[or-cvs] r13122: Basic hacks to get TLS handshakes working: remove dead code; (in tor/trunk: . src/or)
nickm at seul.org
nickm at seul.org
Sun Jan 13 00:20:47 UTC 2008
Author: nickm
Date: 2008-01-12 19:20:47 -0500 (Sat, 12 Jan 2008)
New Revision: 13122
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c
tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
Log:
r15891 at tombo: nickm | 2008-01-12 19:20:24 -0500
Basic hacks to get TLS handshakes working: remove dead code; fix post-handshake logic; keep servers from writing while the client is supposed to be renegotiating. This may work. Needs testing.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r15891] on d9e39d38-0f13-419c-a857-e10a0ce2aa0c
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/command.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/command.c 2008-01-13 00:20:44 UTC (rev 13121)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/command.c 2008-01-13 00:20:47 UTC (rev 13122)
@@ -461,10 +461,8 @@
end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
- if (v == 1 || v == 2) {
- if (v > highest_supported_version)
- highest_supported_version = v;
- }
+ if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
+ highest_supported_version = v;
}
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
@@ -476,20 +474,15 @@
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
-#if 0
- /*XXXX020 not right; references dead functions */
if (highest_supported_version >= 2) {
- if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0 ||
- connection_or_send_cert(conn) < 0) {
+ if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
- if (conn->handshake_state->started_here)
- connection_or_send_link_auth(conn);
} else {
- /* XXXX020 finish v1 verification. */
+ /* Should be impossible. */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
}
-#endif
}
/** Process a 'netinfo' cell. DOCDOC say more. */
@@ -577,7 +570,7 @@
if (!conn->handshake_state)
return -1;
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->authenticated != 0);
+ tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->received_versions != 0);
delta = conn->handshake_state->apparent_skew;
/*XXXX020 magic number 3600 */
@@ -607,174 +600,3 @@
return 0;
}
-#if 0
-/*DOCDOC*/
-static void
-command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
-{
- int n_certs = 0;
- uint16_t conn_cert_len = 0, id_cert_len = 0;
- const char *conn_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
- const char *cp, *end;
- int done = 0;
-
- if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got CERT cell when not handshaking. "
- "Ignoring.");
- return;
- }
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
- if (!conn->handshake_state->received_versions ||
- !conn->handshake_state->received_netinfo) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got CERT cell before VERSIONS and "
- "NETINFO. Closing the connection.");
- goto err;
- }
- if (conn->handshake_state->received_certs) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got duplicate CERT cell. "
- "Closing the connection.");
- goto err;
- }
-
- cp = cell->payload;
- end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
-
- while (cp < end) {
- uint16_t len;
- if (end-cp == 1)
- goto err;
- len = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
- cp += 2;
- if (end-cp < len)
- goto err;
- if (n_certs == 0) {
- id_cert = cp;
- id_cert_len = len;
- } else if (n_certs == 1) {
- conn_cert = id_cert;
- conn_cert_len = id_cert_len;
- id_cert = cp;
- id_cert_len = len;
- } else {
- goto err;
- }
- cp += len;
- ++n_certs;
- }
-
- /* Now we have 0, 1, or 2 certs. */
- if (n_certs == 0) {
- /* The other side is unauthenticated. */
- done = 1;
- } else {
- int r;
- r = tor_tls_verify_certs_v2(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, conn->tls,
- conn_cert, conn_cert_len,
- id_cert, id_cert_len,
- &conn->handshake_state->signing_key,
- (conn->handshake_state->started_here ?
