_2-patches/debian/tor.postinst 2008-05-14 20:29:47 UTC (rev 14616)
@@ -61,6 +61,68 @@
fi
fi
+
+move_away_keys=0
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ] &&
+ [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] &&
+ [ ! -z "$2" ]; then
+ if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then
+ move_away_keys=1
+ fi
+fi
+if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then
+ echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys. See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz"
+ echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for"
+ echo "further information."
+ if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then
+ mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package
+ cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF
+It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
+Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
+result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package
+upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created
+in the affected timeframe. There is no sure way to automatically tell
+if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move
+is done unconditionally.
+
+If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably
+did that for you already unless you configured your system differently)
+then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all
+likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys.
+
+If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with
+a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain
+the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to
+/var/lib/tor/keys. Do not move back the onion keys, they were created
+only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few
+days anyway.
+
+Sincerely,
+Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200
+EOF
+ fi
+ for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do
+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then
+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f"
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then
+ id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key`
+ sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s`
+ if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then
+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0
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