[or-cvs] r16136: Never allow a circuit to be created with the same circid as (in tor/trunk: . src/or)

nickm at seul.org nickm at seul.org
Wed Jul 23 12:55:56 UTC 2008


Author: nickm
Date: 2008-07-23 08:55:55 -0400 (Wed, 23 Jul 2008)
New Revision: 16136

Modified:
   tor/trunk/
   tor/trunk/ChangeLog
   tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
   tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c
   tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
   tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
Log:
 r17302 at aud-055:  nickm | 2008-07-23 14:55:28 +0200
 Never allow a circuit to be created with the same circid as a circuit that has been marked for close.  May be a fix for bug 779.  Needs testing.  Backport candidate.



Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
 svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r17302] on 49666b30-7950-49c5-bedf-9dc8f3168102

Modified: tor/trunk/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/ChangeLog	2008-07-23 12:47:13 UTC (rev 16135)
+++ tor/trunk/ChangeLog	2008-07-23 12:55:55 UTC (rev 16136)
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
       or RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell. This can save a second or two
       on the client side when connecting to a hidden service. Bugfix
       on 0.0.6pre1. Found and fixed by Christian Wilms; resolves bug 743.
+    - Ensure that two circuits can never exist on the same connection
+      with the same circuit ID, even if one is marked for close.  This
+      is conceivably a bugfix for bug 779; fixes a bug on 0.1.0.4-rc.
 
   o Minor features:
     - When relays do their initial bandwidth measurement, don't limit

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c	2008-07-23 12:47:13 UTC (rev 16135)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuitbuild.c	2008-07-23 12:55:55 UTC (rev 16136)
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@
       return 0;
     }
     test_circ_id |= high_bit;
-  } while (circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(test_circ_id, conn));
+  } while (circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(test_circ_id, conn));
   return test_circ_id;
 }
 

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c	2008-07-23 12:47:13 UTC (rev 16135)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/circuitlist.c	2008-07-23 12:55:55 UTC (rev 16136)
@@ -661,6 +661,14 @@
     return circ;
 }
 
+/** Return true iff the circuit ID <b>circ_id</b> is currently used by a
+ * circuit, marked or not, on <b>conn</b>. */
+int
+circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(uint16_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn)
+{
+  return circuit_get_by_circid_orconn_impl(circ_id, conn) != NULL;
+}
+
 /** Return the circuit that a given edge connection is using. */
 circuit_t *
 circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn)

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/command.c	2008-07-23 12:47:13 UTC (rev 16135)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/command.c	2008-07-23 12:55:55 UTC (rev 16136)
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@
     return;
   }
 
-  if (circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn)) {
+  if (circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn)) {
     routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
     log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
            "Received CREATE cell (circID %d) for known circ. "

Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h	2008-07-23 12:47:13 UTC (rev 16135)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h	2008-07-23 12:55:55 UTC (rev 16136)
@@ -2623,6 +2623,7 @@
 or_circuit_t *or_circuit_new(uint16_t p_circ_id, or_connection_t *p_conn);
 circuit_t *circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(uint16_t circ_id,
                                         or_connection_t *conn);
+int circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(uint16_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn);
 circuit_t *circuit_get_by_edge_conn(edge_connection_t *conn);
 void circuit_unlink_all_from_or_conn(or_connection_t *conn, int reason);
 origin_circuit_t *circuit_get_by_global_id(uint32_t id);



More information about the tor-commits mailing list