- conn->handshake_state->server_cert_digest :
- conn->handshake_state->client_cert_digest),
- &conn->handshake_state->identity_key,
- conn->handshake_state->cert_id_digest);
- if (r < 0)
- goto err;
- if (r == 1) {
- done = 1;
- conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
- }
- }
-
- conn->handshake_state->received_certs = 1;
- if (done) {
- if (connection_or_finish_or_handshake(conn) < 0)
- goto err;
- }
- if (! conn->handshake_state->signing_key)
- goto err;
-
- return;
- err:
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
-}
-
-#define LINK_AUTH_STRING "Tor initiator certificate verification"
-
-/** DOCDOC */
-static void
-command_process_link_auth_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
-{
- or_handshake_state_t *s;
- char hmac[DIGEST_LEN];
- uint16_t len;
- size_t sig_len;
- const char *sig;
- char *checked = NULL;
- int checked_len;
- tor_assert(conn);
- if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
- "Received a LINK_AUTH cell on connection in the wrong state; "
- "dropping.");
- return;
- }
- s = conn->handshake_state;
- tor_assert(s);
- if (s->started_here) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
- "Got a LINK_AUTH cell from a server; closing the connection.");
- goto err;
- }
- if (!s->received_netinfo || !s->received_versions || !s->received_certs) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Got a LINK_AUTH cell too early; "
- "closing the connection");
- goto err;
- }
- len = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload));
- if (len < 2 || len > CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 2) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad length field (%d) on LINK_AUTH cell;"
- " closing the connection", (int)len);
- goto err;
- }
- if (cell->payload[2] != 0x00) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Unrecognized LINK_AUTH signature "
- "version; closing the connection");
- goto err;
- }
- connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(conn, hmac);
-
- tor_assert(s->signing_key);
-
- sig = cell->payload+3;
- sig_len = len-1;
- checked = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(s->signing_key));
- checked_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(s->signing_key,checked,sig,sig_len);
- if (checked_len < 0) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad signature on LINK_AUTH cell; "
- "closing the connection");
- goto err;
- }
- if (checked_len != DIGEST_LEN) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad length (%d) of signed material in "
- "LINK_AUTH cell; closing the connection", checked_len);
- goto err;
- }
- if (memcmp(checked, hmac, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Bad signed data in LINK_AUTH cell; "
- "closing the connection.");
- goto err;
- }
-
- s->authenticated = 1;
-
- if (connection_or_finish_or_handshake(conn)<0)
- goto err;
-
- tor_free(checked);
- return;
- err:
- tor_free(checked);
- connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
-}
-#endif
-
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c 2008-01-13 00:20:44 UTC (rev 13121)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection.c 2008-01-13 00:20:47 UTC (rev 13122)
@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_FLUSHING: return "proxy flushing";
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_READING: return "proxy reading";
case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: return "handshaking (TLS)";
- case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING: return "renegotiating (TLS)";
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING:
+ return "renegotiating (TLS)";
+ case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
+ return "waiting for renegotiation (TLS)";
case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING: return "handshaking (Tor)";
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: return "open";
}
@@ -1896,7 +1899,7 @@
int pending;
or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING ||
- conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING) {
+ conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING) {
/* continue handshaking even if global token bucket is empty */
return connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_conn);
}
@@ -2118,7 +2121,7 @@
conn->state > OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_READING) {
or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING ||
- conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING) {
+ conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING) {
connection_stop_writing(conn);
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_conn) < 0) {
/* Don't flush; connection is dead. */
@@ -2127,6 +2130,8 @@
return -1;
}
return 0;
+ } else if (conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING) {
+ return connection_handle_read(conn);
}
/* else open, or closing */
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2008-01-13 00:20:44 UTC (rev 13121)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/connection_or.c 2008-01-13 00:20:47 UTC (rev 13122)
@@ -584,14 +584,18 @@
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
{
or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
- char id_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ (void)tls;
- if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn,
- !tor_tls_is_server(tls),
- id_digest) < 0)
- return;
+ if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
+ /* XXXX020 double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
+ connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* XXXX020 this happens later, right? */
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, conn->_base.addr,
conn->_base.port, id_digest, 0);
+#endif
}
/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
@@ -605,10 +609,12 @@
int result;
check_no_tls_errors();
again:
- if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING)
+ if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING)
result = tor_tls_renegotiate(conn->tls);
- else
+ else {
+ tor_assert(conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
+ }
switch (result) {
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
@@ -618,7 +624,7 @@
if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
- conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING;
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
goto again;
}
} else {
@@ -626,6 +632,10 @@
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
conn);
+ conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING;
+ connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
+ connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
+ return 0;
}
}
return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
@@ -829,22 +839,18 @@
directory_set_dirty();
+ if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
+ digest_rcvd) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
conn->link_proto = 1;
- if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
- digest_rcvd) < 0)
- return -1;
if (!started_here) {
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->_base.addr,
conn->_base.port, digest_rcvd, 0);
}
return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
} else {
- if (started_here) {
- if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
- digest_rcvd) < 0)
- return -1;
- }
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING;
if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
return -1;
@@ -859,21 +865,6 @@
or_handshake_state_t *s;
s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
- if (tor_tls_get_random_values(conn->tls,
- conn->handshake_state->client_random,
- conn->handshake_state->server_random) < 0)
- return -1;
- if (started_here) {
- if (tor_tls_get_cert_digests(conn->tls,
- s->client_cert_digest,
- s->server_cert_digest)<0)
- return -1;
- } else {
- if (tor_tls_get_cert_digests(conn->tls,
- s->server_cert_digest,
- s->client_cert_digest)<0)
- return -1;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -882,10 +873,6 @@
or_handshake_state_free(or_handshake_state_t *state)
{
tor_assert(state);
- if (state->signing_key)
- crypto_free_pk_env(state->signing_key);
- if (state->identity_key)
- crypto_free_pk_env(state->identity_key);
memset(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
tor_free(state);
}
@@ -1036,21 +1023,35 @@
return 0;
}
+/**DOCDOC*/
+static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2 };
+static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
+ sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+/**DOCDOC*/
+int
+is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
+ if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
/** DOCDOC */
static int
connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn)
{
var_cell_t *cell;
- uint16_t versions[] = { 1, 2 };
- int n_versions = sizeof(versions) / sizeof(uint8_t);
int i;
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
!conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at);
- /*XXXX020 docdoc 2-byte versions */
- cell = var_cell_new(n_versions * 2);
+ cell = var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions * 2);
cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
- for (i = 0; i < n_versions; ++i) {
- uint16_t v = versions[i];
+ for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
+ uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*i), htons(v));
}
@@ -1093,115 +1094,3 @@
return 0;
}
-#if 0
-#define LINK_AUTH_STRING "Tor initiator certificate verification"
-/** DOCDOC */
-int
-connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(or_connection_t *conn,
- char *hmac_out)
-{
- char buf[64 + 2*TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN + 2*DIGEST_LEN];
- char *cp;
- or_handshake_state_t *s;
- tor_assert(conn);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
- tor_assert(conn->tls);
- s = conn->handshake_state;
-
- /* Fill the buffer. */
- strlcpy(buf, LINK_AUTH_STRING, sizeof(buf));
- cp = buf+strlen(buf);
- ++cp; /* Skip the NUL */
- memcpy(cp, s->client_random, TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN);
- cp += TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN;
- memcpy(cp, s->server_random, TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN);
- cp += TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN;
- memcpy(cp, s->client_cert_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- cp += DIGEST_LEN;
- memcpy(cp, s->server_cert_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- cp += DIGEST_LEN;
- tor_assert(cp < buf+sizeof(buf));
-
- if (tor_tls_hmac_with_master_secret(conn->tls, hmac_out, buf, cp-buf) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**DOCDOC*/
-int
-connection_or_send_cert(or_connection_t *conn)
-{
- size_t conn_cert_len = 0, id_cert_len = 0, total_len = 0;
- char *id_cert = NULL, *conn_cert = NULL;
- var_cell_t *cell;
- char *cp;
-
- /* If we're a client, we can send no cert at all. XXXXX020 */
- /* DOCDOC length of cert before cert. */
- tor_assert(conn);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->received_versions == 1);
- if (conn->handshake_state->started_here)
- conn_cert = tor_tls_encode_my_certificate(conn->tls, &conn_cert_len, 1);
- id_cert = tor_tls_encode_my_certificate(conn->tls, &id_cert_len, 0);
- tor_assert(id_cert);
- total_len = id_cert_len + conn_cert_len + conn_cert ? 4 : 2;
-
- cell = var_cell_new(total_len);
- cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
- cp = cell->payload;
- if (conn_cert) {
- set_uint16(cp, htons(conn_cert_len));
- cp += 2;
- memcpy(cp, conn_cert, conn_cert_len);
- cp += conn_cert_len;
- }
- set_uint16(cp, htons(id_cert_len));
- cp += 2;
- memcpy(cp, id_cert, id_cert_len);
- cp += id_cert_len;
- tor_assert(cp == cell->payload + total_len);
-
- connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
-
- tor_free(conn_cert);
- tor_free(id_cert);
- var_cell_free(cell);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/**DOCDOC*/
-int
-connection_or_send_link_auth(or_connection_t *conn)
-{
- cell_t cell;
- char hmac[DIGEST_LEN];
- crypto_pk_env_t *key;
- int r, len;
-
- tor_assert(conn);
- tor_assert(conn->tls);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->started_here == 1);
- tor_assert(conn->handshake_state->received_certs == 1);
-
- memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell));
- cell.command = CELL_LINK_AUTH;
- key = tor_tls_dup_private_key(conn->tls);
- connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(conn, hmac);
-
- cell.payload[2] = 0x00; /* Signature version */
- r = crypto_pk_private_sign(key, cell.payload+3, hmac, sizeof(hmac));
- crypto_free_pk_env(key);
- if (r<0)
- return -1;
- len = r + 1;
-
- set_uint16(cell.payload, htons(len));
-
- connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
-
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
Modified: tor/trunk/src/or/or.h
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2008-01-13 00:20:44 UTC (rev 13121)
+++ tor/trunk/src/or/or.h 2008-01-13 00:20:47 UTC (rev 13122)
@@ -248,14 +248,16 @@
/** State for a connection to an OR: SSL is handshaking, not done yet. */
#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING 4
/** DOCDOC */
-#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_RENEGOTIATING 5
+#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING 5
+/** DOCDOC */
+#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING 6
/** State for a connection to an OR: We're done with our SSL handshake, but we
* haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions and finished authenticating.
*/
-#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING 6
+#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING 7
/** State for a connection to an OR: Ready to send/receive cells. */
-#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 7
-#define _OR_CONN_STATE_MAX 7
+#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8
+#define _OR_CONN_STATE_MAX 8
#define _EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN 1
/** State for an exit connection: waiting for response from dns farm. */
@@ -669,16 +671,8 @@
#define CELL_CREATED_FAST 6
#define CELL_VERSIONS 7
#define CELL_NETINFO 8
-#if 0
-#define CELL_CERT 9
-#define CELL_LINK_AUTH 10
-#endif
-#define CELL_RELAY_EARLY 11 /*DOCDOC*/
+#define CELL_RELAY_EARLY 9
-#if 0
-#define CELL_COMMAND_IS_VAR_LENGTH(x) \
- ((x) == CELL_CERT || (x) == CELL_VERSIONS)
-#endif
#define CELL_COMMAND_IS_VAR_LENGTH(x) ((x) == CELL_VERSIONS)
/** How long to test reachability before complaining to the user. */
@@ -823,7 +817,7 @@
* connections. Set once we've set the stream end,
* and check in connection_about_to_close_connection().
*/
- /** Edge connections only: true if we've blocked writing until the
+ /** Edge connections only: true if we've blocked reading until the
* circuit has fewer queued cells. */
unsigned int edge_blocked_on_circ:1;
/** Used for OR conns that shouldn't get any new circs attached to them. */
@@ -895,24 +889,11 @@
unsigned int started_here : 1;
unsigned int received_versions : 1;
unsigned int received_netinfo : 1;
- unsigned int received_certs : 1;
- unsigned int authenticated : 1;
- /* from tls */
- char client_random[TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN];
- char server_random[TOR_TLS_RANDOM_LEN];
- char client_cert_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /* may also be set by netinfo */
- char server_cert_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
-
/* from netinfo */
long apparent_skew;
uint32_t my_apparent_addr;
unsigned int apparently_canonical;
-
- /* from certs */
- char cert_id_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
- crypto_pk_env_t *signing_key;
- crypto_pk_env_t *identity_key;
} or_handshake_state_t;
/** Subtype of connection_t for an "OR connection" -- that is, one that speaks
@@ -2873,6 +2854,7 @@
int connection_or_send_link_auth(or_connection_t *conn);
int connection_or_compute_link_auth_hmac(or_connection_t *conn,
char *hmac_out);
+int is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t version);
void cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dest, const cell_t *src);
void var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out);
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